


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FOUR GOSPELS

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

BY

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

AND

NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

BY

BY GEORGE CAMPBELL, D.D. F.R.S. EDINBURGH

REVISED BY ALEXANDER BALCANQUHORN, D.D.

VOL. I

WITH THE AUTHOR'S LAST CORRECTIONS

WITH NOTES BY ALEXANDER

AND

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1844

THE  
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**PRELIMINARY DISSERTATIONS,**  
AND  
NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY.

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BY GEORGE CAMPBELL, D.D. F.R.S. EDINBURGH.

<sup>1837</sup>  
Principal of the Marischal College, Aberdeen.

---

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

WITH THE AUTHOR'S LAST CORRECTIONS.

ΜΟΝΗ ΟΥΤΕΟΝ ΤΗ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ.

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# FOUR VOLUMES

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TO THE

RIGHT REV. JOHN DOUGLAS, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF CARLISLE.

MY LORD,

THE trouble you were last year so good as to take, in perusing a considerable part of this work in manuscript, and the favourable sentiments you were pleased to express of what you had got time to peruse, have emboldened me to dedicate it to your lordship. I mean not thus to bespeak your future patronage, or even approbation of the whole, when you shall become acquainted with it. That can be only as your better judgment shall direct. I well know that, if the book have no merit of its own, no patron whatever can long preserve it, or ought to preserve it, if he could, from its natural fate, oblivion. But I am happy in this opportunity of expressing to the world my gratitude for the patronage you have already bestowed both on it, and on its author. I am

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happy also to have it in my power to inscribe a work intended for promoting the best interests of mankind, the cause of truth and probity, to one who, to the satisfaction of the candid and judicious, has approved himself an able defender of the most important truths, as well as a successful detector of fraud and falsehood.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient servant,

GEORGE CAMPBELL.

ABERDEEN,  
SEPTEMBER 17, 1788.

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## PREFACE.

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IN compliance with a custom, which is not without its advantages, I purpose, in this place, to lay before the reader some account of the following work, its rise and progress, nature and design. To do so, will, perhaps, be thought the more necessary, as there have been, in this and the preceding century, many publications on the Gospels, both abroad and at home, in some or other of which, it may be supposed, that all the observations of any consequence, which can be offered here, must have been anticipated, and the subject in a manner exhausted. I am not of opinion that the subject can be so easily exhausted as some may suppose. I do not even think it possible for the richest imagination to preclude all scope for further remark, or for the greatest acuteness to supersede all future criticism. On the other hand, it must be owned possible, that a man may write copiously on a subject, without adding to the stock of knowledge provided by those who wrote before him, or saying any thing which has not been already as well, or perhaps better, said by others.

How far this is applicable to the present publication, must be submitted to the judicious and intelligent reader. In the mean time, it may be hoped that it will not be judged an unfair attempt at bespeaking his favour, to give him a brief account of the origin and preparation of the work now offered to his examination.

As far back as the year 1750, soon after I had gotten the charge of a country parish, I first formed the design of collecting such useful criticisms on the text of the New Testament, as should either occur to my own observation, or as I should meet with in the course of my reading; particularly, to take notice of such proposed alterations on the manner of translating the words of the original, as appeared not only defensible in themselves, but to yield a better meaning, or at least, to express the meaning with more perspicuity or energy. Having, for this purpose, provided a folio paper book, which I divided into pages and columns, corresponding to the pages and columns of the Greek New Testament which I commonly used, I wrote down there, in the proper place, as they occurred, such alterations on the translation as, in my judgment, tended to improve it, and could be rationally supported. And having divided the pages in the middle, I allotted the upper part of each for the version, and the lower for *scholia*, or notes containing the reasons (wherever it appeared necessary to specify reasons) of the changes introduced. In this way I proceeded many years, merely for my own improvement, and that I might

qualify myself for being more useful to the people intrusted to my care. I did not assign to this occupation any stated portion of my time, but resorted to it occasionally, when any thing occurred in reading, or offered itself to my reflections, which appeared to throw light on any passage of the New Testament.

Things proceeded in this train, till I found I had made a new version of a considerable part of that book, particularly of the Gospels. The *scholia* I had added, were indeed very brief, being intended only to remind me of the principal reasons on which my judgment of the different passages had been founded. But soon after, from a change of circumstances and situation, having occasion to turn my thoughts more closely to scriptural criticism than formerly, I entered into a minute examination of many points concerning which I had thrown together some hints in my collection. On some of the points examined, I have found reason to change my first opinion: on others I have been confirmed in the judgment I had adopted. I have always laid it down as a rule, in my researches, to divest myself, as much as possible, of an excessive deference to the judgment of men; and I think that, in my attempts this way, I have not been unsuccessful. I am even confident enough to say, that I can with justice apply to myself the words of the poet:

Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri ;

or rather the words of one much greater than he ;  
I have learnt, in things spiritual, to *call no man*

*Master upon earth.* At the same time that I have been careful to avoid an implicit deference to the judgment of any man, I have been ready to give a patient hearing, and impartial examination, to reason and argument, from what quarter soever it proceeded. That a man differs from me on some articles, has given me no propensity to reject his sentiments on other articles; neither does the concurrence of his sentiments with mine on some points, make me prone to admit his sentiments on others. Truth I have always sought (now there is no respect of persons in this pursuit): and, if a man may pronounce safely on what passes within his own breast, I am warranted to say, I have sought it in the love of truth.

It must be acknowledged that, though a blind attachment to certain favourite names has proved, to the generality of mankind, a copious source of error; an overweening conceit of their own reason has not proved less effectual in seducing many who affect to be considered as rational inquirers. In these I have often observed a fundamental mistake, in relation to the proper province of the reasoning faculty. With them, reason is held the standard of truth; whereas, it is, primarily, no more than the test or the touchstone of evidence, and, in a secondary sense only, the standard of truth. Now the difference between these two, however little it may appear, on a superficial view, is very great. When God revealed his will to men, he gave them sufficient evidence, that the information conveyed to them by his ministers, was a revelation from him. And it cannot

be justly doubted that, without such evidence, their unbelief and rejection of his ministers would have been without guilt. *The works, said our Lord, which the Father has given me to finish, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me*<sup>1</sup>. And again: *If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin*<sup>2</sup>. His works were sufficient evidence that what he taught was by commission from God; and without such evidence, he acknowledges their unbelief would have been blameless: whereas, on the contrary, having gotten such evidence, there was nothing further they were entitled to, and consequently their disbelief was inexcusable.

Some modern rationalists will say, ‘Is not ‘the subject itself submitted to the test of reason, as well as the evidence?’ It is readily granted, that a subject may be possessed of such characters as are sufficient ground of rejecting it in point of evidence, and is, therefore, in this respect, submitted to the test of reason. If any thing were affirmed that is self-contradictory, or any thing enjoined that is immoral, we have such internal evidence, that nothing of this sort can proceed from the Father of lights, and the Fountain of good, as all the external proofs which could be produced on the other side, would never be able to surmount. The proofs, in that case, might confound, but could not rationally convince, the understanding. We may, for example,

<sup>1</sup> Jo. v. 36.<sup>2</sup> Jo. xv. 24.

venture to assert, that no conceivable evidence from without, could render the theology of Hesiod or Homer, in any degree, credible. Thus far, therefore, it will be allowed, that reason is entitled to examine and judge concerning the subject itself: for there may be something in the subject that may serve as evidence, either in its favour, or against it. At the same time it must be owned that, the more the subject is above the things which commonly fall under the discussion of our faculties, the narrower is the range of our reason; insomuch that, in things so far beyond our reach, as those may be supposed to be which are conveyed by revelation from God, there is hardly any internal character that can be considered as sufficient to defeat a claim, otherwise well supported, but either, as has been said, absurdity or immorality.

Now, here lies the principal difference between the impartial seekers of truth, whose minds are unbiassed on every side, and those who, under the appearance of exalting human reason, idolize all their own conceptions and prejudices. I speak not of those who reject revelation altogether; but of those who, whilst they admit the truth of the Christian revelation in general, consider their own reason as competent to determine, and prejudge, as I may say, what it is fit for God, either to declare as truth, or to command as duty. Such people, for example, if they do not discover an useful purpose that any particular declaration in Scripture can answer, boldly conclude, in defiance of the clearest positive evi-

dence, that it is not there : if they cannot divine the intention of Providence in the production of any being, or order of beings, of which there may be frequent mention in holy writ, they infer that such being, or order of beings, notwithstanding the notice there taken of them, does not exist. They will not admit the reality of an operation, of which they do not perfectly comprehend the manner, though the former may be a matter clearly revealed in Scripture, the latter not. Now the rejection of the aid of reason altogether (the common error of fanatics of every denomination), and such a conviction as that now described of its all-sufficiency, are extremes which the judicious, but humble-minded Christian, will think it incumbent on him equally to guard against.

Indeed those deifiers of human reason, of whom I have been speaking, seem, all the while, to mistake the proper province of reason. They proceed on the supposition that, from her own native stock, she is qualified for the discovery of truth ; of all such truths, at least, as are of any consequence to a man to be acquainted with. The fact is nearly the reverse : for except those things which pass within our own minds, and which we learn solely from what is called consciousness, and except the deductions made from self-evident or mathematical axioms, all our information relating to fact, or existence of any kind, is from without. Hence all our knowledge of arts, sciences, languages ; of history, philosophy, and every thing in which human life is concerned. Do I, by this, mean to depreciate

human reason as a thing of little consequence? Far from it. Reason, I am sensible, is absolutely necessary to render us capable of that information from without, by which we are enabled to make so great progress in knowledge. For want of this power entirely, or at least in the requisite degree, how little, comparatively, is the greatest knowledge which the most sagacious of the brute creation can attain? I cannot, therefore, be justly thought to derogate from a faculty which, by my hypothesis, constitutes the radical distinction between man and beast. Would a man be understood to depreciate that admirable organ of the body, the eye, because he affirmed, that unless the world, which is without the body, furnished us with light, our eyes could be of no service to us? Reason is the eye of the mind: it is in consequence of our possessing it, that we are susceptible either of religion or of law. Now the light by which the mental eye is informed, comes also from without, and consists chiefly in testimony, human or divine.

I would recommend it, therefore, to those, who are accounted the most refined rationalists in religion, to take the trouble to reflect a little, and inquire what is the method which they, and indeed all, must follow, in the acquisition of human knowledge. In natural history, for example, how insignificant would be our progress, if our conviction were to be regulated by the same maxims by which those men seem to regulate their faith in matters of revelation? If our not knowing the use of any thing were a

sufficient reason for disbelieving its existence, how many animals, how many vegetables, how many inanimate substances, apparently useless, or even noxious, should we discard out of our systems of nature, inflexibly denying that they exist any-where, except in the disordered imaginations of men? Nor should we make greater proficiency in the other branches of science. Of nothing have we clearer evidence than of this, that by means of the food which animals swallow, life is preserved, the body is nourished, the limbs gradually advance in strength and size, to their full maturity. Yet, where is the philosopher, where is the chemist, who can explain, or will pretend to understand, the process whereby the nourishment is converted into chyle, and the chyle into blood, and the blood into skin, and flesh, and bones and sinews?

Now if, in matters of science, merely human, our ignorance of the use, in the one case, and of the manner of operation, in the other, does not preclude our belief of the fact, a belief which ultimately rests, in most cases, on the testimony of our fellow-creatures; can we think it reasonable to be more shy of admitting a fact, on the testimony of God, when, in effect, we admit that sufficient ground is given us to conclude that we have his testimony? For I do not here argue with the deniers of revelation, but with those who, professing to believe it, reject its obvious meaning. Are we better acquainted with things divine than with things human? or with things eternal than with things temporal? Our Lord, in

his conversation with Nicodemus, seemed to consider it as an acknowledged truth, that things earthly are more level to the natural capacity of man than things heavenly<sup>3</sup>. Yet how soon would an effectual stop be put to our progress in every branch, even of earthly science, were we to lay down as maxims, that the existence of any being, however well attested, whereof we cannot discover the use, is not to be believed; and that the production of an effect, if we do not comprehend the mode of operation in the cause, is incredible? The much greater part of all human knowledge, whether of things corporeal, or things spiritual, things terrestrial, or things celestial, is originally from information. Revelation means no other than information from God; and whatever human knowledge we derive from the testimony of our fellow-mortals, which is more than ninety-nine parts in a hundred of all we are possessed of, is, if I may be allowed the expression, a revelation from man. In regard to both, we ought, no doubt, in the first place, to be satisfied that we have the proper testimony: but when this point is ascertained, I think it unaccountable to reject the obvious meaning of the divine testimony (which is indirectly to reject the testimony), on grounds which no judicious person would think sufficient to warrant him in rejecting the testimony of a man of character. If ye have not satisfactory evidence, that what claims to be the testimony of God is really such, ye are no

<sup>3</sup> Jo. iii. 12.

doubt entitled to reject it. But do not first admit the testimony, and afterwards refuse your assent to what it manifestly implies; and that for such a reason as would prove no obstacle to your assent, on the information of a fellow-mortal. This is surely the reverse of what might be expected from a humble pious Christian. *For if we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater*<sup>4</sup>.

Besides, this conduct, in rejecting the obvious sense of the divine testimony, is the more inexcusable, as the circumstance on which the rejection is founded, is such as the whole analogy of nature leads us to expect, in all the works of the Creator. If, in every part of the creation, we find that there are many creatures, the purpose of whose existence we cannot investigate; and that there are hardly any natural productions, in which, though, from experience, we may discover the cause, we can trace its operation; it is but just to conclude, that this unsearchableness to human faculties, is a sort of signature impressed on the works of the Most High, and which, when found in any thing attested as from him, ought to be held, at least, a presumption in favour of the testimony.

But, though nothing can be more different from an implicit adoption of all the definitions, distinctions, and particularities of a sect, than the general disposition of the rationalist; there is often a great

<sup>4</sup> 1 Jo. v. 9.

resemblance in their methods of criticising, and in the stretches which they make for disguising the natural interpretation of the sacred text. Each is, in this, actuated by the same motive, namely, to obtrude on others that interpretation which suits his favourite hypothesis. And, if we may say of the one, that he is too foolish to be improved by teaching ; we may, with equal justice, say of the other, that he is too wise to attend to it. Revelation, surely, was never intended for such as he. Our Lord said to the Pharisees, that he came not *to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance*<sup>5</sup>. We may, with like reason, say, he came not to instruct the *learned*, but the *ignorant*. Nay he, in effect, says so himself. It was to *babes* in knowledge, not to *sages*, that the things of God were revealed by him<sup>6</sup>. The disposition of children, so often recommended as necessary for our giving a proper reception to the Gospel, and obtaining admission into the kingdom, refers as clearly to the teachable temper of children, free from prepossessions and self-conceit, as to their humility and innocence. How strongly is this sentiment expressed by the Apostle : *If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise*<sup>7</sup> ! The judicious and candid will not mistake me, as, in matters of religion, decrying the use of reason, without which, I am sensible, we cannot proceed a single step ; but as pointing out the proper application of this faculty.

<sup>5</sup> Mat. ix. 13.<sup>6</sup> Mat. xi. 25.<sup>7</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 18.

In what concerns revelation, reason has a two-fold province ; first, to judge whether what is presented to us as a revelation from God, or, which is the same thing, as the divine testimony to the truth of the things therein contained, be really such or not ; secondly, to judge what is the import of the testimony given. For the former of these, first, the external evidences of Christianity offer themselves to our examination, prophecy, miracles, human testimony ; and then the internal, arising from the character of the dispensation itself, its suitableness to the rational and moral nature of such a creature as man. As to the second point, the meaning of the revelation given ; if God has condescended to employ any human language in revealing his will to men, he has, by employing such an instrument, given us reason to conclude that, by the established rules of interpretation in that language, his meaning must be interpreted. Otherwise the use of the language could answer no end, but either to confound, or to deceive. If the words of God were to be interpreted by another set of rules than that with which the grammar of the language, founded in general use, presents us ; with no propriety could it be said, that the divine will is revealed to us, till there were a new revelation furnishing us with a key for unlocking the old. This consideration points to the necessity of the grammatical art, and of criticism, by means of which, readers, especially of a distant age and country, must arrive at the requisite proficiency in the language. As to both these, it is evident that the

sacred writers address themselves to our reason. *Why, said our Lord<sup>8</sup>, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?* And the Apostle Paul<sup>9</sup>: *I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.* With the first, the evidences of the truth of our religion, I am not here concerned. The great design of this work is, to deliver with plainness, in our own tongue, a very essential part of what was, more than seventeen centuries ago, communicated in another tongue, to the inhabitants of countries remote from ours. It was, in order the more effectually to answer this end, particularly, to remove all prejudices and prepossessions which might prove obstructions in the way, that I determined, on reflection, to add to the Version, the Preliminary Dissertations, and the Notes.

The necessary aids for acquiring the knowledge of an ancient and foreign tongue, are more or fewer, according to the circumstances of the case. The distance of time and place, and the great difference, in respect of customs, manners, and sentiments, between those to whom the sacred writers first addressed themselves, and the present inhabitants of this island, could not fail to occasion our meeting with some difficulties. And, although it cannot be justly doubted, that a good deal of light has been thrown on some points, by the labours of former critics; it can as little be denied that, by the same means, many things have been involved in greater darkness. In other critical inquiries, wherein religion is not con-

<sup>8</sup> Lu. xii. 57.

<sup>9</sup> 1 Cor. x. 15.

cerned, there is little to bias the judgment in pronouncing on what side the truth lies. But where religion is concerned, there are often, not only inveterate prejudices, but secular motives, to be surmounted, to whose influence few can boast an entire superiority. Besides, I shall have an opportunity to observe, in the sequel, that, in what relates to this subject, there has come a gradual change on the meaning of many words, consequent on the changes which have been gradually introduced into the church, in religious ceremonies, modes of government, and formularies of doctrine. Old names are given to things comparatively new, which have, by insensible degrees, arisen out of the old, and have at last supplanted them.

To trace such changes with accuracy, is an essential quality of philology. A translator, when he finds that the words used by former translators, though right at first, have since contracted a meaning different from that in which they were originally employed, sees it necessary, that he may do justice both to his author and to his subject, to substitute such terms as, to the best of his judgment, are adapted to convey those sentiments, and those only, intended by the author. When a change is made from what people have been long accustomed to, it is justly expected that the reason, unless it be obvious, should be assigned. Hence arises the propriety of *scholia*, or notes, both for vindicating the version, and for supplying further information, which, if not necessary to all, is, to most readers, highly useful. The frequent

allusions to rites, customs, and incidents, well known to the natives of the writer's country, and to his contemporaries, render such occasional illustrations, as can be given in the notes, very expedient for those of distant lands and ages. It is not on account of any peculiar obscurity in sacred writ, that more has been judged requisite in this way, with regard to it, than with regard to any other writings; but partly on account of certain peculiarities in the case, and partly on account of the superior importance of the subject. Of both these I shall have occasion to take notice in the Preliminary Dissertations. There is a further use in bringing additional light for viewing these subjects in, though we admit that the light absolutely necessary was not deficient before. To brighten our perceptions is to strengthen them; and to strengthen them, is to give them a firmer hold of the memory, and to render them more productive of all the good fruits that might naturally be expected from them. The most we can say of the best illustrations which, from the knowledge of Christian antiquity, critics have been enabled to give the sacred text, is like that which the ingenious author of *Polymetis* says, in regard to the utility of his inquiries into the remains of ancient sculpture and painting, for throwing light upon the classics. "The chief use," says he<sup>10</sup>, "I have found in this sort of study, has not been so much in discovering what was wholly unknown, as in

<sup>10</sup> Dialogue VI.

“strengthening and beautifying what was known  
“before. When the day was so much over-  
“cast just now, you saw all the same objects  
“that you do at present; these trees, that river,  
“the forest on the left hand, and those spreading  
“vales on the right: but now the sun is broke  
“out, you see all of them more clearly, and with  
“more pleasure. It shows scarce any thing that  
“you did not see before; but it gives a new life  
“and lustre to every thing that you did see.”

It cannot, however, be denied that, on this subject, many things have been advanced, in the way of illustration, which have served more to darken, than to illuminate, the sacred pages. I have great reason to think that, in my researches into this matter, I have been impartial; but, whether I have been successful, is another question: for, though partiality in the method of conducting an inquiry, sufficiently accounts for its proving unfruitful, the utmost impartiality will not always ensure success. There are more considerations which, in a work of this kind, must be taken into view, than even readers of discernment will at first have any apprehension of. Several of the changes here adopted, in translating both words and idioms, will, I know well, upon a superficial view, be judged erroneous; and many of them will doubtless be condemned as frivolous, which, it is to be hoped, will, on deeper reflection, be admitted, by well informed judges, both to be more apposite in themselves, and to render the matter treated more perspicuous.

In illustrating the principles on which some of the changes here made are founded, a great deal more, in the way of critical discussion, was found necessary, in order to do justice to the argument, than could, with propriety, be thrown into the notes. A conviction of this, first suggested the design of discussing some points more fully in preliminary dissertations. This, however, is not the only use which these discourses were intended to answer. Though there has appeared, since the revival of letters in the West, a numerous list of critics on the Bible, little has been done for ascertaining the proper, and, in some respect, peculiar, rules of criticising the sacred books; for pointing out the difficulties and the dangers to which the different methods have been exposed, and the most probable means of surmounting the one, and escaping the other. Something in this way has been attempted here. Besides, I have been the more free in applying my philological remarks in these discourses, to various passages in the other apostolical writings, as I had a more extensive view in translating, when I first engaged in it, than that to which at last I found it necessary to confine myself.

I have endeavoured, in the interpretations given, to avoid, with equal care, an immoderate attachment to both extremes, *antiquity* and *novelty*. I am not conscious that I have in any instance, been inclined to disguise the falsity of an opinion, because ancient, or, with partial fondness, hastily to admit its truth, because new. That an opinion is the opinion of the multitude is, to some, a powerful

recommendation ; to others it appears an infallible criterion of error ; to those who are truly rational it will be neither. There are, indeed, many cases wherein antiquity and universality are evidences of some importance. It has been, all along, my intention never to overlook these circumstances, where they could be urged with propriety ; for certain it is, that singularity is rather an unfavourable presumption. But I hope that, with the help of some things which are treated in the Preliminary Dissertations, the intelligent and candid reader will be convinced, that nowhere have I more effectually restored the undisguised sentiments of antiquity, than where I employ expressions which, at first sight, may appear to proceed from the affectation of novelty. I have, to the utmost of my power, observed the injunction which God gave to the Prophet Jeremiah<sup>11</sup> : I have *stood in the ways* ; I have *looked and asked for the old paths*. And if, in this research, I have, in any instances proved successful ; men of discernment will, I am persuaded, be sensible, that nowhere have I been luckier in conveying the genuine conceptions of the most venerable antiquity, than in those places which, to a superficial examination, will appear, in point of language, most chargeable with innovation. The very command, to look and to ask for the old paths, implies that it may happen that the old paths are deserted, consequently untrodden, and known, comparatively, to very few. In that case, it is manifest that the person who

<sup>11</sup> Jer. vi. 16.

would recommend them, runs the risk of being treated as an innovator. This charge, therefore, of affecting novelty, though very common, must be, of all accusations, the most equivocal; since, in certain circumstances, nothing can more expose a man to it, than an inflexible adherence to antiquity.

I may, in this work, have erred in many things: for to err is the lot of frail humanity; and no merely human production ever was, or ever will be, faultless. But I can say, with confidence, that I have not erred in any thing essential. And wherefore am I thus confident? Because I am conscious that I have assiduously looked and asked for the old paths; that I have sought out the good way; that I might, at all hazards, both walk therein myself, and recommend it to others: and because I believe the word of the Lord Jesus: *Whosoever will do the will of God, shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God*<sup>12</sup>. This I think a sufficient security, that no person, who is truly thus minded, shall err in what is essential. In what concerns the vitals of religion, rectitude of disposition goes farther, even to enlighten the mind, than acuteness of intellect, however important this may be, in other respects. But the exercise of no faculty is to be despised, that can be rendered, in any degree, conducive to our advancement in the knowledge of God. Nay, it is our duty to exert every faculty in this acquisition, as much as possible.

<sup>12</sup> Jo. vii. 17.

In an age like the present, wherein literary productions are so greatly multiplied, it is not matter of wonder that readers, when they hear of any new work, inquire about what, in modern phrase, is called the *originality* of the thoughts, and the beauties of style it possesses. The press teems daily with the labours of the learned. Plenty in this, as in every other commodity, makes people harder to be pleased: hence it happens, that authors are sometimes tempted, for the sake of gratifying the over-nice and fastidious taste of their readers, to affect paradoxes, and to say things extravagant and incredible, being more solicitous about the newness, or even the uncommonness, than about the truth, of their sentiments. Though I cannot help thinking this preference injudicious, whatever be the subject, it is highly blameable in every thing wherein religion or morals are concerned. To this humour, therefore, no sacrifice can be expected here. The principal part of the present work is translation. A translator, if he do justice to his author and his subject, can lay no claim to originality. The thoughts are the author's; the translator's business is to convey them unadulterated, in the words of another language. To blend them with his own sentiments, or with any sentiments which are not the author's, is to discharge the humble office of translator unfaithfully. In the Translation here offered, I have endeavoured to conform strictly to this obligation. As to the remarks to be found in the Dissertations and Notes, nothing was farther from my purpose than, in any instance,

to sacrifice truth to novelty. At the same time I will, on the other hand, frankly acknowledge that, if I had not thought myself qualified to throw some light on this most important part of holy writ, no consideration should have induced me to obtrude my reflections on the Public. If I have deceived myself on this article, it is, at the worst, a misfortune which appears to be very incident to authors. But, if some readers, for different readers will think differently, should find me, on some articles, more chargeable with the extreme of novelty, than with that of triteness of sentiment; I hope that the novelty, when narrowly examined, will be discovered, as was hinted above, to result from tracing out paths which had been long forsaken, and clearing the ancient ways of part of the rubbish in which, in the tract of ages, they had unhappily been involved. Those who are profoundly read in theological controversy, before they enter on the critical examination of the divine oracles, if they have the discernment to discover the right path, which their former studies have done much to prevent, and if they have the fortitude to persevere in keeping that path, will quickly be sensible, that they have more to unlearn, than to learn; and that the acquisition of truth is not near so difficult a task, as to attain a superiority over rooted errors and old prejudices.

As to the exposition of the text, where there is thought to be any difficulty, it is seldom that any thing new can be reasonably expected. If, out of the many discordant opinions of former expositors,

I shall be thought, by the judicious, to have generally chosen the best (that is, the most probable), I have attained, in regard to myself, my utmost wish. On this article, the exercise of judgment is requisite, much more than of ingenuity. The latter but too often misleads. In adopting the interpretation of any former translator or expositor, I commonly name the author, if at the time he occur to my memory; but not when the exposition has been so long, and is so generally, adopted, that it would be difficult to say from whom it originated. Let it be observed, also, that when no person is named, I do not claim to be considered as the discoverer myself. A person will remember to have heard or read a particular observation or criticism, though he does not recollect from whom, or in what book; nay, more, to reading and conversation we doubtless owe many sentiments, which are faithfully retained, when the manner wherein they were acquired is totally forgotten.

For my own part, I do not pretend to much reading in this way. I have not been accustomed to read whole commentaries. My way is (what I recommend to others, especially students), to consult them only occasionally, when, in reading, I meet with any difficulty; and not even then, till after other helps, particularly the various readings, the ancient versions, the context, and the use of the sacred writers in other passages, have been, with the aid of concordances, in vain recurred to. Some seem to make the whole study of Scripture merely an exercise of memory; in my opinion it consists much more in

the exercise of judgment and reflection. It is only thus that we can hope to attain that acuteness, and preserve that impartiality, in judging, which will secure us against calling any *man father upon earth*. In this way, we shall avail ourselves of the services of the best expositors, on different, and even opposite, sides, without subjecting ourselves to any. We may expect to meet, in all of them, with faults and imperfections: but, if I can safely reason from experience, I do not hesitate to say, that the least dogmatical, the most diffident of their own judgment, and moderate in their opinion of others, will be ever found the most judicious. Those, on the contrary, who are either the idolaters of their own reason, or blindly devoted to that of some favourite doctor, to whom they have implicitly resigned their understandings, display as often the talent of darkening a clear passage, as of enlightening a dark one. However, I am far from thinking that even such may not be sometimes consulted with advantage. Considerable abilities are often united in the same person with considerable defects. And whatever a man's prepossessions in point of opinion may be, there are some things in Scripture which cannot be said to have any relation to them. In regard to all such, it may justly be expected, that learning and talents will produce some light. There are few, therefore, who have really the advantages of literature and abilities, who, whatever be the party or system to which they have attached themselves, may not occasionally prove useful aids.

For the readings here adopted, I have been chiefly indebted to the valuable folio edition of the Greek New Testament published by Mill, and that published by Wetstein, but without blindly following the opinion of either. In the judgments formed by these editors, with respect to the true reading, they appear to be in extremes: the former often acquiesces in too little evidence, the latter requires too much. This, at least, holds in general. But whether I agree with, or differ from, either, or both of these, about any particular reading by which the sense is affected; that every intelligent reader may judge for himself, I commonly assign my reason in the notes. I do not, therefore, mean to enter farther into the subject, or examine the critical canons on which they found, or the opinions they have given on the comparative excellence of different manuscripts and versions. What has been written on this subject by Simon, Bengelius, Michaelis, and others, renders any discussion here the less necessary.

For the ancient versions, where it appeared proper, I have had recourse to Walton's Polyglot; of some, as the Syriac, the Gothic, or as it is now with greater probability accounted, the Frankish, the Anglo-Saxon, the modern Greek, and the Vulgate, I have copies, as well as of all the modern translations quoted in this work. All the late English translations of any account, I had provided. There is indeed one, or perhaps two, that I have not met with, about which, to say the truth, from the accounts I have had of their plan and method, and from some specimens, I

have not felt much solicitude. I am, however, far from saying that these may not also have their use, and be, in expressing some things, luckier than versions which are, on the whole, superior.

As to the language, particularly of the version itself, simplicity, propriety, and perspicuity, are the principal qualities at which I have aimed. I have endeavoured to keep equally clear of the frippery of Arias, and the finery of Castalio. If I have hazarded, on any occasion, incurring the censure of the generality of readers, on account of the diction, I am certain it is in those places where, from a desire of conveying neither more nor less than the exact thought of the author, I have ventured to change some expressions to which our ears have been long accustomed. But on this point I mean to say nothing further in this place. The reasons on which I have proceeded, in such alterations, are fully explained in the preliminary discourses, which I consider as so necessary to the vindication of many things in the translation, that I do not wish the judicious reader, if, in any degree, acquainted with the original, to read the Version, till he has given these Dissertations a very attentive and serious perusal.

As I have never yet seen a translation of the Bible, or of any part of it, into any language I am acquainted with, which I did not think might be, in several places, altered for the better; I am not vain enough to imagine, that the Version here presented to the Public will, by any class of readers,

be accounted faultless. Part of this work has long lain by me in manuscript; for I may justly say of it what Augustin, if I remember right, says of one of his treatises, *Juvenis inchoavi, senex edidi*. Now, in that part I have been making corrections, or at least alterations, every year; and I have no reason to doubt that, if it were to lie longer by me, I should still be altering and correcting. As I am not an implicit follower of any man, because I think no man can plead an exemption from either faults in practice, or errors in opinion; I am, at the same time, far from arrogating to myself a merit which I refuse to acknowledge in others. It is not difficult to make me distrust my own judgment, and impartially re-examine my own reasoning. I say *impartially*, because I am conscious that I have often, in this manner, revised what I had advanced, when I found it was objected to by a person of discernment; and, in consequence of the revisal, I have been convinced of my mistake. I will venture to promise, therefore, that I shall give all due attention to any criticisms or remarks, candid or uncandid, which shall be made on any part of this work. Criticisms made in an uncandid manner may, as to the matter of them, be well founded, and, on that account, deserve attention. But if there appear neither reason in the matter of the criticism, nor candour in the manner of producing it, the most prudent part in an author is to let it pass without notice.

If the language of the translation, in the third volume, shall be thought not unsuitable, and sufficiently perspicuous, I have, in what concerns the

expression, attained my principal object. The rest, I imagine, will be intelligible enough to those who are conversant in questions of Christian antiquities and criticism. Sensible of the disadvantages, in point of style, which my northern situation lays me under, I have availed myself of every opportunity of better information, in regard to all those terms and phrases, in the Version, of which I was doubtful. I feel myself under particular obligations, on this account, to one Gentleman, my valuable friend and colleague, Dr. Beattie, who, though similarly situated with myself, has, with greater success, studied the genius and idiom of our language; and of whom it is no more than justice to add, that the acknowledged purity of his own diction, is the least of his many qualifications as an author. But if, notwithstanding all the care I have taken, I shall be found, in many places, to need the indulgence of the English reader, it will not much surprise me. One who often revises and alters, will sometimes alter for the worse: and, in changing, one has not always at hand a friend to consult with. The apology which Irenæus, bishop of Lyons in Gaul, in the second century, makes for his language, in a book he published in defence of religion, appears to me so candid, so modest, so sensible, at the same time so apposite to my own case, that I cannot avoid transcribing and adopting it: “Non autem ex-  
“quires a nobis qui apud Celtas commoramur, et  
“in barbarum sermonem plerumque avocamur,  
“orationis artem quam non didicimus, neque vim  
“conscriptoris quam non affectavimus, neque orna-

“ mentum verborum, neque suadelam quam nesci-  
 “ mus : sed simpliciter et vere et idiotice, ea quæ  
 “ tibi cum dilectione scripta sunt, cum dilectione  
 “ percipies ; et ipse augeas ea penes te, ut magis  
 “ idoneus quam nos, quasi semen et initia ac-  
 “ cipiens a nobis ; et in latitudine sensus tui,  
 “ in multum fructificabis ea, quæ in paucis a  
 “ nobis dicta sunt ; et potenter asseres iis qui  
 “ tecum sunt, ea quæ invalide a nobis relata  
 “ sunt<sup>13</sup>. ”

Need I, in so late and so enlightened an age, subjoin an apology for the design itself, of giving a new translation of any part of scripture ? Yet there are some knowing and ingenious men, who seem to be alarmed at the mention of translation, as if such an attempt would sap the very foundation of the Christian edifice, and put the faith of the people in the most imminent danger of being buried in its ruins. This is no new apprehension. The same alarm was taken so early as the fourth century, when Jerom was employed in preparing a new translation of the Bible into Latin ; or, at least, in making such alterations and corrections on the old Italic, as the original and the best Latin manuscripts should appear to warrant. The people in general exclaimed ; and even the learned were far from applauding an attempt which, in their judgment, was so bold and so dangerous. I do not allude to the abuse thrown out by Ruffinus, because he was then at variance with Jerom on another account ; but even men, who were

<sup>13</sup> Adversus Hæreses, lib. i. Prefatio.

considered as the lights of the age, were not without their fears. Augustin, in particular, who admired the profound erudition of Jerom, and had a high esteem of his talents, yet dreaded much, that the consequence of such an undertaking would prove prejudicial to the authority of Scripture ; and did not hesitate to express his disapprobation in very strong terms. That interpreter, however, persevered, in spite of the greatest discouragements, the dissuasion of friends, the invectives of enemies, and the unfavourable impressions which, by their means, were made upon the people. The version was made and published : and those hideous bugbears of fatal consequences, which had been so much descanted on, were no more heard of.

Luckily, no attempt was made to establish the new version, by public authority. Though Damasus, then bishop of Rome, was known to favour it, the attempt to obtrude it upon the people, would probably have awaked such a persecution against it, as would have stifled it in the birth. On the contrary, its success was left entirely, as it ought to be, to the efficiency of its own merit. In consequence of this, the prejudice very soon subsided : many of those who were at first declared enemies of the undertaking, were entirely reconciled to it. Augustin, himself, came to be convinced that it was guiltless of those horrors which his warm imagination had foreboded. Nay, he did not scruple to recur to it for aid, in explaining the Scriptures. The version, thus quietly introduced about the end of the fourth, or

the beginning of the fifth, century, and left to its fate, to be used by those who liked it, and neglected by those who disliked it, advanced in reputation every day. The people very soon, and very generally, discovered that, along with all the simplicity they could desire, it was, in every respect, more intelligible, and, consequently, both more instructive, and more agreeable, than the old. The immediate effect of this general conviction, was greatly to multiply the copies, which proved, in a very few centuries, the total extinction of the Italic, formerly called the Vulgate, version, and the establishment of the present Vulgate, or Jerom's translation in its room. To make this sudden revolution, which is a matter of so much importance, better understood by the unlearned, it is proper to observe, that it was in consequence of no law of the church, or indeed of any Christian country, that the old Italic first, and the present Vulgate afterwards, were used in churches in the offices of religion. Such matters were regulated in every individual church, by the bishop and presbyters of that church, as appeared most for the edification of the people. Now the general and growing reputation of the new version, made it soon supplant the old. As it was not to any law of church or state, that the Italic owed its promotion at first; so it required no law of either, to make it give place, quietly, to a better version. After this of Jerom had come gradually to obtain every where the preference, and to be used in private families, by individuals, it might be expected that so general an approbation

would gradually usher it into the churches. For an authoritative sentence, of either pope or council, in favour of any translation, was a thing unheard of till the sixteenth century, when the decree of the council of Trent was obtained in favour of the present Vulgate. Now, the Vulgate, we may observe, by the way, had been, for ages before, by the tacit consent of all ranks, in full possession of all the prerogatives conferred by that council.

But, though the introduction of a new translation produced none of those terrible consequences which had been presaged; though, on the contrary, by rendering the style of Scripture purer, as well as more perspicuous, it came soon to be read by the people with greater pleasure and improvement; yet it must be owned, that the clamour and jealousies that had been raised on this subject, were productive of one very unfavourable effect upon the interpreter. Though it did not make him desist from his undertaking, it made him prosecute it with a timidity which has proved hurtful to the work itself. Many things which, by the old interpreter, had been improperly rendered; many things which had been obscurely, or even unintelligibly, expressed, Jerom, through dread of the scandal which too many changes might occasion, has left as he found them. We have, therefore, the utmost reason to conclude, that to this cause alone it is imputable, that the present Vulgate is not greatly superior to what we find it. Jerom was strongly impressed with a sense of the danger to which his attempt exposed him. This

appears from many parts of his writings; particularly from his letter to pope Damasus, prefixed to the translation of the Gospels: "*Periculosa presumptio,*" says he, "*judicare de cæteris, ipsum ab omnibus judicandum: senis mutare linguam, et canescentem mundum ad initia retrahere parvulorum. Quis, enim, doctus pariter vel indoctus; cum in manus volumen assumpserit; et a saliva quam semel imbibit, viderit discrepare, quod lectitat; non statim erumpat in vocem, me falsarium, me clamans esse sacri-legum, qui audeam aliquid in veteribus libris, addere, mutare, corrigere.*"

How dismal were the apprehensions which were entertained immediately after the Reformation, on account of the many translations of Scripture which came in quick succession, one after another? Have men's fears been justified by the effect? Quite the reverse. The violent concussion of parties at the Reformation produced, as might have been expected, a number of controversies, which were, for some time, hotly agitated; but the greater part of these were in being before those versions were made. And if a few have arisen since, many have subsided, which once made a great noise, and produced a great ferment in the church. Nothing will be found to have conduced more to subvert the dominion of the metaphysical theology of the schoolmen, with all its interminable questions, cobweb distinctions, and wars of words, than the critical study of the sacred Scriptures, to which the modern translations have not a little contributed. Nothing has gone farther to satisfy

reasonable men that, in many of the profound disputes of theologians, revelation could not, with justice, be accused of giving countenance to either side. Yet no disputes have been productive of more rancour in the disputants, or been carried on with greater virulence, than those which are merely verbal.

It has been said, that the introduction of different translations tends to unsettle men in their principles, particularly with regard to the authority of sacred writ, which, say they, is made to speak so variously in these productions. For my part, I have not discovered, that this is, in any degree, the effect. The agreement of all the translations, as to the meaning, in every thing of principal consequence, makes their differences, when properly considered, appear as nothing. They are but like the inconsiderable variations in expression which different witnesses, though all perfectly unexceptionable, employ in relating the same fact. They rather confirm men's faith in Scripture, as they show, in the strongest light, that all the various ways which men of discordant sentiments have devised, of rendering its words, have made no material alteration, either on the narrative itself, or on the divine instructions contained in it. People are at no loss to discover, that the difference among interpreters lies chiefly in this, that one renders the account of things, which that book exhibits, more intelligible, more perspicuous, or even more affecting, than another. These differences are, I acknowledge, of great moment to readers; they are such as may show one version to be greatly superior to another in point of use; yet as they are all

compatible with justness of representation in every thing essential to the historical and didactic parts of the work, they are so far from affecting the credibility of the whole, that they serve not a little to confirm it. A gentleman, who knows neither Greek nor Hebrew, but understands Latin, and several modern tongues, told me once, he had read the New Testament in different languages, and that he had reaped considerable benefit from the practice, in more ways than one; particularly in this, that those versions served as vouchers for the fidelity of one another, by their concurrence in every thing essential in that book; for when it was considered that the translators were not only men of different nations, but of hostile sects, Roman Catholics, church of England-men, Lutherans, Calvinists, Remonstrants, &c. their perfect harmony on all material points, is the best pledge we could desire of their veracity.

Of nearly the same kind and consequence have been the fears which even judicious men have entertained about the publication of the various readings of the Scriptures. These readings are tremendous only, when considered in a general view, and when we are told of the number they amount to. Nothing serves more to undeceive us, than to consider them in detail, and fairly examine those collections. I will acknowledge, for one, that I believe I should not have been easily persuaded till I made the experiment, that the authority of Scripture could be so little injured by them. The actual collection is, therefore, of great consequence, for satisfying candid and reasonable

men, that there is nothing in them so formidable, as the vague and general representations of their number and weight would lead men to conclude. Now, if such a man as Dr. Whitby, a man of distinguished learning and abilities, was alarmed at Mill's publication, as dangerous to the cause, not only of Protestantism, but of Christianity itself; we need not be surprised, that men of inferior talents, and less acquainted with the science of criticism, should look on the edition of the Old Testament by Kennicott, or of the New by Mill, or by Wetstein, as, at least, a very hazardous experiment. Yet, now that the experiment has been made, is there any appearance of those evils which have been dreaded from it? I am not sensible that there is. It is true, that Kennicott's publication of the Old Testament is so recent, that we have scarcely yet had time to discover its consequences; but if we may judge from the reception given to the New, we have no ground to fear them. Mill's work has been now in the hands of the Public for more than half a century, and Wetstein's for not much less. Yet it is not in my power to discover that, in the judgment of any reasonable man, or even in the judgment of the people, the cause of Christianity has suffered by these publications. I know that the most enlightened readers have judged them to be, in many respects, of service to the cause: and the opinion of the most enlightened, where there is no interference of secular motives, or of violent measures, will always prove at last the opinion of the generality.

Soon after Mill's edition appeared, which was about the beginning of the present century, the various readings of the New Testament became a topic for declamation to sceptics and freethinkers. There needed but a little time, in which men might canvass those variations, to convince every person who reflected, that there was nothing terrible in the case. Accordingly, he would now be deemed but a sorry advocate for the infidel hypothesis, who should have recourse to an argument which, if allowed to have any validity, would subvert our belief in all history whatever, as well as in that of the Gospel; for the writings of the Old and New Testament have not been exposed to more hazards from transcribers, than other ancient writings. Now, if any one should say, We can believe nothing in ancient history, on account of the variations to be found in the different editions and manuscripts of the different authors, no man of common sense would think him fit to be argued with. Yet there is one reason (without recurring to a miraculous interposition) to think, that we have more security of a faithful transmission of the Scriptures, than of any composition merely human. The supposed sacredness of the former, serves as a guard to them, and makes at least the greater part of transcribers afraid to take those freedoms with them which they would, without scruple, take with other writings. The excessive, nay, even superstitious, scrupulosity, which has given rise to so many absurdly literal versions of Scripture, is a strong presumption of the truth of what I say.

Those who consider religion as no other than a political engine, have reason, I own, to be alarmed. But those, on the contrary, who are persuaded that the religion of Jesus is founded in truth, and consequently divine, are inexcusable in their fears of canvassing it as much as possible. It is falsehood, not truth; it is guilt, not innocence, which studiously excludes the light, and flies examination. This our reason teaches; this our religion also teaches. *For whosoever doth evil, saith our Lord<sup>14</sup>, hateth the light, and shunneth it, lest his deeds should be detected. But he who obeyeth the truth, cometh to the light, that it may be manifest that his actions are agreeable to God.* Fears of this kind, in these latter ages (for from the beginning they were not), originated with the Romanists. The Protestants thought they saw clearly the reason of their apprehensions on this subject, and were not surprised at them. The measures employed by the party were all of a piece, and not badly suited to the end they had in view. Such were their *index expurgatorius*, their inquisitions, their licensers of books, their prohibitions, and other methods, for discouraging translations of the Scriptures, and for preventing the people's becoming acquainted with them. Of such measures the secret springs, as well as the manifest tendency, furnished ample matter of declamation to the adversaries of the Romish establishment.

It is not with pleasure that I add, but impartiality obliges me, for it is too true, that when

<sup>14</sup> Jo. iii. 20, 21.

matters in any place took such a turn, as to throw the secular power into the hands of any party of such adversaries ; those of that party too often betrayed a propensity to recur to some of the measures they had before so universally and so loudly reprobated. We may, however, now, with some confidence, affirm, that it is rather too late a period in the age of the world to think of such odious expedients. By the invention of printing, and by the many discoveries and improvements which have extended the intercourse of nations, the acquisition of knowledge is, at present, so much facilitated and accelerated, in all civilized countries, that it will not be checked in its progress, nor will truth be overborne, by those expedients which were found fully sufficient for the purpose formerly. Nay, so evident is this become, that even that formidable power, which so long made ignorance a principal engine of government, seems compelled, at length, to shift her ground, and to appear among the foremost in patronizing what must conduce to the furtherance of knowledge.

It is little more than two centuries since the authenticity of the Vulgate version was formally affirmed, by a decree of the council of Trent. Immediately after that sentence, it appears to have been the prevalent opinion of zealous Romanists, that that translation ought to be considered as inspired, and consequently as absolutely faultless. On this account, the champions of the party did not hesitate to exalt it far above the original, which, though they acknowledged to have been inspired, they affirmed to have been, since

that time, miserably corrupted, in passing through the hands of collators and copists. In about a century after, how much more moderate the opinions, even of Romanists, were become, appears sufficiently from what we are informed of, on this subject, in Simon's Critical History. The high style, so common with theologians, and former controvertists, was heard no more. All moderate and judicious Romanists were ashamed of it. The prevalent opinion of such was then, what no reasonable Protestant will dissent from at this day, that, in every thing essential to the faith and practice of a Christian, it was a good version, and might be safely used. "*Opinionum commenta delet dies.*" Let not the hand of power interfere; let there be neither bribes nor terrors, to bias the mind on either side; and men of the most opposite factions will soon become reasonable, and learn to understand one another. Free and fair discussion will ever be found the firmest friend to truth. At the time I speak of, the most moderate of the Roman Catholic party were, however, convinced that, in deference to the council's declaration, every true son of the church, who, for the use of the people, purposed to translate the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, ought to translate from the Vulgate version only. What, then, would those people have thought of a new translation into Latin, by one of their own priests, from the original Hebrew and Greek? They had some specious grounds, I acknowledge, for considering it as presumptuous, at least in the appearance which it has, of setting up the opinion of an indi-

vidual, in opposition to the declared judgment of the church. Yet in little more than half a century after the publication of the Critical History, another priest of the oratory undertook, and, with the pope's approbation, executed, a new translation of the Old Testament from the original into Latin, in which he corrects the errors of the Vulgate, with as much freedom as any candid Protestant could have done. Is there not reason, then, to say, that Rome seems to have changed her measures? How great was the encouragement which was given lately by the most eminent personages in that church, to the labours of an English Protestant, who undertook to give the Public a more correct edition of the Hebrew Scriptures, with the various readings, than the Christian world had enjoyed before?

But if Rome, from whatever motive it may arise, shall now, at length, judge it proper to contribute to the advancement of knowledge, and assist in furnishing the world with light and information; is it incumbent on Protestants, in opposition to all their former maxims, to do their utmost to withhold the light, and involve matters, as much as possible, in darkness? Might it not, in that case, be justly concluded, that they were actuated, not by the love of truth, but by the spirit of faction; and that they had become, at last, enemies to the light, finding, upon further inquiry, that the light was no friend to their cause? As no judicious Protestant can seriously think that there is ground for suspecting this, let not any one act as if he suspected it. If there

were ground for suspicion, this itself would be an additional reason for inquiry ; unless we are absurd enough to be more attached to a sect than to truth ; and to have more of that bigotry, and implicit faith, which are of the essence of superstition, than we have of genuine religion, which is ever found a reasonable service, and as completely amiable as the other is hateful.

Yet, is there not, even in some who are the friends of truth, and the friends of freedom, who, in religion, as in other matters, would give scope to inquiry and communication ; a sort of jealousy, on the article of translation, which makes them less equitable, less candid, judges, in regard to it, than in regard to any other matter that comes under their discussion ? They are jealous for the honour of the common version ; and though they are far from ascribing any supernatural power to the translators, they are afraid of the detection of any error which might make that version sink in the opinion of the people. ‘ This,’ say they, ‘ could not be productive of a good effect, either ‘ on the faith of the nation, or on their practice ; ‘ for, as the people cannot be supposed nice in distinguishing ; their Bible, and their religion, are ‘ to them the same thing. By discrediting the ‘ one, you injure the other ; and, by introducing ‘ questions about the proper rendering of a passage, you weaken the effect of the whole.’ As there is some plausibility in this method of arguing, I beg leave to offer a few more thoughts on the subject.

In every question relating to fact, where experience may be had, our safest recourse is to experience. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, many Latin translations of the Bible, of very different characters, have been published. Can we justly say that, by means of these, the authority of Scripture, among those who do not understand the original, but are readers of those versions, has been weakened, and scepticism has been promoted? I do not think that, with any shadow of reason, this can be asserted. If people will but reflect, they will soon be sensible, that it is not among the readers of Scripture, either in the original, or in translations, that those evils chiefly abound. But there are many other species of reading, and many other causes to be traced, by which the effects above mentioned may be amply accounted for. To me it is evident, that of all sorts of reading and study, that of the Scriptures is the most innocent of those evil consequences. So the sacred writers, themselves, have thought, by whom this reading is often and warmly recommended, and not only reading the Scriptures, but searching into them, and meditating on them. Now, those who seriously comply with these injunctions, will never reject any aid by which they may be enabled to discover what lies deeper than the surface; so, also, have thought those pious men celebrated in Scripture, as having drawn much profit and delight from this exercise. I would not say so much for the reading of theological controversy; yet I would not that men, who liked this species of reading, were restrained from

using it. The accidental bad consequences which may accrue to individuals, from any literary pursuit, are of no consideration, compared with the general advantage resulting from the liberty of search, and free communication of knowledge. No person would think it better for the world that all men were enslaved, because some men make a very bad use of their freedom.

On the first publication of Erasmus' translation of the New Testament into Latin, much offence was taken by many, and dismal apprehensions were entertained of the hurt it would do to the cause of religion and Christianity. Even men who were esteemed both moderate and judicious, seemed to think that it was, at least, a hazardous experiment. The experiment, however, has been tried, not only by him, but by several others since his time. Yet there is not one, as far as I can learn, who has pretended to deduce from that, or any other translation, the irreligion and incredulity of the times.

To come to our own case; Have the attempts which have been made in this island, I may almost say, since the days of Wickliff, to translate the Scriptures into English, ever been found to lessen their authority? I have not heard this affirmed by any body. Yet every new version altered, and pretended to correct, many things in those which had preceded. But whatever may be the private judgment of individuals, concerning the comparative merit of the different translations, we cannot discover any traces of evidence, that their number did, in the smallest degree,

derogate from the veneration for holy writ generally entertained by the people. Against the common translation, in use at present, which was made and authorized in the beginning of the reign of James the First, there were precisely the same exceptions taken, founded in the like apprehensions of pernicious consequences. Whoever will consult the preface of that translation, and read the paragraph which is titled on the margin, *The speeches and reasons both of our brethren and of our adversaries against this work*; will be surprised to find how much they coincide with what has been thrown out, of late, against any new attempt of the same kind. It is remarkable that, from the days of Jerom to the present, the same terrible forebodings have always accompanied the undertaking, and vanished on the execution, inso-much that the fatal effects predicted, have never afterwards been heard of.

Now, to take the matter in another view; the cause assigned is nowise adequate to the effect. If the different ways of rendering one passage may make the unlearned doubtful with regard to the meaning of that passage, the perfect harmony of the different interpreters, as far as regards the sense, in many more passages; nay, I may justly say, in every thing that can be considered as essential in the history and doctrine, serves as the strongest confirmation of these in particular. The different translators are like so many different touchstones. Those truths which can stand such numerous trials, are rendered quite indubitable. I know not any, even of the common people,

that are possessed of an ordinary measure of understanding, who need to be told, that it is in the meaning, and not in the sound, that the doctrine of the Gospel lies : or, as the English translators have well expressed it : “ Is the kingdom of God “ become words or syllables ? Why should we “ be in bondage to them, if we may be free ? ” When people find those translations, though differing in words, yet, in every thing material, agreeing in sense, they prove to them, as was hinted before, like so many different witnesses, each in his own style, and in his own manner, attesting the same things, the great truths of our religion. They are witnesses, who perfectly agree in the import of their testimony : their differences in expression, far from derogating, in the judgment of any sensible reader, from their veracity, serve to establish it, and, consequently, prove confirmations of the facts attested. Various translations are, therefore, upon the whole, much better calculated for confirming, than for weakening, the faith of the unlearned.

Has the margin, in the English Bible, which, in a very great number of passages, gives every reader his choice of different translations, ever been found to endanger the faith of the people ? or, has it ever been suggested to have the same tendency with the arguments of deists ? Yet what should more readily, upon the principles of those gentlemen, with whom I am arguing, have produced this effect, than the confession (for their margin manifestly implies no less) of those learned men who were employed in the work, of the nu-

merous doubts which they had to encounter in the execution. They have honestly told their doubts, and, as far as I know, were never suspected of having done any hurt to the cause, by this ingenuous conduct. On the other hand, I am sorry to observe men of knowledge, discernment, and probity, appearing in support of measures which seem to proceed on the supposition, that a sort of disingenuous policy must be used with the people, for the defence of the truth. However necessary dissimulation and pious frauds, as they are called, may be for the support of false, I have never seen them of any service to true, religion. If not treacherous, they are dangerous, allies, at the best.

That one version expresses the sentiment more intelligibly, more perspicuously, or more emphatically, than another, will indeed occasion its being read with more pleasure, and even more profit; but it will never, on that account, be considered, by any, as giving a contradictory testimony. Yet it is such opposition of evidence that is the only circumstance which can affect the veracity of holy writ, and, consequently, the credit given to it by the people. And surely, whatever can, on the contrary, be rendered conducive to the emolument of the reader, cannot be prejudicial to the cause of religion, or disrespectful to the word of God, which does not consist in the words of any translation, but in the dictates of the divine Spirit.

The words of a translation that has long been in common use, have an advantage, of which they

cannot be of a sudden divested. The advantage results from this very circumstance, that it has been long in general use, and men are familiarized to its expressions. But, notwithstanding this, it may have considerable faults; it may, in several places, be obscure; and, though it should very rarely convey a false sense, it may be often ambiguous. In this case, a new version will be of great utility, if it were but for rendering the old more intelligible. For my part, I shall think my labour more than sufficiently recompensed, if, by the pious and the impartial, I shall be judged to express no extravagant opinion, and to form no presumptuous hope, when I say, in the words which Erasmus employed on a similar occasion: “*Illa [Vulgata editio] legatur in scholis, canatur in templis, citetur in concionibus, nullus obstat. Illud ausim polliceri, quisquis hanc nostram domi legerit, suam rectius intellecturus*”<sup>15</sup>.”

Some, perhaps, are ready to interpose, ‘If translations were to be used only as private helps for understanding the scriptures, as commentaries and paraphrases are used, they would not be objected to: but what has alarmed the minds of men, is that, of late, some attempts have been made to persuade the public of the need there is for a new and more correct translation of the Bible, with the sanction of the higher powers, for the use of churches.’ As to any project of this kind, I can say very little, as I know not, in particular, what is projected: at the same

<sup>15</sup> *Erasm. in Apolog.*

time I must acknowledge that, in the general view, it appears to me a very delicate point. To establish a version of Scripture by human authority, to be used by the people (without any regard had to their sentiments) in the public service of God, to the express exclusion of every other version, is a measure, about the propriety of which, at any time, I am far from being satisfied. The public use of particular translations of the Bible in the churches, Oriental and Occidental, for many centuries, took its rise, solely, from the general use in private: and, to this private use, no doubt, the favourable opinion of the pastors, such, especially, as were eminent for piety and learning, greatly contributed. But then, the effect was produced gradually and tacitly; in consequence of which, it appeared the result of the people's free choice, though not formally declared, well enough understood. It was in this way, certainly, that the old Italic first came into use in the Latin church; and it was in this way, from the growing predilection of the people, that the present Vulgate came at length to supplant it. It was fortunate for the success of Jerom's version, that no sanguine patron stood forth to push it into notice, and that no law was made commanding its reception, and prohibiting the public use of the Italic. Though men's opinions and attachments, even in matters which do not so deeply affect them as religion, cannot, at the command of a superior, be changed in a moment, the same effect will often, by proper means, be produced in a gentle and gradual manner. When the Italic

was first introduced, there was probably no other Latin translation of any account. In consequence of this, and of that desire of religious instruction, which universally animated the primitive Christians, they would receive it with joy. To read it to them, would be highly to gratify them; for we ought to reflect, that books were then matters of very difficult acquirement, compared to what they are now. But when the introduction of one book was the dispossession of another, to which they had been long accustomed, and were, from habit, warmly attached, the case was very different. Yet even this effect, which, it is probable, would not have been produced by stronger measures, was silently, and (as it were) imperceptibly, brought about by time. If, in some places, tumults were occasioned by the change, this, I suspect, when impartially examined, will be found imputable, more to the rashness and imprudence of the pastors, than to any want of docility in the people. Immediately after the Reformation, the opportunity was very favourable for procuring, among those who favoured the measures of the Reformers, a welcome reception to any version of the Bible into the vulgar tongue, which had the approbation of the heads of the party. If gratified in the thing chiefly wanted, they would not be critical as to the mode of introduction; and if, from the changes in their rulers, there had been some changes in relation to the Scriptures to be read in the congregation; what was established, in some places, was of so short continuance, that

the mind could hardly be said to be preoccupied by it.

But the case, at present, is widely different. Learning is in more hands. Critics are multiplied. The press is open; and every cavil, as well as every argument, is quickly circulated. Besides, the prepossession, in favour of the translation to which we have been so long habituated, is, at this day, very strong. Add to all this, that the religious, as well as the civil, rights of mankind were never better understood; the genuine principles of toleration had never greater influence. How, then, should we be affected, upon hearing that we are commanded, under pains and penalties, by our superiors, to read, and cause to be read in our churches, such a particular translation of the Bible only, and never more to admit into the sacred service, that version to which we have been hitherto, all our lives, accustomed, and for which we have contracted a high veneration. For my part, I will not dissemble the matter; I should think such a measure exceedingly incongruous to the spirit of that religion which the legislators, perhaps, intended to serve by it; and no less unseasonable, in respect of the age and country wherein we live. I perfectly agree with Tertullian, that religion, and coercion of any kind, are utterly incompatible. "*Hu-*  
"*mani juris et naturalis potestatis est, unicuique*  
"*quod putaverit, colere.*" Again: "*Nec reli-*  
"*gionis est cogere religionem, quæ sponte suscipi*  
"*debeat, non vi.*" I cordially subscribe to the sentiment of Lactantius, who deems it essential

to the value of every thing in religious service, in respect both of the object, and of the mode, that it be voluntary : “ *Nihil est tam voluntarium quam religio, in qua si animus sacrificantis aversus est, jam sublata, jam nulla est.*” Nor does it make any difference in the nature of the thing, whether the power that would compel us, be called civil or ecclesiastical.

But, is there nothing, then, which can, with propriety, be attempted by the higher powers, spiritual or temporal, for promoting the success of an accurate translation of the Bible ? The utmost which, in my judgment, can be done, if such a version should, in any future period, be offered to the Public, is to remove the obstructions which those powers have heretofore raised to prevent its introduction, and to permit, not command, the use of it, wherever it shall be found agreeable to the people, and judged, by the pastors, to be edifying. In the reign of Christian charity, which subsisted in times truly primitive and apostolical, it was not necessary that the limits of jurisdiction and authority should be so accurately ascertained, as afterwards, when love began to give place to ambition and secular prospects. Esteem and love are unsuspicious. In such a state of things, the opinion of no persons would go so far with the congregation, as that of their pastors ; nor would the pastors know any motive so powerful, as that of contributing to the edification of the people. ‘ But,’ it will be objected, ‘ to leave things in this manner, ‘ would appear like giving a sanction to different

‘ translations at the same time.’ If it should, I can perceive no absurdity in such a sanction ; no evil consequence that would follow from it. In fact, would it be any more, with respect to the whole Bible, than that which has long obtained in England, with regard to one considerable book, the Psalms, of which two very different versions, one in the Bible, the other in the Common Prayer, have equally the sanction of the higher powers? Are the people ignorant of this difference? Those who know any thing of the religion of the country, who read their Bible at home, and attend the service of the church, know it perfectly. Yet I have not heard that any private Christian was scandalized at it ; much less, that any one pretended to deduce, from this cause, the libertinism and infidelity of the times. Yet, in no part of Scripture would the people have so many opportunities of remarking the variations, as in that book, which they hear in church not seldomer than twelve times a year. So much cannot be said of any other part of the sacred volume, the New Testament being read over only thrice a year, and the Old Testament but once. If the people were so easily alarmed, as some seem to imagine, how has it happened, that the striking difference between the two authorized translations above mentioned, have not, long ere now, raised a clamour, either against the common translation, or against the Common Prayer ?

I should not have thought it necessary to say any thing on this head, if the subject had not been started, of late, and warmly agitated (I believe

with the best intentions on both sides), by some learned and worthy men. As my sentiments, on the subject, do not entirely coincide with those of either party, I thought it incumbent to add the explanation now given. The publishing of a new translation is not to be considered as implying a condemnation of any that preceded. This was objected to those employed by James the First, in preparing the translation used at present; and the reply which those translators made to their opponents in this business, as it had served Jerom before them, and served them, will equally serve me, or any translator, who shall afterwards bestow his time and labour in the same way. “We answer them,” say they, “with St. Hierom, *Do we condemn the ancient? In no case; but, after the endeavours of them that were before us, we take the best pains we can in the house of God.* As if he said, Being provoked, by the example of the learned, that lived before my time, I have thought it my duty to assay whether my talent, in the knowledge of the tongues, may be profitable; in any measure, to God’s church, lest I should seem to have laboured in them in vain, and lest I should be thought to glory in men (although ancient) above that which was in them.” So said those worthy men, who, as they did not think themselves precluded from making improvements on the valuable labours of their predecessors, show, sufficiently, that they did not consider their own labours as superseding all attempts at still farther

improvements, by those who should come after them.

The due consideration of the progressive state of all human knowledge and art, will ever be unfriendly to the adoption of any measure which seems to fix a barrier against improvement, and to say to science, *Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther*. And if, in matters merely of science, such measures would prove hurtful, how much more in any thing wherein religion is concerned? My opinion, therefore, on this question, I freely acknowledge, favours the removal of all legal restraints, as much as possible, and not barely the change of the object. Indeed, this will be found the natural result of the argument, as it has heretofore been conducted. There is not a topic, which the present adversaries of an improved translation in English employ now, which was not, with the same plausibility, employed against Jerom's Latin translation, called the Vulgate, at present in universal use in the Latin church, and which was not also employed against the English translation of James the First, that very version for which our adversaries, on this article, now so strenuously contend. On the other hand, there was not any plea, which Jerom urged in support of his attempt, or which the English translators urged in support of theirs, that will not equally serve the purpose of any present or future well-meant attempt of the like kind, and, consequently, that does not strike against every measure which might effectually preclude any such attempt in time to come.

There are only two differences, in point of circumstances, between us and the inhabitants of this island, in the beginning of the last century, which impartiality obliges me to mention, and which (as they render more delicacy requisite in these days, than was necessary in those), if attended to, may prevent men from concluding too hastily, that those measures cannot fail of success now, which have succeeded formerly. Though some versions had been publicly authorized before that of James the First, none of them had been of near so long standing as that which is in use at present; and, consequently, the people's attachment to any one of them, was not so much strengthened by habit, as the present attachment to the English Bible may be supposed to be. An alteration, therefore, in respect of the public use, might be a much more difficult attempt now than it was then. The other difference arises from the consideration, that the spirit of liberty is much higher, at present, in the nation, than it was at that period; the rights of conscience are better understood, and the absurdity, as well as tyranny, of employing coercion, in matters of religion, are almost universally acknowledged.

All these considerations, whilst they give the utmost encouragement to the study of biblical criticism, show sufficiently, in a matter which so nearly affects the rights of conscience, the danger of all measures that can be justly accounted compulsory. For my own part, it is enough for me, that common sense assures me, that, if God condescends to speak to us mortals, it is our

duty to attend to what he says ; and if, in any writing, he has revealed his will to us, it is our duty carefully to read that writing, and do our utmost rightly to understand it. The language of the Christian revelation, we quickly see, concurs with that of reason, in enjoining this practice ; nay, it excites us still more strongly, by the example it sets before us, of those who have found much comfort and improvement in it. Can I require stronger motives to induce me to make God's word the subject of my study and meditation, day and night ? And if I have reason to think that, by the blessing of Heaven, I have been, in some measure, successful in this application of my time, does not our common Christianity, one of the great commandments of which is, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*, oblige me, for the benefit of others, to communicate any lights I may have received from this exercise ? When they are communicated, I have discharged a Christian duty. The reception will be such as it pleases Providence to give them.

Though, in these volumes, I have not affirmed any thing, as my opinion, which did not at the time, and does not still, appear to me probable ; and though many things, in them, appear certain, I desire nothing to be admitted, by the reader, upon my affirmation : my wish is, that every thing may be candidly and deliberately examined ; that my reasons, which I commonly give, where the subject requires it, may be impartially weighed, and the opinion adopted, or rejected, as the reader, on due reflection, shall find cause. If to

make proselytes by the sword, is tyranny in rulers, to resign our understanding to any man, and receive, implicitly, what we ought to be rationally convinced of, would be, on our part, the lowest servility. Now, *tyranny* and *servility*, how much soever adapted to the genius of worldly domination, are by no means suited to the heavenly character of Christ's kingdom. The only means the Gospel itself permits us to employ, for promoting this spiritual power, is *persuasion*, which operates upon the understanding, and, by it, upon the will and affections : the great engine of secular dominion is *force*, which, without regarding the understanding, will, or affections, lays hold of the body. The language of our Lord to his hearers was, *If any man will come under my guidance ;* *Εἰ τις ΘΕΛΕΙ ὀπίσω μου εἰσθῆναι.* Nothing is obtruded or forced upon the unwilling. Now, as the great source of the infidelity of the Jews, was a notion of the temporal kingdom of the Messiah, we may justly say, that the great source of the corruption of Christians, and of their general defection, foretold by the inspired writers, has been an attempt to render it, in effect, a temporal kingdom, and to support and extend it by earthly means. This is that spirit of Antichrist, which was so early at work, as to be discoverable even in the days of the Apostles.

Every thing, therefore, here, is subjected to the test of Scripture and sound criticism. I am not very confident of my own reasonings. I am sensible that, on many points, I have changed my opinion, and found reason to correct what I had

judged formerly to be right. The consciousness of former mistakes, proves a guard to preserve me from such a presumptuous confidence in my present judgment, as would preclude my giving a patient hearing to whatever may be urged, from reason or Scripture, in opposition to it. TRUTH has been, in all my inquiries, and still is, my great aim. To her I am ready to sacrifice every personal consideration; but am determined not, knowingly, to sacrifice her to any thing. To Lucian's advice to the historiographer, *Μονη θυτειν τη αληθεια*, which I have inscribed in the title, it is my intention sacredly to adhere.



## Preliminary Dissertations.

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### DISSERTATION THE FIRST.

*Observations on the language and idiom of the New Testament, on the diversity of style, and on the inspiration of the sacred writers.*

### PART I.

#### THE LANGUAGE AND IDIOM.

IF the words and phrases employed by the Apostles and Evangelists, in delivering the revelation committed to them by the Holy Spirit, had not been agreeable to the received usage of the people to whom they spoke, the discourses, being unintelligible, could have conveyed no information, and consequently would have been no revelation to the hearers. Our Lord and his Apostles, in publishing the Gospel, first addressed themselves to their countrymen the Jews; a people who had, many ages before, at different periods, been favoured with other revelations. To those ancient Jewish Revelations, now collected into one volume, Christians give the name of the Old Testament; and thereby distinguish them from those

apostolical and evangelical writings, which, being also collected into one volume, are called the New Testament. In the latter dispensation, the divine authority of the former is presupposed and founded on. The knowledge of what is contained in that introductory revelation, is always presumed in the readers of the New Testament, which claims to be the consummation of an economy of God for the salvation of man; of which economy the Old Testament acquaints us with the occasion, origin, and early progress. Both are therefore intimately connected. Accordingly, though the two Testaments are written in different languages, the same idiom prevails in both; and in the historical part at least, nearly the same character of style.

§ 2. As the writings of the Old Testament are of a much earlier date, and contain an account of the rise and first establishment, together with a portion of the history of the nation to whom the Gospel was first promulged, and of whom were all its first missionaries and teachers, it is thence unquestionably that we must learn, both what the principal facts, customs, doctrines, and precepts are, that are alluded to in the apostolical writings, and what is the proper signification and extent of the expressions used. Though the New Testament is written in Greek, an acquaintance with the Greek classics (that is, with the writings of profane authors in that tongue in prose and verse) will not be found so conducive to this end, as an acquaintance with the ancient Hebrew Scrip-

tures. I am far from denying that classical knowledge is, even for this purpose, of real utility ; I say only, that it is not of so great utility as the other. It is well known that the Jews were distinguished by all Pagan antiquity, as a nation of the most extraordinary and peculiar manners ; as absolutely incapable of coalescing with other people, being actuated, especially in matters where religion or politics were thought to be concerned, by the most unrelenting aversion to every thing foreign, and the most violent attachment to every thing national. We cannot have a clearer evidence of the justness of this character, than their remaining to this day a distinct people, who, though they have been for many ages scattered over the face of the earth, have never yet been blended in any country with the people amongst whom they live. They are, besides, the only wandering nation that ever existed, of which this can be affirmed.

§ 3. BEFORE the tribes of Judah and Benjamin returned from captivity in Babylon to the land of their fathers, their language, as was inevitable, had been adulterated, or rather changed, by their sojourning so long among strangers. They called it Hebrew, availing themselves of an ambiguous name<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Hebrew* was ambiguous, as it might denote either the language spoken on the other side of the river (that is *Euphrates*, which is commonly meant when no river is named) or the language of the people called *Hebrews*. Preface to Matthew's Gospel, § 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

It is accordingly always called Hebrew in the New Testament. This, though but a small circumstance, is characteristical of the people, who could not brook the avowal of changing their language, and adopting that of strangers, even when they could not avoid being conscious of the thing. The dialect which they then spoke might have been more properly styled Chaldee, or even Syriac, than Hebrew. But to give it either of these appellations, had appeared to them as admitting what would always remind both themselves and others of their servitude. After the Macedonian conquests, and the division which the Grecian empire underwent among the commanders, on the death of their chief, Greek soon became the language of the people of rank through all the extensive dominions which had been subdued by Alexander. The persecutions with which the Jews were harassed under Antiochus Epiphanes, concurring with several other causes, occasioned the dispersion of a great part of their nation throughout the provinces of Asia Minor, Assyria, Phenicia, Persia, Arabia, Lybia, and Egypt; which dispersion was in process of time extended to Achaia, Macedonia, and Italy. The unavoidable consequence of this was in a few ages, to all those who settled in distant lands, the total loss of that dialect which their fathers had brought out of Babylon into Palestine. But this is to be understood with the exception of the learned who studied the oriental languages by book. At length a complete version of the Scriptures of the Old Testament was made into Greek;

a language which was then, and continued for many ages afterwards, in far more general use than any other. This is what is called the Septuagint or version of the *Seventy* (probably because approved by the Sanhedrim), which was begun (as has been said) by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, for the use of the Alexandrian library. At first no more than the Pentateuch was translated, which was soon followed by a version of the other books. This is doubtless the first translation that was attempted of the Sacred Writings.

§ 4. It will readily be imagined that all the Jews who inhabited Grecian cities, where the oriental tongues were unknown, would be solicitous to obtain copies of this translation. To excite in them this solicitude, patriotism would concur with piety, and indeed almost every motive that can operate upon men. In one view their Bible was more to them than ours is to us. It is religion alone, I may say, that influences our regard; whereas their sacred book contained not only their religious principles and holy ceremonies, but the whole body of their municipal laws<sup>2</sup>. They contained an account of their political constitution, and their civil history, that part especially which is most interesting, the lives of their Patriarchs, and the gradual advancement of that family from which they gloried to be descended; the history of their establishment as a na-

<sup>2</sup> See Lowth, De Sacra Poësi Hebræorum, Præl. viii.

tion; the exploits, victories, and conquests of their ancestors; the lives and achievements of their kings and heroes, prophets and reformers. Nay, more, the Scriptures might also be justly considered as a collection of the writings, both prosaic and poetical, of all the most eminent authors their country had produced. A copy of such a version was therefore, in every view we can take of it, an inestimable treasure to every Jew who understood Greek, and could not read the original. And hence we may easily conceive that the copies would soon be greatly multiplied, and widely scattered.

§ 5. LET us attend to the consequences that would naturally follow. Wherever Greek was the mother-tongue, this version would come to be used not only in private in Jewish houses, but also in public in their schools and synagogues, in the explanation of the weekly lessons from the Law and the Prophets. The style of it would consequently soon become the standard of language to them on religious subjects. Hence would arise a certain uniformity in phraseology and idiom among the Grecian Jews, wherever dispersed, in regard to their religion and sacred rites, whatever were the particular dialects which prevailed in the places of their residence, and were used by them in conversing on ordinary matters.

§ 6. THAT there was, in the time of the Apostles, a distinction made between those Jews who used the Greek language, and the Hebrews, or those who spoke the language of Palestine and of

the territory of Babylon, which they affected to call Hebrew; is manifest from the Acts of the Apostles. There<sup>3</sup> we are informed, that *there arose a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrews, because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration*. That those Grecians were Jews, is evident from the history: for this happened before Peter was specially called to preach the gospel to Cornelius and his family, who were the first fruits of the Gentiles to Christ. Besides, though the word *Grecian* made use of in our translation is synonymous with *Greek*, yet the term employed in the original is never applied in the New Testament to pagan Greeks, but solely to those Jews who had resided always or mostly in Grecian cities, and consequently whose common tongue was Greek. The Gentile Greeks are invariably called in Scripture *Ἕλληνες*, whereas the term used in the place quoted is *Ἑλληνισταί*, a word which even in classical authors does not mean Greeks, but *imitators of the Greeks*, or *those who write or speak Greek*; being a derivation from the word *ἑλληνίζειν*, *to speak Greek*, or *imitate the Greeks*. The term occurs only thrice in the New Testament, that is in two other passages of the Acts beside that now quoted. One of these is<sup>4</sup> where we are told that Saul, also called Paul, after his conversion, being at Jerusalem, *disputed with the Grecians*, *προς τας Ἑλληνιστας*, who went about to slay him. This also happened before the conversion of Cornelius,

<sup>3</sup> Acts, vi. 1, &c.<sup>4</sup> Acts, ix. 29.

and consequently before the Gospel was preached to any Gentile : but as at their festivals there was a general concourse of Jewish people at Jerusalem from all the parts of the world into which they were dispersed, a considerable number of those Hellenists or Grecizers, as in our idiom we should be apt to term them, must have been present on that occasion. It may be observed by the way, that the Syriac version, probably the oldest extant, which, in the two other passages, confounds ἑλληνισαὶ with ἑλληνες, here marks the distinction, rendering the former by periphrasis, agreeably to the sense above given, *those Jews who knew Greek*. The only other passage is where we are told<sup>5</sup>, that some of those being Cypriots and Cyrenians, who were scattered abroad on the persecution that arose about Stephen, *spoke unto the Grecians* (πρὸς τὰς Ἑλληνιστάς) at Antioch, *preaching the Lord Jesus*. Whether this was before or after the baptism of Cornelius, recorded in the foregoing chapter, is not certain : but one thing is certain, that it was before those disciples could know of that memorable event. Concerning the others who were in that dispersion, who were probably Hebrews, we are informed in the verse immediately preceding, that in all those places, Phenicia, Cyprus, and Antioch, through which they went, they preached the word to none but Jews.

§ 7. THE learned Basnage makes a principal handle of this passage for supporting an opinion,

<sup>5</sup> Acts, xi. 20.

which had been advanced before by Beza, that by the *Hellenists* is meant *the proselytes to Judaism*, they being contrasted here not with the *Hebrews*, but with the *Jews*. Mr. Bowyer<sup>6</sup>, on the contrary, thinks that, in the two former places referred to, the word *Hellenists* means proselytes; but in the last, where those so denominated are expressly distinguished from *Jews*, it can only mean *Heathen Greeks*. But, in answer to both, let it be observed that the word Jew was not always, in those days, used in the same sense. Most commonly indeed it referred to the nation, in which sense it was synonymous with Israelite. A man of Jewish extraction was not the less a Jew, because he was neither a native nor an inhabitant of Judea, and understood not a syllable of its language. Sometimes, however, it referred to the country, in which acceptation it belonged particularly to the inhabitants of Judea or Palestine, including those neighbouring regions wherein the same tongue was spoken. That the Samaritans (though mortally hated as schismatics) were comprehended in this application of the term Jew, is evident from what we learn from the Acts<sup>7</sup>, where we are informed of their being converted by Philip, and receiving the gifts of the Holy Spirit by the hands of Peter, sometime before the conversion of Cornelius, the first fruits of the Gentiles to Christ. Nay sometimes, in a still more limited signification, it regarded only the inhabitants of the district belonging

<sup>6</sup> Conjectures, Acts vi. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Acts, viii. 5, &c.

to the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had anciently constituted the kingdom of Judah. In this sense we understand the word as used by the Evangelist John<sup>8</sup>, *After these things Jesus walked in Galilee : for he would not walk in Jewry (Isdalia, Judea), because the Jews sought to kill him.* Yet Galilee was a part of Judea in the larger and even more common acceptation of the word, and the Galileans, of whom were the Apostles, were, in every sense except this confined one, Jews as well as the others. The same distinction is made between Judea and Galilee by Matthew<sup>9</sup>. It cannot be doubted therefore, that the term *Jews* in the passage under examination, ought to be understood in the second sense above mentioned, as equivalent to Hebrews.

A little attention to the case puts this conclusion beyond a doubt. Why should they, in preaching the Gospel, make a distinction between *Jews* and *proselytes*, persons who had received the seal of circumcision, and subjected themselves, without reserve, to the Mosaic yoke? The law itself made no distinction; nay, it expressly prohibited the people from making any. <sup>10</sup>*When a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the passover to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it, and he shall be as one that is born in the land; for no uncircumcised person shall eat thereof. One*

<sup>8</sup> John, vii. 1.<sup>9</sup> Matth. ii. 22.<sup>10</sup> Exod. xii. 48, 49. See also Numb. xv. 14, 15, 16. 29.

*law shall be to him that is home-born, and to the stranger that sojourneth among you.* This last phrase (though sometimes used with greater latitude) became a common periphrasis for a proselyte. We find accordingly that though a question arose early in the church, and was for a time hotly agitated, concerning the lawfulness of admitting the uncircumcised to baptism (for such was Cornelius, though no idolater); there is no hint given that the smallest doubt was entertained concerning the admission of proselytes who had already embraced the Jewish ritual, and were circumcised. So far from it, that the keenest advocates for uniting Judaism with Christianity, insisted only that the Gentile converts might be circumcised, and compelled to join the observance of the law of Moses to their faith in Christ. Where, then, could be the difficulty of receiving those who were already disciples of Moses, and had been circumcised?—It will perhaps be retorted, “If the Christians could have no scruple “to preach to proselytes, still less could they have “to preach to those native Jews, who differed in “nothing from their brethren in Palestine but in “language.” True, indeed, they could have no scruple; but those who came at that time to Antioch, were not all qualified for preaching in Greek, for all had not the gift of tongues. And the historian has rendered it evident that the want of the language was the reason they did it not, having observed that those who came thither and preached to the Hellenists, were men of Cyprus and Cyrene, places where Greek was the prevailing tongue.

In regard to the murmuring mentioned in the sixth chapter, which gave rise to the appointment of deacons, nothing can be more improbable than Beza's hypothesis. The number of the proselytes of righteousness, as they are sometimes called, could not be great; for though several, like Cornelius, had been gained over from Paganism to the worship of the true God, few, comparatively, were induced to adopt the Mosaic ceremonies. Now converts of the first sort were still by the Jews accounted heathens, and had access to no part of the temple inaccessible to Gentiles. Of the Jewish proselytes, it was a part only that was converted to Christianity; and of that part, those who were both widows and indigent could not surely be a great proportion. Further, if by Hellenists be meant proselytes, where was the occasion for classing them separately from the Jews, or for so much as inquiring who was a Jew by birth, and who a proselyte? It was not agreeable, as we have seen, either to the spirit or to the letter of the law, to make so invidious, not to say odious, a distinction; and if not to the law, still less, if possible, to the Gospel. Whereas the distinction, on the other hypothesis, being founded on their using different languages, was not barely convenient, but necessary. They were classes of people who could not be addressed in the same tongue; and, for this reason, it was probably found expedient to employ different agents in supplying them. Certain it is, they were in the constant practice of assembling in different synagogues; for in Jerusalem

there were Greek synagogues for the accommodation of the Hellenists of different nations, who came thither either occasionally or to attend the great festivals, as well as Hebrew synagogues for the use of the natives. Such were most of those mentioned in the Acts<sup>11</sup>; the Cyrenian synagogue and the Alexandrian,—the Cilician and the Asian.

That Nicolas, one of the deacons elected on that occasion, was a proselyte, is a circumstance of no moment in this question. If four, or even three of the seven, had been of that denomination, it might have been pleaded with some plausibility, that there must have been in this a design of destroying in the proselytes all suspicion of partiality. As it was, had it been they who murmured, it would have rather increased than diminished their jealousy, to find that they had gotten only one of their own class chosen for six of the other. This, therefore, must be considered as a circumstance merely accidental. As to that singular conceit of Vossius, that the Hellenists were those who favoured the doctrine of submission to a foreign yoke; as it is destitute alike of internal credibility and external evidence, it requires no refutation.

§ 3. So much for the distinction that obtained in those days between Hebrew Jews and Grecian Jews, or Hellenists; among the latter of whom, the version of the Seventy was in constant use. The Greek had been for ages a sort of universal

<sup>11</sup> Acts vi. 9.

language in the civilized world, at least among people of rank and men of letters. Cicero had with truth said of it<sup>12</sup>, at the time when Rome was in her glory and Greece declining—" *Græca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus : Latina suis finibus, exiguis sane continentur.*" This continued to be the case till the time of the publication of the Gospel, and for some centuries afterwards. As the Greek was then of all languages the best understood, and the most generally spoken throughout the empire, the far greater part of the New Testament, which contained a revelation for all mankind, was originally written in that tongue. I say, the far greater part, because many critics are of opinion that the Gospel of Matthew<sup>13</sup> and the epistle to the Hebrews were originally written in that dialect of the Chaldee which was then the language of Jerusalem, and by Jewish writers called Hebrew. It must be remembered that all the penmen of the New Testament were Jews—the greater part Hebrews, not Hellenists : but whether they were Hebrews or Hellenists, as they wrote in Greek, the version of the Seventy would serve as a model in what concerned propriety of expression on religious subjects. It was, besides, the idiom which would be best understood by all the converts to Christianity from among their brethren the Jews, wheresoever scattered, and that whereby their writings would more perfectly harmonize with their own Scriptures, which the whole of that people had in so great

<sup>12</sup> Pro Archia Poeta.

<sup>13</sup> See the Preface to that Gospel.

and deserved veneration; for let it be observed that, though the Jews afterwards came to lose entirely their respect for the Septuagint, and even to depreciate it as an unfaithful, as well as inaccurate, translation; this change of their sentiments was the mere effect of their disputes with the Christians, who, in arguing from it, went to the opposite extreme—considered it as the immediate work of inspiration—and, in every instance wherein it differed from the original Hebrew, with which they were unacquainted, gave it the preference, treating the latter as a compilation, which had been corrupted by the Jews, in spite to Christianity. But of the high esteem which this people once entertained for that version, particularly about the time of the publication of the Gospel, their own writers, Philo and Josephus, are the most unexceptionable witnesses.

§ 9. FROM the conformity and peculiarity in language above taken notice of, some critics, in order to distinguish the idiom of the Septuagint and New Testament from that of common Greek, have termed it Hellenistic; not with exact propriety, I acknowledge, if we regard the etymology of the word, but with justness sufficient for the purpose of characterising the peculiar phraseology of those writings. The disputes raised on this subject by Salmasius and some others are scarcely worth naming, as they will, upon examination, all be found to terminate in mere disputes about words. I readily admit, that this speciality of diction is properly not a peculiar language, nor

even a peculiar dialect, in the same sense as the *Attic*, the *Ionic*, the *Eolic*, and the *Doric*, are called different dialects; for there are in it no peculiarities in the inflexions of either nouns or verbs. In strictness of speech, the peculiarity does more properly constitute a difference of idiom, than either of language or of dialect. The phraseology is Hebrew, and the words are Greek. This singular manner in the ancient translators, is to be considered as partly intentional, and partly accidental: partly intentional, because, from the scrupulous, I may even say, superstitious, attachment of the Jews not only to the words, but to the letters and syllables, to every jot and tittle, of the original, they would be led to attempt a manner of translating so servilely literal, as is always incompatible with purity in the language into which the translation is made;—partly accidental, because, even without design, a person speaking or writing a foreign language, frequently mingles in his speech the idioms of his native tongue. One source of the peculiarities in idiom, may have arisen from this circumstance, that the translators, though Jews, were Alexandrians. In a language spoken, as Greek was then, in many distant countries, all independent of one another, there inevitably arise peculiarities in the acceptations of words in different regions. Perhaps we ought to impute to this, that sometimes terms have been adopted by the Seventy which appear to us not the most apposite for rendering the import of the original, such as *διαθηκη* for *ברית* *berith*, and *όσιος* for *חסיד* *chasid*. But whatever be in this,

the habit which the Apostles and Evangelists had of reading the Scriptures, and hearing them read, whether in the original, or in the ancient version, would, by infecting their style, co-operate with the tendency which, as natives of Palestine, they would derive from conversation, to intermix Hebraisms and Chaldaisms in their writings.

§ 10. It is not to be dissembled, that the sacred penmen of the New Testament have, especially in modern times, had some strenuous advocates, both among foreigners, and amongst our own countrymen, who have, in my opinion, with more zeal than judgment, defended their diction, as being, when judged by the rules of grammar and rhetoric, and the practice of the most celebrated writers in Greece, altogether pure and elegant. They seem to suspect, that to yield, even on the clearest evidence, a point of this nature, though regarding ornaments merely human and exterior, might bring dishonour on inspiration, or render it questionable. I cannot help thinking that these people must have very indistinct ideas on this subject, and may be justly said to incur the reproof which Peter, on a memorable occasion, received from his Master—that *they savour more the things of men than the things of God*<sup>14</sup>. Are words of any kind more than arbitrary signs? And may not the same be said with justice of phrases and idioms? Is there a natural fitness

<sup>14</sup> Matth. xvi. 23.

in one word or phrase more than in another, for denoting the thing signified? Is not the connexion between sounds and ideas merely artificial—the result of human, though tacit conventions? With regard to those rules which constitute purity in the language of any country, what are they, in effect, but the conventions which have happened to obtain among the natives, particularly those of the higher ranks?—Vulgarisms, and foreign idioms, which may obtain among strangers, and those of the lower ranks, have no more natural unfitness to convey the sense which they that use them intend to convey by them, than the terms and phrases which, in consequence of the preference given by their superiors, may be regarded as elegancies. It may be as reasonably objected against our religion, that the persons by whom it was propagated, were chosen from what men, in high life, account the dregs of the people, as that the Holy Spirit should accommodate himself to the language of those who were actually chosen. Nay, language as well as dress being in fact no more than a species of mode, it may with as good reason be maintained that the ambassadors whom Christ sent for promulgating his doctrine, should have been habited like gentlemen, and men of fashion, as that they should have spoken the dialect of such. Splendid style had no more connexion with the purpose of their mission than splendid apparel. The cloth which they wore, how coarse soever, answered all the essential purposes of clothing; the same may be said of the language which they

spoke. And if it be argued, that good language would create greater respect to their persons, and closer attention to what they said, and consequently would contribute to its making a deeper impression ; as much may be affirmed, with truth, of a genteel appearance both of person and of dress. Nothing serves more powerfully to quash curiosity and expectation, and consequently to destroy attention, than such an external figure as generally accompanies poverty and ignorance, and suggests a total want of the advantages of education, and, more especially, of that indispensable advantage which the fashionable world calls *seeing good company*.

But these very disadvantages or defects, both in speech and in outward figure, are assigned by the inspired writers as the reason of God's preference, whose thoughts are not our thoughts, nor are our ways his ways. Paul argues, that the success of the preachers of the Gospel, in spite of the absence of those accomplishments in language then so highly valued, was an evidence of the divine power and energy with which their ministry was accompanied. He did not address them, he tells us<sup>15</sup>, *with the wisdom of words*—with artificial periods and a studied elocution, *lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect* ;—lest to human eloquence that success should be ascribed which ought to be attributed to the divinity of the doctrine, and the agency of the Spirit, in the miracles wrought in support of it. There is

<sup>15</sup> 1 Cor. i. 17.

hardly any sentiment which he is at greater pains to enforce. He *used none of the enticing or persuasive words of man's wisdom*.—Wherefore?—*That their faith might not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God*<sup>16</sup>. Should I ask, What was the reason why our Lord Jesus Christ chose for the instruments of that most amazing revolution in the religious systems of mankind, men perfectly illiterate, and taken out of the lowest class of the people? your answer to this will serve equally for an answer to that other question—Why did the Holy Spirit choose to deliver such important truths in the barbarous idiom of a few obscure Galileans, and not in the politer and more harmonious strains of Grecian eloquence? I repeat it, the answer to both questions is the same—That it might appear, beyond contradiction, that the excellency of the power was of God, and not of man<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5.

<sup>17</sup> Those who desire to see this argument treated as it affects infidels (who make a handle of the badness of the style to discredit revelation), may consult the late Bishop of Gloucester's *Doctrine of Grace*, B. I. ch. viii, ix, and x. I here consider the question chiefly as affecting some well-meaning but mistaken Christians. It may be proper further to observe, that the opinion of the very acute and learned author of the work above mentioned, does not, on the subject of inspiration laid down in ch. vii., in every thing coincide with that here supported. A distinction is made by him, not only between the style and the sentiments, but between the sentiments of greater and those of less moment, in the several books. The latter distinction leads to a controversy which is quite foreign from my argument, and with which for that reason I have not meddled.

§ 11. THERE are some collateral purposes which Providence has effected by the same means. One is, that the writings of the New Testament carry, in the very expression and idiom, an intrinsic and irresistible evidence of their authenticity. They are such as, in respect of style, could not have been written but by Jews, and hardly even by Jews superior, in rank and education, to those whose names they bear. And what greatly strengthens the argument is that, under this homely garb, we find the most exalted sentiments, the closest reasoning, the purest morality, and the sublimest doctrine. The homeliness of their diction, when criticised by the rules of grammarians and rhetoricians, is what all the most learned and judicious of the Greek fathers frankly owned. And is it modest in us, petty critics of modern times, to pretend to be nicer judges of purity and elegance in the Greek language, than Origen and Chrysostom, whose native tongue it was ; and who, besides, were masters of uncommon skill, as well as fluency, in that language ? I have heard of a French critic who undertook to demonstrate that Aristotle did not understand Greek, nor Livy Latin. There is hardly an opinion so paradoxical or absurd as not to find some admirers. What wonder then that we should meet with people who esteem a Pfochinus and a Blackwall<sup>18</sup> better judges of Greek than the

<sup>18</sup> A. Blackwall, author of "The Sacred Classics defended and illustrated."

greatest orators among the Grecians, and maintain that Paul's style, in spite of his own verdict, is as classical as Plato's. The writings of the ancient Greeks have been rummaged for the discovery of words and phrases, which, in the import given them, might appear to resemble what has been accounted Hebraism or Syriasm in the New Testament. The success of such endeavours has been far from giving satisfaction to readers of discernment. It will readily be acknowledged, by the impartial, that several idioms in the New Testament have been mistaken for Oriental, which may be as truly denominated Grecian. But there remains a much larger number of those brought under that class, concerning which there can be no reasonable doubt<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> The very first words of the Gospel, *Βιβλος γενεσεως*, for *genealogy* or *lineage*, are one example amongst hundreds that might be produced. How many meanings are given to the word *σαρξ*, *flesh*, in that Sacred Volume, for which you will not find a single authority in any prophane writer? Beside the original meaning of the word universally admitted, it sometimes denotes the whole body considered as animated, as in Matth. xxvi. 41. *The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak*.—This may indeed be thought to be of all the deviations from the proper sense, the most defensible on classical and rhetorical principles, being not an unnatural synecdoché of the part for the whole.—Secondly, It sometimes means a human being, as in Luke iii. 6. *All flesh shall see the salvation of God*;—sometimes, 3dly, a person's kindred collectively considered, as in Rom. xi. 14. *If by any means I may provoke to emulation them which are my flesh*; sometimes, 4thly, any thing of an external or ceremonial nature,

§ 12. THE methods by which our opponents, on this article, support their hypothesis are, I say, unsatisfactory. There are such negligencies in the style, even of the best writers, as to render it unsafe to pronounce on the goodness of an expression which we have only once met with, though in a celebrated author. Much less ought a singular phrase found in one single classic, similar to an idiom frequent in the New Testament, to be accounted evidence that the idiom was in general, and approved, use, which always determines purity in every tongue. The sin-

as opposed to that which is internal and moral, as in Gal. iii. 3. *Having begun in the spirit, are ye now made perfect by the flesh?*—sometimes, 5thly, the sensitive part of our nature, the seat of appetite, as in 2 Cor. vii. 1. *Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit*, where there can be no doubt that the pollutions of the flesh must be those of the appetites, being opposed to the pollutions of the spirit or those of the passions. 6thly, and lastly, It is employed to denote any principle of vice and moral pravity of whatever kind. Thus among *the works of the flesh* (Gal. v. 19, 20, 21.) are numbered not only *adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, drunkenness, and revellings*, which all relate to criminal indulgences of appetite, but *idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, and murders*, which are manifestly vices of a different kind, and hold more of the diabolical nature than of the beastly. Now, for any of the six meanings above mentioned, except perhaps the first, as to which I will not be positive, we may defy those critics to produce classical authority. Yet no man accustomed to the oriental idiom, and the style of the sacred writers, can mistake the sense in any of the passages quoted.

gularity, in the one case, opposed to the frequency in the other, should lead us to a very different conclusion. The evidence cannot be more satisfactory which arises from a particular turn of expression occurring in some poetical work, and coinciding with an idiom current in the New Testament, which is written in prose. We know that the Greek poetry had a peculiar dialect, and many peculiar words; and that their poets were, by the laws of their versification, allowed a latitude, in this respect, with which their prose writers were not indulged: nor is there any thing that their critics more loudly condemn, as savouring of artifice and affectation, than what may be called a poetic phraseology in prose. Let it not be imagined that I think the sacred penmen chargeable with any thing affected or artificial in their phraseology. There is no character of style for which they are more distinguishable than the reverse. But what would be justly denominated artificial, affected, and foreign, in a native of Attica, might be the result of the most undesigning and natural simplicity, in an inhabitant of Palestine, because conformable to the idioms of his native language. Further, a strong resemblance, in an expression admitted to be classical, will not suffice for removing the charge of foreign idiom from the resembling but different expression. In most cases, nothing less than identity will serve<sup>20</sup>. Recourse to synonymas, analogy,

<sup>20</sup> I shall illustrate this by an example in regard to which every English reader can with safety be more decisive than even

and etymology, is necessary and often successful in discovering the sense of an obscure expression, whereof nothing less than the use of good authors

men of literature are qualified to be in regard to an example taken from a dead language. In a letter during the late war from the captain of a French privateer to the magistrates of a seaport, demanding a contribution, and threatening in case of non-compliance to destroy the town, there was this expression, "I will *make* my duty." No Englishman, we are certain, would have expressed himself so, unless he had done it for a disguise. Yet I can easily conceive that a foreigner, who has learnt our language only by book, might speciously maintain, that the expression, so far from being a Gallicism, is unexceptionable English. "Is it not," he would argue, "common to say, I will *do* my duty? Now, if this expression be classical, where is the impropriety in substituting one synonymous word for another?" And to show that *do* and *make* are synonymous, he might urge, first, that in most other tongues one word serves for both. Thus each of them is rendered into Latin, *facere*; into Italian, *fare*; into French, *faire*. Secondly, though he had not found, in any English book, the identical phrase, to *make duty*, he could produce expressions in which there is an entire similarity. To *make court*, to *make obeisance*, are both good; nay, it strengthens the argument, that to *do obeisance*, is also used, in the same signification. Shakespear says, "What *make* they there?" which is equivalent to, What *do* they there? Dryden speaks of "the faults he had *made*;" though doubtless the more usual expression would have been "the faults he had *done*." Now, from the first principles of analogy, we are warranted to conclude, that if *making a fault* be proper to express *doing wrong*, *making a duty*, is proper to express *doing right*. All this is very plausible, and would, probably, be sufficient to convince most strangers, but would only extort a smile from an intelligent native, on whom a thousand such arguments could make no impression. Yet I will venture to affirm that, if there

will warrant the propriety or elegance. Sufficient evidence in the one case, is often no evidence in the other.

§ 13. BLACKWALL<sup>21</sup> admits freely that there are many Hebraisms in the New Testament, at the same time asserting that they are real beauties, which add both vigour and ornament to the expression. In this opinion, if he was serious, I believe that, upon examination, we shall not be found to differ. Abstracting from that lowest kind of beauty in language, which results from its softness and harmony, considered as an object to the ear, every excellency of style is relative, arising solely from its fitness for producing, in the mind of the reader, the end intended

be no solidity in this reasoning, nine tenths of what has been so pompously produced, to show that the supposed Hebraisms of the New Testament are in the genuine idiom of the Greek tongue, are no better than arrant trifling. It was to triflers of this sort that Chrysostom said very appositely, *Ἵνα μὴ καταγελωμεθα οὕτω διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς Ἕλληνας, ἐπειδὴν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγὼν ἦν, καταγορωμεν ἀποστόλων ὡς ἀμαθῶν, ἢ γὰρ κατηγορία αὐτῇ ἐγκωμῖον.* Chrys. Hom. 3. in 1 Cor. i. “That we may not render ourselves ridiculous, arguing thus “with Grecians, for our dispute is with them; let us accuse “the Apostles of being illiterate, for this accusation is an “encomium.” Origen goes still farther, and says, *Οὐκ ἀσυναισθητοὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι τυγχάνοντες τῶν ἐν οἷς προσκοπιτοῦσι, φαεῖν ἰδιωταὶ εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῇ γνώσει.* Philoc. c. 4. “The Apostles, not insensible of their own defects, profess “themselves to be of the vulgar in speech, but not in knowledge.”

<sup>21</sup> Sacr. Class. Part I. Ch. 1.

by the writer. Now in this view it is evident, that a style and manner may, to readers of one denomination, convey the writer's sentiments with energy as well as perspicuity, which, to those of a different denomination, would convey them feebly, darkly, and, when judged by their rules of propriety, improperly. This I take to have been actually the case with the writers of the New Testament. I speak particularly of the historical books. I look upon the language of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, as better adapted to the readers for whose use the Gospels and Acts were at first composed, than the language of Plato or Demosthenes would have been.

I should, at the same time, think it unreasonable to deny that the latter must have been more intelligible to an Athenian, and much more pleasing, nervous, and animated, than the former. Nay, if such a one had even denominated the idiom of the New Testament *barbarous*, I should not have thought it an unpardonable offence. The word indeed sounds harshly; but we know that, from the mouths of native Greeks, it could only mean that the idiom of that book is not conformable to the rules of their grammarians and rhetoricians, and to the practice of their writers of reputation; a concession which we may easily make them, without derogating, in the least, from the Apostles and Evangelists;—a concession which (as was observed before) the most learned and oratorical of the Greek fathers did not scruple to make. In such cases, it is evident, that a native

of common sense is a much better judge than a learned foreigner<sup>22</sup>.

§ 14. I EXPRESSED myself dubiously of Blackwall's seriousness in affirming that the Oriental idioms, with which the sacred authors abound, are highly ornamental to their compositions; because nothing can be plainer than that he is indefatigable in controverting their claims to the greater part of those ornaments. I cannot think he would have willingly injured them; yet it is impossible not to perceive, that he is at infinite pains, though on the most frivolous pretexts<sup>23</sup>, to divest them of almost every beauty of this

<sup>22</sup> Hardly any foreigner of the last century has been more conversant with English men and English books than *Voltaire*. Yet his knowledge of our language, on which I have been told he piqued himself not a little, has not secured him from blundering when he attempted to write it. In a letter to the Parisians, prefixed to his comedy *L'Ecossaise*, which he thought proper to introduce to the world as a translation, he quotes the following sentence as part of a letter he had received from the English author: "You have quite impoverished the character of Wasp; and you have blotted his chastisement at the end of the drama." An Englishman might have guessed what he meant by the first clause, but must have remained in total darkness about the second, if he had not explained himself by subjoining the translation. *Vous avez affaibli le caractere de Frelon; et vous avez supprime son chatiment a la fin de la piece.* An explanation not less necessary to many of his English readers than to his French.

<sup>23</sup> The following is a specimen, Vol. II. Part I. Ch. 2. § 2. "Καταβολη κοσμου in the sacred writers, seemed to some

sort ascribed to them by others ! I desire only to restore to them the merit, of which he has not very consistently, though I believe with a pious intention, endeavoured to strip them. This critic did not consider that, when he admitted any Hebraisms in the New Testament, he, in effect, gave up the cause. That only can be called a Hebraism in a Greek book, which, though agreeable to the Hebrew idiom, is not so to the Greek. Nobody would ever call that a Scotticism which is equally in the manner of both Scots and English. Now, such foreign idioms as Hebraisms in Greek, Grecisms in Hebrew, or Latinisms in either, come all within the definition of barbarism, and sometimes even of solecism—words which have always something relative in their signification ; that turn of expression being a barbarism or a solecism in one language, which is strictly proper in another—and I may add, to one set of hearers, which is not so to another. It is, then, in vain, for any one to debate about the application of the names *barbarism* and *solecism*.

To do so, is at best, but to wrangle about words, after admitting all that is meant by them. The Apostle Paul, less scrupulous, does not hesitate,

“ gentlemen conversant in these studies unexampled in the old Grecians. Indeed it is very rare ; but it is found in the lofty Pindar (Nem. Od. 2.) *Καταβολαν ιερων αγωνων*.” A most extraordinary way of proving that the phrase *Καταβολη κοσμου* is not unexampled in the old Grecians. About the noun *Καταβολη* no doubt was ever made, nor was any doubt made about *Κοσμος* ; the question was solely about the phrase.

by implication, to call every tongue barbarous to those who do not understand it. *If I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be a barbarian to him that speaketh; and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian to me*<sup>24</sup>. Nor does it make any difference, as appears from the whole of the Apostle's argument, even if what is spoken be spoken by the Spirit. Surely, with equal reason, we may say of those foreign idioms in any tongue, which render what is said unintelligible, or even obscure, to the natives, that, in respect of them, they are barbarisms. Nor is it, I think, denied, by any judicious person, that there are some idiomatical expressions in the New Testament which must have puzzled those who were absolute strangers to the language of Holy Writ<sup>25</sup>. My intention, in observing this, is chiefly to show, that

<sup>24</sup> 1 Cor. xiv. 11.

<sup>25</sup> Take the two following for examples: *Ουκ αδυνατησει παρα τω Θεω παν ρημα*, Luke, i. 37. and *ουκ αν εβωθη πασα σαρκς*, Matth. xxiv. 22. phrases which, in my apprehension, would not have been more intelligible to a Greek author than Arabic or Persian would have been. *Ρημα* for *thing*, *παν ουκ* and *πασα ουκ* for *no* or *none*, *σαρκς* for *person*, &c. would to him, I suspect, have proved insurmountable obstacles. Indeed the vulgar translation of the last phrase is no more Latin than the original is classical Greek. *Non fieret salva omnis caro*, which we may venture to affirm would have been no better than a riddle to Cicero or Cæsar. Castalio has expressed the sense in proper Latin, *Nemo prorsus evaderet*. Our translators have not unfitly kept in their version the one. Hebraism *flesh* for *person*, to which our ears are, by scriptural use, familiarized, and not less fitly rejected the

if we would enter thoroughly into the idiom of the New Testament, we must familiarize ourselves to that of the Septuagint; and if we would enter thoroughly into the idiom of the Septuagint, we must accustom ourselves to the study, not only of the original [of the Old Testament, but of the dialect spoken in Palestine, between the return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity, and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans; for this last, as well as the Hebrew, has affected the language both of the old Greek translation and of the New Testament. But of this more afterwards.

§ 15. SUCH is the origin and the character of the idiom which prevails in the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, and the remarkable conformity of the new revelation which we have by them, though written in a different language, to the idiom of the old. It has been distinguished in the former by the name Hellenistic, not with critical accuracy, if regard be had to the derivation of the word, but with sufficient exactness, if attention be given to the application which the Hebrews made of the term Hellenist, whereby they distinguished their Jewish brethren who lived in Grecian cities, and spoke Greek. It has been, by some of late, after father Simon of the *Oratory*,

other saying, *No flesh should be saved*; for every body must be sensible that if they had preserved also the other idiom in English, and said, *All flesh should not be saved*, the sense would have been totally altered. This is but a small specimen, not the hundredth part of what might be produced, on this subject.

more properly termed the Greek of the synagogue. It is acknowledged that it cannot strictly be denominated a separate language, or even dialect, when the term dialect is conceived to imply peculiarities in declension and conjugation. But, with the greatest justice, it is denominated a peculiar idiom, being not only Hebrew and Chaldaic phrases put in Greek words, but even single Greek words used in senses in which they never occur in the writings of prophane authors, and which can be learnt only from the extent of signification given to some Hebrew or Chaldaic word, corresponding to the Greek, in its primitive and most ordinary sense. This difference in idiom constitutes a difficulty of another kind from that which is created by a difference in dialect; a difficulty much harder to be surmounted, as it does not affect the form of the words, but the meaning.

§ 16. It is pertinent, however, to observe that the above remarks on the Greek of the New Testament, do not imply that there was any thing which could be called idiomatical or vulgar in the language of our Lord himself, who taught always in his mother tongue. His apostles and Evangelists, on the contrary, who wrote in Greek, were, in writing, obliged to translate the instructions received from him into a foreign language of a very different structure, and for the use of people accustomed to a peculiar idiom. The apparently respectful manner in which our Saviour was accosted by all ranks of his countrymen, and in which they spoke of his teaching, shows

that he was universally considered as a person of eminent knowledge and abilities. It was the amazing success of his discourses to the people, in commanding the attention and reverence of all who heard him, which first awaked the jealousy of the scribes and pharisees.

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## PART II.

### THE STYLE AND INSPIRATION.

WE are not, however, to imagine that, because all the writers of the New Testament wrote in the idiom of the synagogue, there is no discernible diversity in their styles. As the same language admits a variety of dialects, and even of provincial and foreign idioms, so the same dialect and the same idiom is susceptible of a variety of styles. The style of Paul has something peculiar, by which, in my opinion, there would be no difficulty in distinguishing him from any other writer. A discerning reader would not readily confound the style of Luke with that of either of the evangelists who preceded him, Matthew or Mark; and still less I imagine would he mistake the Apostle John's diction for that of any other penman of the New Testament. The same differences of style will be discovered by one who is but moderately conversant in Hebrew, in the writers of the Old Testament. In it we have still greater variety

than in the New. Some of the books are written in prose, and some in verse: and in each, the differences between one book and another are considerable. In the book of Job, for instance, the character of the style is remarkably peculiar. What can be more dissimilar in this respect, though both are excellent in their kind, than the towering flights of the sublime Isaiah, and the plaintive strains of the pathetic Jeremiah? In the books of Scripture, we can specify the concise style and the copious, the elevated and the simple, the aphoristic and the diffuse.

The difference, I own, is not so remarkable in translations as in the original. The reason will be evident on a little reflection. Every man, and consequently every translator has his peculiar diction and manner, which will rarely fail to affect, not only his own compositions, but also the versions he makes from other authors. In every version of the Bible, therefore, wherein the different books have the same translator, there will be more or less of an assimilating quality, by which the works translated are brought, in point of expression, to bear some resemblance to the ordinary style of the translator. Now, by being all brought nearer the same thing, they are brought nearer one another. Translation, therefore, is a sort of leveller. By its means, generally, not always (for some can adapt themselves to different styles more easily than others), the lofty is depressed, the humble elevated, the looser strains are confined, and the laconic rendered more explicit. The learned reader will be sensible of the justness of

this remark, when he reflects how much more distinguishable the styles of the sacred penmen above mentioned are in their own language, than even in the best translations extant. Add to this, that if, of any two sacred authors who differ greatly in their style, we compare together some passages, as they are rendered in the same translation, we shall commonly find the sameness of the translator's style more remarkable in them all, than the differences there may be of the styles of the authors. We shall be oftener at a loss to discover, in the quotations, (if the recollection of the sentiments do not assist us) Isaiah and Amos, Matthew and John, than to recognize Castalio and Beza, the Vulgate and Junius. Every translator, however, is not equally chargeable with this fault. I think none indeed so much as Castalio.

§ 2. BUT it may be asked, How is this diversity in the diction of the sacred penmen reconcilable with the idea of inspiration? Is not the style of all inspired writers the same, as being the style of the same Spirit by which they were alike directed? That in some sense the style of all those writers is the style of the Holy Spirit who spoke by them, and was the same in them all, is not to be denied; but that the Holy Spirit should always employ the same style in conveying celestial truths to men, is no more necessary than that he should always use the same language. People do not sufficiently advert, when they speak on this subject, to the difference between the expression and the sentiment, but strangely confound

these, as though they were the same ; yet no two things can be more widely different. The truths implied in the sentiments, are essential, immutable, and have an intrinsic value : the words which compose the expression, are in their nature circumstantial, changeable, and have no other value than what they derive from the arbitrary conventions of men. That the Holy Spirit would guide the minds of the sacred penmen in such a manner as to prevent their adopting terms unsuitable to his design, or which might obstruct his purpose ; and that, in other respects, he would accommodate himself to their manner and diction, is both reasonable in itself, and rendered unquestionable, by the works themselves, which have the like characteristic differences of style that we find in other literary productions.

Can it be accounted more strange that the Holy Spirit should, by the prophet Amos, address us in the style of a shepherd, and by Daniel, in that of a courtier, than that by the one, he should speak to us in Hebrew, and by the other, in Chaldee ? It is as reasonable to think that the Spirit of God would accommodate himself to the phraseology and diction, as to the tone of voice and pronunciation, of those whom he was pleased to enlighten ; for it cannot be denied that the pronunciation of one person, in uttering a prophecy, might be more articulate, more audible, and more affecting than that of another—in like manner as one style has more harmony, elegance, and perspicuity, than another. Castalio says justly, “ *Res dictat Spiritus, verba quidem et linguam*

“*loquenti aut scribenti liberam permittit*<sup>26</sup>,” which is to the same purpose with what Jerom had said more than a thousand years before—“*Nec putemus in verbis scripturarum evangelium esse, sed in sensu*<sup>27</sup>.” Allow me to add the testimony of a late writer of our own—than whom none has done more to make men apprehend the meaning, and relish the beauties of the sacred poesy : “*Hoc ita sacris vatibus tribuimus, ut nihil derogemus Divini Spiritus afflatui : etsi suam interea vim propriæ cujusque scriptoris naturæ atque ingenio concedamus. Neque enim instinctu divino ita concitatur vatis animus, ut protinus obruatur hominis indoles : attolluntur et eriguntur, non extinguuntur aut occultantur naturalis ingenii facultates ; et quanquam Mosis, Davidis, et Isaïæ, scripta semper spirent quiddam tam excelsum tamque cæleste, ut plane videantur divinitus edita, nihilo tamen minus in iis Mosem, Davidem, et Isaïam, semper agnoscimus*<sup>28</sup>.”

§ 3. IN this there was an eminent disparity between the prophets of God and those among the Pagans, said to be possessed of the spirit of *Python*,

<sup>26</sup> “The Spirit dictates the things, leaving the words and language free to the speaker or the writer.” *Defensio contra Bezam.*

<sup>27</sup> “Let us not imagine that the gospel consists in the words of Scripture, but in the sense.” *Comment. in Epist. ad Gal. cap. 1.*

<sup>28</sup> *De Sacra Pœsi Heb. Præl. xvi.*

or spirit of divination. These are reported to have uttered their predictions in what is called extasy or trance, that is, whilst they underwent a temporary suspension both of their reason and of their senses. Accordingly they are represented as mere machines, not acting but acted upon, and passive like the flute into which the musician blows. This is what has been called organic inspiration. In imitation of one remarkable class of these, the sorcerers and soothsayers among the Jews (who, like those of the same craft among Pagans, reaped considerable profit from abusing the credulity of the rabble), had acquired a wonderful mode of speaking, in which they did not appear to employ the common organs of speech, and were thence termed *εγγαστριμφοι*, *ventriloqui*, belly-speakers. It is in allusion to this practice that Isaiah denominates them *the wizzards*<sup>29</sup> that peep and that mutter, whose speech seemed to rise out of the ground, and to whisper out of the dust<sup>30</sup>.

Totally different was the method of the prophets of the true God. The matter, or all that concerned the thoughts, was given them: what concerned the manner, or enunciation, was left to themselves. The only exception the Rabbies mention is Balaam, whose prophecy appeared to them to have been emitted in spite of himself. But this case, if it was as they imagine, which may be justly doubted, was extraordinary. In all other cases, the prophets had, when prophesying, the same command over their own actions, over

<sup>29</sup> Isaiah, viii. 19.

<sup>30</sup> Isaiah, xxix. 4.

their members and organs, .as at other times. They might speak, or forbear; they might begin, and desist, when they pleased; they might decline the task assigned them, and disobey the divine command. No doubt when they acted thus, they sinned very heinously, and were exposed to the wrath of Heaven. Of the danger of such disobedience we have two signal examples, in the prophet who was sent to prophesy against the altar erected by Jeroboam at Bethel, and in the prophet Jonah.

But that men continued still free agents, and had it in their power to make a very injudicious use of the spiritual gifts and illuminations which they had received from above, is manifest from the regulations, on this subject, established by the Apostle Paul, in the church of Corinth. The words wherewith he concludes his directions on this topic are very apposite to my present purpose. *The spirits of the prophets*, says he<sup>31</sup>, *are subject to the prophets*. Such is the difference between those who are guided by the Spirit of Truth, and those who are under the influence of a Spirit of error. There is therefore no reason to doubt that the sacred writers were permitted to employ the style and idiom most familiar to them, in delivering the truths with which they were inspired. So far only they were over-ruled, in point of expression, by the divine Spirit, that nothing could be introduced tending, in any way, to obstruct the intention of the whole. And sometimes, especially

<sup>31</sup> 1 Cor. xiv. 32.

in the prediction of future events, such terms would be suggested, as would, even beyond the prophet's apprehension, conduce to further that end. The great object of divine regard, and subject of revelation, is things, not words. And were it possible to obtain a translation of scripture absolutely faultless, the translation would be, in all respects, as valuable as the original.

§ 4. BUT is not this doctrine, it may be said, liable to an objection also from the gift of tongues conferred on the Apostles and others, for the promulgation of the gospel? In the languages with which those primitive ministers were miraculously furnished, it may be objected, they could not have any style of their own, as a style is purely the effect of habit, and of insensible imitation. This objection, however, is easily obviated: First, as they received by inspiration those tongues only, whereof they had previously no knowledge, it is not probable, at least it is not certain, that this gift had any place in the writings of the New Testament: that in most of them it had not, is manifest. But, 2dly, if in some it had, the most natural supposition is, first, that the knowledge of the tongue, wherewith the Holy Ghost inspired the sacred writers, must have been, in them, precisely such a knowledge and such a readiness in finding words and expressions, as is, in others, the effect of daily practice. This is even a necessary consequence of supposing that the language itself, and not the words of particular speeches (according to Dr.

Middleton's notion<sup>32</sup>), was the gift of the Spirit: 2dly, That their acquaintance with the tongue, supernaturally communicated, must have been such as would render their teaching in it best adapted to the apprehensions of the people with whom they would be most conversant, or such as they would have most readily acquired among them in the natural way. Now on this hypothesis, which appears on many accounts the most rational, the influence of habit, of native idiom, and of particular genius and turn of thinking, would be the same on the writer's style as though he had acquired the language in the ordinary way.

As to the hypothesis of the author above mentioned, it is not more irrational in itself, than it is destitute of evidence. It is irrational, as it excludes the primary use, the conversion of the nations, for which, by the general acknowledgment of Christians in all ages, the gift of tongues was bestowed on the Apostles, and represents this extraordinary power, as serving merely to astonish the hearers, the only purpose, according to him, for which it ever was exerted. And as to evidence, the great support of his system is an argument which has been sufficiently considered already, the defects of the style of the sacred writers, when examined by the rules of the rhetoricians, and the example of the orators of Athens. For, because Cicero and the Greek philosophers were of opinion, that if Jupiter spoke Greek, he would speak like Plato, the learned doctor cannot con-

<sup>32</sup> Essay on the Gift of Tongues.

ceive that a style so unlike Plato's as that of the Evangelists, can be the language of inspiration, or be accounted worthy of God. It was not, we find, peculiar to the Greeks, or to the apostolic age, to set too high a value on the words which man's wisdom teacheth. Nor was it only in the days of Samuel, that men needed to be taught that *the Lord seeth not as man seeth*<sup>33</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> 1 Sam. xvi. 7.

## Dissertation the Second.

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*The Causes to which the principal Differences in Languages are imputable ; the Origin of the Changes produced on the Language and the Idiom of the Jews, and the principal Difficulties to be encountered in translating the Sacred Books.*

### PART I.

#### THE CAUSES OF THE DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGES.

WHEN we compare one tongue with another, if we enter critically into the genius and powers of each, we shall find, that neither the only nor the chief difference is that which is most obvious, and consists in the sounds or words employed, the inflexions, the arrangement, and the construction. These may soon be learnt from a tolerable grammar, and are to be considered as affecting only the form of the language. There are others, which more intimately affecting its spirit, it requires a nicer discernment to distinguish. These serve much more to characterise, both the language, and the people who speak it. Indeed, the knowledge of one of these has a great effect in advancing the knowledge of the other. We may say, with the greatest justice, that as, on the one

hand, the real character of a nation will not be thoroughly understood by one who is a perfect stranger to their tongue; so, on the other, the exact import of many of the words and combinations of words, made use of in the language, will never be perfectly comprehended by one who knows nothing of the character of the people, who is totally unacquainted with the history of their religion, law, polity, arts, manners, and customs. Whoever, therefore, would be a proficient in either kind, must be a student in both. It is evident, that the particulars enumerated, or whatever regards the religion, the laws, the constitution, and the manners of a people, operate powerfully on their sentiments; and these have a principal effect, first on the associations of ideas formed in their minds, in relation to character and to whatever is an object of abstract reflection; secondly, on the formation of words, and combination of phrases, by which these associations are expressed. But this will be better understood from what follows.

§ 2. THERE are certain words, in every language, to which there are other words perfectly corresponding, in other languages. There are certain words, in every language, which but imperfectly correspond to any of the words of other languages. There are certain words, in every language, to which there is nothing, in some other languages, in any degree, correspondent. I shall exemplify these three classes in Greek,

Latin, and English, which will sufficiently illustrate my meaning.

§ 3. IN all languages, the words whereby the obvious productions of nature, and the plainest distinctions of genera and species known to the people are signified, correspond respectively to one another. Thus to the Greek words *ἥλιος*, *σεληνη*, *ορνις*, *δενδρον*, *αετος*, *αμπελος*, *λιθος*, the Latin words, *sol*, *luna*, *avis*, *arbor*, *aquila*, *vitis*, *lapis*, and the English, *sun*, *moon*, *bird*, *tree*, *eagle*, *vine*, *stone*, are perfectly equivalent in signification; and we are sure that we can never mistake in rendering the Greek word *ἥλιος*, wherever it occurs, into Latin, by the word *sol*, and into English, by the word *sun*. The same thing holds true of the other terms in the three languages, taken severally, in the order in which I have placed them.

To this class we must add the names of natural and obvious relations, as *πατηρ*, *μητηρ*, *υἱος*, *θυγατηρ*, *αδελφος*, *αδελφη*, to which the Latin words *pater*, *mater*, *filius*, *filia*, *frater*, *soror*, and the English words *father*, *mother*, *son*, *daughter*, *brother*, *sister*, perfectly correspond.

To the same class we ought also to assign those words whereby the most common and necessary productions of the mechanic arts are expressed: for though, in different countries, and distant ages, there are considerable differences in the fashion and appearance of their productions; we attend solely, in translating, to the principal

uses which a piece of work was intended to answer. Consequently, when in these we find an entire coincidence, we, without further examination, pronounce the names equivalent. Thus *οικος*, *ναυς*, *κλινη*, in Greek, and *domus*, *navis*, *lectus*, in Latin, answer sufficiently to *house*, *ship*, *bed*, in English, on account of the coincidence in use of the things signified, notwithstanding the less important differences in structure and workmanship.

These, however, are not entirely on the same footing with natural objects, in which there is everywhere, and in every age, a more perfect uniformity. The names *βιβλιον*, *liber*, *book*, are in most cases suited to one another. But as the books of the ancients were in outward form and construction very different from ours; when we find any thing advanced concerning *βιβλιον* in Greek, or *liber* in Latin, with an evident allusion to the outward make, we know that the English word *book* is not a proper version. Thus the words *σρανος απεχωρισθη ως βιβλιον ειλισσομενον*<sup>34</sup>, if rendered, "heaven departed as a book that is rolled up," would not be intelligible, though nothing conveys a more distinct image than the words in the original. Their books consisted of long scrolls, commonly of parchment, sewed or pasted together, and fastened at the ends to two rollers. Our translators properly therefore employed here the more general word *scroll*, which perfectly conveys the meaning. Again, the word *βιβλιον* occurs

<sup>34</sup> Rev. vi. 14.

in an application wherein the term *book* could not be rightly apprehended by a mere English reader: *Βιβλίον γεγραμμενον εσωθεν και οπισθεν*<sup>35</sup>, in the common version, *a book written within and on the back-side*. To such a reader, the last term thus applied would be understood to mean the cover, which is not very fit for being written on, and could, besides, contain no more than might have been contained in one additional leaf, though the book had consisted of a thousand leaves. Now the long scrolls or books of the ancients were seldom written but on one side, here said to be *εσωθεν*, *within*, because that side was turned inwards in rolling. When any of these scrolls was written on both sides, it contained twice as much as if written in the usual way<sup>36</sup>. The chief intention of the Prophet in mentioning this circumstance, must have been to signify that this volume was replete with information, and that its contents were not to be measured by its size. But notwithstanding the exceptions in a few particular cases, the names of the common productions of the most necessary arts, may be considered as so far at least corresponding to each other in most languages, as not to throw any difficulty worth mentioning in the way of a translator.

<sup>35</sup> Rev. v. 1.

<sup>36</sup> A book executed in this manner the Greeks called *οπισθογραφος*, which is thus expressed by Juvenal, "*Scriptus et in tergo*." Sat. 1.

§ 4. THE second class above mentioned, is of those words which, in one language, do, but imperfectly, correspond to any of the words of another language compared with it. Of this kind will be found, if properly attended to, most of the terms relating to morals, to the passions and matters of sentiment, or to the objects of the reflex and internal senses, in regard to which, it is often impossible to find words in one language, that are exactly equivalent to those of another. This holds in all languages, less or more, according as there is more or less, uniformity, in the constitution, religion, and laws, of the nations whose languages are compared; on which constitution, religion, and laws, as was observed, the sentiments, manners, and customs of the people, in a great measure, depend. Herein consists one principal difficulty which translators, if persons of penetration, have to encounter. Finding it sometimes impossible to render fully the sense of their author, they are constrained (if I may borrow a term from the mathematicians) to do the best they can by approximation.

To come to examples: To the Greek words *αρετη*, *σωφροσυνη*, *εγκρατεια*, *φρονησις*, *ελεος*, the Latin words, *virtus*, *temperantia*, *continentia*, *prudentia*, *misericordia*, are not entirely equivalent; still less the English words *virtue*, *temperance*, *continence*, *prudence*, *mercy*: for, though these last are manifestly formed from the Latin words, one would think that, by being adopted into another country, they had all, more or less, changed their

nature with the climate. Those persons whose knowledge, in such matters, is but superficial, will not enter readily into these sentiments. They are accustomed to consider certain words, in the different languages, as respectively correspondent. The grammars, lexicons, and common translations, lead them to conclude so, and they inquire no further. But those who are conversant with authors of reputation, in these different tongues, will need no arguments to convince them of the truth of what has been advanced.

Who knows not that the Latin word *virtus* would, in many instances, be but weakly, not to say improperly, rendered by the English word *virtue*; as that word, in Roman authors, comes often nearer the import of what we call *valour* or *fortitude*, sometimes even *brute force*? We should not readily ascribe *virtue* to wild beasts; yet Tacitus so applies the term *virtus*: “*Fera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviscuntur.*” And if some of our words have too great latitude of signification to answer always to their Latin etymons; some have, on the contrary, too little. For example, the English word *temperance* is too confined in meaning to answer to the Latin *temperantia*, which implies moderation in every desire, and is defined by Cicero, in one place, “*moderatio cupiditatum rationi obediens*<sup>37</sup> ;” and in another, “*temperantia est quæ in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis, rationem ut sequamur, monet*<sup>38</sup>.” Now all that is implied in the English word is almost

<sup>37</sup> De Fin, l. ii.

<sup>38</sup> De Fin. l. i.

only that species which he denominates "*temperantia in victu.*" And, though the differences may not be so considerable in all the other related words above mentioned, it were easy to shew that they cannot, in every instance, be made to tally.

It requires, indeed, but a very small skill in languages to enable us to discover that etymology is often a very unsafe guide to the proper acceptance of a term. It will not be doubted that the Latin word *sobrius* is the root of the English word *sober*, and the term *honestum* of our term *honesty*; but every body knows that the related words, in the two languages, will not always answer to each other. Nay, to shew, in the strongest manner, how much more difficult it is, than is commonly imagined, to apprehend the precise import, and proper application, of words of this order in dead languages, I shall transcribe a short passage from the fourth book of the Tusculan Questions, where the author explains the generic word *ægritudo*, with the various names of species comprehended under it. Amongst other observations are the following: "*Ægritudo est opinio recens mali presentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur. Ægritudini subjiciuntur angor, mæror, dolor, luctus, ærumna, afflictatio: angor est ægritudo premens, mæror ægritudo flebilis, ærumna ægritudo laboriosa, dolor ægritudo crucians, afflictatio ægritudo cum vexatione corporis, luctus ægritudo ex ejus, qui carus fuerat, interitu acerbo.*" "Let any one," says D'Alembert<sup>39</sup>,

<sup>39</sup> Sur l'Harmonie des Langues, et sur la Latinité des Modernes.

“examine this passage with attention, and say  
“honestly, whether, if he had not known of it, he  
“would have had any idea of these nice shades of  
“signification here marked; and whether he would  
“not have been much embarrassed, had he been  
“writing a dictionary, to distinguish with accuracy  
“the words *ægritudo*, *mæror*, *dolor*, *angor*, *luctus*,  
“*ærumna*, *afflictatio*. If Cicero, the greatest phi-  
“losopher as well as orator that ever Rome pro-  
“duced, had composed a book of Latin synonymas,  
“such as that which Abbe Girard did of French;  
“and if this work had but now for the first time  
“been produced in a circle of modern Latinists, I  
“imagine it would have greatly confounded them,  
“in showing them how defective their knowledge  
“is of a subject of which they thought themselves  
“masters.”

I have brought this quotation, not to support D'Alembert's opinion, who maintains that it is impossible for any modern to write Latin with purity; but only to shew how much nicer a matter it is than is commonly supposed, to enter critically into the peculiarities of a dead language. It might be easily shown, were it necessary, that distinctions like those now illustrated in the nouns, obtain also in the verbs of different languages. Under this class those words also may be comprehended which are not barely the names of certain things, or signs of particular ideas, but which express also the affection or disposition of the speaker, towards the thing signified. In every language, we shall find instances wherein the same thing has different names, which are not perfectly sy-

nonymous ; for though there be an identity of subject, there is a difference of manner, wherein the speaker appears affected towards it. One term will convey the idea with contempt, another with abhorrence, a third with some relish, a fourth with affection, and a fifth with indifference. Of this kind are the diminutives and amplificatives which abound so much in the Greek, and Italian, languages.

It is this principally which justifies Girard's observation, that there are much fewer words in any language which are, in all respects, synonymous than is commonly imagined. And it is this which makes the selection of apposite words so much, and so justly, the study of an orator : for when he would operate on the passions of his hearers, it is of the last consequence, that the terms he employs not only convey the idea of the thing signified, which may be called the primary use ; but that, along with it, they insinuate into the minds of the hearers, the passion of the speaker, whatever it be, love, or hatred, admiration or contempt, aversion or desire. This, though the secondary use of the word, is not the less essential to his design. It is chiefly from the associated affection that these different qualities of synonymous words taken notice of by Quintilian must be considered as originating : “ *Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significent, quod συνωνυμα vocatur, jam sunt alia* “ *aliis honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora,* “ *vocaliora.*” The last is the only epithet which regards merely the sound. The following will serve for an example of such English synonymas,

*public speaker, orator, declaimer, haranguer, holder-forth.* The subject of them all is the same, being what the first expression, *public speaker*, simply denotes; the second expresses also admiration in the person who uses it; the third conveys disapprobation, by hinting that it is the speaker's object rather to excite the passions, than to convince the judgment; the fourth is disrespectful, and the fifth contemptuous.

But there is a difference in words called synonymous, arising from the customary application, even when they imply little or nothing of either sentiment or affection. The three words, *death, decease, demise*, all denote the same thing. The first is the simple and familiar term; the second is formal, being much employed in proceedings at law; the third is ceremonious, and scarcely used of any but princes and grandees. There are also some words peculiar to poetry, some to burlesque, which it is needless here to specify. From these observations we learn that, in writings where words of this second class frequently occur, it is impossible, in a consistency with either perspicuity, or propriety, to translate them uniformly, by the same terms, like those of the first. For, as has been observed, they are such as do not perfectly correspond with the terms of a different tongue. You may find a word that answers exactly to the word in question in one acceptation, that will not suit it in another; though for this purpose some other term may be found equally well adapted.

It was too servile an attempt in the first translators of the Old Testament (at least of the Penta-

teuch, for the whole does not appear to have been translated at one time, or by the same persons), at this rigid uniformity in rendering the same Hebrew words by the same Greek words, which has given such a peculiarity of idiom to the style of the Septuagint, and which, issuing thence as from its fountain, has infected, more or less, all the writings of the New Testament. I might observe further, that there are some words, in the original, by no means synonymous, which have been, almost uniformly, rendered by the same term, partly, perhaps, through not adverting sufficiently to some of the nicer differences of signification, partly through a desire of avoiding, as much as possible, in the translation, whatever might look like comment or paraphrase. Of this I shall have occasion to take notice afterwards.

§ 5. THE third class above mentioned is of those words, in the language of every nation, which are not capable of being translated into that of any people, who have not a perfect conformity with them in those customs which have given rise to those words. Such are the names of weights, measures, and coins, which are, for the most part, different in different countries. There is no way that a translator can properly take in such cases, but to retain the original term, and give the explanation in the margin. This is the way which has actually been taken, perhaps in all the translations of the Old Testament. To substitute for the original term a definition or circumlocution, if the word frequently occur, would encumber the

style with an offensive multiplicity of words, and awkward repetitions, and thereby destroy at once its simplicity, vivacity, and even perspicuity. In this class we must also rank the names of the particular rites, garments, modes, exercises, or diversions, to which there is nothing similar among those into whose language the version is to be made. Of this class there are several words retained in the common English translation; some of which, by reason of their frequency have been long since naturalized amongst us; as *synagogue*, *sabbath*, *jubilee*, *purim*, *ephod*, *homer*, *ephah*, *shekel*, *gerah*, *teraphim*, *urim* and *thummim*, *phylacteries*, *cherubim*, *seraphim*, and a few others.

Beside these, often the names of offices, judicatories, sects, parties, and the like, scarcely admit of being transferred into a version in any other manner. It must be owned, however, that in regard to some of these, especially offices, it is a matter of greater nicety than is commonly imagined, to determine when the name ought to be rendered in the translation by a term imperfectly corresponding, and when it ought to be retained. What makes the chief difficulty here is, that there are offices, in every state, and in every constitution, which are analogous to those of other states and constitutions, in many material circumstances, though they differ in many others. It is not always easy to say, whether the resemblances or the peculiarities preponderate. If the former, the word ought to be translated, if the latter, it ought to be retained. The inconveniency of an

excess in the first way is, that it may lead the reader into mistakes ; that of an excess in the second is, that it occasions obscurity, and by the too frequent interspersion of uncouth and foreign words, gives the appearance of barbarism to a version.

It may be said, however, in general, that the latter is the safer error of the two. Not only does the speciality of the case afford a sufficient apology for the use of such words ; but if either the dignity of the nation, which is the subject, or our connexion with the people, or interest in their history, shall familiarize us to their institutions and customs, the barbarism of the terms will vanish of course. Who considers now these names of Roman magistracies, *consul*, *pretor*, *edile*, *censor*, *questor*, *dictator*, *tribune*, as barbarous ? Yet they are not the names of offices amongst us correspondent, or similar, to those among the Romans. To have employed, instead of them, *mayor*, *alderman*, *sheriff*, &c. we should have justly thought much more exceptionable. I have heard of a Dutch translator of Cesar's Commentaries, who always rendered *consul*, *burgomaster*, and in the same taste, the name of all the other officers and magistrates of Rome. A version of this kind would appear to us ridiculous.

§ 6. It is almost unnecessary to observe, that the two last are the only classes of words wherein the student will find any thing that can greatly puzzle him. A mere schoolboy, with the help of his grammar and lexicon, may acquire all that is

requisite for the just interpretation of the words of the first class. Those of the third, it is manifest, are not to be understood by us without a previous knowledge of the religious and political constitutions of the country, together with their ceremonies and usages; and those of the second, which is the matter of the greatest delicacy of all, cannot be thoroughly apprehended without an acquaintance with the national character, that is, the prevalent cast of mind, manners, and sentiments of the people. So much is necessary in order to be master of the language of any country; and of so much importance it is, in order clearly to comprehend the style of Scripture, to be well acquainted with whatever concerns the Jewish nation.

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## PART II.

### THE ORIGIN OF THE CHANGES IN THE IDIOM OF THE JEWS.

It is true that, as the New Testament is written in Greek, it must be of consequence that we be able to enter critically into the ordinary import of the words of that tongue, by being familiarized to the genius and character of those who spoke it. But from what has been observed it is evident that though, in several cases, this knowledge may be eminently useful, it will not suffice; nay, in many cases it will be of little or no significance. Those words, in particular, which have

been in most familiar use with the old interpreters, and have been current in the explanations given in the Hellenistical synagogues and schools, have, with their naturalization among the Israelites, acquired in the Jewish use, if I may be allowed the expression, an infusion of the national spirit. Though the words therefore are Greek, Jewish erudition is of more service than Grecian, for bringing us to the true acceptation of them in the sacred writings. Would you know the full import of the words *ἀγιασμος*, for example, and *δικαιοσύνη* in the New Testament? It will be in vain to rummage the classics. Turn to the pages of the Old Testament. It will avail little to recur to the Greek roots *ἅγιος* and *δική*. Examine the extent given to the signification of the Hebrew roots קדש *kadash*, and צדק *tsadak*, which have given occasion to the introduction of those Greek terms into the translation of the Seventy.

§ 2. CLASSICAL use, both in Greek, and in Latin, is not only, in this study, sometimes unavailable, but may even mislead. The sacred use, and the classical, are often very different. We know the import of the word *sanctitas* in the Vulgate and in ecclesiastical writers, and that it answers exactly enough to our own word *sanctity* derived from it. Yet from Cicero's account, it is plain that, in modern European tongues, we have no word corresponding to it in its primitive and classical use. "ÆQUITAS," says he, "tripartita dicitur esse. Una ad superos deos,

“ altera ad manes, [tertia ad homines pertinere ;  
 “ prima *pietas*, secunda *sanctitas*, tertia *justitia* no-  
 “ minatur<sup>40</sup>.” According to him, therefore, the  
 Latin word *sanctitas* imports equity or suitable  
 regards towards the infernal gods.

But, in no instance, does the classical sense of a  
 word differ more from that which it has invariably  
 in the sacred pages, than in the term *ταπεινος*,  
 which, with the former, is always expressive of a  
 bad quality, with the latter, of a good. With us,  
 it is a virtue, with them, it was a vice. Nor can  
 it be justly affirmed that the word expressed  
 the same disposition of mind, with Pagans, as with  
 Jews and Christians, and that the only difference  
 was, in the opinion or judgment formed con-  
 cerning this disposition ; that the former looked  
 upon it with a favourable eye, the latter with an  
 unfavourable. For this is far from being the  
 case. The quality of which it is expressive, in  
 classical use, is totally different from that which  
 it expresses, in the sacred writings. In the first  
 it corresponded exactly to, and was commonly  
 translated by, the Latin *humilis*, which in profane  
 authors, always conveys a bad meaning, and de-  
 notes such a feeble, mean, and abject temper,  
 as is the very reverse of that fortitude, that su-  
 periority to death, shame, and pain, which the  
 law of Christ so peremptorily exacts, and with  
 which the faith of Christ so powerfully inspires  
 the genuine disciple. *Ταπεινοτης*, the abstract,  
 is comprised by Aristotle<sup>41</sup> under *μικροψυχια*,

<sup>40</sup> Topica.

<sup>41</sup> Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν.

pusillanimity; or, as explained by lexicographers, “*animus demissus et abjectus*,” and contrasted to μεγαλοφυχια, magnanimity, “*animi celsitudo*.” And to evince that the Latin term, in heathen authors, has the same meaning with the Greek, I need no better authority than Cicero, who says<sup>42</sup>, “Succumbere doloribus, eosque *humili* animo “inbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi, multi parentes, multi amicos, “nonnulli patriam, plerique autem seipsos penitus “perdiderunt.” To this he opposes, “Robustus “animus et excelsus, qui omni est liber cura et “angore, cum et mortem contemnit,” &c. The temper of mind here condemned by Cicero, every Christian will condemn as much as he; and the application of the term *humilis* to this temper, is a demonstration, that, with him, the word was the sign of an idea very different from that, of which it has since, in conformity to the style of the Italic translation, been made the sign, by ecclesiastical authors.

We may observe, by the way, that the English word *humility*, though borrowed directly from the Latin, conveys not the classical, but the scriptural sense of the word ταπεινοτης or ταπεινοφροσυνη, which Castalio, over-zealous for the Latinity of his style, never renders *humilitas*, but always *modestia*. This word *modestia*, however, does not express adequately the sense of the original. *Modesty* relates only to the opinion of men, *humility* relates also, and principally, to the unerr-

<sup>42</sup> De Finibus, l. i.

ing judgment of God; and includes such a combination of qualities as no species of polytheism could give a foundation for. It implies, along with a modest self-diffidence, a sense of unworthiness in the sight of God, accompanied with a profound veneration of his perfections. Accordingly piety, meekness, and modesty, make, if I may so express myself, the principal figures in the groupe. So far from involving any thing of that weak timidity and irresolution expressed in the passage quoted from the philosopher, as comprehended in the classical sense of the term *humilis*; it, on the contrary, implies, in every situation, a submission to the will of Heaven, without repining or reserve, founded in a consciousness of one's own ignorance of what is best, upon the whole, and an unshaken confidence in the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, by whose providence all events are over-ruled.

This is one of those terms which, in the mouth of a Jew or a Christian, an idolater could not comprehend, till he had previously acquired some notion of the Biblical theology. To some people it may appear strange, that so much knowledge should be thought necessary for qualifying one to understand the words in current use in any language. But to those more deeply versed in these matters there will be nothing surprising in the remark. They will be sensible that the modern names, *pedantry*, *gallantry*, *foppery*, *coquetry*, *prudery*, and many others, could not be translated into any ancient language, otherwise

than by circumlocutions. Montesquieu<sup>43</sup> observes of what is called *honour* in the monarchies of Europe, that it is unknown, and consequently unnamed in the despotisms of Asia, and that it would even be a matter of some difficulty to render the term, as understood by Europeans, intelligible to a Persian.

§ 3. I SHOULD not have been so particular on the different acceptations of some words, as used by Jews and by Pagans, but in order to illustrate more effectually that important proposition, that Scripture will ever be found its own best interpreter; and to evince, what was remarked before, that the manners and sentiments of a people, being closely connected with their constitution and customs, sacred and civil, have a powerful influence on the language, especially on those combinations of ideas, which serve to denote the various *phases* (pardon the unusual application of the term) both of virtue and of vice, as displayed in the characters of individuals. For, though some traces of all the virtuous, and all the vicious, qualities of which human nature is susceptible, will perhaps be found in every country; these qualities are greatly diversified in their appearance, inasmuch as they invariably receive a kind of signature, or peculiar modification, from the national character. One plain consequence of this doctrine has been already considered, namely, that there will be a diversity in the associated

<sup>43</sup> L'Esprit des Loix, liv. iii. ch. 8. Lett. Pers. 88.

ideas classed under the appellatives, and consequently in the genius of the languages, wherever there is a diversity of character, in the nations which use them.

§ 4. I AM NOW going to exemplify another consequence of this doctrine, which is, that the language of the same people will vary from itself, or, to speak more properly, from what it was in a former period, when the people themselves undergo a material alteration from what they were, in any of the respects above mentioned. Indeed it is manifest that, if a nation should continue at the same precise degree of advancement in the sciences and arts, both elegant and useful, should undergo no variation, in their form of government, religion, and laws, and should have little or no intercourse with foreigners, their language and idiom would, in all essential characters, remain the same. These two, language and idiom, though often confounded, I have had occasion to discriminate before. The distinction deserves our attention the more, as some of the causes mentioned, operate more upon the one, and others more upon the other; and as one of them may be even totally altered, whilst the other is retained. This was accordingly the case with the Jewish nation.

§ 5. DURING the Babylonish captivity, the Jews scattered through the Assyrian provinces lost irrecoverably, in consequence of the mixture with

strangers so much superior to them in number and consideration, their vernacular dialect. But, in consequence of their attachment to their religion (which included their polity and law); in consequence of their inviolable regard to their own customs, and of their detestation, both of the customs, and of the arts, of the heathen; in consequence of their veneration for the sacred books, and their never hearing any other than a literal version of them in the public offices of religion, they still, in a great measure, preserved the idiom; insomuch that, if the Chaldee of Jerusalem was not as different from the Chaldee of Babylon as the Greek of the synagogue was from the Greek of the classics, the only assignable reason perhaps is, that the idiom of the Hebrew and that of the Chaldee were originally more akin to each other, than the idiom of the Greek was to either. Now the idiom keeps a much firmer hold of the mind, than the words, which are mere sounds, do, and which, compared with the other, may be considered as but the body, the material part of a language, whereof the idiom is the soul.

Though the Jewish tongue therefore became different, their idiom was nearly the same. I say nearly so; hence we infer, that the knowledge of the style and idiom of the Old Testament must throw light upon the New: but it was not entirely the same. Hence we conclude the utility of knowing the state of the rabbinical and traditionary learning of that people in the days

of our Saviour, this being the most effectual means of illustrating those particulars wherein the idiom of the New Testament differs from that of the Old. It was indeed impossible that such an intercourse with strangers as extirpated their language, should not be productive of some effect on their notions of things, sentiments, and manners. And changes produced in the sentiments and manners of a people, never fail to show themselves in their writings.

§ 6. BUT, if what happened during their captivity had some effect on these; what followed after their return to Judea had a much greater. The persecutions they endured under the Grecian empire, on account of their religion, did, as is often the case, greatly endear it to them, and make them consider it in a light, in which (whatever may be said of individuals) they seem never as a nation to have considered it in before. It became more an object and a study to them. Sensible how little their perseverance secured them the temporal advantages held forth in the letter of the law, they became fond of attending to those spiritual and sublime interpretations, both of the law, and of the prophets, which served to fortify the mind against all secular losses and misfortunes, and inspire it with hope, in the immediate views of torture, and of death. Besides, the intercourse which, from the time of the Macedonian conquests, they unavoidably had with the Greeks, introduced insensibly, into their manner of treating religion, an infusion of the

philosophic spirit, with which they had before been utterly unacquainted.

The Greeks were perhaps the most inquisitive, the most ingenious, and the most disputatious, people that ever appeared upon the earth. The uncommon importance which the Jews attributed to their religious peculiarities, both in doctrine, and in ceremonies, and their abhorrence of the ceremonies of other nations, with whom they would have no intercommunity in worship, could not fail to provoke the scrutiny and contradiction of a people at once so acute and so conceited as the Greeks. The Jews also, in self-defence, began to scrutinize and argue. On examining and comparing, they perceived, in a stronger light than ever, the inexpressible futility and absurdity of the mythology of the Greeks, and the noble simplicity, purity, and sublimity of their own theology. The spirit of inquiry begot among them, as might have been expected, the spirit of dogmatizing, a spirit quite unknown to their ancestors, though many centuries had elapsed from their establishment in Canaan, to the period of which I am speaking. One of the first consequences of the dogmatical spirit was a division into factions and sects.

In this state we find them, in the days of our Lord; the whole nation being split into Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes. Now, of such party distinctions there is not a single vestige in the Old Testament. The dogmatists, on the different sides, would have recourse to different theories, the theories would give rise to particular phrases,

by which the peculiar opinions of the partizans would be expressed, and even to particular applications of the words and phrases to which they had been accustomed before. Hence the usefulness of understanding their differences, and tenets, and manner of expounding sacred writ.

§ 7. BUT, though the differences in opinions, and modes of exposition, which prevailed in the different sects, do not much affect the style of the historical part of the New Testament, which, in its nature, gives less occasion for introducing subtleties in speculation, and was written by men who, from their education, cannot be supposed to have entered much into the polemical discussions of those days; they may reasonably be supposed to affect the style of the epistolary writings, especially of Paul, who was an adept in all the Jewish learning of the age. Indeed we learn from Philo, Josephus, and the talmudical writers, that their literati, at that period, were become fond of assigning a moral significance and purpose to all the ritual observances of the law, and of applying the words and phrases relating to these, in a certain figurative and mystical manner. That, in their mode of application, they would often be whimsical, I do not deny; but that the New Testament itself gives ground to think that their ceremonies and carnal ordinances, as the Apostle calls them<sup>44</sup>, were intended to adumbrate some spiritual and more important instructions, appears to me uncontroversial.

<sup>44</sup> Heb. ix. 10.

But whatever be in this, it must be allowed to be a matter of some moment, that we form a right notion of the different dogmas and prevailing taste of the time. The reason is evident. The sacred writers, in addressing those of their own nation, would doubtless, in order to be understood, adapt themselves, as their great Master had done before them, to the prevailing idiom and phraseology. Now, this is to be learned only from the common usages, and from the reigning modes of thinking and reasoning, which distinguished the people in that age and nation.

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### PART III.

#### THE DIFFICULTIES FOUND IN TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES.

It can scarcely admit a doubt that, as every language has in it something peculiar, and as the people of every nation have customs, rites, and manners wherein they are singular; each tongue will have its special difficulties; which will always be the greater to strangers, the more remote the customs, rites, and manners of the nation are, from the customs, rites, and manners of other nations: for, in the same proportion, the genius of the tongue will differ from that of other tongues. If so, it is no wonder that the distinguishing particularity of the Jews in constitution, sentiments, ceremonies, and laws, should render it more difficult to

translate, with justness, from their language, than to translate from the language of any people who, in all the respects aforementioned, do not so remarkably differ from others.

It may be proper here to point out, more particularly, where difficulties of this kind will be found principally to lie. It is evident that they will not at all affect the construction of the sentences, or the inflections of the words. The analogy of the language, and its whole grammatical structure, may be very simple, and easily acquired, whatever be the customs of the people, or how extraordinary soever they may appear to us. Further, simple narration is not that kind of writing which will be much affected by those difficulties. The nouns which occur in it are generally of the first class, mentioned in the preceding part of this Dissertation. And in these, from the principles formerly explained, the interpreter will not often meet with any thing to retard his progress. If the narrative be of matters which concern the community at large, as in civil history, there will no doubt be frequent recourse to the words of the third class. But in regard to these, the method of adopting the original term, established by universal practice, and founded in necessity, whereby translators extricate themselves when correspondent terms cannot be found, does in effect remove the difficulty. And even when words of the second class occur, as will sometimes happen, there is a greater probability that the context will ascertain their meaning in an historical work, than there is where they occur in any other kind of writing, such as the didactic, the

declamatory, the proverbial, or aphoristic, and the argumentative.

This is the first difficulty proper to be mentioned, arising from difference of manners, a difficulty which cannot be said to affect the sacred writings peculiarly otherwise than in degree. It is always the harder to reach, in a version, the precise signification of the words of the original, the wider the distance is in sentiments and manners, between the nation in whose language the book is written, and the nation into whose language it is to be translated.

§ 2. THE second difficulty I shall take notice of, arises from the penury of words in the ancient oriental languages, at least in the Hebrew, a natural consequence of the simplicity of the people, the little proficiency made by them in sciences and arts, and their early withdrawing themselves, on account of religion, from the people of other nations. The fewer the words are, in any language, the more extensive commonly is the signification given to every word; and the more extensive the signification of a word is, there is the greater risk of its being misunderstood, in any particular application; besides, the fewness of words obliges writers of enlarged minds, for the sake of supplying the deficiency, frequently to recur to metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, catachresis, and other rhetorical tropes. These, accordingly, are always found to abound most in the scantiest tongues. Now the frequent use of tropes

occasions an unavoidable obscurity, and sometimes ambiguity, in the expression.

§ 3. A THIRD difficulty arises from the penury of books extant in the genuine and ancient Hebrew, there being no more than the books of the Old Testament, and not even all these. When we consider the manner in which the knowledge of any language, even of our native tongue, is acquired, we find it is solely by attending to the several ways in which words are used in a vast variety of occurrences and applications, that the precise meaning is ascertained. As it is principally from conversation, in our mother-tongue, or in any living language which we learn from those who speak it, that we have occasion to observe this variety, so it is only in books that we have occasion to observe it, when employed in the acquisition of a dead language. Consequently, the fewer the books are, there is the greater risk of mistaking the sense, especially of those words which do not frequently occur. This has given rise to doubts about the meaning of some words, even of the first class, to wit, the names of a few natural objects, as plants, animals, and precious stones, which occur, but rarely, in Scripture, and, solely, in passages where sufficient light cannot be had from the context.

§ 4. IT may indeed be said, that as the writers of the New Testament, employed not the Hebrew, but the Greek language, in their compositions; neither of the two remarks last mentioned can

affect them, however they may affect the penmen of the Old. The Greek is indeed a most copious language, and the books written in it are very numerous. But whoever would argue in this manner, must have forgotten, what has been fully evinced in the former Dissertation, that though the words, the inflection, and the construction in the books of the New Testament are Greek, the idiom is strictly Hebraical; or at least, he must not have reflected on the inevitable consequences of this doctrine; one of which is, that the Hebraistic Greek, or Greek of the synagogue, as it has been called, will, in a great measure, labour under the same inconveniences and defects with the tongue on which its idiom is formed. Another consequence is, that the scarcity of books in the language which is the parent of the idiom, is, in effect, a scarcity of the lights that are necessary, or at least convenient, for the easier discovery of the peculiarities of the idiomatic tongue formed upon it. The reason of both is obvious; it is from that language we must learn the import of the phrases, and even sometimes of particular words, which otherwise would often prove unintelligible.

§ 5. THE fourth difficulty which the interpreter of the Bible has to encounter, arises from the nature of the prophetic style, a style highly figurative, or, as some critics have thought proper to denominate it, symbolical. The symbolic or typical is, in my apprehension, very much akin to what may be called the allegoric style. There is, how-

ever, this difference: the symbols employed in prophecy have, like the Egyptian hieroglyphics, acquired a customary interpretation from the established use in that mode of writing, and are seldom or never varied; whereas the allegory is more at the discretion of the writer. One consequence of this is, that in the former there is not required the same exactness of resemblance between the symbols, or the types and their antitypes, as is required in allegory. The reason is obvious. The usual application supplies the defects in the first; whereas, in the second, it is solely by an accuracy of resemblance that an allegory can be distinguished from a riddle.

This difficulty however in the prophetic style, may be said, more strictly, to affect the expounder of the sacred oracles than the translator. For, in this mode of writing, there are two senses exhibited to the intelligent reader; first, the literal, and then the figurative: for, as the words are intended to be the vehicle of the literal sense, to the man who understands the language; so, the literal sense is intended to be the vehicle of the figurative, to the man whose understanding is exercised “to discern the things of the Spirit.” It is to such, therefore, in a particular manner, that whatever is written in the symbolic style, in the New Testament, is addressed. Our Lord, to distinguish such from the unthinking multitude, calls them those who have ears to hear. *Whoso hath ears to hear*, says he, *let him hear*<sup>42</sup>. The same

<sup>42</sup> Matth. xi. 15. xiii. 9. Mark, iv. 9. Luke, viii. 8.

expression is also used in the Apocalypse<sup>43</sup>, a book of prophecies. And it deserves to be attended to, that Jesus Christ never employs these words in the introduction, or the conclusion, of any plain moral instructions, but always after some parable, or prophetic declarations figuratively expressed. Now, it is with the literal sense only, that the translator, as such, is concerned. For the literal sense ought invariably to be conveyed into the version, where, if you discover the antitype or mystical sense, it must be, though not through the same words, through the same emblems, as you do in the original.

This also holds in translating allegory, apologue, and parable. A man may render them exactly into another tongue, who has no apprehension of the figurative sense. Who can doubt that any fable of Esop or Phedrus, for example, may be translated, with as much justness, by one who has not been told, and does not so much as guess the moral, as by one who knows it perfectly? Whereas the principal concern of the expounder is to discover the figurative import. In the New Testament, indeed, there is only one book, the Apocalypse, written entirely in the prophetic style: and it must be allowed that that book may be accurately translated by one who has no apprehension of the spiritual meaning. However, in the greater part, both of the historical, and of the epistolary, writings, there are prophecies interspersed. Besides, some knowledge in the diction

<sup>43</sup> Rev. ii. 7. 11. 17. 29.

and manner of the prophets is necessary for the better apprehension of the application made in the New Testament, of the prophecies of the Old, and the reasonings of the Apostles in regard to those prophecies.—Indeed it may be affirmed in general, that for translating justly what is of a mixed character, where the emblematic is blended with the historical, some knowledge of the mystic applications is more essential, than for translating unmixed prophecy, allegory, or parable.

§ 6. I SHALL mention, as the cause of a fifth difficulty in the examination, and consequently in the right interpretation, of the Scriptures, that, before we begin to study them critically, we have been accustomed to read them in a translation, whence we have acquired a habit of considering many ancient and oriental terms, as perfectly equivalent to certain words in modern use in our own language, by which the other have been commonly rendered. And this habit, without a considerable share of knowledge, attention, and discernment, is almost never perfectly to be surmounted. What makes the difficulty still the greater is that, when we begin to become acquainted with other versions beside that into our mother-tongue, suppose Latin, French, Italian; these, in many instances, instead of correcting, serve but to confirm the effect. For, in these translations, we find the same words in the original, uniformly rendered by words which we know to correspond exactly, in the present use of those

tongues, to the terms employed in our own translation.

I hope I shall not be so far misunderstood by any, as to be supposed to insinuate, by this remark, that people ought to delay reading the Scriptures in a translation, till they be capable of consulting the original. This would be to debar the greater part of mankind from the use of them altogether, and to give up the many immense advantages derived from the instructions, contained in the very worst versions of that book, for the sake of avoiding a few mistakes, comparatively small, into which one may be drawn, even by the best. A child must not be hindered from using his legs in walking, on pretence that if he be allowed to walk, it will be impossible always to secure him from falling. My intention in remarking this difficulty, is to show first, that those early studies, however proper and even necessary in Christians, are nevertheless attended with this inconveniency, that at a time when we are incompetent judges, prepossessions are insensibly formed on mere habit or association, which afterwards, when the judgment is more mature, cannot easily be surmounted; 2dly, to account in part, without recurring to obscurity in the original, for the greater difficulty said to be found in explaining holy writ, than in expounding other works of equal antiquity; and, 3dly, to awake a proper circumspection and caution, in every one who would examine the Scriptures with that attention which the ineffable importance of the subject merits.

But, in order to set the observation itself in relation to this fifth difficulty in the strongest light, it would be necessary to trace the origin, and give, as it were, the history of some terms, which have become technical amongst ecclesiastical writers, pointing out the changes which in a course of ages they have insensibly undergone. When alterations are produced by slow degrees, they always escape the notice of the generality of people, and sometimes even of the more discerning. For a term once universally understood to be equivalent to an original term whose place it occupies in the translation, will naturally be supposed to be still equivalent, by those who do not sufficiently attend to the variations, in the meanings of words, which the tract of time, and the alterations in notions and customs thence arising, have imperceptibly introduced. Sometimes etymology too contributes to favour the deception. Is there one of a thousand, even among the readers of the original, who entertains the smallest suspicion that the words, *blasphemy*, *heresy*, *mystery*, *schism*, do not convey to moderns, precisely the same ideas which the Greek words *βλασφημία*, *αιρεσις*, *μυστηριον*, *σχισμα*, in the New Testament, conveyed to Christians, in the times of the Apostles? Yet that these Greek and English words are far from corresponding perfectly, I shall take an occasion of evincing afterwards<sup>48</sup>. The same thing may be affirmed of several other words and even phrases which retain their currency on re-

<sup>48</sup> Dissertation ix.

ligious subjects, though very much altered in their signification.

§ 7. THE sixth and last difficulty, and perhaps the greatest of all, arises from this, that our opinions on religious subjects are commonly formed, not indeed before we read the Scriptures, but before we have examined them. The ordinary consequence is, that men afterwards do not search the sacred oracles in order to find out the truth, but in order to find what may authorize their own opinions. Nor is it, indeed, otherwise to be accounted for, that the several partizans of such an endless variety of adverse sects (although men who, on other subjects, appear neither weak nor unfair, in their researches) should all, with so much confidence, maintain that the dictates of holy writ are perfectly decisive, in support of their favorite dogmas, and in opposition to those of every antagonist. Nor is there, in the whole history of mankind, a clearer demonstration than this, of the amazing power of prejudice and prepossession.

It may be said, that interest often warps men's judgment, and gives them a bias towards that side of a question in which they find their account; nay, it may even be urged further that, in cases in which it has no influence on the head, it may seduce the heart, and excite strenuous combatants in defence of a system which they themselves do not believe. I acknowledge that these suppositions are not of things impossible. Actual instances may be found of both. But, for the honour of hu-

man nature, I would wish to think that those of the second class now mentioned, are far from being numerous. But, whatever be in this, we certainly have, in cases wherein interest is entirely out of the question, nay, wherein it appears evidently on the opposite side, irrefragable proofs of the power of prepossession, insomuch that one would almost imagine that, in matters of opinion, as in matters of property, a right were constituted, merely by preoccupancy. This serves also to account, in part, for the great diversity of sentiments in regard to the sense of Scripture, without recurring to the common plea of the Romanists, its obscurity and ambiguity.

§ 8. THUS the principal difficulties to be encountered in the study of Biblical criticism are six, arising, 1st, from the singularity of Jewish customs ; 2dly, from the poverty (as appears) of their native language ; 3dly, from the fewness of the books extant in it ; 4thly, from the symbolical style of the prophets ; 5thly, from the excessive influence which a previous acquaintance with translations may have occasioned ; and, 6thly, from prepossessions, in what way soever acquired, in regard to religious tenets.

## Dissertation the Third.

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*Of the Style of the Scripture History, particularly the Gospels.  
Its Perspicuity defended against the Objections of Father  
Simon.*

FROM what has been evinced in the preceding discourse, it will, not improbably, be concluded that the style of holy writ, both of the New Testament, and of the Old, of the historical books, as well as of the prophetical, and the argumentative, must be generally obscure, and often ambiguous. So much, and with so great plausibility and acuteness, has been written, by some learned men, in proving this point, that were a person, before he ever read the Scriptures, either in the original, or in a translation, to consider every topic they have employed, and to observe how much, in regard to the truth of such topics, is admitted by those who cannot entirely acquiesce in the conclusion, he would infallibly despair of reaping any instruction, that could be depended on, from the study of the Bible; and would be almost tempted to pronounce it altogether unprofitable.

What can exceed the declarations, to this purpose, of the celebrated Father Simon, a very emi-

nent critic, and probably the greatest oriental scholar of his age? "We ought," says he<sup>48</sup>, "to regard it as unquestionable, that the greater part of the Hebrew words are equivocal, and that their signification is *entirely* uncertain. For this reason, when a translator employs in his version the interpretation which he thinks the best, he cannot say absolutely that that interpretation expresses truly what is contained in the original. There is *always* ground to doubt whether the sense which he gives to the Hebrew words be the true sense, because there are other meanings which are *equally* probable." Again<sup>49</sup>, "They [the Protestants] do not consider that even the most learned Jews doubt almost every where concerning the proper signification of the Hebrew words, and that the Hebrew lexicons composed by them, commonly contain nothing but uncertain conjectures." Now, if matters were really

<sup>48</sup> Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. iii. ch. ii. On doit supposer comme une chose constante, que la plus part des mots Hebreux sont equivoques, et que leur signification est *entierement* incertaine. C'est pourquoi lors qu'un traducteur employe dans sa version l'interpretation qu'il juge la meilleure, on ne peut pas dire absolument, que cette interpretation exprime au vrai ce qui est contenu dans l'original. Il y a *toujours* lieu de douter, si le sens qu'on donne aux mots Hebreux est le veritable, puis qu'il y en a d'autres qui ont *autant* de probabilité.

<sup>49</sup> Hist. Crit. du V. T. liv. iii. ch. iv. Ils n'ont pas pris garde, que même les plus scavans Juifs doutent presque par tout de la signification propre des mots Hebreux, et que les dictionnaires qu'ils ont composés de la langue Hebraique ne contiennent le plus souvent que de conjectures incertaines.

as here represented, there could be no question that the study of Scripture would be mere loss of time, and that, whatever might be affirmed of the ages of the ancient prophets, it could not be said at present, that there is any revelation extant of what preceded the times of the Apostles. For a revelation which contains nothing but matter of doubt and conjecture, and from which I cannot raise even a probable opinion that is not counterbalanced by opinions equally probable, is no revelation at all. How defective, on this hypothesis, the New Testament would be, which every where presupposes the knowledge and belief of the Old ; and, in many places, how inexplicable without that knowledge, it is needless to mention.

§ 2. IT would not be easy to account for exaggerations so extravagant, in an author so judicious, and commonly so moderate, but by observing that his immediate aim, whereof he never loses sight, throughout his whole elaborate performance, is to establish TRADITION, as the foundation of all the knowledge necessary for the faith and practice of a Christian. *Scripture*, doubtless, has its difficulties ; but we know at least what, and where it is. As for *tradition*, *what* it is, *how* it is to be sought, and *where* it is to be found, it has never yet been in the power of any man to explain, to the satisfaction of a reasonable inquirer. We are already in possession of the former, if we can but expound it. We cannot say so much of the latter, which, like Nebuchad-

nezzar's dream, we have first to find, and then to interpret.

I am not ignorant that Simon's principal aim has been represented by some of his own communion, particularly Bossuet bishop of Meaux, as still more hostile to religion, than from the account above given we should conclude it to be. That celebrated and subtle disputant did not hesitate to maintain that, under the specious pretext of supporting the church, this priest of the Oratory undermined Christianity itself, a proceeding which, in the end, must prove fatal to an authority that has no other foundation to rest upon. The Bishop accordingly insists that the general tendency of his argument, as appears in every part of the work, is to insinuate a refined Socinianism, if not an universal scepticism. Certain it is, that the ambiguous manner often adopted by our critical historian, and the address with which he sometimes eludes the expectation of his readers, add not a little probability to the reasoning of this acute antagonist. When to any flagrant misinterpretation of a portion of Scripture mentioned in his work, we expect his answer from a critical examination of the passage, we are silenced with the tradition and authority of the church, urged in such a way as evidently suggests, that without recurring to her decision, there is no possibility of refuting the objections of adversaries, or discovering the truth; and that our own reasonings, unchecked by her, if they did not subvert our faith altogether, would infallibly plunge us into all the errors of Socinus. Thus most of his discussions concern-

ing the import of the sacred text conclude in an alternative which, whilst it conceals his own sentiments, bewilders his readers. The purport is, 'If ye will be rational, ye must soon cease to be Christians; and if ye will be Christians, ye must (wherever religion is concerned) cease to be rational.' This alternative of *faith* or *reason*, though not expressed in so many words, is but too plainly implied in those he uses. If for *Christian* he had substituted *Roman Catholic*, or even any one denomination of Christians, the sentiment would not have been so generally controverted. As it is, he offers no other choice, but to believe every thing, how absurd soever, on an authority into the foundation of which we are not permitted to inquire, or to believe nothing at all. The Critical History has accordingly been observed to produce two contrary effects on readers of opposite characters. Of the weak and timid it often makes *implicit believers*; of the intelligent and daring it makes *free-thinkers*. To which side the author himself leaned most, it would perhaps be presumptuous to say. But as his personal character and known abilities were much more congenial to those of the latter class than to those of the former, it was no wonder that he fell under suspicion with some shrewd but zealous Catholics, who looked on his zeal for tradition as no better than a disguise. But this only by the way. I mean not to consider here what was his real and ultimate scope in the treatise above mentioned: it is enough for my purpose to ex-

amine his professed intention, which is to support tradition by representing Scripture as, in consequence of its obscurity, insufficient evidence of any doctrine.

That Simon's assertions above quoted are without bounds hyperbolic, can scarcely be doubted by any person who reflects. Of the prophetic writings I am not now to speak, though even, with regard to them, it were easy to show that such things could not be affirmed, in an entire consistency with truth. As to the historical books, I hope to prove, notwithstanding all that has been evinced on one side, and admitted on the other, that they are, in general, remarkable for perspicuity. It is true that our knowledge of the tongue, for the reasons above mentioned, is defective; but it is also true, that this defect is seldom so great as materially to darken the history, especially the more early part of it.

§ 3. THE first quality for which the sacred history is remarkable is simplicity. The Hebrew is a simple language. Their verbs have not, like Greek and Latin, a variety of moods and tenses, nor do they, like the modern languages, abound in auxiliaries and conjunctions. The consequence is, that in narrative they express by several simple sentences, much in the way of the relations usual in conversation, what in most other languages would be comprehended in one complex sentence of three or four members. Though the latter method has many advantages, in respect of elegance, harmony, and variety, and is essential

to what is strictly called style; the former is incomparably more perspicuous. Accordingly we may often observe that unlettered people who are very attentive to a familiar story told in their own homely manner, and perfectly understand it, quickly lose attention to almost any written history, even the most interesting, the history contained in the Scriptures alone excepted. Nor is the sole reason of this exception, because they are more accustomed to that history than to any other, though no doubt this circumstance contributes to the effect; but it is chiefly because the simplicity of the diction brings it to the level of ordinary talk, and consequently does not put the minds of people who are no readers, so much to the stretch, as what is written, even in the least laboured style of composition, in any modern tongue, does in regard to those acquainted with the tongue.

§ 4. TAKE for an example of the simplicity here meant, the first paragraph of Genesis, consisting of five not long verses, and containing not fewer than eleven sentences. The common punctuation does not indeed make them so many. When sentences are very short, we usually separate them by semicolons, sometimes by commas; but that is a complete sentence, in whatever way pointed, which conveys a meaning fully enunciated, and intelligible, independently of what precedes or what follows; when what precedes, and what follows, is also intelligible, independently of it. 1. *In the beginning God created the heaven*

*and the earth. 2. And the earth was without form and void. 3. And darkness was upon the face of the deep. 4. And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. 5. And God said, Let there be light. 6. And there was light. 7. And God saw the light, that it was good. 8. And God divided the light from the darkness. 9. And God called the light day. 10. And the darkness he called night. 11. And the evening and the morning were the first day.* This is a just representation of the strain of the original. A more perfect example of simplicity of structure we can nowhere find. The sentences are simple; the substantives are not attended by adjectives, nor the verbs by adverbs, no synonymas, no superlatives, no effort at expressing things in a bold, emphatical, or uncommon manner.

In order to judge of the difference of this manner from that of ordinary compositions, we need only compare with it Castalio's version of the passage into Latin, wherein all, except the first sentence and the last, and consequently nine of those above recited, are comprised in one complicated period. "1. *Principio creavit Deus cælum et terram. 2. Quum autem esset terra iners atque rudis, tenebrisque effusum profundum, et divinus spiritus sese super aquas libraret, jussit Deus ut existeret lux, et extitit lux; quam quum videret Deus esse bonam, lucem secrevit a tenebris, et lucem diem, et tenebras noctem appellavit. 3. Ita extitit ex vespere et mane dies primus.*" Compare with this the version of the same passage in the Vulgate, which is literal like the English.

“*In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.*  
 “*Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebræ*  
 “*erant super faciem abyssi : Et spiritus Dei*  
 “*ferebatur super aquas. Dixitque Deus, Fiat*  
 “*lux. Et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem*  
 “*quod esset bona. Et divisit lucem a tenebris.*  
 “*Appellavitque lucem diem, et tenebras noctem.*  
 “*Factumque est vespere et mane dies unus.*”

The difference between these in point of perspicuity, is to an ordinary hearer extremely great. So much depends on the simplicity of structure, necessarily arising, in some degree, from the form of the language. Nothing is more characteristic of the simple manner than the introduction of what was spoken, directly in the words of the speaker; whereas, in the periodic style, we are informed obliquely of its purport. Thus what is in the Vulgate, “*Dixit Deus, Fiat lux,*” is in Castalio, “*Jussit Deus ut existeret lux.*”

§ 5. But beside this, there is a simplicity of sentiment, particularly in the Pentateuch, arising from the very nature of the early and uncultivated state of society about which that book is conversant. This renders the narrative in general extremely clear and engaging. Simple manners are more easily described than manners highly polished and refined. Being also adapted to the ordinary ranks of people, and to all capacities, they much more generally excite attention, and interest the heart. It has been remarked, not unjustly, that though no two authors wrote in

languages more widely different both in genius and in form, than Moses and Homer, or treated of people who in their religious opinions and ceremonies were more opposite than were the Hebrews and the Greeks, we shall hardly find any who resemble one another more than these writers, in an affecting and perspicuous simplicity, which suits almost every taste, and is level to every understanding. Let it be observed that, in this comparison, I have no allusion to imagery, or to any quality of diction, except that above mentioned. Now nothing contributes more to this resemblance than this circumstance which they have in common, that both present to our view a rude, because little cultivated, state of human beings and politics. The passions and the motives of the men recorded by them, display themselves without disguise. There is something wonderfully simple, and artless, even in the artifices related in their writings. If nature be not always exhibited by them naked, she is dressed in a plain decent garb, which, far from disguising, accommodates her, and shows her to advantage. Natural beauties please always, and universally; artificial ornaments depend, for their effect, on mode and caprice. They please particular persons only, or nations, and at particular times. Now, as the writers above mentioned, though in many respects very dissimilar, resemble each other in this species of simplicity, they also resemble in a certain native perspicuity invariably resulting therefrom.

§ 6. HOMER is thought by many the most perspicuous writer in Greek; yet, in respect of idiom and dialect, he is so peculiar, that one is less assisted to understand him by the other compositions in the language, than to understand any other Greek writer in prose or verse. One would almost think that the only usage in the tongue which can enable us to read him, is his own. Were we, therefore, to judge from general topics which might plausibly be descanted upon, we should conclude that the Iliad and the Odyssey are among the darkest books in the language; yet they are in fact the clearest. In matters of criticism, it is likewise unsafe to form general conclusions from a few examples, which may be pompously displayed, and, when brought into view together, made appear considerable, but are as nothing in number, compared with those with which it is possible to contrast them.

§ 7. INDEED most of Simon's instances, in support of his doctrine of the impenetrable darkness of Scripture, appear to me rather as evidences of the strait he was in to find apposite examples, than as tolerable proofs of his opinion. For my part, I frankly own that, from the conviction I had of the profound erudition and great abilities of the man, I was much more inclined to his opinion before, than after the perusal of his proofs. At first, I could not avoid suspecting that a man of his character must have had something extraordinary, to which I had not attended, to advance,

in support of so extraordinary a position. I was at the same time certain that, as it was a point he had much at heart to enforce, the proofs he would bring from examples in support of it, would be the strongest he could find.

Let us then consider some of the principal of these examples. What pains has he not taken to shew that **בָּרָא** *bara*, does not necessarily imply, *to make out of nothing*? But if it do not, can any man consider this as an evidence of either the ambiguity, or the obscurity, of Hebrew? The doctrine that God made the world out of nothing, does not rest upon the import of that verb, but on the whole narration, particularly, on the first verse of Genesis compared with those which follow; whence we learn that God first made the chaotic matter, out of which he afterwards formed the material beings whereof the world is composed. But passing this; for I mean not here to inquire into the grounds of that article, but into the obscurity of Scripture; who sees not that the original term is not more ambiguous, or more obscure, than those by which it is rendered into other languages? Is *ποιεω*, or even *κτιζω* in Greek, *creo* in Latin, or *create* in English, more definite? Not in the least, as we may learn from the common dictionaries of these languages. In regard even to the scriptural use of the English word, God, in the two first chapters of Genesis, is said, in the common version, to have *created* those very things, of which we are also told, that he formed them out of the ground and out of the water. Are these languages then

(and as much may be said of all the languages I know) perfectly ambiguous and obscure? “It is,” says Simon<sup>50</sup>, “the tradition of the synagogue “and of the church, which limits the vague meaning of these first words of Genesis.” But, if words be accounted *vague*, because they are general expressions, under which several terms more special are included, the much greater part of the nouns as well as the verbs, not of the oriental tongues only, but of every tongue, ancient and modern, must be denominated vague. Every name must be so that is not a proper name; the name of a species, because applicable to many individuals; more so the name of a genus, because applicable to many species; and still more so, the name of a class or order, because applicable to many genera.

Would it not be an abuse of words to say that a man spoke vaguely, equivocally, or darkly, who told me that he had built a *house* for himself; because the verb *to build* does not suggest what the materials of the building were, whether stone, or brick, or wood, to any of which it may be equally applied; and because the noun *house* may equally denote a house of one story, or of seven stories, forty feet long, or four hundred? As far as the information went, the expression was clear and unequivocal. But it did not preclude the possibility of farther information on the subject. And what single affirmation ever does pre-

<sup>50</sup> Reponse aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Hollande, ch. 16.

clude this? Are we informed of nothing when we are told that God *made all things*? And if it should be added *out of nothing*, would not this be accounted additional information, and not the removal of any obscurity in the foregoing? Would we not judge in the same manner, should a man, after acquainting us that he had built his house, add, that it was of marble, seventy feet long, and three stories high? Yet there would be still scope for further inquiry, and further information. Is a man told nothing who is not told every thing? And is every word obscure or ambiguous, that does not convey all the information that can be given upon the subject? This way of proving, adopted by our learned critic, is indeed a novelty of its kind.

§ 8. ANOTHER of his examples is the word צְבָא *tsaba*<sup>51</sup>, rendered by the Seventy *κοσμος*, in the Vulgate *ornatus*, and by our translators *host*. Though this word be admitted to be equivocal taken by itself, as most nouns in every language are, its import in this passage is clearly ascertained by the context to be metaphorical. Whether therefore it be rendered *host* with the English interpreters, *κοσμος* with the Greek, or *ornatus* with the Latin, it makes no conceivable variation in the sense. Nobody, in reading our translation, ever thinks of an army of men, in the literal acceptation, mustered in the sky. Nor is the diversity

<sup>51</sup> Gen. ii. 1. The whole verse is in the common version : *Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them.*

at all material, when the purport of the whole sentence is considered, between the different versions which have been given of the two Hebrew words *תהו* *thohu* and *בהו* *bohu*<sup>52</sup>. All concur in making them expressive of a chaos.

§ 9. As to the version which, according to him, may be given to the three first verses of Genesis<sup>53</sup>, making of five or six simple sentences, one complex period, little more is necessary, than to remark that its very want of simplicity in such a book, written in so early an age, is a very strong presumption against it, being not less unsuited to the time of the historian, than it is to the genius of the language. In what respect he could call it literal, or agreeable to the grammatical sense, I do not know; since it evidently departs from the ordinary import, as well as the usual construction of the words, and that not for giving

<sup>52</sup> Rendered in the English translation, *without form and void*, Gen. i. 2.

<sup>53</sup> The version is, "*Avant que Dieu crea le ciel et la terre, que la terre etoit sans forme, &c. que les tenebres etoient, &c. et que l'esprit de Dieu, &c. Dieu dit que la lumiere soit,*" &c. Literally in English, *Before that God created the heavens and the earth, that the earth was without form and void, that darkness was upon the face of the deep, and that the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters; God said, Let there be light, and there was light.* Hist. Crit. de V. T. liv. iii. ch. iii. He mentions also another rendering: *Au commencement que,* &c. But this seems only a more awkward way of expressing the same thing.

light to a passage otherwise obscure (which may reasonably excuse a small deviation from the letter), but for involving in darkness what is expressed perspicuously. It is, besides, quite arbitrary. The copulative is thrice rendered "*Que,*" *that*; the fourth time it is omitted; and what follows is in the perfect of the indicative, the preceding clauses being in the potential or subjunctive mood. Now I may venture to affirm, that no conceivable reason can be assigned why this clause should be made choice of for the direct affirmation, and not of any of those preceding or following in the paragraph.

Add to all this, that to make בראשית *bereshith*, a conjunction, and render it "*priusquam,*" *avant que*, is not only without, but against Biblical authority. ראשית *beginning*, is a very common noun, and joined with the prepositive ב signifying *in*, occurs in four places beside this. In these it is uniformly rendered as here, εν αρχη in the Septuagint, and *in principio* in the Vulgate, and cannot, in a consistency with the words connected, be rendered otherwise. In the Targum or Chaldee paraphrase of Onkelos on the books of Moses, which in point of antiquity comes next to the Septuagint, it is rendered בקרמין *in principiis*, in conformity to every other known translation.

The opinion of Grotius and some learned Rabbies, unsupported by either argument or example, nay, in manifest contradiction to both, is here of no weight. Scriptural usage alone must decide the question. These commentators, (with all de-

ference to their erudition and abilities be it spoken) being comparatively modern, cannot be considered as ultimate judges on a question depending entirely on an ancient use, whereof all the evidences that were remaining in their time, remain still, and are as open to our examination, as they were to theirs. In other points where there may happen to be in Scripture an allusion to customs or ceremonies, retained by the Jews, but unknown to us, the case is different. But nothing of this kind is pretended here. It is therefore needless to enter further into particulars.—What has been produced above will serve for a specimen of the evidence, brought by Father Simon, of the obscurity of the Hebrew Scriptures. And I imagine that, by the like arguments, I might undertake to prove any writing, ancient or modern, to be vague, ambiguous, and obscure.

§ 10. THAT some things, however, in the sacred history, not of great consequence, are ambiguous, and some things obscure, it was never my intention to question. But such things are to be found, in every composition, in every language. Indeed, as the word *perspicuous* is a relative term (for that may be perspicuous to one which is obscure to another), it must be allowed also that the dead languages have, in this respect, a disadvantage, which is always the greater, the less the language is known. As to the multiplicity of meanings sometimes affixed to single words, one would be at a loss to say what tongue, ancient or modern, is most chargeable with this blemish. Any

person accustomed to consult lexicons will readily assent to what I say. In regard to English (in which we know that it is not impossible to write both unambiguously and perspicuously), if we recur to Johnson's valuable Dictionary for the signification of the most common terms, both nouns and verbs, and overlook, for a moment, our acquaintance with the tongue, confirmed by long and uninterrupted habit, we shall be surprised that people can write intelligibly in it, and be apt to imagine that, in every period, nay, in every line, a reader will be perplexed in selecting the proper, out of such an immense variety of meanings as are given to the different words<sup>54</sup>. In this view of things the explanation of a simple sentence will appear like the solution of a riddle.

§ 11. BUT no sooner do we return to practice, than these imaginations, founded merely on a theoretical and partial view of the subject, totally disappear. Nothing can be more pertinent, or better founded, than the remark of Mr. Le Clerc, "That a word which is equivocal by itself, "is often so clearly limited to a particular signification by the strain of the discourse, as to

<sup>54</sup> Thus to the noun *word* Johnson assigns 12 significations—to *power* 13, and to *foot* 16. The verb *to make* has, according to him, 66 meanings, *to put* 80, and *to take*, which is both neuter and active, has 134. This is but a small specimen in nouns and verbs; the observation may be as amply illustrated in the other parts of speech.

“leave no room for doubt.” Nor has Simon paid a due regard to this most evident truth, though he pretends, in answering that writer, to have been aware of it<sup>55</sup>. He could not otherwise have run into such exaggerations as these: “The signification of the greater part of the Hebrew words is *entirely* uncertain;” and “a translator cannot say absolutely, that his interpretation expresses truly what is contained in the original, there being *always* ground to doubt, because there are other meanings which are *equally probable*,” absurdities, which it were easy to confute from his own work, were this the proper place.

§ 12. It may be asked in reply, But is not the poverty of the Hebrew tongue, of which the obscurity and the ambiguity seem to be the natural consequences, acknowledged by all impartial critics? In some sense it is, and I have acknowledged it very amply: but it deserves our notice, that much more has been inferred from this than there is foundation for. The language of a people little advanced in civilization, amongst whom knowledge of any kind has made but inconsiderable progress, and the arts of life are yet rude and imperfect, can hardly be supposed copious. But it is not sufficiently weighed, on the other hand, that, if their words be few, their ideas are few in proportion. Words multiply with the occasions

<sup>55</sup> Reponse aux Sentimens de quelques Theol. de Holl. ch. xvi.

for employing them. And if, in modern languages, we have thousands of names, to which we can find none in Hebrew corresponding, we shall discover, upon inquiry, that the Hebrews were ignorant of the things to which those names are affixed by us as the signs.

Knowledge precedes, language follows. No people have names for things unknown and unimagined, about which they can have no conversation. If they be well supplied in signs for expressing those things with which they are, either in reality, or in imagination, acquainted, their language, considered relatively to the needs of the people who use it, may be termed copious; though, compared with the languages of more intelligent and civilized nations, it be accounted scanty. This is a scantiness, which might occasion difficulty to a stranger attempting to translate into it the writings of a more polished and improved people, who have more ideas as well as words, but would never be felt by the natives; nor would it hurt, in the least, the clearness of their narratives, concerning those matters which fall within the sphere of their knowledge. There is no defect of signs for all the things which they can speak or write about, and it can never affect the perspicuity of what they do say, that they have no signs for those things whereof they have nothing to say, because they know nothing about them.

Nay, it may be reasonably inferred that, in what is called a scanty language, where the signs are few, because the things to be signified are few,

there is a greater probability of precision than in a copious language, where the requisite signs are much more numerous, by reason of the multiplicity of things to be represented by them. The least deviation from order will be observed in a small company, which would be overlooked in a crowd. The source of much false reasoning on this head, is the tendency people have to imagine that, with the same extent of subject which might have employed the pen of an ancient Greek, the Hebrews had perhaps not one fourth part of their number of words. Had this been the case, the words must indeed have been used very indefinitely. But as the case really stood, it is not so easy to decide, whether the terms (those especially for which there is most occasion in narrative) be more vague in their signification in Hebrew, than in other languages.

§ 13. BUT, to descend from abstract reasoning to matters of fact, which in subjects of this kind, are more convincing, "It is false," says Le Clerc, "that there is always ground to doubt whether the sense which one gives to the Hebrew words be the true sense; for, in spite of all the ambiguities of the Hebrew tongue, all the interpreters of Scripture, ancient and modern, agree with regard to the greater part of the history, and of the Jewish religion." Le Clerc is rather modest in his assertions: but in fact he was too much of Simon's opinion on this article, as appears particularly from his *Prolegomena* to the

Pentateuch<sup>56</sup>. Otherwise he might have justly asserted that the points rendered doubtful by the obscurity or the ambiguity of the text, bear not to those which are evident, the proportion of one to an hundred in number, and not of one to a thousand in importance. Let it be observed that I speak only of the doubts arising from the obscurity of Scripture; for, as to those which may be started by curiosity concerning circumstances not mentioned, such doubts are, on every subject, sacred and profane, innumerable. But in questions of this sort, it is a maxim with every true and consistent Protestant, that the faith of a Christian is not concerned.

Simon's reply is affectedly evasive. At the same time that it, in fact, includes a concession subversive of the principles he had advanced, it is far short of what every person of reflection must see to be the truth. He tells us that "he never doubted, that one might understand Hebrew well enough to know *in gross* and *in general*, the Biblical histories; but this *general* and *confused* knowledge does not suffice for fixing the mind in what regards the articles of our belief<sup>57</sup>." Now what this author meant by *knowing in gross*

<sup>56</sup> Dissert. I. chap. vi.

<sup>57</sup> "Mr. Simon n'a jamais douté qu'on n'eût assez de connoissance de la langue Hebraïque pour savoir *en gros* et *en general* les histoires de la Bible. Mais cette connoissance *generale* et *confuse* ne suffit pas pour arrêter l'esprit dans ce qui regarde les points de nôtre creance." Reponse aux Sentimens de quelq. Theolog. de Holl. ch. xvi.

and *in general*, (which is a more vague expression than any I remember in the Pentateuch,) I will not attempt to explain; but it is not in my power to conceive any kind of knowledge, gross or pure, general or special, deducible from a writing wherein “there is *always* ground to doubt whether “the sense assigned be the true sense, because “there are other meanings which are *equally* probable.” There is in these positions a manifest contradiction. When the probabilities in the opposite scales balance each other, there can result no knowledge, no nor even a reasonable opinion. The mind is in total suspense between the contrary, but equal, evidences.

§ 14. BUT, to be more particular; what historical point of moment recorded in Genesis, is interpreted differently by Jews of any denomination, Pharisees, Sadducees, Karaites, Rabbinists, or even Samaritans? Let it be observed that I speak only of their literal or grammatical interpretations of the acknowledged text, and neither of their interpolations, nor of their mystical expositions and allegories, which are as various as men’s imaginations: for with these it is evident that the perspicuity of the tongue is no way concerned. Or is there one material difference, in what concerns the history, among Christians of adverse sects, Greeks, Romanists, and Protestants; or even between Jews and Christians? This book has been translated into a great many languages, ancient and modern, into those of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Is not every thing that can be denominated an event

of consequence similarly exhibited in them all? In all we find one God, and only one, the maker of heaven and earth, and of every thing that they contain. From all we learn that the world was made in six days, that God rested the seventh. All agree in the work of each day, in giving man dominion over the brute creation, in the formation of the woman out of the body of the man, in the prohibition of the tree of knowledge, in man's transgression and its consequences, in the murder of Abel by his brother Cain, in the deluge, in the preservation of Noah's family, and of the animal world, by the ark, in the confusion of tongues, in the histories given of the patriarchs.

It were tedious, I had almost said endless, to enumerate every thing. Take the story of Joseph for an example, the only one I shall specify. In what version of that most interesting narrative, oriental or occidental, ancient or modern, Jewish or Christian, Popish or Protestant, is any thing which can be justly called material, represented differently from what it is in the rest? Do we not clearly perceive in every one of them the partiality of the parent, the innocent simplicity of the child, the malignant envy of the brothers, their barbarous purpose so cruelly executed, their artifice for deceiving their father, the young man's slavery in Egypt, his prudence, fidelity, piety, chastity, the infamous attempt of his mistress, and the terrible revenge she took of his virtuous refusal, his imprisonment, his behaviour in prison, the occasion of his release, Pharaoh's dreams, and Joseph's interpretation, the exaltation of the latter in

Egypt, the years of plenty and the years of famine, the interviews he had with his brothers, and the affecting manner in which he, at last, discovered himself to them? Is there any one moral lesson that may be deduced from any part of this history, (and none surely can be more instructive,) which is not sufficiently supported by every translation with which we are acquainted? Or is this coincidence of translations, in every material circumstance, consistent with the representations which have been given of the total obscurity and ambiguity of the original? The reverse certainly.

§ 15. NOR is it necessary, in this inquiry, to confine one's self to the points merely historical, though, for brevity's sake, I have done it. Permit me only to add in a sentence, that the religious institutions, the laws and the ceremonies of the Jews, as far as they are founded on the express words of Scripture, and neither on tradition, nor on traditional glosses, are, in every thing material, understood in the very same way, by both Jews and Christians. The principal points on which the Jewish sects differ so widely from one another, are supported, if not by the oral traditive law, at least by mystical senses, attributed by one party, and not acquiesced in by others, to those passages of Scripture, about the literal meaning whereof all parties are agreed.

§ 16. YET our critic will have it, that our knowledge of these things is *confused* and *gene-*

*ral.* He had granted more, as we have seen, than was compatible with his bold assertions above quoted ; and therefore to disguise a little the inconsistency of those assertions with the concession now made, he encumbers it with the epithets *confused and general*. But let the fact speak for itself. Had there been any source of confusion in the original, was it possible that there should have been such a harmony in translations made into languages so different, and by men who, in many things that concern religion, were of sentiments so contrary ? But if this knowledge be *confused and general*, I should like to be informed what this author, and those who think as he does, would denominate *distinct and particular*. For my part, I have not a more distinct and particular notion of any history, I ever read, in any language, than of that written by Moses. And if there has not been such a profusion of criticism on the obscurities and ambiguities which occur in other authors, it is to be ascribed solely to this circumstance, that what claims to be matter of revelation, awakens a closer attention, and excites a more scrupulous examination, than any other performance which, how valuable soever, is infinitely less interesting to mankind. Nor is there a single principle by which our knowledge of the import of sacred writ, especially in what relates to Jewish and Christian antiquities, could be overturned, that would not equally involve all ancient literature in universal scepticism.

§ 17. SOME perhaps will be ready to conclude from what has been advanced, that all new translations of Scripture must be superfluous, since the language is so clear, that no preceding translator has missed the sense in points of consequence. It is indeed true, that no translator, that I know, has missed the sense in points of principal consequence, whether historical events, articles of faith, or rules of practice; insomuch that we may with Brown safely desire the sceptic<sup>58</sup>, “to chuse  
“which he should like best or worst among  
“all the controverted copies, various readings,  
“manuscripts, and catalogues, adopted by what-  
“ever church, sect, or party; or even any of  
“the almost infinite number of translations made  
“of these books in distant countries and ages, relying on it as amply sufficient for all the great  
“purposes of religion and christianity.”

Yet it is not to be argued that, because the worst copy or translation contains all the essentials of religion, it is not of real consequence, by being acquainted with the best, to guard against errors, which, though comparatively of smaller moment, and not subversive of the foundation, impair the integrity, and often injure the consistency, as well as weaken the evidence, of our religious knowledge. Although the most essential truths are the most obvious, and accessible to the unlearned, as well as to the learned, we ought not to think lightly of any advances attainable in the divine science. There is a satisfaction which the well-

<sup>58</sup> Essays on the Characteristics, Ess III. Sect. iii.

disposed mind receives from an increase of knowledge, that of itself does more than repay all the labour employed in the acquisition. If this hold, even in ordinary subjects, how much more in the most sublime? There is, besides, such a symmetry of parts in the divine institution we have by Jesus Christ, that a more thorough acquaintance with each part, serves to illustrate the other parts, and confirm our faith in the whole. And whatever in any degree corroborates our faith, contributes in the same degree to strengthen our hope, to enhance our love, and to give additional weight to all the motives with which our religion supplies us, to a pious and virtuous life.

These are reasons which ought to weigh with every Christian, and the more especially, as the most minute examination will never be found an unprofitable study, even to the most learned. It is with the good things of the Spirit, as with what are called the good things of life; the most necessary are the most common, and the most easily acquired. But as, in regard to the animal life, it would be a reproach on those possessed of natural abilities, through torpid indolence, to look no further than mere necessities, not exerting their powers for the attainment of those conveniencies whereby their lives might be rendered both more comfortable to themselves, and more beneficial to others; it is, beyond compare, more blameworthy to betray the same lazy disposition, and the same indifference, in what concerns the spiritual life. Barely to have faith, does not satisfy the mind of

the pious Christian, whose ambition it is to be rich in faith. To have received of the celestial grace is not enough in point, either of acquirement, or of evidence, to him whose ardent and daily desire it is to grow in grace, and in the comfort of God's Spirit. Now, to make progress in divine knowledge, is (if I may be allowed the similitude) to improve the soil in which faith, and hope, and charity, and all the graces of the Spirit, must be sown and cultivated.

§ 18. But, to return to the style of the sacred history, from which I fear this controversy, though exceedingly important, and intimately connected with the subject, has made me digress too far; there is another species of simplicity, besides the simplicity of structure, and the simplicity of sentiment above mentioned, for which, beyond all the compositions I know in any language, Scripture history is remarkable. This may be called simplicity of design. The subject of the narrative so engrosses the attention of the writer, that he is himself as nobody, and is quite forgotten by the reader, who is never led, by the tenour of the narration, so much as to think of him. He introduces nothing as from himself. We have no opinions of his, no remarks, conjectures, doubts, inferences; no reasonings about the causes, or the effects, of what is related. He never interrupts his reader with the display, of either his talents, or his passions. He makes no digressions: he draws no characters: he gives us only the naked facts, from which we are left to collect the character. The utmost

he does in characterizing, and that but seldom, is comprised in a very few words. And what is thus said, is not produced as his opinion, either of the person or of the thing, but as the known verdict of the time, or perhaps, as the decision of the Spirit. No attempt to shine, by means of the expression, composition, or sentiments. Plainness of language is always preferred, because the most natural, the most obvious, and the best adapted to all capacities. Though, in style, by no means slovenly, yet, in little points, as about those grammatical accuracies which do not affect the sense and perspicuity of the sentence, rather careless than curious.

§ 19. Now in the last of the three sorts of simplicity enumerated, our Lord's biographers particularly excel. This quality, or something akin to it, has been much and justly celebrated in some pagan writers, in Xenophon, for instance, among the Greeks, and Cæsar among the Latins. It were easy, however, to show, were it a proper subject of discussion here, that the difference between these and the sacred penmen, especially the Evangelists, is very considerable. In respect of the first species of simplicity mentioned, simplicity of structure, the difference of the genius of the Greek language, from that of the Hebrew, must no doubt occasion some difference in the manner of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, from that of Moses; but the identity of idiom explained in a former discourse<sup>59</sup>, occasions still a strong resem-

<sup>59</sup> Diss. I. Part I.

blance between them. If Genesis, therefore, may be justly said to possess the first rank of simplicity of composition in the sentences, the Gospels are certainly intitled to the second. But even these are not, in this kind, entirely equal among themselves. John and Matthew have it in a higher degree than Mark and Luke.

As to the second species, simplicity of sentiment, arising chiefly from the uncultivated state of society, in the period and country about which the history is conversant; the change of times, which was doubtless very great, as well as the difference of subject, would necessarily confer the first degree here also upon the former. But in what was denominated simplicity of object or design, the Evangelists, of all writers, sacred and profane, appear the foremost. Their manner is indeed, in some respects, peculiar and unrivalled. It may not be amiss to consider a little, the circumstances which gave occasion to this diversity and peculiarity.

§ 20. For this purpose I beg leave to lay before the reader the few following observations. 1st, I observe, that the state and circumstances of things were, before the times of the Apostles, totally changed in Palestine, from what they had been in the times of the Patriarchs. The political alterations gradually brought upon the country, by a succession of revolutions in government, which made their condition so very unlike the pastoral life of their wandering forefathers, are too obvious to need illustration. 2dly, Their

intercourse with strangers of different nations, to some of which they had been successively in subjection, had, notwithstanding their peculiarities in religion, introduced great changes in manners, sentiments, and customs. In our Saviour's days we find the nation divided into religious sects and political parties; the former of which had their respective systems, schools, and patrons among the learned. Each sect had its axioms or leading principles, and its particular mode of reasoning from those principles. Now there is not a single trace of any thing similar to this in all the Old Testament history. 3dly, As the *great* object of our Lord's ministry, which is the *great* subject of the Gospels, was to inculcate a doctrine and morality with which none of their systems perfectly coincided; and as, by consequence, he was opposed, by all the principal men of the different factions then in the nation, the greater part of his history must be employed in relating the instructions which he delivered to the people, and to his disciples, the disputes which he had with his antagonists, and the methods by which he recommended and supported his doctrine, exposed their sophistry, and eluded their malice.

This must give a colour to the history of the Messiah, very different from that of any of the ancient worthies recorded in the Old Testament; in which, though very instructive, there is comparatively little delivered in the didactic style, and hardly any thing in the argumentative. A great deal of both we have in the Gospels. It ought

not here to pass unnoticed, that it is more in compliance with popular language, than in strict propriety, that I denominate his manner of enforcing moral instruction, *arguing*. Our Lord, addressing himself much more to the heart than to the head, and, by his admirable parables, without the form of argument, convincing his hearers, that the moral truths he recommended are conformable to the genuine principles of our nature, in other words, to the dictates of conscience and the common sense of mankind, commands, from the impartial, and the considerate, an unlimited assent. Accordingly, when a similitude, or an example, is made to supply the place of argument, in support of a particular sentiment, he does not formally deduce the conclusion, but either leaves it to the reflections of his hearers, or draws it from their own mouths, by a simple question. This, without the parade of reasoning, is, in practical subjects, the strongest of all reasoning. After candidly stating an apposite case, it is appealing, for the decision, not to the prejudices or the passions, but to the natural sense of good and evil, even of his adversaries. 4thly, As our Lord's history is occupied, partly with what he said, and partly with what he did, this occasions in the Gospels a two-fold distinction of style and manner ; first, that of our Saviour, as it appears in what he said ; secondly, that of his historians, as it appears in their relation of what he did. I shall consider briefly, how the different sorts of simplicity above mentioned may be applied to each of these.

§ 21. As to the simplicity of structure, it may be said in a very eminent degree to belong to both. It is, in itself, regarded more as a quality of narration, but is by no means excluded from the other kinds of composition. Besides, in our Lord's discourses, particularly his parables, there is a great deal of narrative. Simplicity of sentiment appears more in the dialogue part, and in the teaching, than in the narration, which is almost confined to what is necessary for information and connection. It may be objected, that our Lord's figurative manner of teaching is not perfectly compatible with simplicity. But, let it be observed, that there is a simplicity of manner, in the enunciation of the sentiments directly signified, which a piece of writing that admits a figurative or allegorical meaning, is as susceptible of, as one that admits only a literal interpretation. Greece has not produced a more genuine specimen of this than we have in the Apologues of Esop, which are all nevertheless to be understood figuratively. In Cebes's Table, which is an allegory, there is great simplicity of diction. It is only with the expression of the literal or immediate sentiment, that this quality is concerned. And nothing surely can, in this particular, exceed the parables of our Lord. As these are commonly in the style of narration, they are susceptible of the same simplicity of structure as well as of sentiment, with the historian's narrative, and are, in this respect, hardly distinguishable from it.

But the third sort mentioned belongs peculiarly to the historian. In our Lord's discourses, though the general and ultimate object is the same throughout, namely the honour of God by the recovery of men, the particular and immediate object varies with the subject and occasion. At one time it is to instruct his hearers in one important doctrine or duty, at another time in another; sometimes to refute one error, at other times another; now to rebuke what is wrong, then again to encourage in the practice of what is right. We have all the variety of threats and promises, prohibitions and precepts, rebukes and consolations, explanation and refutation, praise and blame. These undoubtedly require a considerable variety in the style and manner. Now, there is occasion for nothing of this kind in the narrative. The historians with whom we are here concerned, do, in their own character, neither explain nor command, promise nor threaten, commend nor blame, but preserve one even tenour in exhibiting the facts entirely unembellished, reporting, in singleness of heart, both what was said, and what was done, by their Master, likewise what was said, and what was done, to him, by either friends or enemies. Not a syllable of encomium on the former, or of invective against the latter. As to their Lord himself, they appear to regard his character as infinitely superior to any praise which they could bestow: and as to his persecutors, they mingle no gall in what they write concerning them; they do not desire to aggravate their

guilt, in the judgment of any man, either by giving expressly, or by so much as insinuating, through the severity of their language, their opinion concerning it.

§ 22. NAY, which is more remarkable, the names of the high-priest and his coadjutor, of the Roman procurator, of the tetrarch of Galilee, and of the treacherous disciple, are all that are mentioned of the many who had a hand in his prosecution, and death. In regard to the four first, it is manifest that the suppression of the names, had the facts been related, would have made no difference to contemporaries; for in offices of so great eminence, possessed by single persons, as all those offices were, the official is equivalent to the proper name, which it never fails to suggest; but such a suppression would have made to posterity a material defect in the history, and greatly impaired its evidence. In regard to the fifth, it is sufficient to observe that, without naming the traitor, justice could not have been done to the eleven. Whereas, of those Scribes and Pharisees who bargained with Judas, of the men who apprehended Jesus, of the officer who struck him on the face at his trial, of the false witnesses who deposed against him, of those who afterwards spat upon him, buffeted and mocked him, of those who were loudest in crying *Away with him; Crucify him; Not this man but Barabbas*; of those who supplied the multitude with the implements of their mockery, the crown of thorns, the reed, and the scarlet robe, of those who upbraided him on the cross

with his inability to save himself; or of the soldier who pierced his side with a spear; no name is given, by any of the historians.

It may be said, 'The names have not been known to them.' This may have been true of some of their names, but cannot be supposed to have been true of them all, and that, with regard not to one, two, or three, but to all the four Evangelists. The witnesses must have been persons of the country, and, at least, occasional hearers of our Lord. It was, no doubt, chiefly the people of Jerusalem, who tumultuously demanded his execution, who derided him with the title of Messiah, and who insulted him even on the cross. Curiosity, on such occasions, leads men to inquire about persons who act a principal part, in a scene so tragical; and, that the disciples were not beyond the influence of this motive, is evident from the whole of the story. The names of the Roman soldiers, concerned in this transaction, might have been unknown to them, and probably little minded by them; but the actions of their countrymen must have excited another kind of emotion, as it more nearly affected all his followers.

Now, this reserve in regard to the names of those who were the chief instruments of his sufferings, is the more observable, as the names of others to whom no special part is attributed, are mentioned without hesitation. Thus Malchus, whose ear Peter cut off, and who was immediately after miraculously cured by Jesus, is named by John; but nothing further is told of him than, that he was present when our Lord was seized, and that

he was a servant of the high-priest. Simon the Cyrenian, who carried the cross, is named by n fewer than three of the Evangelists; but we are also informed that, in this service he did not act voluntarily, but by compulsion. Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus are the only members of the Sanhedrim, except the high-priest, who are mentioned by name; but they were the only persons of that body who did not concur in condemning the Son of God, and who, though once fearful and secret disciples, assumed the resolution to display their affection, at a time when no one else ventured openly to acknowledge him. Our Lord's biographers, whilst they are thus far ready to do justice to merit, avoid naming any man, without necessity, of whom they have nothing to say that is not to his dishonour. To the virtuous and good they conciliate our esteem and love, an effectual method of raising our admiration of virtue and goodness, and exciting in us a noble emulation; but our contempt and hatred they direct against the crimes, not against the persons of men; against vices, not against the vicious; aware that this last direction is often of the most dangerous tendency to Christian charity, and consequently to genuine virtue. They showed no disposition to hold up any man to the Christians of their own time, as an object of either their fear or their abhorrence, or to transmit his name with infamy to posterity.

Though this holds principally in what concerns the last great catastrophe, it appears, in some

degree, in every part of the history. Except in the case of Herodias, which, from the rank of the personages concerned, must have been a matter of notoriety and public scandal, [and therefore required a more public reprehension, the names are never mentioned, when what is related reflects disgrace on the persons. Of the Scribes and Pharisees who watched our Lord, and, on different occasions, dissembling esteem, assailed him with captious and ensnaring questions, of those who openly ascribed his miracles to Beelzebub, called him a madman, a demoniac, and what they accounted worse than either, a Samaritan, who accused him of associating with the profligate, of Sabbath-breaking, of intemperance, and blasphemy, of those Sadducees who, by their sophistry, vainly attempted to refute the doctrine of the resurrection, of those enraged Nazarenes his fellow-citizens, who would have carried him by force to a precipice, that they might throw him down headlong, no names are ever mentioned; nor is the young but opulent magistrate named, who came to consult him as to what he must do to obtain eternal life; for though there were some favourable symptoms in his case, yet as, by going away sorrowful, he betrayed a heart wedded to the world, the application did not terminate to his honour. But of Simon the Pharisee, who invited our Lord to his house, and who, though doubtful, seemed inclinable to learn, of Jairus, and Bartimeus, and Zaccheus, and Lazarus, and his sisters Mary and Martha, and some others, of whose faith, repentance, gratitude, love,

and piety, the most honourable testimony is given, a very different account is made.

Some may object that this conduct, in the first disciples, is imputable to a weak and timid policy. They were afraid to raise against themselves powerful enemies, whose vengeance might prove fatal to their persons, and ruinous to their cause. It happens luckily for silencing this pretext, that, in other things, they gave the most unequivocal proofs of their fortitude; besides, that the exceptions above mentioned include almost all the persons possessed of such authority civil or sacred, united with such a disposition, as could render their resentment an object of terror to those who were obnoxious to it. That the difference thus marked between the evil and the good is, on the contrary, in the true spirit of their Master, might be inferred, as from several other passages, so in particular, from that similitude wherein the rewards and punishments of another state are so well exemplified. A name is given to the poor man who was conveyed by angels to Abraham's bosom: the other, who was consigned to torments, is distinguished solely by the epithet *rich*. A particularity from which we may learn an instructive lesson of modesty and caution, in regard to names, when what truth compels us to say, is to the disadvantage of the persons, and that it suffices that we consider particular punishments as suited to particular actions, without referring them to known individuals, or leading the thoughts of others to refer them.

But, as to the penmen themselves, and their fellow-disciples, in recording their own faults, no secret is made of the names. Of this the intemperate zeal of the sons of Zebedee, on one occasion, and their ambition and secular views, on another, the incredulity of Thomas, the presumption of Peter, and his lamentable defection in the denial of his Master, not to mention the prejudices and dulness of them all, are eminent examples. These particulars are all related, by the sacred historians, with the same undisguised plainness, which they use in relating the crimes of adversaries; and with as little endeavour to extenuate the former, as to aggravate the latter. Nor have they, on the other hand, the remotest appearance of making a merit of their confession. In one uniform strain, they record the most signal miracles, and the most ordinary events. In regard to the one, like persons familiarized to such exertions of power, they no more express themselves, either with hesitancy, or with strong asseverations, than they do in regard to the other. Equally certain of the facts advanced, they recite both in the same unvaried tone, as faithful witnesses, whose business it was to testify, and not to argue.

§ 23. HENCE it happens that that quality of style which is called *animation*, is in a manner excluded from the narrative. The historians speak of nothing, not even the most atrocious actions of our Lord's persecutors, with symptoms of emotion; no angry epithet, or pathetic exclamation, ever

escapes them; not a word that betrays passion in the writer, or is calculated to excite the passions of the reader. In displaying the most gracious, as well as marvellous, dispensation of Providence towards man, all is directed to mend his heart, nothing to move his pity, or kindle his resentment. If these effects be also produced, they are manifestly the consequences of the naked exposition of the facts, and not of any adventitious art in the writers, nay not of any one term, not otherwise necessary, employed for the purpose.

I am sensible that to those who are both able and willing to give these writings a critical examination, hardly, in any translation, does this peculiarity appear so much as it does in the original. Most readers consider *animation* as an excellency in writing; and in ordinary performances, it no doubt is so. By interesting them strongly in the events related, it rouses and quickens their attention. Unanimated simplicity, on the contrary, they call flatness, if not insipidity of manner. In consequence of this general sentiment, when two words occur to a translator, either of which expresses the fact, but one of them does it simply, without any note of either praise or blame, the other with some warmth expressive of censure or approbation; he very naturally prefers the latter, as the more emphatical and affecting. Nor will he be apt to suspect that he is not sufficiently close to the original, if the action or thing alluded to be truly signified, though not entirely in the same manner. Such differences even good trans-

lators, though not insensible of them, are apt to overlook, excusing themselves with the consideration, that words, in all respects, corresponding, in two tongues which differ widely from each other, are not always to be found.

But to explain myself by examples, without which a writer is often but indistinctly understood; in rendering *ὁ παραδὲς αὐτον*<sup>60</sup> into Latin; of the two verbs, *tradere* to deliver up, and *prodere* to betray, most translators would prefer the latter, as the more animated. Yet in reality, the former is more conformable to the simplicity of the sacred author, who satisfies himself with acquainting us with the external fact, without characterizing it or insinuating his own opinion; otherwise the term would have been *προδὲς*, not *παραδὲς*. Again, the demonstrative *ἵτος*<sup>61</sup> may be rendered into the English either *this man* or *this fellow*. But in the last expression a degree of contempt is suggested, which is not in the first, nor in the original. See the notes on both passages.

§ 24. LET it be observed, that in excluding animation, I, in a great measure, confine myself to the narrative, or what proceeds immediately from the historians. In the discourses and dialogues wherein their Master bears the only, or the principal part; the expression, without losing aught of its proper simplicity, is often remarkable for spirit and energy. There is, in these, an animation, but so

<sup>60</sup> Matth. x. 4.

<sup>61</sup> Matth. xii. 26.

chastised by candour and strict propriety, as to be easily distinguished from what is often so termed, in other compositions.

Yet here too, the language has sometimes suffered, in the very best translations, and that not so much through the fault of translators, as in consequence of the difference of genius found in different tongues. Some of the epithets employed by our Lord against his antagonists, have not that asperity which all modern versions appear to give them. The Greek word *ὑποκριτής*, for example, as metaphorically used in Scripture, has more latitude of signification than the word *hypocrite* formed from it, as used in modern tongues. The former is alike applicable to all who dissemble on any subject or occasion; the latter is in strictness applied only to those who, in what concerns religion, lead a life of dissimulation. It must be owned, that it is to persons of this character, that it is oftenest applied in the Gospel; but the judicious philologist hardly needs to be informed, that the more the signification of a word is extended, the more vague and general it becomes, and consequently, if a reproachful epithet, the softer. The word *ψευστής*, in like manner, has not that harshness in Greek that *liar* has in English. The reason is the same as in the former instance: for, though often properly rendered *liar*, it is not limited to what we mean by that term. Every man who tells or teaches what is false, whether he know the falsehood of what he says or not, is what the sacred authors justly denominate *ψευστής*, a *false speaker*; but he is not what we call a

*liar*, unless he knows it to be false, and deceives intentionally. For this reason I have, in some instances<sup>62</sup>, considered it as no more than doing justice to the spirit of the original, to soften the expression in the common version, though otherwise unexceptionable.

On the other hand, the Evangelists, in their own characters, are rarely other than mere narrators, without passions or opinions. In this, as I have said, they differ from Moses and the other historians of the Old Testament, who, though justly celebrated for native simplicity of manner, have not hesitated briefly to characterize the most remarkable persons and actions whereof they have occasion to speak. Without pretending to account entirely for this difference of manner, in writers who spoke by the same Spirit, I shall only submit to the judicious reader the following considerations, which appear to indicate a singular propriety, in the modest reserve of our Lord's biographers.

Moses and the other writers of the Old Testament Scriptures were all prophets, a character with which, considered in a religious light, no merely human character can be compared. None therefore could be better authorized than they, to pronounce directly, on the quality both of the agents and of the actions mentioned in their histories. In this view of the matter, they had no superior, even in the most eminent personages whose lives they recorded. An unreserved plain-

<sup>62</sup> Matth. xxii. 18. Jo. viii. 55.

ness of censure, or approbation, was, in them, therefore, becoming, as it entirely suited the authority with which they were vested. But was not the situation of the Evangelists, it may be asked, the same in this respect, as they also wrote by inspiration? It is true, they were inspired, and, at least, equally entitled to the prophetic character with any who preceded them; but they were not entirely in the same situation. In the Old Testament, the sacred penmen were the mouth of God to the people. In the Gospels, the writers appear solely as Christ's humble attendants, selected for introducing to the knowledge of others, this infinitely higher character, who is himself, in a supereminent sense, the mouth, the oracle of God. It is this subordinate part of ushers which they professedly act. Like people struck with the ineffable dignity of the Messiah whom they serve, they lose no opportunity of exhibiting him to the world, appearing to consider the introduction of their own opinion, unless where it makes a part of the narration, as an impertinence. As modest pupils, in the presence of so venerable a teacher, they lay their hand upon their mouth, and, by a respectful silence, show how profound their reverence is, and how strong their desire to fix all the attention of mankind upon him. They sink themselves, in order to place him in the most conspicuous point of view: they do more; they, as it were, annihilate themselves, that Jesus may be all in all. Never could it be said of any preachers, with more truth than of them, that they

preached not themselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord. Deeply impressed with their Master's instructions, and far from affecting to be called Rabbi, or to be honoured of men as fathers and teachers in things divine, they never allowed themselves to forget that they had only one Father who is in heaven, and only one Teacher the Messiah. The unimpassioned, yet not unfeeling, manner, wherein they relate his cruel sufferings, without letting one harsh or severe epithet escape them, reflecting on the conduct of his enemies, is as unexampled as it is inimitable, and forms an essential distinction between them and all who have either gone before or followed them, literate or illiterate, artful or artless, sceptical or fanatical. For if, in the latter classes, the illiterate, the artless, and the fanatical, fury and hatred flame forth, wherever opposition or contradiction presents them with an occasion; the former, the literate, the artful, and the sceptical, are not less distinguishable for the supercilious and contemptuous manner, in which they treat the opinions of religionists of all denominations. The manner of the Evangelists was equally removed from both. Add to this that, without making the least pretences to learning, they nowhere affect to depreciate it; but, on the contrary, show a readiness to pay all due regard to every useful talent or acquisition.

§ 25. FROM all that has been said I cannot help concluding that, if these men were impostors, agreeably to the infidel hypothesis, they were the

most extraordinary the world ever produced. That they were not philosophers and men of science, we have irrefragable, I had almost said intuitive, evidence; and of what has hitherto been found invariably to mark the character of fanatics and enthusiasts of all religions, we do not discover in them a single trace. Their narratives demonstrate them to have been men of sound minds and cool reflection. To suppose them deceived, in matters which were the objects of their senses; or, if not deceived, to suppose such men to have planned the deception of the world, and to have taken the method which they took, to execute their plan; are alike attended with difficulties insurmountable. The Christian's hypothesis, that they spoke the truth, and were under the influence of the Divine Spirit, removes at once all difficulties, and, in my judgment, (for I have long and often revolved the subject,) is the only hypothesis which ever will, or ever can remove them. But this only by the way.

§ 26. CONCERNING the other qualities of style to be found in these writings, I acknowledge, I have not much to add. Simplicity, gravity, and perspicuity, as necessarily resulting from simplicity, are certainly their predominant characters. But, as in writings it is not always easy to distinguish the qualities arising from the thought, from those arising merely from the expression; I shall consider, in a few sentences, how far the other properties of good writing, commonly attributed to the style, are applicable to the Evangelists. In

what concerns harmony, and qualities which may be called merely superficial, as adding only an external polish to their language; about such, if we may judge from their writings, they do not appear, as was hinted before, to have had any the smallest solicitude. To convey the sense (the only thing of importance enough to be an object to them) in the most familiar, and consequently in the most intelligible, terms to their readers, seems to have been their highest aim in point of style. What concerned the sound alone, and not the sense, was unworthy of their attention.

In regard to elegance, there is an elegance which results from the use of such words as are most in favour with those who are accounted fine writers, and from such an arrangement in the words and clauses, as has generally obtained their approbation. This is still of the nature of *varnish*, and is disclaimed, not studied, by the sacred authors. But there is also an elegance of a superior order, more nearly connected with the sentiment; and in this sort of elegance they are not deficient. In all the Oriental languages great use is made of tropes, especially metaphor. The Scriptures abound with them. When the metaphors employed bear a strong resemblance, and the other tropes are happily adapted, to the subjects they are intended to represent, they confer *vivacity* on the writing. If they be borrowed from objects which are naturally agreeable, beautiful, or attractive, they add also *elegance*. Now of this kind, both of *vivacity* and of *elegance*, the Evangelists furnish us with a variety of examples. Our Lord illus-

trates every thing (agreeably to the use of the age and country) by figures and similies. His tropes are always apposite; and often borrowed from objects naturally engaging. The former quality renders them *lively*, the latter *elegant*. The ideas introduced are frequently those of corn-fields, vineyards, and gardens. The parables are sometimes indeed taken from the customs of princes and grandees, but oftener from the life of shepherds and husbandmen. If those of the first kind confer dignity on the examples, those of the second add an attraction, from the pleasantness of images which recal to the fancy, the thoughts of rural happiness and tranquillity. And even in cases where propriety required that things disagreeable should be introduced, as in the story of the rich man and Lazarus, the whole is conducted with that seriousness, and chaste simplicity of manner, which totally exclude disgust. We may justly say, therefore, that the essential attributes of good writing are not wanting in these histories, though whatever can be considered as calculated for glitter and ostentation, is rather avoided than sought.

§ 27. UPON the whole, therefore, the qualities of the style could not, to those who were not Jews, nor accustomed to their idiom, serve at first to recommend these writings. The phraseology could hardly fail to appear to such, awkward, idiomatical, and even vulgar. In this manner it generally did appear to gentile Greeks, upon the first perusal. But if they were, by any means, induced to give them a second reading, though

still not insensible of the peculiarity, their prejudices and dislike of the idiom rarely failed to subside. A third commonly produced an attachment. The more they became acquainted with these books, the more they discovered of a charm in them, to which they found nothing comparable, or similar, in all that they had learnt before; inso-much that they were not ashamed, nay, they were proud, to be taught by writers, for whose persons and performances they had formerly entertained a sovereign contempt. The persecutors of the church, both Jews and Pagans, perceived, at last, the consequences of conniving at the study of the Scriptures; and were therefore determined to make it their principal object, to effect the suppression of them, particularly of the Gospels. But the more this was attempted, the more were the copies multiplied, the more was the curiosity of mankind excited, and the more was the inestimable treasure of divine knowledge they contained, circulated. Early, and with avidity, were translations demanded, in almost every known tongue. Those Christians who had as much learning as to be capable, were ambitious of contributing their share in diffusing amongst all nations, the delight as well as the instruction, which the study of these books conveyed into the soul. Nor was this admiration of the divine writings to be found only among the vulgar and the ignorant. It is true, it originated among them; but it did not terminate with them. Contrary to the common course of fashion, which descends from the higher ranks to the lower, it arose among the lowest

classes, and ascended to the highest. Not only nobles and senators, but even philosophers and men of letters, the pupils of sophists and rhetoricians, who by the prejudices of their education would be most shocked with the inelegancies, the vulgarisms, and even the barbarisms (as they would account them,) of the sacred writers, found a secret and irresistible attraction, which overcame all their prepossessions, and compelled them to acknowledge, that no writers could so effectually convey conviction to the understanding, and reformation to the heart, as these poor, homely, artless, and unlettered Galileans.

## Dissertation the Fourth.

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*Observations on the Right Method of proceeding in the Critical Examination of the Books of the New Testament.*

It was remarked, in a foregoing Dissertation,<sup>1</sup> that, notwithstanding the sameness both of the language and of the idiom employed by the penmen of the New Testament, there is a sensible diversity in their styles. The first general rule, therefore, which demands the attention of him who would employ himself in searching the Scriptures, is to endeavour to get acquainted with each writer's style, and, as he proceeds in the examination, to observe his manner of composition, both in sentences and in paragraphs, to remark the words and phrases peculiar to him, and the peculiar application which he may sometimes make of ordinary words; for there are few of those writers who have not their peculiarities, in all the respects now mentioned. This acquaintance with each can be attained only, by the frequent and attentive reading of his works, in his own language.

<sup>1</sup> Diss. I. Part. II. § 1.

§ 2. THE second general direction is to inquire carefully, as far as is compatible with the distance of time, and the other disadvantages we labour under, into the character, the situation, and the office of the writer, the time, the place, and the occasion, of his writing, and the people for whose immediate use he originally intended his work. Every one of these particulars will sometimes serve to elucidate expressions, otherwise obscure or doubtful. This knowledge may, in part, be learnt from a diligent and reiterated perusal of the book itself, and in part, be gathered from what authentic, or at least probable, accounts have been transmitted to us, concerning the compilement of the canon.

§ 3. THE third, and only other, general direction I shall mention, is, to consider the principal scope of the book, and the particulars chiefly observable in the method by which the writer has purposed to execute his design. This direction, I acknowledge, can hardly be considered as applicable to the historical books, whose purpose is obvious, and whose method is determined by the order of time, or, at least, by the order in which the several occurrences recorded have presented themselves to the memory of the compiler. But, in the epistolary writings, especially those of the Apostle Paul, this consideration would deserve particular attention.

§ 4. Now, to come to rules of a more special nature : If, in reading a particular book, a word or

phrase occur, which appears obscure, perhaps unintelligible, how ought we to proceed? The first thing undoubtedly we have to do, if satisfied that the reading is genuine, is to consult the context, to attend to the manner wherein the term is introduced, whether in a chain of reasoning, or as belonging to a historical narration, as constituting some circumstance in a description, or included in an exhortation or command. As the conclusion is inferred from the premises; or, as from two or more known truths, a third unknown or unobserved before may fairly be deduced; so from such attention to the sentences in connection, the import of an expression, in itself obscure or ambiguous, will sometimes, with moral certainty, be discovered. This, however, will not always answer.

§ 5. If it do not, let the second consideration be, whether the term or phrase be any of the writer's peculiarities. If so, it comes naturally to be inquired, what is the acceptation in which he employs it in other places? If the sense cannot be precisely the same in the passage under review, perhaps, by an easy and natural metaphor, or other trope, the common acceptation may give rise to one which perfectly suits the passage in question. Recourse to the other places wherein the word or phrase occurs in the same author, is of considerable use, though the term should not be peculiar to him.

§ 6. But thirdly, if there should be nothing in the same writer that can enlighten the place, let

recourse be had to the parallel passages, if there be any such, in the other sacred writers. By parallel passages I mean those places, if the difficulty occur in history, wherein the same or a similar story, miracle, or event, is related; if in teaching or reasoning, those parts wherein the same doctrine or argument is treated, or the same parable propounded; and if in moral lessons, those wherein the same class of duties is recommended. Or, if the difficulty be found in a quotation from the Old Testament, let the parallel passage in the book referred to, both in the original Hebrew, and in the Greek version, be consulted.

§ 7. BUT, if in these there be found nothing that can throw light on the expression, of which we are in doubt; the fourth recourse is to all the places wherein the word or phrase occurs in the New Testament, and in the Septuagint version of the Old, adding to these the consideration of the import of the Hebrew or Chaldaic word whose place it occupies, and the extent of signification, of which, in different occurrences, such Hebrew or Chaldaic term is susceptible.

§ 8. PERHAPS the term in question is one of those which very rarely occur in the New Testament, or those called *ἁπαξ λεγόμενα*, only once read in Scripture, and not found at all in the translation of the Seventy. Several such words there are. There is then, a necessity, in the fifth place,

for recurring to the ordinary acceptation of the term in classical authors. This is one of those cases wherein the interpretation given by the earliest Greek fathers deserves particular notice. In this verdict, however, I limit myself to those comments wherein they give a literal exposition of the sacred text, and do not run, as is but too customary with them, into vision and allegory. There are so many advantages which people have, for discovering the import of a term or phrase in their mother-tongue, unusual perhaps in writing, but current in conversation, above those who study a dead language, solely by means of the books extant in it, that no reasonable person can question that some deference is, in such cases, due to their authority.

You will observe that, in regard to the words or phrases, whereof an illustration may be had from other parts of sacred writ, whether of the Old, or of the New, Testament; I should not think it necessary to recur directly to those primitive, any more than to our modern, expounders. My reason is, as the word or phrase may not improbably be affected by the idiom of the synagogue, the Jewish literature will be of more importance than the Grecian, for throwing light upon the passage. Now this is a kind of learning with which the Greek fathers were very little acquainted. Whereas, on the other hand, if the term in question rarely, or but once occur in the New Testament, and never in the version of the Old, there is little ground to imagine that it is affected by the idiom of the synagogue, but the greatest

reason to suppose that it is adopted, by the sacred penmen, in the common acceptation.

I think it necessary to add here another limitation to the reference intended to the ancient Greek expositors. If the doubtful passage have been produced in support of a side, in any of the famous controversies by which the Christian church has been divided; no regard is due to the authority, whatever may be due to the arguments, of any writer, who lived at, or soon after, the time when the controversy was agitated. If you know the side he took in the dispute, you are sure beforehand of the explanation he will give of the words in question. Nothing blinds the understanding more effectually than the spirit of party, and no kind of party-spirit more than bigotry under the assumed character of religious zeal.

§ 9. WITH respect to the use to be made of the Fathers, for assisting us to understand the Scriptures, there are two extremes, to one or other of which, the much greater part of Christians show a propensity. One is, an implicit deference to their judgment, in every point on which they have given an opinion; the other is, no regard at all to any thing advanced by them. To the first extreme the more moderate Romanists, and those Protestants who favour pompous ceremonies, and an aristocratical hierarchy, are most inclined; and to the second, those Protestants, on the contrary, who prefer simplicity of worship, and the democratical form in church

government. But these observations admit many exceptions. As to the Papists, in the worst sense of the word, those who are for supporting even the most exorbitant of the papal claims, the manifest tendency whereof is to establish an ecclesiastical despotism, the aim of their doctrine, in spite of the canons, has long been to lessen, as much as possible, our reverence of the Fathers. What was said by Friar Theatin an Italian, in a public disputation with some French divines, at Paris, in presence of the Pope's nuncio and many prelates, may be justly considered as spoken in the spirit, and expressive of the sentiments, of the whole party. When his antagonist Baron, a Dominican, urged the testimonies of several Fathers, in direct opposition to the doctrine maintained by the Italian, the latter did not recur to the chimerical distinctions of the Sorbonists, but making light of that long train of authorities, replied contemptuously, "As to what concerns the authority of the Fathers, I have only to say with the church, *Omnes sancti patres orate pro nobis*;" an answer which, at the same time that it greatly scandalized the Galican doctors, was highly approved by the Nuncio, well knowing that it would be very much relished at Rome. So similar on this head are the sentiments of the most opposite sects. Nor is this the only instance wherein the extremes approach nearer to each other, than the middle does to either. I may add that an unbounded respect for the Fathers was, till the commencement of the sixteenth century, the prevalent sentiment in Christendom. Since

that time, their authority has declined apace, and is, at present, in many places, totally annihilated.

I own that, in my opinion, they of former generations were in one extreme, and we of the present are in another. The Fathers are not entitled to our adoration, neither do they merit our contempt. If some of them were weak and credulous, others of them were both learned and judicious. In what depends purely on reason and argument, we ought to treat them with the same impartiality we do the moderns, carefully weighing what is said, not who says it. In what depends on testimony, they are, in every case wherein no particular passion can be suspected to have swayed them, to be preferred before modern interpreters or annotators. I say not this to insinuate that we can rely more on their integrity, but to signify that many points were with them a subject of testimony, which, with modern critics, are matter merely of conjecture, or at most, of abstruse and critical discussion. It is only from ancient authors, that those ancient usages, in other things, as well as in language, can be discovered by us, which to them stood on the footing of matters of fact, whereof they could not be ignorant. Language, as has been often observed, is founded in use; and ancient use, like all other ancient facts, can be conveyed to us only by written testimony. Besides, the facts regarding the import of words (when controversy is out of the question) do not, like other facts, give scope to the passions to operate; and if misrepresented, they expose either the ignorance, or the bad faith, of the author,

to his cotemporaries. I do not say, therefore, that we ought to confide in the verdict of the Fathers as judges, but that we ought to give them an impartial hearing as, in many cases, the only competent witnesses. And every body must be sensible that the direct testimony of a plain man, in a matter which comes within the sphere of his knowledge, is more to be regarded, than the subtle conjectures of an able scholar who does not speak from knowledge, but gives the conclusions he has drawn from his own precarious reasonings, or from those of others.

§ 10. AND, even as to what is advanced not on knowledge, but on opinion, I do not think that the moderns are, in general, entitled to the preference. On controverted articles of faith, both ought to be consulted with caution, as persons who may reasonably be thought prejudiced, in favour of the tenets of their party. If, in this respect, there be a difference, it is entirely in favour of the ancients. An increase of years has brought to the church an increase of controversies. Disputes have multiplied, and been dogmatically decided. The consequence whereof is, that religion was not near so much moulded into the systematic form, for many centuries, as it is in these latter ages. Every point was not, in ancient times, so minutely discussed, and every thing, even to the phraseology, settled, in the several sects, with so much hypercritical, and metaphysical, not to say sophistical subtlety, as at present. They were, therefore, if not entirely free, much less entangled

with decisions merely human, than more recent commentators; too many of whom seem to have had it for their principal object, to bring the language of Scripture to as close a conformity, as possible, to their own standard, and make it speak the dialect of their sect. So much for the preference I give to the ancient, particularly to the Greek, expounders of Scripture, when they confine themselves to the grammatical sense; and so much for the regard to which I think the early Christian writers justly entitled.

§ 11. To the aid we may have from them, I add that of the ancient versions, and, last of all, that of modern scholiasts, annotators, and translators. In the choice of these we ought to be more influenced, by the acknowledged learning, discernment, and candour of the person, than by the religious denomination to which he belonged, or the side which, on contested articles, he most favoured. So far from limiting ourselves to those of one sect, or of one set of tenets, it is only by the free use of the criticisms and arguments of opposite sides, as urged by themselves, that undue prepossessions are best cured, or even prevented. We have heard of poisons which serve as antidotes against other poisons of opposite quality. It will be no inconvenient consequence of the use of interpreters addicted to adverse parties, if their excesses serve mutually to correct one another.

§ 12. BUT I am aware that some will be astonished that, among the assistances enumerated for

interpreting the Scriptures, I have made no mention of two helps much celebrated by writers of almost all denominations. These are *the analogy of the faith*, and *the etymology of the words*. It will no doubt be proper now to inquire impartially, what aid, in the interpretation of dark and doubtful passages, may reasonably be sought for, and expected, from these.

§ 13. FIRST, of the analogy of the faith : As far as I can collect, from the import of the terms, what is meant by proposing this as a rule of interpretation, in every dubious case ; it should be, that when a passage appears ambiguous, or is susceptible of different interpretations, that interpretation is always to be adopted which is most conformable to the whole scheme of religion, in respect both of doctrines and of precepts, delivered in the sacred oracles. Now there can be no question that, if the inquirer be previously in the certain knowledge of that whole scheme, this rule is excellent, and, in a great measure, supersedes the necessity of any other. But, let me ask him, or rather, let him ask himself, ere he proceed, this simple question, What is the reason, the principal reason, at least, for which the study of Scripture is so indispensable a duty ? It is precisely, all consistent Protestants will answer, that thence we may discover what the whole scheme of religion is. Are we then to begin our examination with taking it for granted that, without any inquiry, we are perfectly acquainted with this scheme already ?

Is not this going to Scripture, not in order to learn the truths it contains, but in order to find something that may be made to ratify our own opinions?

If no more were meant by making the analogy of the faith the rule of interpreting, than that, where an expression is either dark or equivocal, an interpretation were not to be adopted, which would contradict the sentiments of the writer, manifestly declared in other passages perfectly clear and unequivocal; this is no more than what candour would allow in interpreting any profane author, who seems to have enjoyed the exercise of his reason; nay, though the rule were extended to what should be found clearly contained in any other sacred writer, it would be but of little significance as an help in the explanation of the holy oracles. For, in the phrase *the analogy of the faith*, when proposed, in this manner, as a canon to direct us in the interpretation of Scripture; it is only the uncontroverted truths, about which there has never arisen any doubt in the church, that ought to be comprehended.

‘But why,’ say you, ‘should we confine the meaning to the uncontroverted truths?’ Attend a little, and you must perceive that what I have now advanced, is almost self-evident. When I recur to holy writ, my view is, or ought to be, that I may know what it teaches; more especially that, as its doctrine is so variously represented by different sects, I may thence discover, amid such a multiplicity of jarring sentiments, where the truth lies. My purpose manifestly is, by the Scripture,

to judge concerning all such controverted sentiments, and not, by a particular set of controverted sentiments, previously, and therefore inconsiderately, adopted, to determine concerning the sense of Scripture. This would not be judging the parties by the law, but resolving to judge of the import of the law by the interpretation that shall be given by one of the parties, whom we have contracted a strong inclination to favour. Surely such a conduct in a civil judge would be universally pronounced incompatible with every principle of reason and justice. And is not at least as great a deference due from the devout Christian to the divine oracles, as is due from the secular judge to the law of his country ?

§ 14. IN vain do we search the Scriptures for their testimony concerning Christ, if, independently of these Scriptures, we have received a testimony from another quarter, and are determined to admit nothing, as the testimony of Scripture, which will not perfectly quadrate with that formerly received. This was the very source of the blindness of the Jews in our Saviour's time. They searched the Scriptures as much as we do ; but, in the disposition they were in, they would never have discovered what that sacred volume testifies of Christ<sup>2</sup>. Why ? Because their great rule of interpretation was *the analogy of the faith* ; or, in other words, the system of

<sup>2</sup> See John, v. 39, 40. in this Translation, with the note upon it.

the Pharisean scribes, the doctrine then in vogue, and in the profound veneration of which they had been educated. This is that veil by which the understandings of that people were darkened, even in reading the law ; of which the Apostle observed, that it remained unremoved in his day, and of which we ourselves have occasion to observe, that it remains unremoved in ours.

And is it not precisely in the same way that the phrase is used by every sect of Christians, for the particular system or digest of tenets for which they themselves have the greatest reverence ? The Latin church, and even the Greek, are explicit in their declarations on this article. With each *the analogy of the faith* is their own system alone. And that different parties of Protestants, though more reserved in their manner of speaking, aim at the same thing, is undeniable : the same, I mean, considered relatively to the speakers ; for absolutely considered, every party means a different thing. When a Lutheran tells you, “ You are to put no interpretation on “ any portion of Scripture, but what perfectly “ coincides with *the analogy of the faith* ;” sift him ever so little on the import of this phrase, and you shall find that, if he mean any thing, it is, that you are to admit no exposition that will not exactly tally with the system of his great founder Luther. Nor is he singular in this. A Calvinist has the same prepossession in favour of the scheme of Calvin, and an Arminian of that of Arminius. Yet they will all tell you with one voice, that their respective doctrines are to be tried

by Scripture, and by Scripture alone. *To the law and to the testimony*, is the common cry; only every one of them, the better to secure the decision on the side he has espoused, would have you previously resolve, to put no sense whatever on the law and the testimony, but what his favourite doctor will admit. Thus they run on in a shuffling circular sort of argument, which, though they studiously avoid exposing it, is, when dragged into the open light, neither more nor less than this: "You are to try our doctrine by the Scripture only. But then you are to be very careful that you explain the Scripture solely by our doctrine." A wonderful plan of trial, which begins with giving judgment, and ends with examining the proof, wherein the whole skill and ingenuity of the judges are to be exerted in wresting the evidence so as to give it the appearance of supporting the sentence pronounced beforehand.

'But,' say some, 'is not this mode of interpretation warranted by apostolical authority? Does not Paul<sup>3</sup>, in speaking of the exercise of the spiritual gifts, enjoin the prophets to prophesy, *κατα την αναλογιαν της πιστεως*, according to the proportion of faith, as our translators render it, but as some critics explain it, according to the analogy of the faith?' Though this exposition has been admitted into some versions<sup>4</sup> and adopted

<sup>3</sup> Rom. xii. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Port Royal and Sacy, though translating from the Vulgate, which says, *secundum rationem fidei*, have rendered the clause *selon l'analogie et la regle de la foi*.

by Hammond and other commentators, and may be called literal, it is suited neither to the ordinary meaning of the words, nor to the tenor of the context. The word *αναλογια* strictly denotes proportion, measure, rate, but by no means that complex notion conveyed in the aforesaid phrase by the term *analogy*, which has been well observed by Whitby, to be particularly unsuitable in this place, where the Apostle treats of those who speak by inspiration, not of those who explain what has been thus spoken by others. The context manifestly leads us to understand *αναλογια πισεως*, v. 6. as equivalent to *μετρον πισεως*, v. 3. And for the better understanding of this phrase, *the measure of faith*, it may be proper to observe, 1st, that a strong conviction of any tenet, from whatever cause it arises, is in Scripture sometimes termed *faith*. Thus, in the same Epistle<sup>5</sup>, the Apostle says, *Hast thou faith? Have it to thyself before God*. The scope of his reasoning shows that nothing is there meant by *faith*, but a conviction of the truth, in regard to the article of which he had been treating, namely, the equality of days and meats, in point of sanctity, under the gospel dispensation. The same is evidently the meaning of the word, v. 23. *Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin*; where, without regard to the morality of an action, abstractly considered; that is concluded to be sin which is done by one who doubts of its lawfulness; 2dly, as to spiritual gifts, prophecy and

<sup>5</sup> Rom. xiv. 22.

inspiration in particular, they appear to have been accompanied with such a faith or conviction that they came from the Spirit, as left no room for hesitation. And indeed it is easy to perceive, that something of this kind was absolutely necessary, to enable the inspired person to distinguish what proceeded from the Spirit of God, from what was the creature of his own imagination. It was observed before <sup>6</sup>, that the prophets of God were not acted upon like machines, in delivering their predictions, as the diviners were supposed to be among the heathen, but had then, as at other times, the free use of their faculties both of body and mind. This caution is therefore with great propriety given them by the Apostle, to induce them to be attentive, in prophesying, not to exceed the precise measure allowed them, (for different measures of the same gift were committed to different persons,) and not to mingle aught of their own, with the things of God's Spirit. This distinction, he tells them, they have it in their power to make, by means of that lively faith with which the divine illumination is accompanied. Though a sense somewhat different has been given to the words, by some ancient Greek expositors, none of them, as far as I remember, seems to have formed a conception of that sense which, as was observed above, has been given by some moderns.

So much for what is commonly understood by *the analogy of the faith*, so unanimously recom-

<sup>6</sup> Diss. I. Part II. § 3.

mended as a rule of interpretation, but so discordantly applied; and so much for the regard that is due to it.

§ 15. ANOTHER ordinary method of explaining is, by entering, on every occasion, into a minute and nice examination of the etymology of the principal words employed in the sentence. This, though generally carried to excess, neither proceeds from the like partial prepossessions as the former, nor is so hazardous in its consequences. There are cases wherein no reasonable person can doubt, that the signification of a word may be fully ascertained from the knowledge we have of the meaning of the etymon: for instance, in verbal nouns expressing the action signified by the verb, as *κριμα judgment*, from *κρινειν to judge*, or the actor, as *κριτης a judge*, from the same root; in concretes from abstracts, as *αληθινος true*, from *αληθεια truth*; or conversely, abstracts from concretes, as *δικαιοσυνη justice*, from *δικαιος just*. In compositions also analogically formed, the sense of the compound term may often be with certainty known, by the import of the simple terms of which it is composed. Thus no man will hesitate a moment to pronounce from etymology, that *φιληδονος* must mean *a lover of pleasure*, and *φιλοθεος* *a lover of God*; though these words occur but once in the New Testament, and never in the Greek version of the Old. In matters so obvious, the bare knowledge of the rudiments of the language renders the mention of any rules, save those of grammar, unnecessary,

almost as much as for determining the import of the future tense of a verb from that of the present, or the signification of the passive voice from that of the active. There are instances, however, wherein the verb in the passive form undergoes an additional change of meaning, beside what the analogy of the language requires.

§ 16. But, there are a great many cases wherein, if I may be allowed the expression, the pedigree of the derivative, or of the compound, cannot be deduced with equal clearness; and there are many cases wherein, though its descent may be clearly traced, we should err egregiously, if we were to fix its meaning from that of the primitive or root. As to the first, that we should not hastily decide concerning the import of an obscure or unusual term, from that of another better known, but of whose relation to the former we are uncertain, is indeed manifest. But even often, where the connection is unquestionable, the sense of the one does not ascertain the signification of the other. It will not be improper to give a few illustrations of this doctrine, as I know nothing in which modern critics are more frequently misled, than in their reasonings from etymology. I shall exemplify this remark first in simple words, and afterwards in compound.

§ 17. THE Greek word *τραγικος*, from *τραγος* a goat; if it occurred very seldom in Greek authors, and if in the few places where it occurred, the

words in connection did not suffice for ascertaining the sense, and if the custom which gave rise to the common acceptation of that term had never been related by any ancient writer, nobody, by the aid of etymology, could have imagined the meaning to be that which we know certainly that it is. As much may be said of the word *κωμικος*, from *κωμη* a village. By neither should we have been led to think of poetry or any of its species. To the Greek word *κωμικος* the Latin *paganus* answers exactly, in being similarly derived from a primitive of the same signification. But it is very far from corresponding in sense. Nor does it, in the use which soon became universal among Christians, correspond better with its etymon *pagus*. When Christianity became very general throughout the empire, as all the churches were in the cities and great towns, where the bishops had their residence, the Christians found a convenience in living near their place of worship, which made them mostly resort to the cities or their suburbs. Those who were attached to the ancient idolatry, not having the same motive for preferring the towns, and probably liking better, when Christianity came to have the ascendant, to associate with one another, lived generally in the villages. Hence *villager* and *idolater* became synonymous. This sense of the Latin *paganus* has passed into modern tongues. The Italians say *pagano*, the French *payen*, and the English *pagan*, to denote the same character. The English word *villain*, in low Latin *villanus*, a farmer, a villager, though nearly coinciding in etymology,

has come gradually by use to signify a worthless unprincipled man. Thus the three words *καμικος* in Greek, *paganus* in Latin, and *villain* in English, though evidently so conformable in etymology, that they all ought to denote the same thing, namely *villager* ; have, for many ages, both lost that signification, and acquired others in which they do not in the least resemble one another. If the use in these languages should ever come to be very little known, and the history of the nations nearly lost, we may form a guess at the absurdities in explaining those terms into which men would be misled by etymology. קדשה *kedeshah*, in Hebrew signifies *a harlot*, a word manifestly sprung, according to the invariable rules of that language, from קדש *kadash*, *to sanctify*. What could give rise to so strange a deviation from the primitive meaning, it is perhaps now impossible to discover.

In process of time, words in every tongue vary from their original import, in consequence of the gradual influence of incidental causes, and the changes in manners and sentiments which they occasion. Hence the word זרה among the Hebrews, which denoted no more at first than a female stranger, came at last to signify a common prostitute ; and is almost always used in this sense by Solomon in the Book of Proverbs. The origin of this application may indeed be easily traced from their laws. The women of that occupation among them were all foreigners, no daughter of Israel being permitted to follow so infamous a profession. It is an observation

of Cicero, if I remember right, that the word *hostis* with them anciently meant *foreigner*, which, having been given at first, through delicacy, as a milder name for people with whom they were at war, became, through long-continued use, the proper appellation for *enemy*. By the like gradation doubtless amongst us, the word *knave*, from denoting servant, has degenerated into the sign of a character distinguished more for turpitude of manners, than for meanness of condition. It would not be easy to divine how the word *beholden*, (if not a corruption of the Dutch *gehouden*) the passive participle of the verb *to behold*, came, from signifying *seen* or *perceived*, to denote *indebted*. Innumerable examples of this kind might be mentioned.

§ 18. BUT, from simple words to proceed, as I proposed, to compounds ; were we to lay it down as a principle, that the combined meanings of the component parts will always give us the sense of the compound, we should conclude that the Greek word *πανσφγος*, is equivalent to the English poetic word *omnific*, to which it exactly corresponds in etymology ; yet nothing can be more different in signification. The former is always adopted in a bad, the latter in a good sense. Hardly any rule in the composition of Greek words holds more uniformly than that the adverb *ευ* gives the addition of a good quality to the word with which it is joined ; yet the term *ευηθης* which, if any faith were due to etymology, should mean a virtuous and wor-

thy man, denotes generally a *simpleton* or *fool*. The Greek word *αυταρχεια* exactly corresponds, in respect of the signification of its component parts, to the English word *self-sufficiency* : yet the former has a good meaning, and denotes *contentment* ; the latter, except when applied to the Deity, has invariably a bad meaning, and signifies *arrogance*. Sometimes the sense of one of the words in composition is totally lost, the compound term being applied in a manner which excludes it. Thus the word *οικοδομεω* ought to signify *to build a house*, but it is not only construed with *ταφος* a *sepulchre* (which by metaphor may indeed be called a house, being the receptacle of the dead,) but with *θυσιαστηριον* *altar*, *χαρακωσις* *bulwark*, and several other terms which, in no sense, proper or figurative, can be denominated *houses*. Such anomalies, both in derivation and in composition, are to be found in all tongues, insomuch that often etymology points to one meaning, and use to another. Were we to mind the indication of the former, the English word *always* ought to be rendered into Latin *omnimodo* and not *semper* ; our verb *to vouchsafe* should denote *to give one a protection*, or *to insure one's safety*, and not *to deign* or *condescend*. The inseparable preposition *re* in English commonly denotes *again*, but *to reprove* is not *to prove again*, *to recommend* is not *to commend again*, nor does *to remark* mean *to mark again*. As little can these be explained by the aid of the adverb *back*, like the verbs *to recall* and *to return*.

§ 19. IN the above examples I have confined myself to terms whose meaning, though an exception from the rules of analogy, is incontrovertible ; my principal object being to evince, to the satisfaction of every intelligent reader, that the sense of words is often totally different from that to which the etymology points; and that, consequently, in all the cases wherein use cannot be discovered, and wherein the context does not necessarily fix the meaning, the conviction which arises from etymology alone, is considerably inferior to that which arises either from known use, or from the words immediately connected. But, before I dismiss this topic, I shall offer some criticisms on a few passages of the New Testament which may appear, on a superficial view, more controvertible, in order to show with how much caution we ought to proceed in rendering a compound word in one language, by one in another similarly compounded ; and that even, though the original term be not, like those above specified, an exception, in respect of meaning, from the common rules of analogy.

The word *διψυχος*, used by the Apostle James, compounded of *δισ*, signifying in composition *double* or *twice*, and *ψυχη*, *soul*, *mind*, *spirit*, could not, one would at first imagine, be more properly or literally rendered, than by the similar English compound *double-minded*. But this, though in some sense, it may be called a literal version, is a mis-translation of the word, inasmuch as it conveys a sense entirely different. Yet the meaning of the

original term is analogical : only there are different ways wherein the mind or soul may be charged with duplicity. One is, when it sometimes leans to one opinion, sometimes to the contrary ; another is, when it secretly harbours passions and opinions the reverse of those which it openly professes. No two meanings can be more different ; the first is certainly the import of the Greek word, the second of the English, which is justly explained by Johnson, *deceitful, insidious*. To recur to the passage itself<sup>7</sup> ; *Ἀνὴρ διπυλὸς ἀκαταστάτος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ*, in the common translation, *A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways* : first, the sentiment itself may suggest a doubt of the justness of the version. There appears no immediate connection between deceitfulness and inconstancy. The deceitful are often but too stable in a bad course. The doubleness expressed in the English word does not imply sudden changes of any kind ; but solely, that the real motives of conduct and the outward professions disagree ; or that the person intends one thing, whilst he professes another. Now who sees not that, in respect of both the intention and the profession, he may be very steady ? Fickleness is not remarkably an attendant on hypocrisy. When I examine the context, I find nothing there that relates to sincerity or the conformity that ought to subsist between a man's words and his thoughts ; but I am led directly by

<sup>7</sup> James, i. 8.

it to think of constancy in right principles, as the apostle had been, in the preceding words, urging the necessity of unshaken faith. This verse, if *διψυχος* be understood to mean unsteady in the belief of the truth, perfectly coincides with, and supports, the Apostle's argument; implying that inconstancy in principles produces inconstancy in the whole conduct, than which no sentiment can be clearer.

To recur, however, to some of the other rules of criticising above mentioned (not as necessary, in the present instance, but for the sake of illustration,) and first to Scriptural usage; I find, on inquiry, that there is only one other passage in the New Testament wherein the word occurs. It is in the same Epistle, but the expression there is too general to ascertain the import of the term in question. As the word is not to be found in the Septuagint, nor even in the Apocrypha, there is reason to believe that it is not affected by the idiom of the synagogue. I therefore apply to common use, and find that the word uniformly denotes *doubtful, fluctuating* in respect of one's judgment. All its conjugates in like manner support this meaning; *διψυχία* is *doubt* or *hesitancy*, *διψυχεω* to *doubt*, to *hesitate*. If we apply to the ancient Greek expositors, they all interpret it in the same way. And as this is none of the passages whereon any of their theological controversies were founded, we can give them the greater credit. I shall only transcribe the explanation

given by Ecumenius<sup>8</sup>, which is to this effect:  
 “ *Διψυχος ανηρ* is a man of unsettled and fluctuating sentiments, too solicitous about the present to attain the future, too anxious about the future to secure the present, who driven hither and thither in his judgment of things, is perpetually shifting the object, who this moment would sacrifice all for eternity, and the next would renounce any thing for this transient life.”  
 The sense of the Apostle’s expression may be therefore justly given in these words: *A man unsteady in his opinions, is in all his actions inconstant.*

§ 20. To the above example I shall add a few of the most common of all kinds of composition, a preposition and a verb in familiar use. My intention is chiefly to show, that a deviation in interpreting, small to appearance, even such as is apt to be overlooked by a reader deceived by the correspondence of the themes, is often sufficient to pervert the sense, either by rendering the expression totally unmeaning, or by giving it a wrong meaning. The verb *ὁραω*, *to see*, is common; *προ* in composition generally answers to the English inseparable preposition *fore*. The verb, therefore, *προοραω*, or, in the middle voice *προοραομαι*, should mean analogically, one would imagine, *I foresee*. It is accordingly in one

<sup>8</sup> *Διψυχον ανδρα, τον ανεπειδωτον, τον αστηρικτον λεγει, τον μητε προς τα μελλοντα παριως, μητε προς τα παροντα ασφαλως ηδρασμενον, αλλα τηδε κακεισε αρομενον και περιφερομενον, και ποτε μεν των μελλοντων, ποτε δε των παροντων αντεχομενον.*

place<sup>9</sup> so rendered, *I foresaw the Lord always before my face*, in Greek, *προωραμην τον Κυριον ενωπιον μου δια παντος*. The words are a quotation from the Psalms<sup>10</sup>, and are literally copied from the Septuagint.

It will naturally occur to an attentive English reader, to inquire, What is the meaning of the word *foresaw* in this passage? Foresight has a reference to the future; whereas the Psalmist is speaking of things as present: for, though it is true that the words relate to the Messiah, who was many centuries posterior to David, they are not announced in the form of a prediction. David, in speaking, personates the Messiah, of whom he was an eminent type, and ascribes as to himself what, in the sublimest sense, was applicable only to that illustrious descendant. It is as it were Christ who speaks. The Lord he represents as always before him, not as *to be* in some future period before him, adding *he is*, not *he will be*, on my right hand. In regard to the compound verb, it occurs only in one other passage of the New Testament, to be considered afterwards, and in no place of the Septuagint, except that above quoted. But, on examining more closely the import of the simple words, we discover that the Greek preposition may relate to place as well as to time, and that it is often merely what grammarians called *intensive*: that is, it does not alter the sense of the simple verb to which it is prefixed, it only renders the

<sup>9</sup> Acts, ii. 25.

<sup>10</sup> xvi. 8.

expression more emphatical. Thus the verb *προο-  
ραω* is as literally rendered *prospicio* as *prævideo*,  
and has been, in this passage, more fitly rendered  
so by Beza. It may be objected that this expla-  
nation produces a pleonasm in the sentence, as it  
is immediately added, *ενωπιον μου*, *before me*.  
But such pleonasms are not uncommon in Scrip-  
ture. Thus <sup>11</sup> *Το πνευμα ὑπερεντυγχανει ὑπερ  
ἡμων.* <sup>12</sup> *Ὅστις οικοδομηδε την οικιαν αυτου.* <sup>13</sup> *Φωνην  
ηκασα κιθαρωδων κιθαριζοντων εν ται σκιθαραις  
αυτων.* The last four words in this verse are  
plainly implied in the participle. The phrase  
which occurs oftener than once, *ὑποποδιον των  
πωδων αυτου*, is chargeable with the like redundan-  
cy. Add to all this, that the Hebrew word here  
translated *προοραω* by the Seventy, never signifies  
*to foresee*, but *to place, to set*. In this passage,  
being applied to the mind, it denotes the Psalm-  
ist's, or rather the Messiah's fixed attention on  
God as always with him.

The other passage in which this verb occurs is  
also in the Acts <sup>14</sup> *Ἦσαν προεωρακοτες Τροφιμον  
τον Εφεσιον εν τη πολει συν αυτω.* Here the con-  
nection, without other resource, shows sufficiently  
that the simple verb *οραω* means literally *to see*,  
and the preposition *προ* *before*, in respect of time,  
not of place, and yet that *προοραω* does not imply  
*to foresee*, but *to see before*. The difference lies  
here. The former is to see or perceive an event  
before it happen, the latter denotes only to see

<sup>11</sup> Rom. viii. 26.

<sup>12</sup> Matth. vii. 24. 26.

<sup>13</sup> Rev. xiv. 2.

<sup>14</sup> xxi. 29.

either person or thing before the present time, which alone can be the sense of this passage, and which is therefore rightly rendered by our translators, “*They had seen before with him, in the city, Trophimus an Ephesian.*” To have said, “*They had foreseen with him,*” would have totally marred the sense. But our translators have not always been equally attentive.

§ 21. I SHALL add an example, not unlike the former, in the verb *προγινώσκω*, though the difficulty, with regard to it, arises as much from the signification of the simple verb, as from that of the preposition. Paul says <sup>15</sup>, *Οὐκ ἀπόσαστο ὁ Θεὸς τὸν λαὸν αὐτῆς ὃν προέγνω*, which our translators render, *God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew.* The last clause in this version conveys to my mind no meaning whatever. To *foreknow* always signifies to know some event before it happen; but no event is here mentioned, so that we are at a loss to discover the object of the foreknowledge mentioned. Is it only the existence of the people? Even this is not explicitly said; but if this were the writer’s intention, we should still be at a loss for the sense. There is nothing in this circumstance, which distinguishes God’s people from any other people, for the existence of all were equally foreknown by him: whereas here something peculiar is plainly intended, which is suggested as a reason to prevent our thinking that God would ever totally cast them away. Though

<sup>15</sup> Rom. xi. 2

nothing, to appearance, can answer more exactly than the English *foreknew*, does to the Greek *προεγνώ*, it, in reality, labours under a double defect. The first is the same which was observed in the preceding paragraph, in rendering the preposition; for there is the same difference between *knowing before* and *foreknowing*, that there is between *seeing before* and *foreseeing*. Our translators have, on some occasions, shown themselves sensible of the difference. Accordingly they render *προγινώσκοντες με ἀνωθεν*<sup>16</sup>, *which knew me from the beginning*, not *foreknew me*. The example above quoted from the twenty-first chapter of the Acts, is a similar instance.

The prepositions in the two languages, though nearly, are not perfectly, correspondent, especially in composition. With us the inseparable preposition *fore*, prefixed to *know*, *see*, *tell*, and *show*, always relates to some event, which is *known*, *seen*, *told*, and *shown* before it happen: whereas the Greek preposition *προ* does not necessarily relate to an event, and signifies no more than *before this time*. The difference in these idioms may be thus illustrated. A friend introducing a person with whom he supposes me unacquainted, says, *This is such a man*. I make answer, *I knew him before*. I should speak nonsense, if I said, *I foreknew him*. Yet in Greek I might say properly, *προεγνων*.

Another instance wherein our interpreters have shown an attention to this distinction, we have in

<sup>16</sup> Acts, xxvi. 5.

the Second Epistle to the Corinthians<sup>17</sup>, where they translate the word *προειρηκα* very properly, *I have said before*. Every reader of discernment must perceive that it would have been absurd to render it in that place, *I have foretold*.

But to return to the passage under review in the Epistle to the Romans : it was observed, that the common version of the word *προεγνω*, in that passage, labours under a double defect. It is not, in my judgment, barely in translating the preposition that the error lies, but also in the sense assigned to the verb compounded with it. That God knew Israel before, in the ordinary meaning of the word *knowing*, could never have been suggested as a reason to hinder us from thinking that he would ever cast them off: for, from the beginning, all nations and all things are alike known to God. But the verb *γνωσχω*, in Hellenistic use, has all the latitude of signification which the verb *יָדַע* *yadang* has, being that whereby the Seventy commonly render the Hebrew word. Now the Hebrew word means not only to *know*, in the common acceptation, but to *acknowledge* and to *approve*. Nothing is more common in Scripture than this use. “The Lord *knoweth*, *γνωσκει*, the way of the righteous<sup>18</sup>,” that is, *approveth*. “Then I will profess unto them, I never *knew* you,” *εγνων*, *acknowledged* you for mine<sup>19</sup>. “If any man love God, the same is known of him<sup>20</sup>,” *εγνωσαι*,

<sup>17</sup> vii. 3.<sup>18</sup> Psalm i. 6.<sup>19</sup> Matth. vii. 23.<sup>20</sup> 1 Cor. viii. 3.

*acknowledged.* If, therefore, in the passage under examination, we understand in this way the verb *γινώσκω*, adding the import of the preposition *προ*, *before*, *formerly*, *heretofore*, the meaning is both clear and pertinent: "God hath not cast off his people whom heretofore he acknowledged."

I shall just add a sense of the verb *προγινώσκω* as used by the Apostle Peter<sup>21</sup>, different from both the former. The verb *γινώσκω* in classical use often denotes *to decree*, *to ordain*, *to give sentence* as a judge, and therefore *προγινώσκω*, *to foreordain*, &c. It is in this sense only we can understand *Προεγνωσμενς προ καταβολης κοσμος*, which our interpreters have rightly rendered "*foreordained*, before the foundation of the world." But they have not so well translated the verbal noun *προγνωσις* in the second verse of the chapter, *foreknowledge*, which renders the expression, indefinite and obscure, not to say, improper. It ought, for the same reason, to have been *predetermination*. The same word, in the same signification, occurs in the Acts<sup>22</sup>, where it is also improperly rendered *foreknowledge*.

§ 22. It may be thought that, in the composition of substantives, or of an adjective and a substantive, in familiar use, there is hardly a possibility of error, the import of both the simple words being essential to the compound. But this is not

<sup>21</sup> 1 Peter, i. 20.      <sup>22</sup> Acts, ii. 23.

without exception, as *βωμολοχος*, *συκοφαντης*, *χειροτονια*, and many others, evince. It is indeed very probable, that the import of such terms originally was, what the etymology indicates. But, in their application, such variations are insensibly introduced by custom, as sometimes fix them, at last, in a meaning very different from the primary sense, or that to which the component parts would lead us.

I shall bring for an example a term about which translators have been very little divided. It is the word *σκληροκαρδια*, always rendered in the common version, *hardness of heart*. Nothing can be more literal, or to appearance, more just. *Σκληροκαρδια* is compounded of *σκληρος* *hard*, and *καρδια* *heart*. Nor can it be denied that these English words, taken severally, are, in almost every case, expressive of the full sense of the Greek words, also taken severally. Yet there is reason to suspect that the Greek compound does not answer to the meaning constantly affixed by us to *hardness of heart*, or, in one word, *hard-heartedness*. Let us recur to examples. In Matthew<sup>23</sup> we read thus; “Moses, because of the *hardness of your hearts*, *προς την σκληροκαρδιαν ὑμων*, suffered you to put away your wives.” Now these terms *hardness of heart* with us always denote cruelty, inhumanity, barbarity. It does not appear that this is our Lord’s meaning in this passage. And, though the passage might be so paraphrased, as would give a plausibility to this

<sup>23</sup> Matth. xix. 8.

interpretation, I do not recollect that this vice of cruelty, as a national vice, was ever imputed to them by Moses; though he often charges them with incredulity, obstinacy, and rebellion. As there is nothing, however, in the context, that can be called decisive, I recur to the other passages in the New Testament wherein the word is found. These are but two, and both of them in Mark's Gospel. One of them is,<sup>24</sup> where the same occurrence is recorded as in the passage of Matthew above referred to. In these two parallel places there is so little variation in the words, that the doubt as to the meaning of this term must equally affect them both. The other passage is<sup>25</sup>, in the account given of our Lord's appearance to his disciples after his resurrection. "Afterwards " he appeared unto the eleven, as they sat at " meat, and upbraided them with *their unbelief* " *and hardness of heart, την απισιαν αυτων και* " *σκληροκαρδιαν*, because they believed not them " which had seen him after he was risen." Nothing can be clearer than that the word here has no relation to *inhumanity*; as this great event gave no handle for displaying either this vice or the contrary virtue. Some commentators, after Grotius, render it here *incredulity*, making our Saviour express the same fault by both words *απισια* and *σκληροκαρδια*. I do not say that the use of such synonymas is without example in Scripture; though I would not recur to them where another interpretation were equally natural, and even more

<sup>24</sup> Mark, x. 5. <sup>25</sup> xvi. 14.

probable. I think therefore, that by the first of these terms the effect is meant, and by the second the cause ; that is, their stiff and untractable temper, their indocility or perverseness. Now this is a fault with which the Jews are frequently upbraided by Moses. Besides, this interpretation perfectly suits the sense of both passages. In that first quoted, as well as in this, the connection is evident. “ Moses, because of your untractable disposition, permitted you to divorce your wives;” lest, by making the marriage tie indissoluble, ye had perversely renounced marriage altogether, saying, as some of the disciples did, “ If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry.” The sense *unbelief*, which Grotius puts upon it, is rather more forced in that passage than the common acceptation. Castalio renders it very properly *pervicacia*.

If, for further satisfaction, I recur to the Septuagint, I find invariably a connection with *perverseness*, never with *inhumanity*. Where we read in English<sup>26</sup>, “ Circumcise the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiff-necked,” the Seventy have it, Περιτεμεισθε την σκληροκαρδιαν υμων, και τον τραχηλον υμων & σκληρυνετε επι. Here the opposition of the members in the sentence, which, in the Oriental taste, gives the same command, first in the positive form, and then in the negative, renders the meaning indubitable. The adjective *σκληροκαρδιος* is used in the Book of Proverbs<sup>27</sup> for perverse or untractable. ‘Ο

<sup>26</sup> Deut. x. 16.<sup>27</sup> xvii. 20.

σκληροκαρδιος, in Hebrew, לִבְשֵׁי קֶשֶׁל *ghakesh leb*, & συναντα αγαθοις; rendered justly in the Vulgate, *Qui perversi cordis est, non inveniet bonum*; in English, "He that hath a froward heart, findeth no good." There is another example of this adjective in Ezekiel<sup>28</sup>, which appears to me decisive. The verse runs thus in our version: "The house of Israel will not hearken unto thee; for they will not hearken unto me, for all the house of Israel are impudent and *hard-hearted*;" φιλονεικοι εισι και σκληροκαρδιοι. It is plain, from the context, that nothing is advanced which can fix on them the charge of inhumanity; but every thing points to their indocile and untractable temper. In like manner, when the verb σκληρυνω is followed by την καρδιαν, the meaning is invariably either to *become*, or to *render, refractory, rebellious*, not *cruel* or *inhuman*. This is evidently the sense of it as applied to Pharaoh, whose obstinacy the severest judgments hardly could surmount. And can any person doubt that the meaning of the Psalmist, when he says<sup>29</sup>, *To day if ye shall hear his voice, μη σκληρυνητε τας καρδιας υμων*, is, *be not contumacious or stiff-necked, as in the provocation?* It is impossible either to recur to the history referred to<sup>30</sup>, or to the comment on the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews<sup>31</sup>, and not perceive this to be a full expression of the sense. *Hard-hearted*, therefore, in our language, which stands

<sup>28</sup> iii. 7.<sup>29</sup> Psal. xcv. 7, 8.<sup>30</sup> Numb. xiv.<sup>31</sup> Heb. iii. & iv.

always in opposition to *tender-hearted* or *compassionate*, is not a just translation, though in some sense, it may be called a literal translation, of *σκληροκαρδιος*.

§ 23. IF we inquire a little into the figurative significations given to the simple word *καρδια* by the sacred penmen, we shall find their application of the compound to *contumacy* or *indocility*, as natural as ours is to *cruelty* and *unfeelingness*. Let it be observed then that, though the Greek word *καρδια*, when used in the proper sense for the part of the body so denominated, is equivalent to the English word *heart*; it is not always so, when used metaphorically. With us it is made, by figure, to stand, sometimes for *courage*, sometimes for *affection*, of which it is considered as the seat; but hardly ever, that I remember, for *understanding*. To denote this faculty, we sometimes speak of a good or a bad *head*; we also use the term *brain*. This, and not the *heart*, we regard as the seat of intelligence and discernment. Yet this was a frequent use of the term *heart* among the ancients, not the Hebrews only, but even the Greeks and the Romans. *Καρδια* in Greek, even in the best use, as well as *cor* in Latin, are employed to denote discernment and understanding. Hence, the word *cordatus* in Latin, for *wise, judicious, prudent*.

For the present purpose it suffices to produce a few instances from Scripture, which will put the matter beyond a doubt. For the sake of brevity,

I shall but just name the things attributed to the heart, referring to the passages in the margin; that from them every person may judge of the figurative application. First then, intelligence is ascribed to it<sup>32</sup>, also reasoning<sup>33</sup>, likewise blindness<sup>34</sup>, doubts<sup>35</sup>, faith<sup>36</sup>, thought<sup>37</sup>, comparison<sup>38</sup>, reflection<sup>38</sup>; in short, all that we commonly consider as belonging to the intellectual faculty, are applied, in Scripture, to the heart, a term which, in figurative style, is used with very great latitude. In this view of the metonymy, *σκληροκαρδιος* comes naturally to signify *indocile, untractable*, of an understanding so hard, that instruction cannot penetrate it. Of similar formation is the term *thick-skulled* with us. But the sense is not entirely the same. This implies mere incapacity, that an untoward disposition.

§ 24. HERE it may not be improper to suggest a caution, for preventing mistakes, not only in the interpretation of Scripture, but in that of all ancient writers. Though a particular word, in a modern language, may exactly correspond with a certain word, in a foreign or a dead language, when both are used literally and properly; these

<sup>32</sup> Matth. xiii. 15. <sup>33</sup> Mark, ii. 6.

<sup>34</sup> iii. 5, &c. The term is *πρωσις* *callousness*, rendered *hardness* in the common translation, but which as often means *blindness*, and is so rendered Rom. xi. 25. Eph. iv. 18. A sense here more suitable to the context.

<sup>35</sup> Mark, xi. 23. <sup>36</sup> Rom. x. 10.

<sup>37</sup> Acts, viii. 22. <sup>38</sup> Luke, ii. 19.

words may be very far from corresponding, when used metaphorically, or when affected by any trope whatever. Nor does this remark hold in any thing more frequently than in that sort of metonymy, so common amongst every people, whereby some parts of the body, especially of the entrails, have been substituted to denote certain powers or affections of the mind, with which they are supposed to be connected. The opinions of different nations and different ages, on this article, differ so widely from one another, that the figurative sense, in one tongue, is a very unsafe guide to the figurative sense, in another. In some instances they seem even to stand in direct opposition to each other. The *spleen* was accounted by the ancient Greeks and Romans the seat of mirth and laughter; by us moderns it is held (I suppose with equal reason,) the seat of ill humour and melancholy. When, therefore, it is evident, that the name is, in one of those ancient languages, used not properly, but tropically; what some would call a literal translation into a modern tongue, would, in fact, be a misrepresentation of the author, and a gross perversion of the sense<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> I had occasion to consider a little this subject in another work, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Book III. Ch. I. Sect. II. Part I. I there took notice of a remark of Cornutus on these words of the first satire of Persius: *Sum petulanti splene cochinno*. Which, as it is much to my present purpose, and not long, I shall here repeat. “Physici dicunt homines splene ridere, felle irasci, jecore amare, corde sapere, et pulmone

§ 25. I SHALL add but one other example, of the misinterpretation of a compound word, arising from the apparent, rather than the real import of its etymology. The word *ὁμοιοπαθης* occurs twice in the New Testament. The first time is on occasion of the miraculous cure of the lame man, by Paul and Barnabas at Lystra. When the people would have offered sacrifice to the workers of this miracle, supposing them to be two of their gods, Jupiter and Mercury; the two apostles no sooner heard of their intention, than they rent their clothes, and ran in among the people, crying out and saying (as in the common translation,) “Sirs, why do ye these things? we also are men *“of like passions with you”*<sup>40</sup>, *ὁμοιοπαθεις ὑμιν*. The other occasion of the word’s occurring, is where the Apostle James said, as our translators render it, “Elias was a man *subject to like passions as we are*, *ὁμοιοπαθης ἡμιν*, and he prayed “earnestly that it might not rain<sup>41</sup>.” From which passages I have heard it gravely inferred, that

“jactari.” To the same purpose, I find in a very ancient piece, called the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, supposed to be the work of a Christian of the first century, the following sentiment in the Testament of Naphtali, introduced for the sake of illustrating that God made all things good, adapting each to its proper use, *καρδιαν εἰς φρονησιν, ἡπαρ πρὸς θυμον, χολην πρὸς πικριαν, εἰς γελῶτα σπληνα, νεφρους εἰς πανοργιαν*. Grab. Spicil. patrum I. Secul. T. 1. Ed. 2. p. 212. This, though differing a little from the remark made by the commentator on Persius, perfectly coincides with what regards the heart and the spleen.

<sup>40</sup> Acts, xiv, 15. <sup>41</sup> James, v, 17,

a superiority over the passions is hardly to be expected from the influence even of the most divine religion, or the most distinguishing lights of the Spirit: since sacred writ itself seems, in this respect, to put Jews, Christians, and Pagans, nay prophets, apostles, and idolatrous priests and people, all upon a level.

But this arises merely from the mistranslation of the word *ὁμοιοπαθης*, concerning which I beg leave to offer the following remarks: 1st, I remark, that it is found only twice in the New Testament, does not occur in the version of the Seventy, and but once in the Apocryphal writings, where it is applied to the earth<sup>42</sup>, in which there is nothing analogous to human passions, though there is some analogy to human sufferings and dissolution; and that therefore we have no reason, agreeably to an observation lately made<sup>43</sup>, to consider this term as affected by the idiom of the synagogue. 2dly, If we recur to classical use, we find that it implies no more than *fellow-mortal*, and has no relation to what, in our language, is peculiarly called *passion*; and, 3dly, That with this, the etymology rightly understood, perfectly agrees. The primary signification of *παθος* in Greek, and of the unclassical term *passio* in Latin, is *suffering*; the first from *πασχειν*, the second from *pati*, to suffer. Thence they are adopted to denote calamity, disease, and death; thence also they are taken sometimes to denote those affections of the mind which are in their nature

<sup>42</sup> Wisd. vii. 3.<sup>43</sup> § 8.

violent, and are considered as implying pain and suffering; nay, the English word *passion* is, in this manner, applied (but it is in a sort of technical language) to the death and sufferings of our Lord.

Now, as to the term *ὁμοιοπαθης*, in the manner in which it is rendered by our interpreters, the argument employed by the Apostles to the Lycaonians, loses all its force and significance. The Pagans never denied that the Gods whom they adored were beings of like passions with themselves; nay, they did not scruple to attribute the most disgraceful, and the most turbulent passions to their deities. And as little as any were the two divinities exempted, whom they supposed Paul and Barnabas to be; but then they always attributed to them a total exemption from mortality and disease. It would have been, therefore, impertinent to say to idolaters, who mistook them for gods, "We are subject to the like passions with you;" for this their priests and poets had uniformly taught them both of Jupiter and of Mercury. But it was pertinent to say, "We are your fellow-mortals," as liable as you to disease and death. For, if that was the case with the two Apostles, the people would readily admit, they were not the gods they took them for. Indeed, this was not only the principal, but, I may almost say, the sole, distinction they made between gods and men. As to irregular lusts and passions, they seem to have ascribed them to the celestials even in a higher degree, in proportion, as it were, to their superior power. And,

in regard to the application to Elijah, in the other passage quoted, let it not be thought any objection to the interpretation here given, that the Prophet was translated, and did not die: for all that is implied in the Apostle's argument is, that his body was naturally mortal and dissolvable as well as ours; a point which was never called in question, notwithstanding his miraculous deliverance from death. I shall only add, that the explanation here given is entirely conformable to the version of those passages in the Vulgate, and to that of all the other translations, ancient and modern, of any name.

§ 26. FROM all that has been said on this topic, it is evident that, in doubtful cases, etymology is but a dangerous guide; and, though always entitled to some attention, never, unless in the total failure of all other resources, to be entirely rested in. From her tribunal there lies always an appeal to *use*, in cases wherein use can be discovered, whose decision is final, according to the observation of Horace,

Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi.

I have been the more particular on this head, because etymology seems to be a favorite with many modern interpreters, and the source of a great proportion of their criticisms. And indeed, it must be owned that, of all the possible ways of becoming a critic in a dead or a foreign language, etymology is the easiest. A scanty knowledge of the elements, with the aid of a good Lexicon, and

a plausible fluency of expression, will be fully sufficient for the purpose. I shall add a few instances in this taste from some modern translations of the New Testament; though I am far from insinuating that the above mentioned qualifications for criticising, were all that the authors were possessed of. Some of them, on the contrary, have, in other instances, displayed critical abilities very respectable. But where is the man who, on every occasion, is equal to himself? The word *εσπλαγχνισθη*<sup>44</sup>, is rendered, by the Gentlemen of Port Royal, *Ses entrailles furent emues de compassion*, on which Wynne seems to have improved in saying, *His bowels yearned with compassion*. *Ευδοκησαν*<sup>45</sup>, is rendered by the former, *ont resolu avec beaucoup d'affection*. *Δησις ενεργουμένη*<sup>46</sup>, is translated by Doddridge, *Prayer wrought by the energy of the Spirit*. *Σκηνωσει*<sup>47</sup>, by Diodati, *Tendera un padiglione*. *Χειροτονησαντες*<sup>48</sup>, by Beza, *cum ipsi per suffragia creassent*, and *κληρονομησουσι*<sup>49</sup>, *hæreditario jure obtinebunt*. The Vulgate too, sometimes without necessity, but more rarely, adopts the same paraphrastical method. For those examples above referred to, which occur in the Gospel, see the notes on the places.

<sup>44</sup> Matth. ix. 36.<sup>45</sup> Rom. xv. 26, 27.<sup>46</sup> James, v. 16.<sup>47</sup> Rev. vii. 15.<sup>48</sup> Acts, xiv. 23.<sup>49</sup> Matth. v. 5.

## Dissertation the Fifth.

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*Of the Proper Version of some Names of Principal Import in the New Testament.*

THE religious institution of which the Lord Jesus is the author, is distinguished in the New Testament by particular names and phrases, with the true import of which it is of great consequence that we be acquainted, in order to form a distinct apprehension of the nature and end of the whole. A very small deviation here may lead some into gross mistakes, and conceal from others, in a considerable degree, the spirit which this institution breathes, and the discoveries which it brings. I think it necessary, therefore, to examine this subject a little, in order to lay before the critical, the judicious, and the candid, my reasons for leaving, in some particulars which at first may appear of little moment, the beaten track of interpreters, and giving, it may be said, new names to known things, where there cannot be any material difference of meaning. The affectation of rejecting a word, because old (if neither obscure nor obsolete,) and of preferring another, because new (if it be not more apposite or expressive,) is justly held contemptible; but without doubt, it would be an

extreme on the other side, not less hurtful, to pay a greater veneration to names, that is, to mere sounds, than to the things signified by them. And surely, a translator is justly chargeable with this fault, who, in any degree, sacrifices propriety, and that perspicuity which, in a great measure, flows from it, to a scrupulous (not to say superstitious) attachment to terms which, as the phrase is, have been consecrated by long use. But of this I shall have occasion to speak more afterwards.

The most common appellation given to this institution, or religious dispensation, in the New Testament, is, ἡ Βασιλεια τῆς Θεοῦ or τῶν οὐρανῶν; and the title given to the manifestation of this new state, is most frequently τὸ Εὐαγγέλιον τῆς Βασιλειᾶς &c. and sometimes, when considered under an aspect somewhat different, ἡ Καινὴ Διαθήκη. The great Personage himself, to whose administration the whole is intrusted, is, in contradistinction to all others, denominated ὁ Χριστός. I shall in this discourse make a few observations on each of the terms above mentioned.

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## PART I.

### OF THE PHRASE

Ἡ Βασιλεια τῆς Θεοῦ, OR τῶν οὐρανῶν.

IN the phrase ἡ Βασιλεια τῆς Θεοῦ, OR τῶν οὐρανῶν, there is a manifest allusion to the predictions in which this economy was revealed by the Prophets

in the Old Testament, particularly by the Prophet Daniel, who mentions it, in one place <sup>1</sup>, as a *Kingdom*, *Βασιλεια* which the God of heaven would set up, and which should never be destroyed: in another <sup>2</sup>, as a kingdom to be given, with glory and dominion over all people, nations, and languages, to one like a son of man. And the Prophet Micah <sup>3</sup>, speaking of the same era, represents it as a time when Jehovah, having removed all the afflictions of his people, would reign over them in mount Zion thenceforth even for ever. To the same purpose, though not so explicit, are the declarations of other Prophets. To these predictions there is a manifest reference in the title *ἡ Βασιλεια τς Θες*, or *των σρανων*, or simply *ἡ Βασιλεια*, given in the New Testament, to the religious constitution which would obtain under the Messiah. It occurs very often, and is, if I mistake not, uniformly, in the common translation, rendered *kingdom*.

§ 2. THAT the import of the term is always either *kingdom*, or something nearly related to kingdom, is beyond all question; but it is no less so, that, if, regard be had to the propriety of our own idiom, and consequently to the perspicuity of the version, the English word will not answer on every occasion. In most cases *βασιλεια* answers to the Latin *regnum*. But this word is of more extensive meaning than the English, being equally adapted to express both our terms *reign* and

<sup>1</sup> ii. 44.<sup>2</sup> vii. 13, 14.<sup>3</sup> iv. 6, 7.

*kingdom*. The first relates to the time or duration of the sovereignty; the second, to the place or country over which it extends. Now, though it is manifest in the Gospels, that it is much oftener the time, than the place, that is alluded to; it is never, in the common version, translated *reign*, but always *kingdom*. Yet the expression is often thereby rendered exceedingly awkward, not to say absurd. Use indeed softens every thing. Hence it is that, in reading our Bible, we are insensible of those improprieties which, in any other book, would strike us at first hearing. Such are those expressions which apply motion to a kingdom, as when mention is made of its *coming*, *approaching*, and the like; but I should not think it worth while to contend for the observance of a scrupulous propriety, if the violation of it did not affect the sense, and lead the reader into mistakes. Now this is, in several instances, the certain consequence of improperly rendering βασιλεια *kingdom*.

§ 3. WHEN βασιλεια means *reign*, and is followed by των ουρανων, the translation *kingdom of heaven* evidently tends to mislead the reader. Heaven, thus construed with kingdom, ought, in our language, by the rules of grammatical propriety, to denote the region under the kingly government spoken of. But finding, as we advance, that this called the *kingdom of heaven* is actually upon the earth, or, as it were, travelling to the earth and almost arrived, there necessarily arises

such a confusion of ideas as clouds the text, and, by consequence, weakens the impression it would otherwise make upon our minds. It may be said indeed, that the import of such expressions in Scripture is now so well known, that they can hardly be mistaken. But I am far from thinking that this is the case. Were it said only that they are become so familiar to us that, without ever reflecting on the matter, we take it for granted that we understand them; there is no sentiment to the justness of which I can more readily subscribe. But then, the familiarity, instead of answering a good, answers a bad, purpose, as it serves to conceal our ignorance, even from ourselves. It is not, therefore, the being accustomed to hear such phrases, that will make them be universally, or even generally, apprehended by the people. And to those who may have heard of the exposition commonly given of them, the conception of the kingdom of heaven, as denoting a sort of dominion upon the earth, a conception which the mind attains indirectly, by the help of a comment, is always feebler than that which is conveyed directly by the native energy of the expression. Not but that the words βασιλεια των σφρανων are sometimes rightly translated *kingdom of heaven*, being manifestly applied to the state of perfect felicity to be enjoyed in the world to come. But it is equally evident that this is not always the meaning of the phrase.

§ 4. THERE are two senses wherein the word *heaven* in this expression may be understood.

Either it signifies the place so called, or it is a metonymy for God, who is in Scripture, sometimes by periphrasis, denominated *he that dwelleth in heaven*. When the former is the sense of the term *σπανοι*, the phrase is properly rendered *the kingdom of heaven*; when the latter, *the reign of heaven*. Let it be remarked in passing, in regard to the sense last given of the word *σπανοι* as signifying *God*, that we are fully authorized to affirm it to be scriptural. I should have hardly thought it necessary to make this remark, if I had not occasionally observed such phrases as *the assistance of heaven*, and *addresses to heaven*, criticised and censured, in some late performances, as savouring more of the Pagan, or the Chinese, phraseology, than of the Christian. That they are perfectly conformable to the latter, must be clear to every one who reads his Bible with attention. Daniel, in the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, says<sup>4</sup>, *Thy kingdom shall be sure unto thee, after that thou shalt have known that the Heavens do rule*. The Prophet had said in the preceding verse, *Seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men*. Thus he who is denominated the *Most High* in one verse, is termed *the Heavens* in the following. The Psalmist Asaph says of profligates<sup>5</sup>, *They set their mouth against the Heavens*; that is, *they vent blasphemies against God*. The phrase in the New Testament *ἡ βασιλεια των σπανων*, is almost as com-

<sup>4</sup> iv. 26.<sup>5</sup> Psal. lxxiii. 9.

mon as ἡ βασιλεια τῆ Θεοῦ. And though it may be affirmed that the regimen in the one expresses the proprietor of the kingdom, in the other the place; it is evident that this does not hold always. In parallel passages in the different Gospels, where the same facts are recorded, the former of these expressions is commonly used by Matthew, and the other as equivalent, by the other Evangelists. Nay, the phrase ἡ βασιλεια των σρανων, is adopted, when it is manifest, that the place of dominion suggested is earth, not heaven; and that, therefore, the term can be understood only as a synonyma for Θεοῦ. The prodigal says to his father<sup>6</sup>, *Father, I have sinned against Heaven and before thee; that is, against God and thee.* Otherwise, to speak of sinning against an inanimate object, would be exceedingly unsuitable both to the Christian theology and to the Jewish. *The baptism of John*<sup>7</sup>, says our Lord, *whence was it; from Heaven, or of men? From Heaven, that is, from God.* Divine authority is here opposed to human. This difference, however, in the sense of σρανος, makes no difference to a translator, inasmuch as the vernacular term with us admits the same latitude with the Hebrew and the Greek.

§ 5. THAT βασιλεια ought sometimes to be rendered *reign*, and not *kingdom*, I shall further evince when I illustrate the import of the words κηρυσσω, ευαγγελιζω, and some others. Isaiah,

<sup>6</sup> Luke, xv. 18. 21.      <sup>7</sup> Matth. xxi. 25.

Daniel, Micah, and others of the Prophets, had encouraged the people to expect a time, when the Lord of hosts should reign in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, when the people of God should be redeemed from their enemies, and made joyful in the Messiah their King. It was this happy epoch that was generally understood to be denominated by the phrases βασιλεια τς Θεου, and βασιλεια των σρανων, *the reign of God*, and *the reign of Heaven*: the approach of which was first announced by the Baptist, afterwards by our Lord himself, and his Apostles. Βασιλεια is applicable in both acceptations, and it needs only to be observed that, when it refers to the time, it ought to be rendered *reign*, when to the place, *kingdom*. For this reason, when it is construed with the verb κηρυσσω, ευαγγελιζω, καταγγελλω, or the noun ευαγγελιον, it ought invariably to be *reign*, as also when it is spoken of as come, coming, or approaching.

§ 6. THE French have two words corresponding to ours, *regne* reign, and *royaume* kingdom. Their interpreters have often fallen into the same fault with ours, substituting the latter word for the former: yet, in no French translation that I have seen, is this done so uniformly as in ours. In the Lord's Prayer, for example, they all say, *ton regne vienne*, not *ton royaume*, *thy reign* come, not *thy kingdom*. On the other hand, when mention is made of entrance or admission into the βασιλεια, or exclusion from it, or where there is a manifest reference to the state of the blessed hereafter; in

all these cases, and perhaps a few others, wherein the sense may easily be collected from the context, it ought to be rendered *kingdom*, and not *reign*.

§ 7. THERE are a few passages, it must be acknowledged, in which neither of the English words can be considered as a translation of βασιλεια strictly proper. In some of the parables<sup>8</sup>, it evidently means administration, or method of governing; and in one of them<sup>9</sup>, the word denotes royalty, or royal authority, there being a manifest allusion to what had been done by Herod the Great, and his immediate successor, in recurring to the Roman senate in order to be invested with the title and dignity of King of Judea, then dependent upon Rome. But where there is a proper attention to the scope of the place, one will be at no loss to discover the import of the word.

<sup>8</sup> Matth. xviii. 23.

<sup>9</sup> Luke, xix. 12. 15.

## PART II.

OF THE NAME *το Ευαγγελιον*.

I PROCEED to inquire into the meaning of the word *το Ευαγγελιον*. This term, agreeably to its etymology, from *ευ bene* and *αγγελια nuncium*, always in classical use, where it occurs but rarely, denotes either *good news*, or the reward given to *the bearer* of good news. Let us see what ought to be accounted the scriptural use of the term. *Ευαγγελιον* and *ευαγγελια* occur six times in the Septuagint in the books of Samuel and Kings. I reckon them as one word, because they are of the same origin, are used indiscriminately, and always supply the place of the same Hebrew word *בשרה besharah*. In five of these the meaning is *good news*; in the sixth, the word denotes the reward given for bringing good news. In like manner, the verb *ευαγγελιζειν*, or *ευαγγελιζεσθαι*, which occurs much oftener in the Septuagint than the noun, is always the version of the Hebrew verb *בשר bashar*, *læta annunciare*, to tell good news. It ought to be remarked also, that *ευαγγελιζω* is the only word by which the Hebrew verb is rendered into Greek: nor do I know any word in the Greek language that is more strictly of one signification than this verb. In one instance

the verbal מְבַשֵּׁר *mebasher*, is indeed used for one who brings tidings, though not good<sup>10</sup>; but in that place the Seventy have not employed the verb εὐαγγελίζω or any of its derivatives. One passage<sup>11</sup>, wherein the Septuagint uses the verb εὐαγγελίζομαι, has also been alleged as an exception from the common acceptation. But that this is improperly called an exception, must be manifest to every one who reflects that the total defeat of the Israelitish army, with the slaughter of the king of Israel and his sons, must have been the most joyful tidings that could have been related in Gath and Askelon, two Philistine cities. The word occurs several times in the Prophets, particularly in Isaiah, and is always rendered in the common version, either by the phrase *to bring good tidings*, or by some terms nearly equivalent. It is sometimes also so rendered in the New Testament<sup>12</sup>.

§ 2. Now, let it be observed, that when the word is introduced in the Gospels, it is generally either in a quotation from the Prophets, or in evident allusion to their words. Thus πτωχοὶ εὐαγγελίζονται, which our translators render, *To the poor the gospel is preached*<sup>13</sup>, the whole context shows to be in allusion to what is said by the Prophet Isaiah<sup>14</sup>, in whom the corresponding

<sup>10</sup> 1 Sam. iv. 17.<sup>11</sup> 2 Sam. i. 20.<sup>12</sup> Luke, i. 19. ii. 10. viii. 1. Acts, xiii. 32. Rom. x. 15.

1 Thess. iii. 6.

<sup>13</sup> Matth. xi. 5. Luke, vii. 22.<sup>14</sup> lxi. 1.

phrase is rendered, *preach good tidings to the meek*. But nothing can be more to my purpose, than that noted passage wherein we are told<sup>15</sup>, that the place in Isaiah was read by our Lord in the synagogue of Nazareth. The words in the common translation of the Gospel are these, *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel, εὐαγγελιζεσθαι, to the poor, he hath sent me to heal the broken hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord*. Now I cannot help observing of this passage, that the meaning would have been more perspicuously conveyed, and its beauty and energy would have been better preserved, if our translators had kept closer to the manner in which they had rendered it in the Old Testament. There the term *εὐγγαλιζεσθαι* is rendered *to preach good tidings*. And though it is certain, agreeably to our Lord's declaration, that the Gospel, with its spiritual blessings, is here held forth to us, it is still under the figure of temporal blessings, and therefore it is very improperly introduced by its distinguishing appellation into the version, which ought to convey the literal, not the figurative, sense of the original.

*Εὐαγγελιζεσθαι πτωχοις, to bring good tidings to the poor* or afflicted, agreeably to the extensive signification of the Hebrew word, is the general title of the message, and comprehends the whole. It

<sup>15</sup> Luke, iv. 18, 19.

is explained by being branched out into the particulars which immediately follow. For, if it be asked, What is the good tidings brought to the afflicted? the answer is, a cure to the broken-hearted, deliverance to the captives, sight to the blind. It is the Lord's jubilee, which brings freedom to the slave, acquittance to the debtor, and relief to the oppressed. Now that the Gospel is herein admirably delineated, is manifest. But still it is presented to us under figures, and therefore, to mention it by its peculiar title, in the midst of the figurative description, is to efface, in a great measure, that description; it is to jumble injudiciously the sign and the thing signified. It is, as if one should confound, in an apologue or parable, the literal sense with the moral, and assert of the one what is strictly true only of the other; by which means no distinct image would be presented to the mind. Or it is, as when a painter supplies the defects in his work by labels, and instead of a picture, presents us with a confused jumble, wherein some things are painted, and some things described in words. But it is not in our version only, but in most modern translations, that this confusion in rendering this beautiful passage has appeared.

§ 3. I SHALL add but one other instance of a quotation from the prophets: *Ὡς ὥραιοι οἱ πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων εἰρηνῇ, τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων τα ἀγαθὰ*<sup>16</sup>. In the common version, as quoted

<sup>16</sup> Romans, x. 15.

in the New Testament: *How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things.* It would have been better here also, on many accounts, to keep closer to the original in Isaiah <sup>17</sup> whence the passage was taken, and to translate it thus: "How beautiful  
" are the feet of them who bring the joyful message of peace, the joyful news of good things;" at the same time, I acknowledge, it is with a particular allusion to that spiritual peace, and those eternal good things, procured to us by Jesus Christ. But the beauty and energy of the allusion and implied similitude are destroyed, or rather, there is no more allusion, or similitude in the words, when the characteristic description, intended by the prophet, is in a manner thrown aside, and in its stead is inserted the name appropriated to the dispensation. This, at least, is in part done; for the Prophet's figures are neither totally laid aside, nor totally retained. Instead of imitating his simplicity of manner, they have made a jumble of the sense implied, and the sense expressed. For this purpose they have rendered the same word (which is repeated in the two clauses) in one clause, *preach the gospel*, according to the sense justly supposed to be figured by it, in the other clause, *bring glad tidings*, according to the letter. I can see no reason for this want of uniformity, unless perhaps the notion that *the gospel of good things* sounded more awkwardly than *the gospel of peace*.

§ 4. THE Prophet's design undoubtedly was, to deliver it as an universal truth, amply confirmed by experience, that the message of peace and prosperity to those who had been oppressed and afflicted by the ravages of war, and its various unhappy consequences, was so charming, that it could transform a most disagreeable, into a pleasing, object. The feet of those who had travelled far, in a hot country, through rough and dusty roads, present a spectacle naturally offensive to the beholder; nevertheless, the consideration that the persons themselves are, to us, the messengers of peace and felicity; and that it is, in bringing these welcome tidings, they have contracted that sordid appearance, can in an instant convert deformity into beauty, and make us behold, with delight, this indication of their embassy, their dirty feet, as being the natural consequence of the long journey they have made. A thought somewhat similar occurs in Horace<sup>17</sup>, who, speaking of victors returning, with glory, from a well-fought field, exhibits them as—*Non indecoro pulvere sordidos*. The poet perceives a charm, something decorous, in the very dust and sweat, with which the warriors are smeared, and which serve to recal to the mind of the spectator, the glorious toils of the day: thus, things in themselves ugly and disgusting, share, when associated in the mind with things delightful, in the beauty and attractions of those things with which they are connected. But this sentiment is lost in the common version; for

<sup>17</sup> Lib. ii. Ode i.

it might puzzle the most sagacious reader to devise a reason why the feet in particular of the Christian preacher should be declared to excel in beauty.

§ 5. Now, in all the passages quoted from the Prophets, it appears so natural, and so proper every way, to give them in the words which had been used in translating the prophecies, when the words in the New Testament will bear the same version, that one is at a loss to conceive what could move the translators to depart from this rule. Ought they, where no ground is given for it, in the original, either to make the sacred penmen appear to have misquoted the Prophets, or to make the unlearned reader imagine, that the Scriptures used by them, differed from those used by us, where there is not, in fact, any difference? Let it be observed, that I say, when the words in the New Testament will bear the same version with those in the Old; for I am not for carrying this point so far as some translators have done, who, when there is a real difference in the import of the expressions, are for correcting one of the sacred writers by the other. This is not the part of a faithful translator, who ought candidly to represent what his author says, and leave it to the judicious critic, to account for such differences as he best can. But it is surely a more inexcusable error to make differences, where there are none; than to attempt to cover them, where there are. Now, as it was never pretended that, in the passages above quoted, the Hebrew word was not

justly translated by the Seventy, and that the sense of both was not justly expressed by the phrase which our translators had employed in the version of the Prophets, they had no reason for adopting a different, though it were a synonymous phrase, in rendering the passage when quoted in the New. What shall we say then of their employing an expression which conveys a very different meaning?

§ 6. I SHALL produce one example, which, though no quotation, yet, having a direct reference to a promise often mentioned in the Old Testament, and made originally to the Patriarchs, ought to have been interpreted in the most comprehensive way. Our translators, by not attending to this, have rendered a passage otherwise perspicuous perfectly unintelligible. *Και γαρ εσμεν ευηγγελισμενοι, καθαπερ κακεινοι*; in the common version, *For unto us was the gospel preached as well as unto them*<sup>19</sup>. He had been speaking of the Israelites under Moses in the wilderness. This sounds strangely in Christian ears. That the Gospel has been preached to us, needs no affirmation to convince us: our only difficulty is, to understand in what sense the Gospel, or religious institution of Jesus Christ, was preached to those who lived and died before his incarnation. Yet it seems here to be supposed that we all know that the Gospel was preached to them, but need to be informed that it has ever been preached to

<sup>19</sup> Heb. iv. 2.

ourselves. Had it been said, *For unto them was the gospel preached as well as unto us*, we should have discovered a meaning in the sentence, though we might have been at a loss to conceive in what respect it is defensible. But, as it stands, we are no less puzzled about the meaning, than about the truth of the observation. Now, the literal and proper translation of the word *ευαγγελιζομαι*, in an instant, removes every difficulty. *For unto us the good tidings are published which were published to them.* What these good tidings are, is evident from the context. It is the promise of rest to God's people. It had been shown by the Apostle, in the preceding chapter, that the promise first made to the patriarchs was not, if I may so express myself, exhausted by the admission of the Israelites into the land of Canaan : that, on the contrary, we learn, from a threat in the Psalms against the rebellious, that there was still a nobler country and superior happiness men had to look for, of which the earthly Canaan was but a figure ; that therefore we ought to take warning, from the example of those whose carcases fell in the wilderness, to beware lest we also forfeit, through unbelief, that glorious inheritance, the rest that yet remains for the people of God. Now, as the promises conveying the good news of rest, were originally made to the fathers, and to Israel, according to the flesh, it was pertinent to take notice that we are equally interested in them, and that this good news of rest in a happy country afterwards to be enjoyed, is declared to us as fully as ever it was to them. This sense, though

clearly the Apostle's, is totally effaced by the misinterpretation of the word *ευηγγελισμενοι*. The Vulgate has, in this place, kept clear of the glaring impropriety in the English version. It has simply, *Etenim et nobis nuntiatur est quemadmodum et illis*. Their common way, however, is different.

§ 7. IN other places, most modern translators have been misled, in this article, by implicitly following the Vulgate, which first set the bad example of translating those passages differently, in the Old Testament, and in the New. In the passage quoted from Paul, and by him from Isaiah, Erasmus has very well preserved both the import of the word, and the conformity to the way in which it had been always justly rendered in the Prophet, *Quam speciosi pedes annuntiantium pacem, annuntiantium bona!* To the same purpose Castalio, who has taken this way, which Erasmus had not done, of rendering also the words read by our Lord in the synagogue, *Me ad læta pauperibus nuntianda misit*. In the other places above referred to, Castalio follows the common method. *Pauperes evangelium docentur*. Erasmus, in rendering the passage quoted from Matthew, has endeavoured to comprehend both ways. *Pauperes lætum accipiunt evangelii nuntium*. He has in this been copied by the translator of Zurich. This method is quite paraphrastical. It does not savour of the simplicity of the evangelical style. If *ευαγγελιον* mean *lætum nuntium*, why did he add *evangelii*? And if it do not mean

*lætum nuncium*, what had these words to do in the version? And if the Latin *evangelium* is of the same import with the Greek *εὐαγγέλιον*, the sentence is a mere tautology; as if he should say, *The poor receive the good news of glad tidings*. And, if the import of the adoptive Latin word *evangelium* be different, which is in fact the case, from that of the Greek, which is fully interpreted by the two words *lætum nuntium*, *evangelii* is a mere interpolation. The words of the original are general, and have equal latitude of signification with the Latin *lætum nuncium*, or the English *good news*. The addition of the word *evangelii* limits the sense in a way which the Prophet's expression does not warrant. Nor does an interpreter's opinion concerning the completion of the prophecy (however true, nay, however certain, that opinion be) entitle him to express the prediction with greater speciality of meaning than has been done by his author. Erasmus does not seem himself to have been entirely satisfied with this circumlocution, as he has rendered the same words in Luke in the common way, and in this also has been followed by the Tigurine translator. Beza has in all the passages above referred to, (except that in which the Vulgate was right,) followed the Vulgate, and has been followed by most of the early Protestant translators.

§ 3. SOME may imagine, that I am here pleading for what, on other occasions, I have shown no partiality to, a translation of the words servilely

literal or etymological. But, let it be observed, that I am never for tracing in the translation, the etymology of the words of the original, when the etymology does not give the just import of the words, according to the received use at the time when the speeches or dialogues related were spoken, or when the book was composed. The Greek verb *εὐαγγελίζω*, when first used by the Evangelists, or the Hebrew *בִּשְׂר* *bashar*, when used by the Prophets, or the Syriac *סִבַּר* *sabar*, as most probably used by our Lord and his Apostles, conveyed to their countrymen only one and the same idea, which is precisely what the phrase *to bring good tidings* conveys to us. The appropriation of the word to the religious institution called the Gospel, is of a later date, and has gradually arisen out of the former usage. When etymology and use entirely coincide, as they often do, we cannot be too literal in our interpretations; when they differ, which does not seldom happen, the latter is to be followed, and not the former.

In some respects, similar, though apparently, contrary, to the above objection, is that of those who urge that our term *Gospel*, in its Saxon etymology, is an exact counterpart to the Greek *εὐαγγέλιον*, being compounded of two words, which conjoined denote *good news*. But, the only pertinent question is, in this case, Is this the present meaning of the English word *Gospel*? The first objectors would assign to the Greek word *εὐαγγέλιον*, a sense which it had not during our Lord's ministry, but which it acquired soon

after : the second would put upon the English word *Gospel*, a sense which it once had, but now has not. That this is the case is evident.

Should one, for example, bring us word<sup>20</sup> that an end is put to hostilities, and that the powers at war have at last agreed upon a peace, ought we, in reporting this intelligence, to say, that one had come preaching to us the gospel of peace ? Whoever should express himself thus, would, I am afraid, be thought to talk both absurdly and profanely. At least, he would be said to employ a very bold and far-fetched metaphor. Yet, not the metaphorical, but the proper expression, in the language of the Apostles, would be, *ευηγγελισατο ἡμιν ειρηνην*, or even *εκηρουξεν ἡμιν το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης*. Josephus, in his History of the Jewish War<sup>21</sup>, acquainting us that Titus sent to his father the good news of his taking Tarichea, says, *Τιτος δε εκπεμψας τινα των ιππεων ευαγγελιζεται τω πατρι το εργον*. How would it sound in our ears to render it, *preached to his father the gospel of the action* ? Nothing can be a stronger evidence that the Greek phrases above mentioned, and the English *preached the gospel*, are not equivalent. All, therefore, that can be concluded from the primitive import of the word *Gospel*, in a different, though related, language, is that, in the Anglo-Saxon, not the English, version of the New Testament, the word *ευαγγελιον* was

<sup>20</sup> This was written towards the end of the American war.

<sup>21</sup> Lib. iii. ch. 34.

rightly so translated. Certain it is, however, that the error remarked in the English version, runs through all the modern translations, as well as the Vulgate which gave it birth, and is a remarkable instance of the truth of an observation formerly made<sup>22</sup> that, sometimes, by consulting other versions, we may be confirmed in an error, instead of having it corrected. Indeed the old Latin translation has served, in many things, as will appear more fully afterwards, as a model to the translators in the West.

§ 9. BUT, though the noun *εὐαγγέλιον* was equally unequivocal with the verb *εὐαγγελίζω*, in its acceptation in the Old Testament, and commonly in the Evangelists, it must be owned that, from its original signification, it came insensibly afterwards to vary and receive other meanings, in the way I shall now attempt to explain. The word occurs very often in the New Testament, where, as it is a term of principal importance, its different significations deserve to be investigated, with the greatest accuracy. That the radical signification, *good news*, is not only the most common, but, in some respect, a concomitant of every other meaning affixed to the word, must be evident to every one who is conversant with the original. Yet this allusive concomitance, if I may so express myself, is an advantage which cannot be obtained in a translation. As use, which governs language, will not bend to our inclinations,

we must change the word in the version, when the import of the original name is so far different, that the same term, in another language, will not answer; yet, by changing it, we may lose the emphasis, which results from the allusion to the primitive and predominant application of the word. It will sometimes happen, in a train of reasoning, where the same word is used in the original, in different, but related, senses, that the change of the corresponding term, in the version, will hurt perspicuity, and yet may be necessary, because the same word in another language, whose idiom does not admit the same extent of signification, would hurt it more.

§ 10. THE first meaning of the word then in the New Testament, especially in the Gospels, is, as has been observed, *good news*, a signification which, though always implied, is not always what is chiefly intended; and therefore the word cannot, without a sacrifice of propriety, be uniformly rendered so. The name, from being expressive of an eminent quality in the dispensation introduced by the Messiah, and from being most frequently applied to it, came gradually to serve as a name for the dispensation itself. When it is thus employed, it is in our tongue properly rendered *gospel*. This is the second meaning of the word. Of the other senses which it has in Scripture, I shall take notice afterwards. The two above mentioned are the chief. And, first, I shall consider the cases wherein that which I call

the literal and primitive signification, ought to be retained.

§ 11. FIRST then, this sense ought to be retained in the version, when the word *ευαγγελιον* is construed with a noun serving to limit or explain its nature, as *το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης*, *the good news of peace*, *το ευαγγελιον της βασιλειας*, *the good news of the reign*. It was observed, on the explanation of the word *Βασιλεια*, that the Christian economy was foretold under the denomination of *the reign of God*, and *the reign of Heaven*; and I may add, in the typical language of the Psalms, *the reign of David*. Now, there were, about the time of our Saviour's appearance, many who, from the predictions of the Prophets, and signs of the times, waited, with pious confidence, for the consolation of Israel, that is, for the coming of the Lord's Messiah, and the commencement of his glorious reign. This was the great subject of comfort to them, amidst all the distresses and oppressions, personal or political, under which they groaned. For, how erroneous soever the prevalent notions concerning the person of the Messiah, and the nature of his reign, were; they agreed in this, that they exhibited him as a deliverer, in whose time, the principal grievances of the nation were to be redressed; and, in consequence of this, the people looked forward with faith and hope, but not without a mixture of impatience, to that long-deferred, as they then thought, but happy era, the mission and consequent reign of the Messiah. Freedom to the slave, release

to the prisoner, pardon to the convict, could not be more welcome, or afford matter of greater joy, than the tidings, well authenticated, that that blessed period, spoken of in raptures by their Prophets, and described in the most glowing colours of Eastern poetry, was at length arrived. Hence it is not improbable that, even some time before the birth of Jesus, this much wished event came to be denominated, by those who expected it, perhaps the majority of the nation, *the good news* (being such in an eminent manner,) and more explicitly *the good news of the reign of God*, that is, of the new dispensation that would obtain under the promised Messiah.

§ 12. A NUMBER of such-like phrases, borrowed from the Prophets, and from the Psalms, relating to this event, had become current among the people, and were adopted both by our Lord and by John his harbinger. Thus the Messiah himself is styled *ὁ ἐρχόμενος*, *he that cometh*, not *he that should come*, as it is less properly rendered in the common version, it being an abbreviation of that expression of the Psalmist<sup>23</sup>, *He that cometh in the name of the Lord*. Now it is manifest that, when first the Baptist, then our Lord himself, and lastly his Apostles, in his lifetime, announced publicly the approach of this reign; they announced what the generality of the people would immediately, and without difficulty, apprehend. I do not mean, that they would under-

<sup>23</sup> cxviii. 26.

stand the nature of the reign or spiritual dominion to be established; for this is what few or none did; but that they would immediately understand it to relate to the accession of the Messiah, their great deliverer, to that sovereignty with which they had learnt from the Prophets, and from the scribes, that he was to be invested. The dispensation, therefore, is properly ushered in with an authoritative call to all men to amend their lives, and prepare for the reign of the Messiah, the expectation and joy of God's people, just about to commence. Nothing, therefore, could be more suitable, and, though alarming to the wicked, nothing could be more consolatory to the pious, at the time the nation was in subjection to a foreign and oppressive yoke, than such seasonable information. Nothing, consequently, can be better accommodated to what must have been the sentiments and prospects of the people at that time, or can more accurately express the full import of the original, *κηρυσσων το εναγγελιον της βασιλειας τς Θες*, than this literal and plain version, *Proclaiming the glad tidings of the reign of God*. This conveys to us, at this moment, the same ideas which, in those circumstances, must have been conveyed by the words of the sacred historian, into the mind of every Jewish reader at the time.

§ 13. ON the contrary, the expression in the vulgar translation, *preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God*, must have been to such a reader unintelligible; as even to us, when we abstract from

the familiarity occasioned by custom, which is apt to impose upon us, it appears both obscure and improper. Castalio, in one place<sup>24</sup>, departs, if possible, still farther from the sense, rendering it *regium publicans evangelium*, “publishing the royal gospel.” Not to mention the futility of the term *royal*, applied in a way which renders it a mere expletive; the very subject published, ἡ βασιλεια, *the reign*, is justled out to make room for a splendid but unmeaning epithet. Our Lord, we find from the Evangelists, spoke to his countrymen in the dialect of their own Scriptures, and used those names to which the reading of the Law and the Prophets, either in the original, or in the version then used, had familiarized them. Our translators, and indeed, most European translators, represent him as using words which, even in their own translations of the Old Testament, never occur, and to which, in fact, there is nothing there that corresponds in meaning. The people had all heard of the reign of the Messiah, to be established in the latter times, and considered the arrival of that period as the happiest tidings with which they could be made acquainted. But of the *Gospel* they had never heard before. “What is this you call the Gospel?” they would naturally ask; “and what does the *Gospel of a kingdom* mean?” These are words to which our ears are strangers. No mention is made of such things in the Law, in the Prophets, or in the Psalms.

<sup>24</sup> Matth. iv. 23.

§ 14. Now, if the terms must have been altogether unintelligible to Jews, they are, even to us Christians, both obscure and improper. First, obscure, because indefinite. It does not appear easy in such circumstances, as those under consideration, to assign a precise meaning to the word *Gospel*. We commonly understand by it the whole religious institution of Jesus, including both doctrines and precepts. Nothing can be plainer than that this is not the meaning of the term here. The very words which were preached or promulgated, are expressly mentioned, and comprised in a single sentence: *Μετανοείτε, ηγγικε γαρ ἡ βασιλεια των ουρανων*. Besides, the Apostles, who, in our Lord's lifetime, received this commission, were not yet qualified for teaching the system of doctrine implied under the name *Gospel*, because, in fact, they did not know it themselves. They had then no notion of a Messiah, but as a temporal prince, and mighty conqueror, or of his kingdom, but as a secular monarchy, more extensive than, but of the same nature with, those, which had preceded, to wit, the Assyrian, the Persian, the Macedonian empires, or, that which was in being at the time, the Roman. Not one of their hearers could have been more prejudiced, than the Apostles themselves were, at that time, against a suffering Saviour, who was to expire, in agonies and infamy, on a cross.

Now, let people but coolly reflect, and then put the question to themselves; If we set aside these important truths, the death, and consequently

the resurrection of Jesus Christ, his victory over the enemies of our salvation, and his purchase of spiritual and eternal blessings, by his blood ; of all which the Apostles were then ignorant, and against most of which, when first informed of them, they were as much prejudiced as any Pharisee, what will remain of that which we denominate the Gospel, in contradiction to Judaism ? The doctrine of the Gospel is, manifestly, what the Apostles were not qualified to teach, till they were enlightened by the descent of the Holy Ghost, on the day of Pentecost, after our Lord's ascension. Nay, they were, after his resurrection, when they knew more than formerly, expressly commanded, before they should attempt to teach that doctrine, to wait the promised illumination from above<sup>25</sup>. But they had been, long before, sufficiently qualified to announce the approach of this dispensation, and to warn men to forsake their sins, and to prepare for the appearance of their Lord and King. Further, if the term *gospel* here be rather indefinite, how does this addition, *of the kingdom*, serve either to illustrate or to limit the import of that term ? And an addition, which answers neither of these purposes, cannot fail still farther to darken it.

§ 15. But, secondly, that expression in our language is, in those instances, also improper ; because there is no meaning which use has affixed

<sup>25</sup> Acts, i. 4. 8.

to the English word *Gospel*, that expresses the sense of the original. And, as it has been shown that our term does not there suit the word *ευαγγελιον*, I mean afterwards to show that the word *preaching* does not exactly convey the sense of *κηρυσσων*. At the same time, it is acknowledged, on the other hand, that the word *ευαγγελιον* is, in many places, in the Epistles of Paul, rightly rendered *Gospel*. But this is manifestly, as has been shown, a secondary sense of later date.

§ 16. I OBSERVED that, when the word *ευαγγελιον* is construed with a noun serving to limit or explain its nature, it ought to be rendered *good news*. But every regimen is not to be understood as serving this purpose. Thus, when it is followed with *Ιησς Χρισς*, with *τς Κυρις*, or *τς Θες*, which denote the author, it is justly regarded as a name for the dispensation, and properly rendered *Gospel*. In the phrase *το ευαγγελιον τς Χρισς*, not preceded by *Ιησς*, the regimen may denote either the author or the subject. In the first view, it is *the Gospel of Christ*, that is, instituted by him; in the second, *the good news of the Messiah*, that is, concerning him. There are, perhaps, a few other cases in which the choice may be a matter of indifference. But, in most cases, the regimen ascertains the sense. Thus, *το ευαγγελιον της ειρηνης*<sup>26</sup> can be no other than *the good news of peace*. The addition plainly

<sup>26</sup> Eph. vi. 15.

indicates the subject. For the same reason, *το ευαγγελιον της χαριτος Θεου*<sup>27</sup>, is the *good news of the favour of God*; *το ευαγγελιον της σωτηριας υμων*<sup>28</sup>, the *good news of your salvation*. The words in the common version, *the gospel of your salvation*, are mere words, and convey no meaning to English ears.—The second case wherein the word always may, and commonly should, be rendered *good news*, and not *gospel*, is when it is construed with *κηρυσσω* *I proclaim* or *publish*. The justness of this observation will be manifest, from what I shall afterwards observe on the import of that verb in the Gospels and Acts.

§ 17. THE third case is, when it clearly refers to a different subject from what is commonly with us denominated the Gospel. Under this, perhaps, may be ranked some of the examples which also come under the first case mentioned. For instance, *το ευαγγελιον της σωτηριας υμων*, the *good news of your salvation*. For here the tidings to which the Apostle refers, was not the embassy itself of peace by Jesus Christ; but it was the cordial reception which the Ephesians had given to that embassy, and which was to him who loved them, good news, because a pledge of their salvation. Under the same case also, in my opinion, we ought to class that famous passage in the Apocalypse<sup>29</sup>, *I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting*

<sup>27</sup> Acts, xx. 24.<sup>28</sup> Eph. i. 13.<sup>29</sup> xiv. 6, 7.

*gospel* (so are the words *εχοντα ευαγγελιον αιωνιον* rendered in the common version,) *to preach to them that dwell on the earth ; and to every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people, saying with a loud voice, Fear God and give glory to him, for the hour of his judgment is come, and worship him, &c.* My reasons are, first, we are expressly informed what the angel had to proclaim, *κηρυσσειν*, which is all contained in the 7th verse, and relates to a particular event long posterior to the first propagation of the Gospel; namely, the vengeance God would take on the persecutors of his church, expressed in these words, *The hour of his judgment is come.* The rest of the verse is to be understood merely as a warning naturally suggested by the occasion. Nor let it be urged, that the approach of the hour of judgment looks rather like bad news than good. It frequently holds, that the tidings which to one are the most doleful, are to another the most joyous. The visions and prophecies of that Book are all directed to the churches of Christ, and intended for their use. To crush their enemies, was to relieve the churches : the defeat of the one, was the victory of the other. Secondly, what the angel had to promulgate, is not called *το ευαγγελιον*, as the word is almost uniformly used, when referring to the Christian dispensation, but simply *ευαγγελιον*, not *the Gospel*, the institution of Christ,—not that which is emphatically styled *the good news*, but barely *good news*. It is styled *αιωνιον*, everlasting, with the same propriety, and in the same latitude, as things of long duration, or

of permanent consequences, are often, in Scripture, so denominated.

§ 18. AGAIN, let it be observed that, by the English word *gospel*, we do not always mean precisely the same thing. The predominant sense is doubtless the religious institution of Jesus Christ. But this is not invariably its meaning. Early, in the church, the word *ευαγγελιον* was employed to denote, and, in one passage of the New Testament, actually denotes, the history of the life, teaching, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. It is in this sense that the four histories or narratives, written by Mathew, Mark, Luke, and John, containing memoirs of that extraordinary Personage, have, from the earliest antiquity, been titled *ευαγγελια*, *Gospels*. The word is thus used by Mark<sup>30</sup>, *Αρχη τε ευαγγελιας Ιησου Χριστου*, *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ*. I confess, however, that it would not be easy to decide, whether this ought to be accounted part of the sacred text, or a title afterwards prefixed (as were the names of the penmen, by some of the first transcribers,) which may have been inadvertently admitted into the text. But whether this application be scriptural or not, it is very ancient, and has obtained universally in the church. The English word has precisely the same application. It may be proper here to remark that, though the Greek word *ευαγγελιον* has been adopted by the Syriac inter-

preters, yet, in the historical part, they admit it only into the titles of the four Gospels, in the sense last mentioned, and into the first verse of Mark's Gospel, where the sense is the same. Their use of the Greek word in these places is exactly similar to the use which our translators have made of the words of the Septuagint, *Genesis* and *Exodus*, which serve for names to the two first Books of the Pentateuch, but which they have never employed in the body of the work, where the words *γενεσις* and *εξοδος* occur in that version. Thus in every other passage of the Gospels, and Acts, *εὐαγγελιον* is rendered כְּבָרְתָא *sa-bartha*, a plain Syriac word of the same signification and similar origin. In this the Syriac interpreters appear to have acted more judiciously than the Latin, as they have been sensible of the impropriety of darkening some of the plainest, but most important declarations, by the unnecessary introduction of an exotic term which had no meaning, or at least not the proper meaning in their language. In Paul's Epistles, I acknowledge they have several times adopted the Greek word; but let it be observed that, in these, the term *εὐαγγελιον* is frequently employed in a different sense. This has, in part, appeared already, but will be still more evident, from what immediately follows.

§ 19. THE fourth sense of *εὐαγγελιον* in the New Testament is the ministry of the Gospel. In this acceptation I find the word used oftener than once by the Apostle Paul. Thus, *God is my*

witness, whom I serve, with my spirit, in the gospel of his Son<sup>31</sup>, *εν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ*, that is, in the ministry of the Gospel, or in dispensing the Gospel of his Son. This is one of the passages in which the Syriac interpreter has retained the original word. In another place<sup>32</sup>, *What is my reward then? Verily that when I preach the gospel, I may make the gospel of Christ, το εὐαγγέλιον, without charge*; that is, that the ministry of the Gospel of Christ may not by me be rendered chargeable. This the context plainly shows; for this is the only expence he is here speaking of. I think for perspicuity's sake, the word *ministry* should have been used in the translation, as the English name *Gospel* hardly admits this meaning. Nor are these the only places wherein the word has this signification<sup>33</sup>.

§ 20. I OBSERVE also, in the Epistles of this Apostle, a fifth meaning, or at least a particular application of the first general meaning, *good news*. It sometimes denotes, not the whole Christian dispensation, but some particular doctrine or promise, specially meriting that denomination. In this sense Paul uses the word, writing to the Galatians<sup>34</sup>. The particular doctrine to which he gives the pertinent appellation *εὐαγγέλιον, good news*, is the free admission of the Gentiles into the church of Christ, without subjecting them to circumcision, and the other ceremonies of the law.

<sup>31</sup> Rom. i. 9.

<sup>32</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 18.

<sup>33</sup> See 2 Cor. viii. 18. and Phil. iv. 15.

<sup>34</sup> ii. 2.

This, considering the Jewish prejudices at that time, accounts for the reserve which he used at Jerusalem, where, by his own representation, he imparted privately to the disciples of chief distinction, and consequently of most enlarged knowledge and sentiments, that doctrine which he publicly proclaimed, in Gentile countries. I think it is this which the Apostle sometimes, by way of distinction, denominates *his Gospel*. For, though there was no discordancy in the doctrine taught by the different Apostles, yet to him and Barnabas, the Apostles of the uncircumcision, it was specially committed to announce every where among the heathen, God's gracious purpose of receiving them, uncircumcised as they were, into the church of Christ. Accordingly, as he proceeds in his Argument<sup>35</sup>, the Gospel, or good news, *ευαγγελιον*, sent to the Gentiles, is expressly contrasted with that sent to the Jews.

This seems also to be the sense of the word in another passage<sup>36</sup>, where what he calls *το ευαγγελιον μυσ*, he describes as *μυστηριον αιωνιοις σεσιγημενον*, *kept secret for ages*, but now made known to all nations for the obedience of the faith. For, in this manner, he oftener than once speaks of the call of the Gentiles. In all such passages, it is better to retain the general term *good news* in the version. This appellation is, in some respect, evidently applicable to them all, whereas the term *Gospel* is never thus understood in our language.

<sup>35</sup> Gal. ii. 7.<sup>36</sup> Rom. xvi. 25.

## PART III.

## OF THE PHRASE ἡ καινη διαθηκη.

ANOTHER title, by which the religious institution of Jesus Christ is sometimes denominated, is ἡ καινη διαθηκη, which is almost always, in the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, rendered by our translators *the New Testament*. Yet the word διαθηκη by itself is, except in a very few places, always there rendered not *Testament*, but *Covenant*. It is the Greek word whereby the Seventy have uniformly translated the Hebrew ברית *berith*, which our translators in the Old Testament have invariably rendered *Covenant*. That the Hebrew term corresponds much better to the English word *Covenant*, though not in every case perfectly equivalent, than to *Testament*, there can be no question: at the same time it must be owned that the word διαθηκη, in classical use, is more frequently rendered *Testament*. The proper Greek word for *Covenant* is συνθηκη, which is not found in the New Testament, and occurs only thrice in the Septuagint. It is never there employed for rendering the Hebrew *berith*, though, in one place, it is substituted for a term nearly synonymous. That the scriptural sense of the word διαθηκη is more fitly expressed by our term

*Covenant*, will not be doubted by any body who considers the constant application of the Hebrew word so rendered in the Old Testament, and of the Greek word, in most places at least, where it is used in the New. What has led translators, ancient and modern, to render it *Testament*, is, I imagine, the manner wherein the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews argues<sup>37</sup>, in allusion to the classical acceptance of the term. But however much it was necessary to give a different turn to the expression in that passage, in order to make the author's argument as intelligible to the English, as it is in the original to the Greek, reader; this was not a sufficient reason for giving a version to the word, in other places, that neither suits the context, nor is conformable to the established use of the term, in the sacred writings.

§ 2. THE term *New* is added to distinguish it from the *Old Covenant*, that is, the dispensation of Moses. I cannot help observing by the way, that often the language of theological systems, so far from assisting us to understand the language of holy writ, tends rather to mislead us. The two Covenants are always in Scripture the two dispensations, or religious institutions; that under Moses is the *Old*, that under the Messiah is the *New*. I do not deny that in the latitude wherein the term is used in holy writ, the command under the sanction of death which God gave to Adam in paradise, may, like the ordinance of circum-

<sup>37</sup> ix. 16, 17.

cision, with sufficient propriety be termed a *Covenant* ; but it is pertinent to observe that it is never so denominated in Scripture ; and that, when mention is made in the Epistles, of the two Covenants, the *Old* and the *New*, or the first and the second (for there are two so called by way of eminence,) there appears no reference to any thing that related to Adam. In all such places, Moses and Jesus are contrasted, the Jewish economy and the Christian, Mount Sinai in Arabia, whence the law was promulged, and Mount Sion in Jerusalem, where the Gospel was first published.

§ 3. IT is proper to observe further that, from signifying the two religious dispensations, they came soon to denote the books, wherein what related to these dispensations was contained ; the sacred writings of the Jews being called ἡ παλαια διαθηκη, and the writings superadded by the Apostles and Evangelists, ἡ καινη διαθηκη. We have one example in Scripture, of this use of the former appellation. The Apostle says<sup>38</sup>, speaking of his countrymen, *Until this day remaineth the veil untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament*, ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναγνώσει τῆς παλαιας διαθηκης. The word in this application is always rendered in our language *Testament*. We have in this followed the Vulgate, as most modern translators also have done. In the Geneva French, the word is rendered both ways in the title, that the one may

<sup>38</sup> 2 Cor. iii. 14.

serve for explaining the other, *Le nouveau Testament*, c'est à dire *La nouvelle alliance*, &c. in which they copied Beza, who says, *Testamentum novum*, sive *Fædus novum*. That the second rendering of the word is the better version, is unquestionable ; but the title appropriated by custom to a particular book, is on the same footing with a proper name, which is hardly considered as a subject for criticism. Thus we call Cæsar's Diary, *Cæsar's Commentaries*, from their Latin name, though very different in meaning from the English word.

## PART IV.

### OF THE NAME *ὁ Χριστός*.

THE only other term necessary to be examined here, is *ὁ Χριστός*, the Messiah, or *the Christ* ; in English rendered, according to the etymology of the word, *the anointed* ; for so both the Hebrew *משיח*, *Meshiach*, and the Greek *Χριστός* signify ; and from the sound of these are formed our names *Messiah* and *Christ*. What first gave rise to the term, was the ceremony of anointing, by which the kings and the high-priests of God's people, and sometimes the Prophets<sup>39</sup>, were consecrated

<sup>39</sup> 1 Kings, xix. 16.

and admitted to the exercise of their holy functions ; for all these functions were accounted holy among the Israelites. As this consecration was considered as adding a sacredness to their persons, it served as a guard against violence from the respect had to religion. Its efficacy this way was remarkably exemplified in David, who acknowledges that, when he had it in his power to avenge himself of Saul his enemy who sought his life, he was, principally by this consideration, restrained from killing him. *The Lord forbid*<sup>40</sup>, said he, *that I should do this thing unto my master, the Lord's anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him, seeing he is the anointed of the Lord.* The word here translated *anointed* is, as in other places, in Hebrew *Messiah*, and in the Greek of the Seventy, *Christ*. It was a term, therefore, in its original use, applicable to all the succession of kings and high-priests, good and bad, of the people of Israel.

§ 2. BUT, as the king and the high-priest were the heads of the whole nation, the one in civil, the other in religious matters, the term *anointed*, that is *Messiah* or *Christ*, might, not improbably, serve, by a figure, to denote the head, chief, or principal of any class or people. So thinks the learned Grotius. Thus the high-priest is sometimes distinguished from ordinary priests by the title *the anointed priest* ; in the Septuagint  $\delta \epsilon \rho \epsilon \upsilon \varsigma \delta \chi \rho \iota \sigma \tau \omicron \varsigma$  ; though this, I own, is not a proof

<sup>40</sup> 1 Sam. xxiv. 6.

of the point, since he was literally so distinguished from the rest<sup>41</sup>. But that the word is sometimes applied, when, in the literal sense, no anointing had been used, cannot be questioned. In this way it is applied to Cyrus the Persian monarch by the Prophet Isaiah<sup>42</sup>, *Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus*; yet Houbigant, differing from his usual manner, renders the words, *de uncto suo Cyro*. But whether the import of this expression be, that Cyrus was a chief among kings, a most eminent sovereign, as Grotius seems to imagine, or that he was selected of God for the restoration of Judah, and the rebuilding of the temple of Jerusalem, the only temple dedicated to the true God, may be made a question. For my part, I am inclinable to think that it is rather this latter interpretation which conveys the Prophet's idea, and the meaning intended by the Spirit of God. And to this interpretation the context entirely agrees. The word was also employed to denote those specially favoured of God, as were the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; concerning whom he is represented by the Psalmist<sup>43</sup>, as having said, *Touch not mine anointed*. The word is in the plural number, *των χριστων μου*, in the Vulgate *Christos meos*, which, in our idiom,

<sup>41</sup> The sons of Aaron were indeed all anointed, in their father's lifetime, by the express command of God; but it does not appear, that this practice descended to other ordinary priests.

<sup>42</sup> Is. xlv. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Psal. cv. 15. 1 Chr. xvi. 22.

is not distinguished from the singular. Now there is no ground from Scripture to believe that any of them was in the literal sense anointed.

§ 3. BUT the most eminent use and application of the word is when it is employed as the title of that sublime Personage typified and predicted from the beginning, who was to prove, in the most exalted sense, the Redeemer and Lord of God's people. He is spoken of by the Prophets, under several characters, and, amongst others, under this *of God's anointed*, the Messiah, or the Christ. Those of the Prophets, who seem more especially to have appropriated this title, formerly more common, to the Mediator of the New Covenant, were the royal Prophet David <sup>44</sup>, Isaiah <sup>45</sup>, and Daniel <sup>46</sup>. The first represents him as anointed of God, King of God's heritage, the second as set apart and consecrated to be the Messenger of good tidings to the inhabitants of the earth, the third as appointed to make expiation for the sins of the people.

§ 4. It deserves to be remarked that, in the English translation of the Old Testament, the word is always rendered *anointed*, to whomsoever applied, except in the two verses of Daniel quoted in the margin, where it is translated *Messiah*. In

<sup>44</sup> Psal. ii. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Isaiah, lxi. 1, &c.

<sup>46</sup> Dan. ix. 25, 26.

the New Testament, the corresponding Greek word is always rendered *Christ*, and commonly without the article. In this our interpreters have been so uniform, that they have even employed the word *Christ*, where the passage is a quotation and literal translation from the Old Testament, in which the Hebrew word, though perfectly equivalent, had been by themselves rendered *anointed*. Thus <sup>47</sup>, *the rulers were gathered together against the Lord and against his Christ, κατα τς Χριστου αυτου*. The words are quoted from the second Psalm, where they had said, *against his anointed*. The change here is the more remarkable, as there is a plain reference to the meaning of the word in the very next sentence: *For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, ου εξρισας, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together.*

§ 5. IN the Vulgate, in all the places of the Old Testament above referred to, it is translated *Christus*. So it is also in Houbigant, except where it is applied to Cyrus, as mentioned § 2. Whereas, in regard to Cyrus, it is in the Vulgate, *Hæc dicit Dominus Christo meo Cyro*. The same appellation is also given to King Saul, *Dixitque David ad viros suos, Propitius sit mihi Dominus, ne faciam hanc rem domino meo, Christo Domini, ut mittam manum meam in eum, quia Christus*

<sup>47</sup> Acts, iv. 26, 27.

*Domini est.* In the Psalms, *Nolite tangere Christos meos*, and *adversus Dominum et adversus Christum ejus*. In Daniel also the word is in the same way rendered. Here indeed, and in the last-mentioned passage from the Psalms, as no Christian can well doubt the reference to the Messiah, there is not so great an appearance of impropriety; yet, when applied to the high-priest, they have not said *christus*, but *unctus*, giving the import of the word as it was literally applicable to him. Otherwise the term *Christus* might have been used, at least, as properly of the high-priest, who was, in one respect, a figure of our Lord, as either of a heathen prince, or even of a bad king of Israel. All the other Latin translators, except *Leo de Juda*, if I remember right, use *unctus*, not only in speaking of the priest, but also in relation to Cyrus and Saul; and wherever they have not observed a direct reference to the Lord Jesus. *Leo*, in the passage above quoted from Samuel, uses both words, *messias* and *unctus*, in relation to Saul, where he probably introduces the latter word for explaining the former. *Servet me Dominus, ne rem istam designem contra dominum meum messiam Domini, ut scilicet inferam ei manum; est enim unctus Domini.* To Cyrus also he applies the word *messias*. In Daniel, *Leo*, *Castalio*, and *Houbigant*, all use the word *messias*: *Junius* chooses *christus* with the Vulgate, both there and in the second Psalm, in which last mentioned place *Leo* also uses *christus*. About other modern translations it is not necessary here to inquire. It is sufficient to observe that, at the time of

our Lord's appearing, and for many years before, the term was understood to denote the great Deliverer and Prince whom God, by his prophets, had promised to send, for the comfort and redemption of his people.

§ 6. LET us now consider a little the use of the term in the New Testament. If we were to judge by the common version, or even by most versions into modern tongues, we should consider the word as rather a proper name than an appellative, or name of office, and should think of it only as a surname given to our Lord. Our translators have contributed greatly to this mistake, by very seldom prefixing the article before *Christ*, though it is rarely wanting in the original. The word *Christ* was at first as much an appellative as the word *baptist* was, and the one was as regularly accompanied with the article as the other. Yet our translators, who always say *the baptist*, have, one would think, studiously avoided saying *the Christ*. This may appear to superficial readers an inconsiderable difference; but the addition of the article will be found, when attended to, of real consequence for conveying the meaning in English, with the same perspicuity and propriety with which it is conveyed in Greek. So much virtue there is in the article, which, in our idiom, is never prefixed to the name of a man, though it is invariably prefixed to the name of office, unless where some pronoun, or appropriating expression, renders it unnecessary; that, without it, the

sense is always darkened, and sometimes marred. Thus, in such expressions as these, *This Jesus whom I preach unto you is Christ*<sup>48</sup> : *Paul testified to the Jews that Jesus was Christ*<sup>49</sup> : *Showing by the Scriptures that Jesus was Christ*<sup>50</sup> : the unlearned reader forms no distinct apprehension, as the common application of the words leads him uniformly to consider Jesus and Christ, as no other than the name and surname of the same person. It would have conveyed to such a reader precisely the same meaning to have said, *Paul testified to the Jews that Christ was Jesus* ; and so of the rest. The article alone, therefore, in such cases, adds considerable light to the expression ; yet no more than what the words of the historian manifestly convey to every reader who understands his language. It should be, therefore, *Paul testified to the Jews that Jesus was the Christ*, or the Messiah, &c. Many other examples might be brought to the same purpose ; but these are sufficient.

§ 7. BUT it may be asked, Is the word *Christ* then never to be understood in the New Testament as a proper name ; but always as having a direct reference to the office or dignity ? I answer that, without question, this word, though originally an appellative, came at length, from the frequency of application to one individual, and only to one, to supply the place of a proper name.

<sup>48</sup> Acts, xvii. 3.<sup>49</sup> xviii. 5.<sup>50</sup> 28

What would contribute to hasten this effect, was the commonness of the name *Jesus* among the Jews at that time, which rendered an addition necessary for distinguishing the person. The remark of Grotius is not without foundation, that, in process of time the name *Jesus* was very much dropped, and *Christ*, which had never been used before as the proper name of any person, and was, for that very reason, a better distinction, was substituted for it; insomuch, that, among the heathen, our Lord came to be more known by the latter, than the former. This use seems to have begun soon after his ascension. In his lifetime, it does not appear that the word was ever used in this manner; nay, the contrary is evident from several passages of the Gospels. But the Evangelists wrote some years after the period above mentioned, and therefore, the more perfectly to notify the subject of their history, they adopted the practice common among Christians at that time, which was to employ the word as a surname for the sake of distinction. This was especially proper in the beginning of their narrative, for ascertaining the person whose history they were to write. Thus Matthew begins, *The lineage of Jesus Christ*<sup>51</sup>; and a little after<sup>52</sup>, *Now the birth of Jesus Christ happened thus*. Mark, in like manner<sup>53</sup>, *The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ*. In all the three places it is *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *Jesus Christ*, not *Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *Jesus the Christ*, or the Messiah.

<sup>51</sup> i. 1.<sup>52</sup> 18.<sup>53</sup> i. 1.

Matthew and Mark, as was just now observed, name him so, in introducing their Gospels ; but it deserves to be remarked that they do not afterwards, in their history, either name him so themselves, or mention this name as given him by any of his cotemporaries : nay, the very profession of Peter, and the doubts raised by his enemies, in regard to his being *ὁ χριστος*, *the Messiah*, or *the Christ*, and his never being named familiarly, either by them or by others, during that period, *Ἰησους Χριστος*, but simply *Ἰησους* or *ὁ Ἰησους*, which occurs in the four Gospels upwards of five hundred times, put it beyond doubt, that the word was never applied to him as a proper name, whilst he remained on this earth. It was at that time always understood as the denomination of the dignity or office to which some believed him entitled, others disbelieved, and many doubted. The names used both by Matthew and by Mark, in the beginning of their Gospels, and by John, in the introductory part of his<sup>54</sup>, for Luke does not adopt this manner ; show only the usage which obtained at the time when they wrote, but not when their Lord was living upon the earth. In the last of the four Gospels, he is, in one place<sup>55</sup>, represented, as calling himself Jesus Christ, in an address to God ; but this is so singular, that I cannot help suspecting an accidental omission of the article ; and that the clause must have stood originally *ὃν απεσειλας Ἰησυν τον χριστον*, *Jesus the Messiah whom thou*

<sup>54</sup> i. 17.<sup>55</sup> John, xvii. 3.

*hast sent.* But, whatever be in this, we are warranted to conclude, from the uniform tenour of all the Gospels, that *Χριστος*, in this passage, must be understood as the name of his office. Now, for the very same reason for which our translators have rendered *ὁ Βαπτιστης*, uniformly *the baptist*, with the article, they ought to have rendered *ὁ Χριστος*, *the Christ*, or *the Messiah*, with the article. By not doing it, they have thrown much obscurity on some passages, and weakened others.

§ 8. THOUGH, in the Epistles, it may be sometimes difficult, but is seldom of consequence, to determine whether *Χριστος* be an appellative or a proper name, there is rarely in the Gospels, with which I am here more immediately concerned, any difficulty that can retard an attentive and judicious critic. Such will be sensible, that whatever was the case afterwards, the word *Christ*, during the period comprehended in the Gospel history, was employed solely to express the office or dignity wherewith he was invested, as the Apostle of God, for the redemption of the world. Accordingly, when it is used in the Gospels, the stress of the sentence lies commonly on the signification of that word. Peter in his solemn confession, says<sup>56</sup>, *We believe and are sure that thou art ὁ Χριστος the Christ the Messiah, the Son of the living God.* Here the substance of his declared belief lies much in the import of

<sup>56</sup> John, vi. 69.

this term. Our translators have considered this as so evident that, in the parallel passages in other Gospels, they have departed from their ordinary practice, and rendered it *the Christ*, and in this passage, less properly, *that Christ*. In other places where propriety equally required the article, they have not given it.

Of several which might be quoted, I shall mention only one example in the question put by Jesus to the Pharisees : <sup>57</sup> *Τι ὑμῖν δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ χριστοῦ*, which our translators render, *What think ye of Christ ?* The word used in this manner, without any article definite or indefinite, or any other term to ascertain the meaning, must, in our idiom, be a proper name ; and, as here proposed by Jesus, can be understood no otherways by an unlearned reader than as intended for drawing forth their sentiments concerning himself. To such the question must appear identical with *What think ye of Jesus ?* A name of office is never used in so indistinct a manner. For example, we may say indefinitely, *What think ye of a king ?* or definitely, *What think ye of the king ?* but never, *What think ye of king ?* unless we speak of one whose name is *King*. Yet an appellation may be used without an article when the name is subjoined, because this serves equally with the article to ascertain the meaning, as thus, *What think ye of king Solomon ?* In the place above quoted, there was therefore the strongest

<sup>57</sup> Matth. xxii. 42.

reason for following more closely the original, as it was evidently our Lord's purpose to draw forth their sentiments, not concerning himself, the individual who put the question to them, and whom he knew they considered as an impostor, but, in general, concerning the quality of that Personage whom, under the title of Messiah, they themselves expected.

§ 9. ONE mark of distinction, therefore, whereby the title *Χρῖσος* may be discriminated from the name, is its being attended with the article. I do not mention this, however, as holding invariably, but very generally. When the word is in the vocative, by the idiom of the language, there can be no article; in that case, therefore, we must be directed solely by the sense. Thus, in *προφητευσον ἡμιν, Χρῖσε* <sup>58</sup>, this term must mean *Messiah*, as the intended ridicule is entirely founded on their ascribing that character to one in his wretched circumstances. Another exception is, when it is joined to some other title, as *Χρῖσος Κυριος* <sup>59</sup>, *Χρῖσος βασιλεὺς* <sup>60</sup>; and sometimes, but more rarely, when construed with a pronoun, as *εαν τις αυτον ὁμολογησῃ χρῖσον* <sup>61</sup>, where the sense renders the meaning indubitable. In a few places in regard to this, as well as to other terms, there is an ellipsis of the article, where the most common usage would require it. Of this *ὅτι χρῖς εσε* <sup>62</sup>, is an instance.

<sup>58</sup> Matth. xxvi. 68.<sup>59</sup> Luke, ii. 11.<sup>60</sup> xxiii. 2.<sup>61</sup> John, ix. 22.<sup>62</sup> Mark, ix. 41.

I know it may be objected to the article as a criterion, that in Greek it is not unusual to prefix it to the proper names of persons. Accordingly, in naming our Lord, *Ιησους* and *ὁ Ιησους* are used indifferently. For this reason, I do not lay much stress on this distinction, unless it be confirmed by the connection. In the Epistles, it is plain, that the term is used familiarly as a proper name, and consequently when alone, and not appearing from the context to be emphatical, may be properly rendered as a name, whether it have the article or not. But when it immediately follows *Ιησους*, the article not intervening, it can hardly be interpreted otherwise. Let it be observed that, in scriptural use, when a person has two names, the article, if used at all, is prefixed to the first name, and never inserted between them, unless when some other word, as *λεγομενος*, is added by way of explanation. Thus it is *Πορκιος Φησος*, *Σεργιος Παυλος*, *Ιουδας Ισκαριωτης*, *Ποντιος Πιλατος*, and *Σιμων Ηετρος*. Indeed, where a person is distinguished by adding an epithet rather than a surname, denoting the place of his birth, or of his residence, the article is constantly prefixed to the adjective. Thus it is always *Μαρια ἡ Μαγδαληνη*, literally *Mary the Magdalene*, that is, *of Magdala*, a city on the lake of Gennesaret; and *Ιησους ὁ Ναζαραιος* *Jesus the Nazarene*, or *of Nazareth*.

When the article, therefore, is inserted between the words *Ιησους* and *Χριστος*, there is reason to consider the latter as used emphatically, and pointing directly to his office. In many places in the

Epistles, perhaps in a very few in the Gospels, it may be regarded as a matter of indifference, in which of the two ways the term is translated. Thus, in the first chapter of Matthew<sup>63</sup>, *Ἰησους, ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστος*, may be either, *Jesus, who is called Christ*, that being a surname which, when Matthew wrote, was frequently given him, or *Jesus who is called* (that is, *accounted*) *Messiah*. I have, in my version, preferred the second interpretation; as, in the verse immediately following, we cannot understand otherwise the words *ἕως τῆς χρίσεως*, with the article, and without the name *Ἰησους* prefixed. If so, *ὁ λεγόμενος χριστος* is mentioned to prepare us for this application of the title. Besides, the same phrase occurs again in this Gospel<sup>64</sup>, as used by Pilate at a time when it was never applied to our Lord but by his followers, and that solely as the denomination of his office. So much for the method whereby we may discover when this word is emphatical, and when it is merely a surname.

§ 10. IT is proper now to inquire, in the last place, which of the three terms, *Messiah*, *Christ*, or *Anointed*, is the most proper to be applied in an English version. The word *Anointed* is indeed an English word, and is, besides, in respect of the idea it conveys, expressive of the etymological import of the Hebrew and Greek terms. But, notwithstanding these advantages, it is not

<sup>63</sup> 16.<sup>64</sup> xxvii. 17. 22.

so proper in this case for being used in a version. For first, the original term had early been employed, as we have seen, without any regard to the literal signification; and, in the ordinary application of it, in our Lord's time, little or no attention seems to have been given to the circumstance of unction, which gave rise to the name. Though the word *Anointed*, therefore, expresses the primitive import of the Hebrew name, it does not convey the meaning in which it was then universally understood. It was considered solely as the well-known title of an extraordinary office, to which there was nothing similar, amongst any other people. The original name, therefore, agreeably to what was concluded in a former discourse<sup>65</sup>, ought to be retained. Secondly, it deserves some notice, that the word, both in Hebrew and in Greek, is a substantive, and therefore, in point of form, well adapted for a name of office, being susceptible of the same variety, in number and mode of construction with other substantives; the English word *Anointed* is a participle and indeclinable, and so far from being adapted for the name of an office, that it is grammatically no more than the attributive of some name, either expressed or understood.

§ 11. As to the other two words, *Messiah* and *Christ*, it may be thought a matter of indifference which of them should be preferred. The following are the reasons which have determined me to

<sup>65</sup> Diss. II. Part I. § 5.

give the preference to the former. First, our Lord's own ministry was only amongst his countrymen the Jews, to whom the title of *Messiah* was familiar. With them, wheresoever dispersed, it is considered as the title of that dignity to this day, and is accordingly naturalized in every language that they speak. We never hear of the *Jewish Christ*, it is always the *Jewish Messiah*. When the English translators found it convenient, in translating Daniel, to adopt a term more appropriated than the general word *anointed*, they chose the Hebrew term *Messiah*, in preference to the Greek; and it is surely proper, when the meaning of a word in the New Testament is manifestly the same, to conform, as much as possible, to the language of the Old. That the word *Messiah* was constantly used in Palestine, in our Lord's time, is evident from the two passages in the Gospel of John<sup>66</sup>, where, after mentioning it as the title in current use, both with Jews, and with Samaritans, he adds the explanation in Greek. Secondly, *Messiah* is, even in English use, much more familiar, as the name of the office, than the term *Christ*, which is now universally understood as a proper name of our Saviour. The word *Messiah*, on the contrary, is never employed, and consequently never understood, as a proper name. It is invariably a name of office: and even this circumstance, however slight it may appear, has a considerable influence on perspicuity.

<sup>66</sup> i. 42. iv. 25.

§ 12. I SHALL only add here, before I conclude this subject, that the word *χριστος* is frequently used by Paul as a trope, denoting sometimes the Christian spirit and temper, as when he says, *My little children, of whom I travail in birth again, until Christ be formed in you*<sup>67</sup>. Sometimes the Christian doctrine, *But ye have not so learned Christ*<sup>68</sup>. And in one place at least, the Christian church, *For as the body is one, and hath many members; and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ*<sup>69</sup>. In these cases it is better to retain the name *Christ*, as used hitherto in the version.

§ 13. SOME have thought that the expression *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, *the son of man*, which our Lord always uses when he speaks of himself in the third person, is also a title which was then understood to denote the Messiah. But of this there does not appear sufficient evidence. The only passage of moment that is pleaded in support of it, is from the Prophet Daniel, who says, that he saw in the night visions, *one like the son of man come, with the clouds of heaven, to the ancient of days, and that there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom*<sup>70</sup>. There can be no reasonable doubt, from the description given, that the Messiah is meant. But this is not notified by any of the

<sup>67</sup> Gal. iv. 19.<sup>68</sup> Eph. iv. 20.<sup>69</sup> 1 Cor. xii. 12.<sup>70</sup> Dan. vii. 13, 14.

terms or phrases taken separately ; it is the result of the whole. Nothing appears to be pointed out by this single circumstance, *one like the son of man*, or *like a son of man* (as it ought to have been rendered, neither term being in *statu emphatico*, which in Chaldee supplies the article,) but that he would be a human, not an angelical, or any other kind of being : for, in the oriental idiom, *son of man* and *man*, are terms equivalent.

The four monarchies which were to precede that of the Messiah, the Prophet had, in the foregoing part of the chapter, described under the figure of certain beasts, as emblems severally of the predominant character of each ; the first under the figure of a lion, the second under that of a bear, the third of a leopard, and the fourth of a monster more terrible than any of these. This kingdom, which God himself was to erect, is contradistinguished to all the rest, by the figure of a man, in order to denote, that whereas violence, in some shape or other, would be the principal means by which those merely secular kingdoms would be established, and terror the principal motive by which submission would be enforced, it would be quite otherwise in that spiritual kingdom to be erected by the ancient of days, wherein every thing would be suited to man's rational and moral nature ; affection would be the prevailing motive to obedience, and persuasion the means of producing it ; or, to use the Scripture expression, we should be drawn *with cords of a man, with bands of love*.

Had the Prophet used *man* instead of *son of man*, could one have concluded, that the word *man* was intended as a distinguishing title of the Messiah? It will hardly be pretended. Yet the argument would have been the same; for the terms are synonymous.

There are two phrases by which this may be expressed in the Hebrew, בן אדם *ben adam*, and בן איש *ben ish*. When these two are contrasted to each other, the former denotes one of low degree, the latter one of superior rank. Thus *bene adam ubene ish* are in the Psalms<sup>71</sup> rightly rendered in the common version *low and high*. The first *bene adam* is, in the Septuagint, translated γηγενεις, in the Vulgate, *terrigenæ*, earth-born, or sons of earth, in allusion to the derivation of the word *adam*, man, from a word signifying ground or *earth*. The same *ben adam*, is the common appellation by which God addresses the Prophet Ezekiel, which is rendered by the Seventy υιε ανθρωπου, and frequently occurs in that Book. *The son of man*, therefore, was an humble title, in which nothing was claimed, but what was enjoyed in common with all mankind. In the Syriac version of the New Testament, it often occurs, where the term in the Greek is simply ανθρωπος, *man*.

That it was never understood by the people in our Lord's time, as a title of the Messiah, or even a title of particular dignity, is manifest from several considerations. In the first place, though Jesus

<sup>71</sup> Psal. xlix. 2.

commonly takes it to himself, it is never given him by the Evangelists, in speaking of him. He is never addressed with this title by others, whether disciples or strangers. Several honourable compellations were given him, by those who applied for relief, as, *κυριε, διδασκαλε*, *rabbi*; sometimes he is addressed *son of David*, sometimes *son of God*, and on one occasion he is called *he who cometh in the name of the Lord*. The two last titles may reasonably be supposed to imply an acknowledgment of him as Messiah. Now, if the title *son of man* had been thought, even in any degree, respectful from others, we should certainly have had some examples of it, in his lifetime. Further, our Lord was in the practice of denominating himself in this manner, at the very time that he prohibited his disciples from acquainting any man that he was the Messiah. What purpose could this prohibition have answered, if the title he commonly assumed, in the hearing of every body, was understood to be of the same import? It is urged further, that this phrase is used in the Apocalypse<sup>72</sup>, in describing the vision which the Apostle had of his Master. The answer is the same with that given to the argument founded on Daniel's vision. First, the phrase is not entirely the same with that by which Jesus distinguishes himself in the Gospel. Our Lord calls himself *ὁ υἱος του ανθρωπου*, *the son of man*; John says, *ὁμοιον υἱω ανθρωπου*, without any article, *one like a son of man*, that is,

<sup>72</sup> Rev. i. 13.

*in the human form.* It is indeed evident that he is speaking of Jesus Christ ; but this is what we gather from the whole description and context, and not from this circumstance alone.

§ 14. BUT, whatever be in this, there are several titles which, in the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, are peculiarly applied to our Lord, though they do not often occur. I have already mentioned *ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου*, and *ὁ υἱὸς Δαβὶδ*. Add to these *ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, *the saint, or the holy one of God*, *ὁ ἐκλεκτός τοῦ Θεοῦ*, *the elect or the chosen one of God*, both expressions borrowed from the Prophets. Now, though these terms are in the plural number susceptible of an application to others, both angels and men ; they are, in the New Testament, when in the singular number, and accompanied with the article, evidently appropriated to the Messiah.

## Dissertation the Sixth.

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INQUIRY INTO THE DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORT OF  
SOME WORDS COMMONLY THOUGHT SYNONYMOUS.

SEVERAL words in the New Testament considered by our translators as synonymous, and commonly rendered by the same English word, are not really synonymous, though their significations may have an affinity, and though sometimes they may be used indiscriminately. I shall exemplify this remark in a few instances of words which occur in the Gospels.

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### PART I.

*Διαβολος, Δαιμων, AND Δαιμονιον.*

THE first of this kind, on which I intend to make some observations, are *διαβολος*, *δαιμων*, and *δαιμονιον*, all rendered in the common translation almost invariably *devil*. The word *διαβολος*, in its ordinary acceptation, signifies *calumniator*,

*traducer, false accuser*, from the verb διαβαλλειν, to calumniate, &c. Though the word is sometimes, both in the Old Testament and in the New, applied to men and women of this character, it is, by way of eminence, employed to denote that apostate angel, who is exhibited to us, particularly in the New Testament, as the great enemy of God and man. In the two first chapters of Job, it is the word in the Septuagint, by which the Hebrew שָׂטָן *Satan* or *adversary* is translated. Indeed the Hebrew word in this application, as well as the Greek, has been naturalized in most modern languages. Thus we say indifferently *the devil* or *Satan* ; only the latter has more the appearance of a proper name, as it is not attended with the article. There is this difference between the import of such terms, as occurring in their native tongues, and as modernized in translations. In the former they always retain somewhat of their primitive meaning, and, beside indicating a particular being, or class of beings, they are of the nature of appellatives, and mark a special character or note of distinction in such beings. Whereas, when thus Latinized or Englished, they answer solely the first of these uses, as they come nearer the nature of proper names. This remark extends to all such words, as *cherub, seraph, angel, apostle, evangelist, messiah*.

§ 2. Διαβολος, I observed, is sometimes applied to human beings. But nothing is easier than to distinguish this application from the more frequent application to the arch-apostate. One mark of

distinction is that, in this last use of the term, it is never found in the plural. When the plural is used, the context always shows that it is human beings, and not fallen angels, that are spoken of. It occurs in the plural only thrice, and only in Paul's Epistles. *Γυναικας*, says he<sup>1</sup>, *ὥσαντως σεμνας, μη διαβολους*, *Even so must their wives be grave, not slanderers*. In scriptural use the word may be either masculine or feminine. Again, speaking of the bad men who would appear in the last times, he says<sup>2</sup>, amongst other things, that they will be *αστοργοι, ασπονδοι, διαβολοι*, in the common translation, *without natural affection, truce-breakers, false accusers*. Once more<sup>3</sup>, *Πρεσβυτιδας ὥσαντως εν καταστηματι ιεροπρεπεις, μη διαβολους*. *The aged women likewise, that they be in behaviour as becometh holiness, not false accusers*. Another criterion, whereby the application of this word to the prince of darkness may be discovered, is its being attended with the article. The term almost invariably is *ὁ διαβολος*. I say *almost*, because there are a few exceptions.

§ 3. It may not be amiss, ere we proceed, to specify the exceptions, that we may discover whether there be any thing in the construction that supplies the place of the article, or at least makes that it may be more easily dispensed with. Paul, addressing himself to Elymas the sorcerer, who endeavoured to turn away the proconsul Ser-

<sup>1</sup> 1 Tim. iii. 11.<sup>2</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 3.<sup>3</sup> Tit. ii. 3.

gius Paulus from the faith, says<sup>4</sup>, *O full of all subtilty, thou child of the devil, υμε διαβολου*. There can be no doubt that the Apostle here means the evil spirit, agreeably to the idiom of Scripture, where a good man is called a child of God, and a bad man a child of the devil. *Ye are of your father the devil*, said our Lord to the Pharisees<sup>5</sup>. As to the example from the Acts, all I can say is, that in an address of this form, where a vocative is immediately followed by the genitive of the word construed with it, the connection is conceived to be so close as to render the omission of the article more natural than in other cases. This holds especially when, as in the present instance, the address must have been accompanied with some emotion and vehemence in the speaker. I know not whether *ὁ αντιδικος ὑμων διαβολος*<sup>6</sup>, *your adversary the devil*, ought to be considered as an example. There being here two appellatives, the article prefixed to the first, may be regarded as common, though I own it is more usual, in such cases, for the greater emphasis, to repeat it. In the word *ὁς ἐστι διαβολος και σατανας*<sup>7</sup>, *who is the devil and satan*; as the sole view is to mention the names whereby the malignant spirit is distinguished, we can hardly call this instance an exception. Now these are all the examples, I can find in which the word, though used indefinitely, or without the article, evidently denotes our spiritual and ancient enemy. The examples in

<sup>4</sup> Acts, xiii. 10.<sup>5</sup> John, viii. 44.<sup>6</sup> 1 Pet. v. 8.<sup>7</sup> Rev. xx. 2.

which it occurs in this sense, with the article, it were tedious to enumerate.

§ 4. THERE is only one place, beside those above mentioned, where the word is found without the article, and, as it is intended to express a human character, though a very bad one, ought not, I think, to have been rendered *devil*. The words are, *Jesus answered, Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?* ἐξ ὑμῶν εἰς διαβολος ἐστι<sup>8</sup>. My reasons for not translating it *devil* in this place are; first, the word is strictly and originally an appellative, denoting a certain bad quality, and though commonly applied to one particular being, yet naturally applicable to any kind of being susceptible of moral character; secondly, as the term in its appropriation to the arch-rebel, always denotes one individual, the term *a devil* is not agreeable to Scripture style, insomuch that I am inclined to think, that if our Lord's intention had been to use, by an antonomasia, the distinguishing name of the evil spirit, in order to express more strongly the sameness of character in both, he would have said ὁ διαβολος, one of you is the *devil*, this being the only way whereby that evil spirit is discriminated. The words ἀντιδικος adversary, πειραζων tempter with the article, are also used by way of eminence, though not so frequently, to express the same malignant being; yet, when either of these occurs without the article, applied to a man as an

<sup>8</sup> John, vi. 70.

adversary or a tempter, we do not suppose any allusion to the devil. The case would be different, if one were denominated ὁ πειραζων, ὁ αντιδικος, *the tempter, the adversary*.

There is not any epithet (for διαβολος is no more than an epithet) by which the same spirit is oftener distinguished, than by that of ὁ πονηρος, *the evil one*. Now, when a man is called simply πονηρος, without the article, no more is understood to be implied than that he is a bad man. But if the expression were ὁ πονηρος, unless used to distinguish a bad from a good man of the same name, we should consider it as equivalent to the devil, or *the evil one*. Even in metaphorical appellations, if a man were denominated *a dragon* or *a serpent*, we should go no farther for the import of the metaphor, than to the nature of the animal so called: but if he were termed *the dragon* or *the old serpent*, this would immediately suggest to us, that it was the intention of the speaker to represent the character as the same with that of the seducer of our first parents. The unlearned English reader will object, Where is the impropriety in speaking of *a devil*? Is any thing more common in the New Testament? How often is there mention of persons possessed with *a devil*? We hear too of numbers of them. Out of Mary Magdalene went seven; and out of the furious man who made the sepulchres his residence, a legion. The Greek student needs not be informed that, in none of those places, is the term διαβολος, but δαιμων or δαιμονιον. Nor can any thing be clearer from Scripture than that, though the *demons*

are innumerable, there is but one *devil* in the universe. Besides, if we must suppose that this word, when applied to human creatures, bears, at the same time, an allusion to the evil spirit; there is the same reason for rendering it devils, in the three passages lately quoted from Paul: for, wherever the indefinite use is proper in the singular, there can be no impropriety in the use of the plural. Both equally suppose that there may be many of the sort. Now, it is plain that those passages would lose greatly, by such an alteration. Instead of pointing, according to the manifest scope of the place, to a particular bad quality to be avoided, or, a vice whereby certain dangerous persons would be distinguished, it could only serve as a vague expression of what is bad in general, and so would convey little or no instruction.

§ 5. THE only plea I know, in favour of the common translation of the passage is, that, by the help of the trope *antonomasia* (for devil in our language has much the force of a proper name,) the expression has more strength and animation, than a mere appellative could give it. But that the expression is more animated, is so far from being an argument in its favour, that it is, in my judgment, the contrary. It savours more of the human spirit than of the divine, more of the translator than of the author. We are inclinable to put that expression into an author's mouth, which we should, on such an occasion, have chosen ourselves. When affected with anger or resentment,

we always desert the proper terms, for those tropes which will convey our sentiment with most asperity. This is not the manner of our Lord, especially in cases wherein he himself is the direct object of either injury or insult. Apposite thoughts, clothed in the plainest expressions, are much more characteristic of his manner. When there appears severity in what he says, it will be found to arise from the truth and pertinency of the thought, and not from a curious selection of cutting and reproachful words. This would be but ill adapted to the patience, the meekness, and the humility, of his character; not to mention that it would be little of a piece with the account given of the rest of his sufferings.

I know it may be objected, that the rebuke given to Peter<sup>9</sup>, *Get thee behind me, Satan*, is conceived in terms as harsh, though the provocation was far from being equal. The answer is much the same in regard to both. Satan, though conceived by us as a proper name, was an appellative in the language spoken by our Lord; for, from the Hebrew it passed into the Syriac, and signified no more than adversary or opponent. It is naturally just as applicable to human, as to spiritual, agents, and is, in the Old Testament, often so applied.

§ 6. I ACKNOWLEDGE that the word *διαβολος*, in the case under examination, is to be understood as used in the same latitude with the Hebrew *Satan*,

<sup>9</sup> Matth. xvi. 23.

which, though commonly interpreted by the Seventy *διαβολος*, is sometimes rendered *επιβουλος*, *insidiator*, and may be here fitly translated into English, either *spy* or *informer*. The Scribes and Pharisees, in consequence of their knowledge of the opposition between our Lord's doctrine and theirs, had conceived an envy of him, which settled into malice and hatred, insomuch that they needed no accuser. But though Judas did not properly accuse his master to them as a criminal, the purpose which he engaged to the Scribes, the chief priests, and the elders, to execute, was to observe his motions, and inform them when and where he might be apprehended privately without tumult, and to conduct their servants to the place. The term used was therefore pertinent, but rather soft than severe. He calls him barely *spy* or *informer*, whom he might have called traitor and perfidious.

§ 7. IT is now proper to inquire, secondly, into the use that has been made of the terms *δαιμων* and *δαιμονιον*. First, as to the word *δαιμων*, it occurs only five times in the New Testament, once in each of the three Gospels, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and twice in the Apocalypse. It is remarkable, that in the three Gospels it refers to the same possession, to wit, that of the furious man in the country of the Gadarenes, who haunted the sepulchres. There does not, however seem to be any material difference in this application from that of the diminutive

δαιμονιον, which is also used by Luke in relation to the same demoniac.

§ 8. Δαιμονιον occurs frequently in the Gospels, and always in reference to possessions, real or supposed. But the word διαβολος is never so applied. The use of the term δαιμονιον is as constantly indefinite, as the term διαβολος is definite. Not but that it is sometimes attended with the article : but, that is only when the ordinary rules of composition require that the article be used, even of a term that is strictly indefinite. Thus, when a possession is first named, it is called simply δαιμονιον, a demon, or πνευμα ακαθαρτον, an unclean spirit, never το δαιμονιον or το πνευμα ακαθαρτον. But when, in the progress of the story, mention is again made of the same demon, he is styled το δαιμονιον, the demon, namely, that already spoken of. And in English, as well as Greek, this is the usage with respect to all indefinites. Further, the plural δαιμονια occurs frequently, applied to the same order of beings with the singular. But what sets the difference of signification in the clearest light is that, though both words, διαβολος and δαιμονιον, occur often in the Septuagint, they are invariably used for translating different Hebrew words. Διαβολος is always in Hebrew either צר tsar, enemy, or שטן Satan, adversary, words never translated δαιμονιον. This word, on the contrary, is made to express some Hebrew term, signifying idol, pagan deity, apparition, or what some render

*satyr.* What the precise idea of the *demons*, to whom possessions were ascribed, then was, it would perhaps be impossible for us, with any certainty, to affirm; but as it is evident that the two words, *διαβολος* and *δαιμονιον*, are not once confounded, though the first occurs in the New Testament upwards of thirty times, and the second about sixty; they can, by no just rule of interpretation, be rendered by the same term. Possessions are never attributed to the being termed *ο διαβολος*. Nor are his authority and dominion ever ascribed to *δαιμονια*: nay, when the discriminating appellations of the devil are occasionally mentioned, *δαιμονιον* is never given as one. Thus he is called not only *ο διαβολος*, but *ο πονηρος*, *ο πειραζων*, *ο αντιδικος*, *ο σατανας*, *ο δρακων*, *ο μεγας*, *ο οφης*, *ο παλαιος*, *ο αρχων του κοσμου τουτου*, *ο αρχων της εξουσιας του αερος*, and *ο θεος του αιωνος τουτου*, that is, *the devil*, *the evil one*, *the tempter*, *the adversary* (this last word answers both to *ο αντιδικος* and *ο σατανας*, which cannot be translated differently,) *the great dragon*, *the old serpent*, *the prince of this world*, *the prince of the power of the air*, and *the god of this world*. But there is no such being as *το δαιμονιον*, the appellation *δαιμονιον* being common to multitudes, whilst the other is always represented as a singular being, the only one of his kind. Not that the Jewish notion of the devil, had any resemblance to what the Persians first, and the Manicheans afterwards, called the evil principle, which they made in some sort co-ordinate with God, and the first source of all evil, as the other is of good.

For *the devil*, in the Jewish system, was a creature, as much as any other being in the universe, and as liable to be controlled by omnipotence, an attribute which they ascribed to God alone. But still the devil is spoken of as only one ; and other beings, however bad, are never confounded with him.

§ 9. I KNOW but two passages of the history, that have the appearance of exceptions from this remark. One is, that wherein our Lord, when accused of casting out demons by the prince of demons, says in return, *How can Satan cast out Satan*<sup>10</sup> ? there is no doubt that ὁ Σατανας and ὁ Διαβολος are the same. Here then, say the objectors, the former of these names is applied to δαιμονια, which seems to show an intercommunity of names. Yet, it must be observed, that this term *Satan*, is introduced only in the way of illustration by similitude, as the divisions in kingdoms and families also are. The utmost that can be deduced from such an example is, that they are malignant beings as well as he, engaged in the same bad cause, and perhaps of the number of those called his angels, and made to serve as his instruments. But this is no evidence that he and they are the same. The other passage is in Luke<sup>11</sup>, where we have an account of the cure of a woman, who had been bowed down for eighteen years. She is said to have

<sup>10</sup> Mark, iii. 23.

<sup>11</sup> xiii. 11.

had a spirit of infirmity ; and our Lord himself says that Satan had bound her<sup>12</sup>. But let it be observed, first, that nothing is said that implies possession. She is not called δαιμονιζομενη, a *demoniac*. Our Saviour is not said to dispossess the demon, but to loose her from her infirmity : secondly, that it is a common idiom among the Jews, to put *spirit* before any quality ascribed to a person, whether it be good or bad, mental or corporeal. Thus the spirit of fear, the spirit of meekness, the spirit of slumber, the spirit of jealousy, are used to express habitual fear, &c. : thirdly, that the ascribing of her disease to Satan, does not imply possession. The former is frequent, even where there is no insinuation of the latter. All the diseased whom our Lord healed, are said to have been oppressed by the devil, ὑπο του διαβολου<sup>13</sup>. All Job's afflictions are ascribed to Satan as the cause<sup>14</sup>, yet Job is no where represented as a demoniac.

§ 10. A LATE learned and ingenious author<sup>15</sup> has written an elaborate dissertation to evince, that there was no real possession in the demoniacs mentioned in the Gospel ; but that the style there employed was adopted, merely in conformity to popular prejudices, and used of a natural disease. His hypothesis is, by no means, necessary for supporting the distinction which I have been

<sup>12</sup> Mark, xiii. 16.      <sup>13</sup> Acts, x. 38.

<sup>14</sup> Job, i. and ii.      <sup>15</sup> Dr. Farmer.

illustrating, and which is founded purely on scriptural usage. Concerning his doctrine, I shall only say, in passing, that, if there had been no more to urge from sacred writ, in favour of the common opinion, than the name *δαιμονιζομενος*, or even the phrases *δαιμονιον εχειν*, *εκβαλλειν*, &c. I should have thought his explanation at least not improbable. But when I find mention made of the number of demons, in particular possessions, their actions expressly distinguished from those of the man possessed, conversations held by the former, about the disposal of them, after their expulsion, and accounts given how they were actually disposed of; when I find desires and passions ascribed peculiarly to them, and similitudes taken from the conduct which they usually observe; it is impossible for me to deny their existence, without admitting that the sacred historians were, either deceived themselves, in regard to them, or intended to deceive their readers. Nay, if they were faithful historians, this reflection, I am afraid, will strike still deeper<sup>16</sup>. But this only by the

<sup>16</sup> The following observation from the judicious Mr. Jortin's excellent remarks on ecclesiastical history, appears to me a strong confirmation of the judgment I have given<sup>a</sup>. "In the New Testament, where any circumstances are added concerning the demoniacs, they are generally such as shew that there was something preternatural in the distemper; for these disordered persons agreed in one story, and paid homage to Christ and to his Apostles, which is not to be expected from madmen, of whom some would have worshipped, and others

<sup>a</sup> 2d Edit. Vol. I. p. 10.

way. To enter farther into the question here, would be foreign to my purpose. The reader of Dr. Farmer's performance, which is written very plausibly, will judge for himself.

§ 11. I OBSERVE further that, though we cannot discover, with certainty, from all that is said in the Gospel concerning possession, whether the demons were conceived to be the ghosts of wicked men deceased, or lapsed angels, or (as was the opinion of some early Christian writers<sup>17</sup>) the mongrel breed of certain angels (whom they understood by *the sons of God* mentioned in Genesis<sup>18</sup>;) and of *the daughters of men*: it is plain they were conceived to be malignant spirits. They are exhibited as the causes of the most direful calamities to the unhappy persons whom they possess, dumbness, deafness, madness, palsy, epilepsy, and the like. The descriptive titles given them, always denote some ill quality or other. Most frequently they are called *πνευματα ακαθαρτα*, *unclean spirits*, sometimes *πνευματα πονηρα*, *malign spirits*. They are represented as conscious that they are doomed to misery and torments, though their punishment be for a while suspended. Art thou come hither, *βασανισαι ημας*, *to torment us before the time*<sup>19</sup>?

“ would have reviled Christ, according to the various humour  
“ and behaviour observable in such persons.”

<sup>17</sup> Just. M. Apol. i.

<sup>18</sup> vi. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Matth. viii. 29.

§ 12. BUT, though this is the character of those demons who were dislodged by our Lord, out of the bodies of men and women possessed by them; it does not follow, that the word *demon* always conveys this bad sense, even in the New Testament. This having been a word much in use among the heathen, from whom the Hellenist Jews first borrowed it, it is reasonable to expect, that, when it is used in speaking of pagans, their customs, worship and opinions; more especially when pagans are represented as employing the term, the sense should be that which is conformable, or nearly so, to classical use. Now, in classical use, the word signified a divine being, though not in the highest order of their divinities, and therefore supposed not equivalent to *Θεός*, but superior to human, and consequently, by the maxims of their theology, a proper object of adoration. "All demons," says Plato, "are an intermediate order between God and mortals"<sup>20</sup>. But though they commonly used the term in a good sense, they did not so always. They had evil demons as well as good. *Juxta usurpatam*, says Calcidius, *penes Græcos loquendi consuetudinem, tam sancti sunt dæmones quam profesti et infidi*. But when no bad quality is ascribed to the demon or demons spoken of, and nothing affirmed that implies it, the acceptation of the term, in pagan writers, is generally favourable. Who has not heard of the demon of Socrates?

<sup>20</sup> Παν το δαιμονιον μεταξυ εστι θεου τε και ανητου. Sympos.

§ 13. IN this way, the word is to be understood, in the only passage of the Acts where it occurs <sup>21</sup> :

Οἱ δε, Ξενων δαιμονιων δοκει καταγγελευς ειναι.

*Others said, he seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods.* So our translators render it. The

reason of this verdict is added, *because he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection, τον Ιησουν και την Αναστασιν.* They supposed the former to be

a male, and the latter a female divinity; for it was customary with them to deify abstract qualities,

making them either gods or goddesses, as suited the gender of the name. This, if I remember

right, is the only passage in the New Testament, in which δαιμονια is not rendered devils, but *gods*.

If our translators had adhered to their method of rendering this word in every other instance, and

said, *He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange devils*, they would have grossly perverted the

sense of the passage. Now, this may suggest a suspicion of the impropriety of this version of the

word any where, but especially where it relates to the objects of worship among the pagans, with

whom the term, when unaccompanied with a bad epithet, or any thing in the context that fixes the

application to evil spirits, was always employed in a good sense.

§ 14. THERE is a famous passage to this purpose in the writings of the Apostle Paul <sup>22</sup>, on which I shall lay before the reader a few observations.

<sup>21</sup> Acts, xvii. 18.

<sup>22</sup> 1 Cor. x. 20, 21.

‘*Α θυει τα εθνη, δαιμονιοις θυει, και ου Θεω· ου θελω δε υμας κοινωνους των δαιμονιων γινεσθαι. Ου δυνασθε ποτηριον Κυριου πινειν και ποτηριον δαιμονιων· ου δυνασθε τραπεζης Κυδιου μετεχειν, και τραπεζης δαιμονιων.* In the English Bible thus rendered, *The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God; and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table and the table of devils.* Passing the impropriety, so often observed above, of representing a name as common to many, which Scripture has invariably appropriated to one; the sentiment itself expressed by our translators, that the Gentiles sacrifice to devils, is not just, whether we consider the thing abstractly, or in relation to the intention of the worshippers.

Considered abstractly, the pagan worship and sacrifices were not offered to God, whom they knew not, and to whose character and attributes there was nothing in the popular creed (I speak not of philosophers) that bore the least affinity. But, as little were they offered to that being, whom Christians and Jews call the devil or Satan, with whose character or history they were equally unacquainted. Nor is it enough to say, that the characters of their deities were so bad, that they partook more of the diabolical nature than of the divine. For this does not hold universally. Pagan nations sometimes deified men who had been their benefactors. Osiris is said to have invented the plough, and to have been the first who taught

the Egyptians husbandry. Though not, on that account, entitled to adoration, yet surely not deserving to be looked on as the devil or enemy of mankind. But admitting it to be true, as it doubtless is, that the characters of their gods were often such as to resemble the devilish nature more than the divine; evil spirits are not understood as excluded from the import of the term *δαίμονια*. As little, on the other hand, ought that term to be confined to such. The proper notion is, beings, in respect of power, (whatever be their other qualities) superior to human, but inferior to that which we Christians comprehend under the term *divine*. For this reason, even the higher orders of the heathen divinities, those whom they styled *Dii majorum gentium*, are included in the Apostle's declaration. For, though they, more rarely, applied to such the terms *δαίμων* and *διαμόνιον*, the power ascribed to them, by their votaries, was infinitely short of omnipotence, as indeed all their other attributes were short of the divine perfections. Paul acknowledged no God but one, of whom the Gentiles were ignorant, and to whom, therefore, they could not offer sacrifice. All beings of a subordinate nature, however much they might be accounted superior to us, he classes under the same general name. 'But can Jupiter  
' himself be included in this description, Jupiter  
' to whom almighty power and supreme dominion  
' are attributed, and who is styled by the poets,  
' *The father of gods and men, the greatest and*  
' *best of beings?*' The attributes sometimes given to Jupiter, must be considered as words

merely complimentary and adulatory; they being utterly inconsistent with the accounts which the same persons give of his origin and history. They are like the titles with which earthly potentates are saluted by their flatterers, when styled fathers of their country, absolute lords of earth and ocean. De la Motte's reply to Madam Dacier<sup>23</sup>, is here very apposite: "What! Could Homer seriously believe Jupiter to be the creator of gods and men? Could he think him the father of his own father Saturn, whom he drove out of heaven, or of Juno his sister, and his wife; of Neptune and Pluto his brothers, or of the nymphs, who had the charge of him in his childhood; or of the giants who made war upon him, and would have dethroned him if they had been then arrived at the age of manhood? How well his actions justify the Latin epithets, *optimus, maximus*, so often given him, all the world knows." Jupiter has, therefore, no right to be held an exception, but is, with strict propriety, comprehended in the name *δαιμονια* attributed, by the Apostle, to all the heathen gods. But *δαιμονιον*, as we have seen, is one thing, and *ὁ διαβολος* is another. Now, if a supposed resemblance, in disposition, between the heathen gods and the devil, were a sufficient foundation for what is affirmed in the common version; any vicious person of whom mention is made in history, such as Cain, Ham, Jezebel, in whom one

<sup>23</sup> De la Critique ; seconde partie. Des Dieux.

might fancy a likeness in character or actions to some divinities of the heathen, might, with equal propriety as the devil, be called the objects of their adoration.

§ 15. THERE are two passages in the Old Testament, one in the Pentateuch<sup>24</sup>, the other in the Psalms<sup>25</sup> to which, particularly the first, the Apostle had doubtless an allusion. In both, the term used by the Septuagint is *δαίμονια* : the Hebrew term is not the same in both places, but in neither is it a word which is ever translated *διαβολος*, by the Seventy. In the Psalm referred to, the term in the original, is that which is commonly rendered *idols*. Now, in regard to idols, the Apostle had said in the same Epistle<sup>26</sup>, that *an idol is nothing in the world* ; in other words, is the representation of no real existence in the universe, though it may be the representation of an imaginary being. It is as much as to say, Jupiter, and Juno, and Saturn, and all the rest of the heathen gods, as delineated by the poets and mythologists, are nonentities, the mere creatures of imagination. Now, if an idol represent no real being, it does not represent the devil, whose existence is, on the Christian hypothesis, beyond a question. But, I am aware of the objection that, if idols represent no real beings, they either do not represent demons, or demons are not real beings. I answer, it is true, that no individual demons, actually existing, are

<sup>24</sup> Deut. xxxii. 17.<sup>25</sup> Psal. xcvi. 5.<sup>26</sup> 1 Cor. viii. 4.

properly represented by their idols; nevertheless, these may, with strict justice, be said to represent the genus or kind, that is, beings intermediate between God and man, less than the former, greater than the latter. For to all who come under this description, real or imaginary, good or bad, the name *demons* is promiscuously given. The reality of such intermediate orders of beings, revelation every where supposes, and rational theism does not contradict. Now, it is to *the kind* expressed in the definition now given, that the pagan deities are represented as corresponding, and not individually, to *particular demons* actually existing. To say, therefore, that the Gentiles sacrifice to *demons*, is no more than to say, that they sacrifice to beings which, whether real or imaginary, we perceive, from their own accounts of them, to be below the supreme. "What are men?" says a dialogist in Lucian<sup>27</sup>. The answer is, "Mortal gods. What are gods? Immortal men." In fact, immortality was almost the only distinction between them.

§ 16. THIS leads directly to the examination of the justness of the sentiment, that *the Gentiles sacrifice to devils*, in the second view of it that was suggested, or considered in relation to the ideas and intentions of the worshippers themselves, to which alone, in my apprehension, the Apostle here alludes. First then, we may justly say, that

<sup>27</sup> Vitarum auctio. Τι δαι' οι ανθρωποι; θεοι θνητοι τι δαι' οι θεοι; ανθρωποι αθανατοι.

their sacrifices were not offered to God; for, however much they might use the name of God, the intention is to be judged, not by the name, but by the meaning affixed to it. Now, such a being as the eternal, unoriginated, immutable, Creator and Ruler of the world, they had not in all their system, and therefore did not adore. For this reason, they are not unjustly termed, by the same Apostle, *αθεοι*, *atheists*<sup>28</sup>, without God, that is, without the knowledge, and, consequently, the belief and worship, of him who alone is God. But their sacrifices and devotions were presented to beings, to whom they themselves ascribed a character infinitely inferior to what we know to belong to the true God, of whom they were ignorant.

A late philosopher, who will not be suspected of partiality to the sentiments of an Apostle, or of the weakness of a bias in favour of Christianity, has, nevertheless, in this instance, adopted the ideas of the sacred author, and has not hesitated to pronounce the pagans<sup>29</sup> *a kind of superstitious atheists, who acknowledged no being that corresponds to our idea of a deity*. Besides, a great part of the heathen worship was confessedly paid to the ghosts of departed heroes, of conquerors, and potentates, and of the inventors of arts, whom popular superstition, after disguising their history with fables and absurdities, had blindly deified. Now, to all such beings, they themselves, as well as the Jews, assigned the name *δαιμονια*. Fur-

<sup>28</sup> Eph. ii. 12.<sup>29</sup> Natural History of Religion, Sect. IV.

ther, it deserves our notice, that the Apostle is not writing here to Hebrews, but to Greeks; and that he himself, being a native of a Grecian city, knew perfectly the sense that was affixed by them to the word *δαιμονια*. If, therefore, he had intended to suggest, that they were all malignant beings to whom their devotions were addressed, he would never have used the general term, which he knew they commonly understood in a more favourable sense. In that case, he would have said *κακοδαιμοσι θυει*, or something equivalent.

§ 17. HOWEVER much, therefore, the gentiles might have disputed the truth of the first part of the Apostle's assertion, that they did not offer sacrifice to God, because they were not sensible of their own ignorance, on this article; the latter part of the assertion they would have readily admitted, that they sacrificed to demons, such as the spirits of heroes and heroines deceased, and other beings conceived superior to mere mortals. This charge they themselves would not have pretended to be either injurious or untrue. The very passage formerly quoted from the Acts, where they call Jesus and the resurrection *strange demons*, *ξένα δαιμονια*, shews, that there were *known demons*, *γνωριμα δαιμονια*, to whose service they were accustomed. We cannot worship whom we do not mean to worship. There is an inconsistency in the ideas. They could, therefore, no more be said to have worshipped the devil, as we Christians understand the

term, than they could be said to have worshipped the cannibals of New Zealand, because they had no more conception of the one than of the other. However much it may be in the spirit of theological controvertists, to use amplifications irreconcilable with truth and justice, in order to render an adversary odious; this manner is not in the spirit of the sacred penmen. Some appearances of the polemic temper there are in most versions of the New Testament, which will be found to spring entirely from translators. The popular doctrine has indeed been adopted by Milton, and greatly embellished in his incomparable poem. But it is not from the fictions of poets that we must draw the principles of religion.

§ 18. I MUST likewise own that, when, in the passage to the Corinthians under examination, we render *δαίμονια* *demons*, we still express the sentiment more harshly than it is in the original, because the word was commonly then used in a good sense, not, as we Christians use it at present, invariably in a bad sense. One way, however, of restoring it to its proper import, is to preserve sacredly the distinction, which holy writ so plainly authorizes, and never to confound terms as synonymous, which are there never confounded.

§ 19. THE above observations may serve also to illustrate a noted passage in the Apocalypse<sup>30</sup>:

<sup>30</sup> Rev. ix. 20.

*The rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues, yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, δαιμονια, and idols of gold and silver, and brass, and stone, and of wood, which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk.* It is equally manifest here, as in the former example, that the word rendered *devils*, ought to have been *demons*; nor is it less manifest, that every being who is not the one true God, however much conceived to be superior to us, whether good or bad, hero or heroine, demigod or demigoddess, angel or departed spirit, saint or sinner, real or imaginary, is in the class comprized under the name *demons*. And the worship of them is as much *demonolatry* (if you will admit the word) as the worship of Jupiter, Mars, and Minerva. This may serve to show, of how much consequence it is to attend, with accuracy, to the differences to be found in the application of words. It is only thereby that we can learn their exact import, and be qualified to judge, both of the subject, and of the completion, of scriptural prophecies. As to the worship of *the devil του διαβολου*, nothing can be clearer than that, in Scripture, no pagans are charged with it; and as to the worship *των δαιμονιων*, beings subordinate to the supreme, it may be considered how far we can, with justice, say that the pagans are peculiarly chargeable. It will deserve to be remarked, by the way, that the only difference between *demonolatry* and *idolatry* appears to be, that the first regards the object of worship, the second the mode. The

former is a violation of the first commandment, the latter of the second. The connection, however, is so intimate between them, that they have rarely, if ever, been found separate.

§ 20. THERE are only two other passages wherein the word *δαιμονια* occurs in the New Testament, in both which there is some difficulty. One is, where Paul warns Timothy<sup>31</sup> of those who would make a defection from the faith, *giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils*, *διδασκαλίας δαιμονίων*, doctrines of demons. It is hard to say, whether, by this phrase, we are to understand doctrines suggested by demons, or doctrines concerning demons. The form of expression will support either meaning. If the first, the word *demons* is taken in a bad sense, for ghosts, or other spirits of a malignant character, the common acceptation of the word in the Gospels, where an agency on human beings is ascribed to them. The connection of the words, *doctrines of demons*, with *seducing spirits*, immediately preceding, gives some plausibility to this interpretation. If the second, there is reason to think, that it is used more extensively, for all those beings, inferior to God, who are made objects of adoration. In this case, the words foretel either a total apostacy from the faith of the Gospel, to heathen demonology, commonly called mythology, or a defection from the purity of its doctrine, by admitting an unnatural mix-

<sup>31</sup> 1 Tim. iv. 1.

ture of heathenish absurdities. That this is his meaning, is rendered not improbable, by its being connected with other corruptions of the Christian doctrine, also introduced some ages after the times of the Apostles, and implied in the words, *forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, &c.* But with respect to this question, I do not pretend to decide.

§ 21. THE other passage is in the Epistle of James<sup>32</sup>. The whole verse in the common version runs thus: *Thou believest that there is one God ; thou dost well : the devils also believe and tremble : τα δαιμονια*, the demons. That the Apostle here means the spirits of wicked men deceased, which (in Jewish use, as we learn from Josephus) were commonly styled demons, there is no reason to question. The only points of which their belief is asserted, are the being and the unity of the Godhead. The epithet *δαιμονιωδης* is accordingly used in a bad sense in this Epistle<sup>33</sup>, where that wisdom which produceth envy and contention, is styled earthly, sensual, *devilish*, *δαιμονιωδης*, demonian.

§ 22. THE only other words in the New Testament, connected with *δαιμων*, are *δεισιδαιμων* and *δεισιδαιμονια*. Each occurs only once. The former is rendered, by our translators, *superstitious*, the latter *superstition*. Neither of them is found

<sup>32</sup> James, ii. 19.      <sup>33</sup> iii. 15.

in the Septuagint, or the Apocrypha, or in any part of the New Testament, except the Acts of the Apostles. We may readily believe, that the Jews, in speaking of their own religion, would avoid the use of terms bearing so manifest an allusion to a species of worship which it condemns. The only place where the term *δεισιδαιμων* occurs, is Paul's speech in the Areopagus at Athens. It is applied by him to the Athenians, who were pagans. *Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι*, says he, *κατὰ πάντα ὥς δεισιδαιμονεστεροὺς ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ*<sup>34</sup>; in the common version, *Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious*. The English expression is, in my opinion, much harsher than the Greek. As the word nowhere else occurs in the sacred writings, our only rule for ascertaining its import is the classical application. Besides, the Apostle, being a native of a Grecian city, well knew in what sense his hearers would understand the term. If, then, he spoke to be understood, we must suppose that he employed his words according to their current value in the place. Now, it is plain that, in the classical use, *δεισιδαιμων* has not a bad meaning, unless there be something in the context that leads us to an unfavourable interpretation. *Αἰεὶ δὲ δεισιδαιμων ἦν*; *He was always a religious man*, says Xenophon of Agesilaus, when he is plainly commending him. Favorinus explains the word by *ὁ εὐσεβής*, *pious*; and gives *εὐλαβεία* as the com-

<sup>34</sup> Acts, xvii. 22.

mon import of *δεισιδαιμονια*, which he resolves into *φοβος Θεου η δαιμονων*, *the fear of God, or of demons*.

Now, it has been shewn that, among pagans, in the common acceptation of *δαιμων*, the meaning was favourable. It is acknowledged that *δεισιδαιμων* was also susceptible of a bad meaning, answering to our word *superstitious*. Further, I readily admit that the Apostle would not probably have used that term in speaking of either Jews or Christians, because he did not consider the *δαιμονες* as objects of their veneration. At the same time, he knew that, in addressing the Athenians, he employed a term which could not be offensive to them. Indeed, his manner of introducing his subject, shews a desire of softening the disapprobation which his words imply, and from which he took occasion to expound the principles of a more sublime theology. The Athenians gloried in the character of being more religious, *δεισιδαιμονεστεροι*, than any other Grecian state. Paul's concession of this point in their favour, would rather gratify than offend them, and would serve to alleviate the censure of carrying their religion to excess. Every thing, in the turn of his expression, shews that it was his intention to tell them, in the mildest terms, what he found censurable in their devotion, and thence to take occasion of preaching to them the only true God. Accordingly, he employed a word, which he knew no pagan could take amiss ; and to denote the excess with which he thought them chargeable, he chose

to use the comparative degree, which was the gentlest manner of doing it. Nay, he even abates the import of the comparative, by the particle *ὥς*. Beza has properly rendered the expression, *quasi religiosiores*. The version, *too superstitious*, not only deviates from the intention of the speaker, but includes a gross impropriety, as it implies that it is right to be superstitious to a certain degree, and that the error lies in exceeding that degree : whereas, in the universal acceptation of the English term, all superstition is excess, and therefore faulty.

As to the noun *δουισιδαιμονια*, in the only place of Scripture where it occurs, it is mentioned as used by a heathen, in relation to the Jewish religion. Festus, the president, when he acquainted king Agrippa concerning Paul, at that time his prisoner, says that he found the accusation brought against him, by his countrymen, not to be such as he had expected, but to consist in *ζητηματα τινα περι της ιδιας δεισιδαιμονιας*, in the English translation, *certain questions of their own superstition*<sup>35</sup>. It was not unlike a Roman magistrate to call the Jewish religion *superstition*. That the Gentiles were accustomed to speak of it contemptuously, is notorious. But it should be considered, that Festus was then addressing his discourse to king Agrippa, who had come to Cesarea to congratulate him, whom he knew to be a Jew, and to whom it appears, from the whole of the story, that Festus meant to show the utmost

<sup>35</sup> Acts, xxv. 19.

civility. It cannot then be imagined, that he would intentionally affront a visitant of his rank, the very purpose of whose visit had been to do him honour on his promotion. That the ordinary import of the term was favourable, cannot be questioned. Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the religious service performed by the high-priest, at which the kings of Egypt were obliged to be present, adds, *Ταντα δ'επραττεν, ἅμα μὲν εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν καὶ θεοφιλή βίον τὸν βασιλεῖα προτρέπομενος*<sup>36</sup>. "These things he did to excite the king to a devout and pious life." The word, therefore, ought to have been rendered *religion*, according to its primitive and most usual acceptance among the Greeks.

Bishop Pearce is, for aught I know, singular in thinking that *τῆς ἰδίας δεισιδαιμονίας* ought to be translated *of a private superstition*, meaning the Christian doctrine taught by Paul. But of this version the words are evidently not susceptible; the only authority alleged is Peter, who says<sup>37</sup>, *πᾶσα προφητεία γραφῆς ἰδίας ἐπιλυσεως οὐ γινεται*, in the common translation, *No prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation*. Admitting that this is a just expression of the sense of that passage, the cases are not parallel. *Ἰδιος* has there no article. If the import of *ἰδιος* in the other place were *private*, the meaning of the phrase must not be *a* but *the* private superstition, or the private religion. Had we any evidence that this designation had been given to

<sup>36</sup> Lib. i.<sup>37</sup> 2 Peter, i. 20.

Christianity in the times of the Apostles, there might be some plausibility in the conjecture. But there is no trace of such a designation ; and indeed it would have been exceedingly improper as applied to a doctrine, which was preached publicly every where, and of whose ministers, both Jews and Pagans complained that they turned the world upside down. There are few words in the New Testament more common than *ιδιος*, but there is not a single instance wherein it is accompanied with the article, that can be rendered otherwise than *his own*, *her own*, or *their own*.

§ 23. So much for the distinction uniformly observed in Scripture between the words *διαβολος* and *δαιμονιον* ; to which I shall only add, that in the ancient Syriac version, these names are always duly distinguished. The words employed in translating one of them are never used in rendering the other ; and in all the Latin translations I have seen, ancient and modern, Popish and Protestant, this distinction is carefully observed. It is observed also in Diodati's Italian version, and most of the late French versions. But in Luther's German translation, the Geneva French, and the common English, the words are confounded in the manner above observed. Some of the later English translations have corrected this error, and some have implicitly followed the common version.

## PART II.

*Ἅδης AND Γέεννα.*

THE next example I shall produce of words in which, though commonly translated by the same English term, there is a real difference of signification, shall be *Ἅδης* and *Γέεννα*, in the common version rendered *hell*. That *Γέεννα* is employed in the New Testament to denote the place of future punishment prepared for the devil and his angels, is indisputable. In the Old Testament we do not find this place in the same manner mentioned. Accordingly the word *Γέεννα* does not occur in the Septuagint. It is not a Greek word, and consequently not to be found in the Grecian classics. It is originally a compound of the two Hebrew words *גֵּי' הִנּוֹם* *ge hinnom*, the valley of Hinnom, a place near Jerusalem, of which we hear first in the Book of Joshua<sup>38</sup>. It was there that the cruel sacrifices of children were made by fire to Moloch, the Ammonitish idol<sup>39</sup>. The place was also called *Tophet*<sup>40</sup>, and that, as is supposed, from the noise of drums, (*Toph* signifying a drum,) a noise raised on purpose to drown the cries of the helpless infants. As this place was, in process of time, considered as an emblem of hell, or the place of torment reserved for the

<sup>38</sup> Jos. xv. 8. It is rendered by the 70 Jos. xviii. 16. *Γαι-Εννοῦ*, and in some editions, *Γαιεννα*, hence the name in the N. T.

<sup>39</sup> 2 Chron. xxxiii. 6.

<sup>40</sup> 2 Kings, xxiii. 10.

punishment of the wicked in a future state, the name *Tophet* came gradually to be used in this sense, and at length to be confined to it. This is the sense, if I mistake not, in which *gehenna*, a synonymous term, is always to be understood in the New Testament, where it occurs just twelve times. In ten of these there can be no doubt: in the other two the expression is figurative; but it scarcely will admit a question, that the figure is taken from that state of misery which awaits the impenitent. Thus the Pharisees are said to make the proselyte, whom they compass sea and land to gain, twofold more a child of hell, *υιος γεεννης*, than themselves<sup>41</sup>; an expression both similar in form, and equivalent in signification, to *υιος διαβολου*, *son of the devil*, and *υιος της απωλειας*, *son of perdition*. In the other passage an unruly tongue is said to be *set on fire of hell*<sup>42</sup>, *φλογιζομενη υπο της γεεννης*. These two cannot be considered as exceptions, it being the manifest intention of the writers in both to draw an illustration of the subject from that state of perfect wretchedness.

§ 2. As to the word *αδης*, which occurs in eleven places of the New Testament, and is rendered *hell* in all, except one, where it is translated *grave*, it is quite common in classical authors, and frequently used by the Seventy, in the translation of the Old Testament. In my judgment, it ought

<sup>41</sup> Matt. xxiii. 15.

<sup>42</sup> James, iii. 6.

never in Scripture to be rendered *hell*, at least in the sense wherein that word is now universally understood by Christians. In the Old Testament the corresponding word is שְׁאוֹל *sheol*, which signifies the state of the dead in general, without regard to the goodness or badness of the persons, their happiness or misery. In translating that word, the Seventy have almost invariably used ᾠδης. This word is also used sometimes in rendering the nearly synonymous words or phrases בּוֹר *bor*, and אֲבְנֵי בּוֹר *abne bor*, *the pit*, and *stones of the pit*, צֶל מוֹת *tsal moth*, *the shades of death*, דּוּמָה *dumeh*, *silence*. The state is always represented under those figures which suggest something dreadful, dark, and silent, about which the most prying eye, and listening ear, can acquire no information. The term ᾠδης, *hades*, is well adapted to express this idea. It was written anciently, as we learn from the poets (for what is called the poetic, is nothing but the ancient dialect,) ᾠδης, *ab a privativa et εἶδω video*, and signifies obscure, hidden, invisible. To this the word *hell* in its primitive signification perfectly corresponded. For, at first, it denoted only what was secret or concealed. This word is found with little variation of form, and precisely in the same meaning, in all the Teutonic dialects <sup>43</sup>.

But though our word *hell*, in its original signification, was more adapted to express the sense of

<sup>43</sup> See Junius' Gothic Glossary, subjoined to the Codex Argenteus, on the word *hulyan*.

ᾠδης than of *γεεννα*, it is not so now. When we speak as Christians, we always express by it, the place of the punishment of the wicked after the general judgment, as opposed to *heaven*, the place of the reward of the righteous. It is true that, in translating heathen poets, we retain the old sense of the world *hell*, which answers to the Latin *orcus*, or rather *infernus*, as when we speak of the descent of Æneas, or of Orpheus, into *hell*. Now the word *infernus*, in Latin, comprehends the receptacle of all the dead, and contains both *elysium* the place of the blessed, and *tartarus* the abode of the miserable. The term *infernus*, comprehends all the inhabitants good and bad, happy and wretched. The Latin words *infernus* and *infernus* bear evident traces of the notion that the repository of the souls of the departed is under ground. This appears also to have been the opinion of both Greeks and Hebrews, and indeed of all antiquity. How far the ancient practice of burying the body may have contributed to produce this idea concerning the mansion of the ghosts of the deceased, I shall not take it upon me to say ; but it is very plain, that neither in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, nor in the New, does the word ᾠδης convey the meaning which the present English word *hell*, in the Christian usage, always conveys to our minds.

§ 3. It were endless to illustrate this remark by an enumeration and examination of all the passages in both Testaments wherein the word is

found. The attempt would be unnecessary, as it is hardly now pretended by any critic, that this is the acceptance of the term in the Old Testament. Who, for example, would render the words of the venerable patriarch Jacob<sup>44</sup>, when he was deceived by his sons into the opinion that his favourite child Joseph had been devoured by a wild beast, *I will go down to hell to my son mourning?* or the words which he used<sup>45</sup>, when they expostulated with him, about sending his youngest son Benjamin into Egypt along with them; *Ye will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell?* Yet in both places the word, in the original, is *sheol*, and in the version of the Seventy, *hades*. I shall only add, that in the famous passage from the Psalms<sup>46</sup>, quoted in the Acts of the Apostles<sup>47</sup>, of which I shall have occasion to take notice afterwards; though the word is the same both in Hebrew and in Greek, as in the two former quotations, and though it is, in both places, rendered *hell* in the common version, it would be absurd to understand it as denoting the place of the damned, whether the expression be interpreted literally of David the type, or of Jesus Christ the antitype, agreeably to its principal and ultimate object.

§ 4. But it appears at present to be the prevailing opinion among critics, that the term, at least in the Old Testament, means no more than קבר

<sup>44</sup> Gen. xxxvii. 35.      <sup>45</sup> xlii. 38.      <sup>46</sup> Psal. xvi. 10.

<sup>47</sup> Acts, ii. 27.

keber, *grave* or *sepulchre*. Of the truth of this opinion, after the most attentive, and I think impartial, examination, I am far from being convinced. At the same time I am not insensible of the weight which is given to that interpretation, by some great names in the learned world, particularly that of Father Simon, a man deeply versed in Oriental literature, who has expressly said<sup>48</sup>, that *sheol* signifies in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, *sepulchre*, and who has strenuously and repeatedly defended this sentiment, against Le Clerc and others who had attacked it<sup>49</sup>. And since he seems even to challenge his opponents to produce examples, from the Old Testament, wherein the word *sheol* has the signification which they ascribe to it; I shall here briefly, with all the deference due to names so respectable as those which appear on the opposite side, lay before the reader the result of my inquiries upon the question.

§ 5. I FREELY acknowledge that, by translating *sheol the grave*, the purport of the sentence is often expressed with sufficient clearness. The example last quoted from Genesis is an evidence. *Ye will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave*, undoubtedly gives the meaning of the sentence in the original, notwithstanding that the

<sup>48</sup> Hist. Crit. du N. T. ch. 12.

<sup>49</sup> Reponse a la Defense des Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande, ch. xvi.

English word *grave* does not give the meaning of the Hebrew word *sheol*. This may, at first, appear a paradox, but will not be found so, when examined. Suppose one, in relating the circumstances of a friend's death, should say, "This unlucky accident brought him to his shroud," another should say, "It brought him to his coffin," a third, "It brought him to his grave." The same sentiment is expressed by them all, and these plain words, "This accident proved the cause of his death," are equivalent to what was said by every one of them. But, can we justly infer thence, that the English words *shroud*, *coffin*, *grave*, and *death*, are synonymous terms? It will not be pretended by those who know English. Yet I have not heard any argument stronger than this, for accounting the Hebrew words *sheol* and *keber* synonymous. The cases are entirely parallel. Used as tropes they often are so. Who can question that, when there is any thing figurative in the expression, the sense may be conveyed without the figure, or by another figure? And if so, the figures or tropes, however different, may doubtless, in such application, be called synonymous to one another, and to the proper term <sup>50</sup>.

<sup>50</sup> This is precisely the idea which Cappellus (to whom Hebrew criticism owes more perhaps than to any other individual) had of the relation between the words *sheol* and *keber*. In answer to Villalpandus, who, in explaining a Hebrew inscription, supposes *sh* the letter *schin*, to stand for *sheol* and mean *sepulchre*, he expresses himself, thus, "Quis non videt, quam

Now, if this holds of the tropes of the same language, it holds also of those of different languages. You may adopt a trope in translating, which does not literally answer to that of the original, and which, nevertheless, conveys the sense of the original, more justly than the literal version would have done. But in this case, though the whole sentence, in the version, corresponds to the whole sentence, in the original, there is not the like correspondence in the words taken severally. Sometimes the reverse happens, to wit, that every word of a sentence, in the original, has a word exactly corresponding, in the version; and yet the whole sentence, in the one, does not correspond to the whole sentence, in the other. The different geniuses of different languages, render it impossible to obtain, always, a correspondence, in both respects. When it can be had only in one, the sentiment is always to be preferred to the words. For this reason I do not know how our translators could have rendered *sheol* in that passage better than they have done. Taken by itself, we have no word in our language that answers to it. The Latin is, in this instance, luckier; as it supplies a word perfectly equivalent to that of the sacred penman, at the same time that it justly expresses the sense of the

“coacta sit ejusmodi interpretatio, quamque aliena a more,  
 “ingenio, et phrasi verè ebraicâ. Nam ut שׂ significet שׂ  
 “quis Ebraismi peritus dixerit, cum שׂ *sepulcrum* non signi-  
 “ficet, nisi figuratâ locutione apud prophetas, qui tropicè lo-  
 “quuntur.” Diatriba de literis Ebr.

whole. Such is the translation of the verse in the Vulgate, *Deducetis canos meos cum dolore ad inferos*. Now, though our word *the grave*, may answer sufficiently in some cases, for expressing, not the import of the Hebrew word *sheol*, but the purport of the sentence, it gives, in other cases, but a feeble, and sometimes an improper, version of the original. But this will be more evident afterwards.

§ 6. FIRST, in regard to the situation of *hades*, it seems always to have been conceived by both Jews and pagans, as in the lower parts of the earth, near its centre, as we should term it, or its foundation (according to the notions of the Hebrews, who knew nothing of its spherical figure,) and answering in depth to the visible heavens in height; both which are, on this account, oftener than once, contrasted in sacred writ. In general, to express any thing inconceivably deep, this word is adopted, which shows sufficiently that unfathomable depth was always a concomitant of the idea conveyed by *sheol*. Thus God is represented by Moses as saying <sup>51</sup>, *A fire is kindled in mine anger, which shall burn to the lowest hell*, as it is rendered in the common version. The word is *sheol* or *hades*; and Simon himself admits <sup>52</sup>, that it is here an hyperbole, which signifies that the fire should reach the bottom of the earth, and consume the whole earth. I acknowledge that it is, in this passage, used hyperbolically.

<sup>51</sup> Deut. xxxii. 22.

<sup>52</sup> Reponse a la Defense, &c. ch. xvi.

But will any person pretend that it could have answered the purpose of giving the most terrible view of divine judgments, if the literal meaning of the word had implied no more than a grave? This concession of Simon's is, in effect giving up the cause. According to the explanation I have given of the proper sense of the word, it was perfectly adapted to such an use, and made a very striking hyperbole; but if his account of the literal and ordinary import of the term be just; the expression, so far from being hyperbolical, would have been the reverse.

In further evidence of this doctrine, the inhabitants of *ἀδης* are, from their subterranean abode, denominated by the Apostle Paul<sup>53</sup>, *καταχθονιοι*, a word of the same import with the phrase *ὑποκατω της γης*, *under the earth*, in the Apocalypse<sup>54</sup>, and which, with the *επουρανιοι* and *επιγειοι* *celestial* beings, and *terrestrial*, include the whole rational creation. That they are expressly enumerated as including the whole, will be manifest to every one who attentively peruses the two passages referred to. Of the coincidence of the Hebrew notions, and the pagan, in regard to the situation of the place of departed spirits, if it were necessary to add any thing to what has been observed above, from the import of the names *infernus* and *inferi*, those beautiful lines of Virgil might suffice :

<sup>53</sup> Phil. ii. 10.

<sup>54</sup> v. 3.

Non secus, ac si quâ penitus vi terra dehiscens  
 Infernas reseret sedes, et regna recludat  
 Pallida, diis invisa, superque immane barathrum  
 Cernatur, trepidentque immisso lumine manes <sup>55</sup>.

§ 7. SEVERAL proofs might be brought from the Prophets, and even from the Gospels, of the opposition in which heaven for height, and hades for depth, were conceived to stand to each other. I shall produce but a few from the Old Testament, which convey the most precise notion of their sentiments on this subject. The first is from the Book of Job <sup>56</sup>, where we have an illustration of the unsearchableness of the divine perfections in these memorable words, as found in the common version, *Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell, βαθυτερα δε των εν αδου, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.* Now, of the opinion that the word in the Old Testament always denotes *grave* or *sepulchre*, nothing can be a fuller confutation than this passage. Among such immense distances as the height of heaven, the extent of the earth, and the ocean, which were not only in those days unknown to men, but conceived to be unknowable; to introduce as one of the unmeasurables, a sepulchre whose depth could scarcely exceed ten or twelve cubits, and which, being the work of men,

<sup>55</sup> Æn. viii.

<sup>56</sup> Job, xi. 7, 8, 9.

was perfectly known, would have been absurd indeed, not to say ridiculous. What man in his senses could have said, ‘Ye can no more comprehend the Deity, than ye can discover the height of the firmament, or measure the depth of a grave.’

A passage very similar we have in the Psalms<sup>57</sup>, where heaven and *ἀδης* are in the same way contrasted. *If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed in hell, εαν καταβω εις τον ἀδην, behold thou art there.* The only other place I shall mention is in the Prophet Amos<sup>58</sup>, where God is represented as saying, *Though they dig into hell, εις ἀδου, thence shall my hand take them ; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down ; and though they hide themselves on the top of Carmel, I will search and take them out thence ; and though they be hid from my sight in the bottom of the sea, thence will I command a serpent, and he shall bite them.* Here for illustration we have a double contrast. To the top of Carmel, a very high mountain, the bottom of the sea is very properly contrasted ; but to heaven, which is incomparably higher than the highest mountain, no suitable contrast is found, except *sheol* or *hades*, which was evidently conceived to be the lowest thing in the world. The *ἐπιγειοι* were supposed to possess the middle parts, the *επουρανιοι* and *καταχθονιοι* occupied the extremes, the former in height, the latter in depth. A late writer, of profound erudition, of whose sentiments, on this subject, I shall have occasion

<sup>57</sup> Psal. cxxxix. 8.<sup>58</sup> Amos, ix. 2, 3.

soon to take notice, has quoted the above passage of Amos, to prove that *into sheol men penetrate by digging* : he might, with equal reason, have quoted it to prove that *into heaven men penetrate by climbing*, or that men, in order to hide themselves, have recourse to the bottom of the sea.

§ 8. AGAIN, let it be observed, that *keber*, the Hebrew word for *grave* or *sepulchre*, is never rendered in the ancient translation *ἀδης*, but *ταφος*, *μνημα*, or some equivalent term. *Sheol*, on the contrary, is never rendered *ταφος* or *μνημα*, but always *ἀδης* ; nor is it ever construed with *θαπτω*, or any verb which signifies to bury, a thing almost inevitable, in words so frequently occurring, if it had ever properly signified a grave. This itself might suffice to show that the ideas which the Jews had of these were never confounded. I observe further, that *ἀδης* as well as the corresponding Hebrew word, is always singular in meaning, as well as in form. The word for *grave* is often plural. The former never admits the possessive pronouns, being the receptacle of all the dead, and therefore incapable of an appropriation to individuals, the latter often. Where the disposal of the body or corpse is spoken of, *ταφος*, or some equivalent term, is the name of its repository. When mention is made of the spirit after death, its abode is *ἀδης*. When notice is taken of one's making or visiting the grave of any person, touching it, mourning at it, or erecting a

pillar or monument upon it, and the like, it is always *keber* that is employed. Add to all this that, in *hades*, all the dead are represented as present, without exception. The case is quite different with the graves or sepulchres. Thus, Isaiah represents, very beautifully and poetically, a great and sudden desolation that would be brought upon the earth, saying<sup>59</sup>, *Hades*, which is in the common version *Hell*, *hath enlarged herself, and opened her mouth without measure. Hades* alone is conceived to contain them all, though the graves in which their bodies were deposited, might be innumerable. Again, in the song of triumph on the fall of the king of Babylon<sup>60</sup>, *Hell* (the original word is the same as in the preceding passage) *from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming: it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth: it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations.* Thus, in *hades*, all the monarchs and nobles, not of one family or race, but of the whole earth, are assembled. Yet their sepulchres are as distant from one another as the nations they governed. Those mighty dead are raised, not from their couches, which would have been the natural expression, had the Prophet's idea been a sepulchral vault, how magnificent soever, but *from their thrones*, as suited the notion of all antiquity, concerning not the bodies, but the shades or ghosts of the departed, to which was always assigned something similar in rank and

<sup>59</sup> Isa. v. 14.<sup>60</sup> xiv. 9.

occupation to what they had possessed upon the earth. Nay, as is well observed by Castalio<sup>61</sup>, those are represented as in hades, whose carcasses were denied the honours of sepulture. In this particular, the opinions of the Hebrews did not coincide with those of the Greeks and Romans.

§ 9. To the preceding examples, I shall add but one other from the Old Testament. It is taken from that beautiful passage in Job<sup>62</sup>, wherein God himself is the speaker, and whereof the great purpose is, to expose human ignorance, and check human presumption. *Have the gates of death been opened unto thee? or hast thou seen the doors of the shadow of death?* For this last designation the term is in Hebrew *tsalmoth*, and in the translation of the Seventy, *ἀδης*: for, as was hinted before, *tsalmoth*, in its ordinary acceptation, is synonymous with *sheol*, though sometimes used metaphorically, for a very dark place, or a state of great ignorance. It is almost too obvious to need being remarked, that this challenge to Job could have no relation to a sepulchre, the door, or entry to which, is always known to the living. The case was very different with regard to the habitation of departed spirits. At the same time, I entirely agree with the learned and ingenious bishop Lowth<sup>63</sup>, that the custom of

<sup>61</sup> Defensio adv. Bezam. Adversarii Errores.

<sup>62</sup> Job, xxxviii. 17.

<sup>63</sup> De sacra Poesi Hebræorum, Præl. vii.

depositing under ground the bodies of the deceased, and the form of their sepulchres, have, probably, first suggested some gloomy notions on this subject. But popular opinions have a growth and progress, and come often, especially in questions at once so interesting and so inscrutable, to differ widely from what they were originally. May we not then, upon the whole, fairly conclude, that we have all the evidence which the nature of the thing will admit, and more than, in most philological inquiries, is thought sufficient, that the word *grave* or *sepulchre* never conveys the full import of the Hebrew *sheol*, or the Greek *hades*, though, in some instances, it may have all the precision necessary for giving the import of the sentiment?

§ 10. EVEN in some instances, where the language is so figurative, as to allow great latitude to a translator, the original term is but weakly rendered *grave*. Thus it is said<sup>64</sup>, *Love is strong as death, jealousy is cruel as the grave*. The *grave*, when personified, or used metaphorically, is more commonly, if I mistake not, exhibited as a gentle power, which brings relief from cruelty, oppression, and trouble of every kind; whereas *hades*, which regards more the state of departed souls, than the mansions of their bodies, exhibits, when personified, a severe and inflexible jailor, who is not to be gained by the most pathetic entreaties, or by any arts merely human. The

<sup>64</sup> Cant. viii. 6.

clause would be appositely rendered in Latin, *inexorabilis sicut orcus* : for it is this inflexibility of character, that is chiefly indicated by the original word rendered *cruel*. In this notion of that state, as indeed in some other sentiments on this subject, and even in the terms applied to it, there is a pretty close coincidence with those of the ancient Pagans. When the Latin poet mentions the fatal consequence of the venial trespass of Orpheus (as it appeared to him) in turning about to take one look of his beloved Eurydice, before leaving the infernal regions, he says, *Ignoscenda quidem* ; but immediately correcting himself, adds, *scirent si ignoscere manes*.

§ 11. I SHALL now proceed to examine some passages in the New Testament, wherein the word occurs, that we may discover whether we ought to affix the same idea to it as to the corresponding term in the Old.—The first I shall produce is one, which, being originally in the Old Testament, is quoted and commented on in the New, and is consequently one of the fittest for assisting us in the discovery. Peter, in supporting the mission of his Master, in a speech made to the inhabitants of Judea and Jerusalem, on the famous day of Pentecost, alleges, amongst other things, the prediction of the royal Psalmist, part of which runs thus in the common version<sup>65</sup> : *Because thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption.*

<sup>65</sup> Acts, ii. 27.

The passage is cited from the Psalms<sup>66</sup>, in the very words of the Seventy, which are (as far as concerns the present question) entirely conformable to the original Hebrew. As this prophecy might be understood by some to relate only to the Psalmist himself, the Apostle shows how inapplicable it is to him, when literally explained. It plainly pointed to a resurrection, and such a resurrection as would very soon follow death, that the soul should not be left in hades, should not remain in the mansion of departed spirits, but should reanimate its body, before the latter had suffered corruption. *Brethren*<sup>67</sup>, says he, *let me speak freely to you of the Patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his sepulchre is with us to this day.* He has had no resurrection. It was never pretended that he had. His body, like other bodies, has undergone corruption; and this gives sufficient reason to believe that his soul has shared the fate of other souls, and that the prophecy was never meant of him, unless in a secondary sense. *But*<sup>68</sup>, continues he, *being a prophet, he spake of the resurrection of Christ, or the Messiah: and, to shew how exactly both what related to the soul, and what related to the body, had their completion in the Messiah, adds, that his soul was not left in hades, neither did his flesh see corruption.* It has been argued, that this is an example of the figure *ἐν διαδυνάμει*, where the same sentiment is expressed a second time by a

<sup>66</sup> Psal. xvi. 10.<sup>67</sup> Acts, .ii. 29.<sup>68</sup> 30, 31.

different phrase. In some sense this may be admitted; for, no doubt, either of the expressions would have served for predicting the event. But it is enough for my purpose, that the writer, in using two, one regarding the soul, the other regarding the body, would undoubtedly adapt his language to the received opinions concerning each. And if so, *hades* was as truly, in their account, the soul's destiny after death, as corruption was the body's.

§ 12. I AM surprized, that a man of Dr. Taylor's critical abilities, as well as Oriental literature, should produce the passage quoted by the Apostle, as an example to prove that *sheol*, *the pit*, *death*, and *corruption*, are synonymous. The expression, as we read it in the Psalm, is (to say the least) no evidence of this; but if we admit Peter to have been a just interpreter of the Psalmist's meaning, which father Simon seems very unwilling to admit, it contains a strong evidence of the contrary: for, in his comment, he clearly distinguishes the destiny of the *soul*, which is to be consigned to *sheol* or *hades*, from that of the *body* or *flesh*, which is to be consigned to *corruption*. Nor is there, in this, the slightest appearance of an unusual or mystical application of the words. The other examples brought by that author, in his very valuable Hebrew Concordance, are equally exceptionable.

He proceeds on the supposition, that no account can be given, why certain phrases are often found coupled together, but by saying that they

are synonymous : whereas, in the present case, it is much more naturally accounted for, by saying, that the events to which they relate, are commonly concomitant. We ought never to recur to tautology for the solution of a difficulty, unless when the ordinary application of the words admits no other resource. This is far from being the case in the instances referred to. Of the like kind are the arguments founded on such figurative expressions, as, digging into *hades* ; Korah's descending alive into it ; Jonah's being there, when in the belly of the great fish ; the foundations of the mountains, or the roots of the trees, reaching to it ; which are all evident hyperboles, and to which we find expressions entirely similar in ancient authors. Thus, Virgil, describing the storm in which Æneas was involved at sea, says,

Tollimur in cœlum, curvato gurgite, et iidem  
Subductâ ad manes imos descendimus undâ.

Again, speaking of an oak,

Ipsa hæret scopulis ; et quantum vertice ad auras  
Æthereas, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.

Yet, these figures, as far as I have heard, have never created any doubt among critics, concerning the ordinary acceptation of the words *tartarus* and *imi manes*. No pretence has been made that the one ever meant, when used not tropically, but

properly, the bottom of the sea, and the other a few yards under ground. Indeed, if a man were to employ the same mode of reasoning, in regard to the Latin terms that relate to this subject, which has been employed, in regard to the Hebrew; we should conclude, that *sepulchrum* and *infernus* are synonymous, *anima* and *corpus*, *manes* and *cinis*, upon evidence incomparably stronger than that we have for inferring, that *sheol* and *keber* are so. Of the first two the Latin poet says, *Animamque sepulchro condimus*. If *anima* be here used for *the soul*, agreeably to its ordinary and proper acceptation, he assigns it the same habitation as is given to the body after death, to wit, the *sepulchre*: and if it be used for *the body*, the words *corpus* and *anima* are strangely confounded, even by the best writers. As we have *anima* here for *corpus*, we have, in other places, *corpus* for *anima*. For, speaking of Charon's ferrying the souls of the deceased over Styx, he says,

Et ferrugineâ subvectat corpora cymbâ.

Now, what Virgil here calls *corpora*, and a few lines after, more explicitly, *defunctaque corpora vita*, he had a very little before expressed by a phrase of the contrary import, *tenués sine corpore vitas*, the one being *the body without the life*, the other *the life without the body*. That *cinis* and *manes* are in like manner confounded, we have an example from the same author:

Id cinerem, aut manes credis curare sepultos?

Here, if *sepultos* mean *buried*, *cinis* and *manes* are synonymous: if *manes* mean *ghosts*, then *sepultos* is equivalent to *deductos ad infernum*. Yet it would not be easy to say to what trope the author has, in these instances, had recourse, if it be not the catachresis. Nor is this promiscuous application of the words peculiar to the poets. Livy, the historian, uses the word *manes* in prose with equal latitude. *Sepulchra diruta, nudati manes.*

To these instances of confusion in the meanings of the words mentioned, nothing parallel has been alleged from the Hebrew Scriptures, except only that נֶפֶשׁ sometimes, like *anima* in the example above quoted, means *a dead body*. Yet nobody considers the examples aforesaid as invalidating those distinctions in Latin, which an usage incomparably more extensive has established in the language. With much less reason then can a few expressions, confessedly hyperbolical and figurative, be pleaded for subverting the uniform acceptance of the Hebrew words in question, in their proper and natural application. Taylor's remark, that *keber* grave, is one particular cavity, &c. and that *sheol* is a collective name for all the graves, &c. tends more to perplex the subject than to explain it. He would hardly be thought to apprehend distinctly the import of the Latin words, who should define them by telling us, that *sepulchrum* is one particular cavity digged for the interment of a dead person, and that *infernus* is a collective name for all the *sepulchra*, &c.

The definition would be both obscure and unjust; yet, from what has been shewn, more might be produced to justify it, than can be advanced in vindication of the other.

§ 13. BESIDES, we have another clear proof from the New Testament, that *hades* denotes the intermediate state of souls between death and the general resurrection. In the Apocalypse<sup>69</sup>, we learn that *death and hades*, by our translators rendered *hell* as usual, *shall*, immediately after the general judgment, *be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death.* In other words, the death which consists in the separation of the soul from the body, and the state of souls intervening between death and judgment, shall be no more. To the wicked, these shall be succeeded by a more terrible death, the damnation of gehenna, *hell* properly so called. Indeed, in this sacred Book, the commencement as well as the destruction of this intermediate state, are so clearly marked, as to render it almost impossible to mistake them. In a preceding chapter<sup>70</sup>, we learn that *hades* follows close at the heels of death; and, from the other passage quoted, that both are involved in one common ruin, at the universal judgment. Whereas, if we interpret *ἀδης hell*, in the Christian sense of the word, the whole passage is rendered nonsense. *Hell* is represented as being cast into *hell*: for so the lake of fire, which is, in this place, also denominated the second death, is universally interpreted.

<sup>69</sup> XX. 14.<sup>70</sup> vi. 8.

§ 14. THE Apostle Paul, without naming *hades*, conveys to us the same idea of the state of souls departed<sup>71</sup>. *The righteousness which is of faith, speaketh on this wise, Say not in thine heart, who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above;) or, who shall descend into the deep? εἰς τὴν ἀβύσσον* into the abyss, (*that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead*)—in other words, faith does not require, for our satisfaction, things impracticable, either to scale the heavens, or to explore the profound recesses of departed spirits. The word here used shows this. It is *ἀβύσσος*, that is, a pit or gulph, if not bottomless, at least, of an indeterminable depth. The very antithesis of descending into the deep, and ascending into heaven, also shows it. There would be a most absurd disparity in the different members of this illustration, if no more were to be understood by the abyss than the grave, since nothing is more practicable for the living than a descent thither. The women, who went to visit our Lord's sepulchre, did actually descend into it<sup>72</sup>. Besides, to call the grave *the abyss*, is entirely unexampled. Let it be also observed, that it is not said *to bring Christ up from the grave*, but *from the dead*, *ἐκ νεκρῶν*, for which end, to bring back the soul is, in the first place, necessary. I do not say that the Greek word *ἀβύσσος*, or the corresponding Hebrew word *תהום* *thehom*, is confined to the signification here given it. I know that it often means the ocean, because conceived

<sup>71</sup> Rom. x. 6, 7.<sup>72</sup> Mark, xvi. 5. Luke, xxiv. 3.

to be of an unfathomable depth, and may indeed be applied to any thing of which the same quality can be affirmed.

§ 15. So much for the literal sense of the word *hades*, which, as has been observed, implies properly neither *hell* nor the *grave*, but the place or state of departed souls. I know that it has been said, and speciously supported, that, in the Mosaical economy, there was no express revelation of the existence of souls after death. Admitting this to be in some sense true, the Israelites were not without such intimations of a future state as types, and figures, and emblematical predictions, could give them : yet certain it is, that life and immortality were, in an eminent manner, brought to light only by the Gospel. But, from whatever source they derived their opinions, that they had opinions on this subject, though dark and confused, is manifest, as from many other circumstances, so particularly from the practice of witchcraft and necromancy, which prevailed among them, and the power they ascribed to sorcerers, justly or unjustly, it matters not, of evoking the ghosts of the deceased.

The whole story of the witch of Endor<sup>73</sup>, is an irrefragable evidence of this. For, however much people may differ, in their manner of explaining the phenomena which it presents to us ; judicious and impartial men, whose minds are not pre-occu-

<sup>73</sup> 1 Sam. xxviii. 7, &c.

pied with a system, can hardly differ as to the evidence it affords, that the existence of spirits, in a separate state, was an article of the popular belief, and that it was thought possible, by certain secret arts, to maintain an intercourse with them. Our question here is not, what was expressly revealed to that people on this subject? but, what appear to have been the notions commonly entertained concerning it? or, what it was which the learned Bishop of London styles<sup>74</sup>, the *infernum poeticum* of the Hebrews? Indeed, the artifices employed by their wizards and necromancers, alluded to by Isaiah, of returning answers in a feigned voice, which appeared to those present, as proceeding from under the ground<sup>75</sup>, is a demonstration of the prevalency of the sentiments I have been illustrating, in regard both to the existence, and to the abode of souls departed. For that these were the oracles intended to be consulted, is manifest from the Prophet's upbraiding them with it, as an absurdity, that the living should recur for counsel, not to their God, but to the dead. It is well expressed in Houbigant's translation, *Itane pro vivis mortui interrogantur*<sup>76</sup>. But what can be clearer to this purpose than the law itself, whereby such practices are prohibited?<sup>77</sup> *There shall not be found among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of*

<sup>74</sup> Notes on ch. xiii. and xiv. of Isaiah.<sup>75</sup> Isa. xxix. 4.<sup>76</sup> Isa. vii. 19.<sup>77</sup> Deut. xviii. 10, 11.

*times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer.* This last character is not expressed in the original, as in the English translation, by a single word, but by a periphrasis, **דּוֹרֵשׁ אֶל הַמֵּתִים** *doresh el hamathim*, which, rendered literally, is, *one who consulteth the dead.* It is accordingly translated by the Seventy **ἐπερωτῶν τοὺς νεκροὺς**, and by Houbigant. *Qui mortuos interroget.*

From the narrative of what passed at Endor, it may be observed that, in whatever way the facts are accounted for by expositors, as to which I am not inquiring, it was evidently believed, at the time, not only that the evocation of the spirits of the deceased was possible, but that the spirit of Samuel was actually evoked. Of this Saul, who consulted him, appears to have had no doubt. Nay more, the sacred penmen who records their conversation, appears as little doubtful as the king. *And Saul, says he, perceived that it was Samuel. And Samuel said—*The son of Sirach also, who is thought to have written two centuries before the Christian era, expresses himself, on this topic, with the same unhesitating confidence. To a brief account of Samuel's life and character he subjoins <sup>78</sup>—*And after his death he prophesied, and showed the king his end, and lift up his voice from the earth in prophecy, to blot out the wickedness of the people.* In like manner Josephus, a contemporary of the apostles, relates the story,

<sup>78</sup> Ecclus. xlv. 20.

without betraying the smallest suspicion, that it was not the soul of Samuel who, on that occasion, conversed with Saul <sup>79</sup>. So that, whatever was the real case, we are warranted to conclude, that the reality of such appearances after death, and consequently of such a state of departed spirits as above described, were standing articles in the popular creed of the Jewish nation.

§ 16. I SHALL add a few things in regard to the metaphorical use of the term. I have observed that *heaven* and *hades* are commonly set in opposition to each other; the one is conceived to be the highest object, the other the lowest. From what is literally or locally so, the transition is very natural (insomuch that we find traces of it in all languages) to what is figuratively so; that is, what expresses a glorious and happy state on the one hand, or a humble and miserable state on the other. In this way it is used by our Lord <sup>80</sup>, *And thou Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shall be brought down to hades*, ἕως ᾧδου. As the city of Capernaum was never literally raised to *heaven*, we have no reason to believe that it was to be literally brought down to *hades*. But as, by the former expression, we are given to understand, that it was become a flourishing and splendid city, or, as some think, that it had obtained great spiritual advantages; so, by the

<sup>79</sup> Antiq. I. vi. c. 15.

<sup>80</sup> Matth. xi. 23.

latter, that it should be brought to the lowest degree of abasement and wretchedness.

§ 17. ANOTHER passage, in which the application of the word is figurative, we have in that celebrated promise made to Peter<sup>81</sup>, *Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell, πυλαι ᾠδου*, the gates of hades, shall not prevail against it. It is by death, and by it only, that the spirit enters into *hades*. The gate of *hades* is therefore a very natural periphrasis for death; insomuch that, without any positive evidence, we should naturally conclude this to be the meaning of the phrase. But we have sufficient evidence, both sacred and profane, that this is the meaning. The phrase occurs in the Septuagint, in the thanksgiving of Hezekiah, after his miraculous recovery from the mortal disease he had been seized with<sup>82</sup>. I said, *I shall go to the gates of the grave, εν πυλαις ᾠδου*. It follows, *I am deprived of the residue of my years*. Nothing can be plainer than that *πυλαι ᾠδου* here means *death*, in other words, I shall die and be deprived of the residue of my years. But, though the phrase is the same (for *πυλαι ᾠδου* is a literal version of the Hebrew) with that used by our Lord, our translators have not liked to make Hezekiah, who was a good man, speak as if he thought himself going to hell, and have therefore rendered it *the grave*.

<sup>81</sup> Matth. xvi. 13.

<sup>82</sup> Isaiah, xxxviii. 10.

Another example we have in the Wisdom of Solomon, which, though not canonical Scripture, is, in a question of criticism, a good authority<sup>83</sup>. *Thou hast power of life and death, thou ledest to the gates of hades, εις πυλας ᾠδου, and bringest up again.* This passage is as little susceptible of doubt as the former. The classical use of this phrase is the same with that of the inspired writers. Homer makes Achilles say, as rendered by our English poet<sup>84</sup>:

Who can think one thing, and another tell,  
My soul detests him as the gates of hell :

—εικος αιδαο πυλησι·

that is, I hate him as death, or I hate him mortally. To say then that the gates of *hades* shall not prevail against the church, is, in other words, to say, It shall never die, it shall never be extinct. Le Clerc, though meaning the same thing (as appears by his note,) has expressed it inaccurately: “*Les portes de la mort ne la surmonteront point;*” *The gates of death shall not surmount it.* We see at once how appositely *death* is called *the gate of hades*. But what should we call the gates of death? Not death itself, surely. They must be *diseases*; for by these we are brought to death. But in this sense we cannot apply the promise. For many direful diseases has the church been afflicted with, if the introduction

<sup>83</sup> xvi. 13.

<sup>84</sup> Iliad B.

of the grossest errors, the most superstitious practices, and senseless disputes, are to be accounted such ; but they have not hitherto proved mortal, and, we have reason to believe, never shall.

§ 18. IN the exclamation adopted by the Apostle<sup>85</sup>, *O death where is thy sting ? O grave, ᾅδης, where is thy victory ?* we cannot say so properly, that the words *death* and *hades* are used figuratively, as the words *sting* and *victory*, with which they are accompanied. In regard to the sense, there can be no doubt. It is manifestly the Apostle's view to signify that, whatever might have been formerly an object of terror in either *death* or *hades*, is removed by Jesus Christ, inso-much that in these very things the true disciples find matter of joy and exultation.

§ 19. BUT is there not one passage, it may be said, in which the word ᾅδης must be understood as synonymous with *γεεννα*, and consequently must denote the place of final punishment prepared for the wicked, or *hell*, in the Christian acceptation of the term ? You have it in the story of the rich man and Lazarus<sup>86</sup>. *In hell, εν τω ᾅδης, he lift up his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom.* This is the only passage in holy writ which seems to give countenance to the opinion that ᾅδης sometimes means the same

<sup>85</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 55.

<sup>86</sup> Luke, xvi. 23.

thing as *γεεννα*. Here it is represented as a place of punishment. The rich man is said to be tormented there, in the midst of flames. These things will deserve to be examined narrowly. It is plain that, in the Old Testament, the most profound silence is observed, in regard to the state of the deceased, their joys or sorrows, happiness or misery. It is represented to us rather by negative qualities than by positive, by its silence, its darkness, its being inaccessible, unless by preternatural means, to the living, and their ignorance about it. Thus much, in general, seems always to have been presumed concerning it, that it is not a state of activity adapted for exertion, or indeed for the accomplishment of any important purpose, good or bad. In most respects, however, there was a resemblance, in their notions on this subject, to those of the most ancient heathens.

But the opinions, neither of Hebrews nor of heathens, remained invariably the same. And from the time of the captivity, more especially, from the time of the subjection of the Jews, first to the Macedonian empire, and afterwards to the Roman; as they had a closer intercourse with pagans, they insensibly imbibed many of their sentiments, particularly on those subjects whereon their law was silent, and wherein, by consequence, they considered themselves as at greater freedom. On this subject of a future state, we find a considerable difference in the popular opinions of the Jews, in our Saviour's time, from those which prevailed, in the days of the ancient

prophets. As both Greeks and Romans had adopted the notion, that the ghosts of the departed were susceptible, both of enjoyment, and of suffering; they were led to suppose a sort of retribution in that state, for their merit or demerit in the present. The Jews did not indeed adopt the pagan fables, on this subject, nor did they express themselves, entirely, in the same manner; but the general train of thinking, in both, came pretty much to coincide. The Greek *hades* they found well adapted to express the Hebrew *sheol*. This they came to conceive as including different sorts of habitations, for ghosts of different characters. And, though they did not receive the terms *Elysium*, or *Elysian fields*, as suitable appellations for the regions peopled by good spirits, they took, instead of them, as better adapted to their own theology, *the garden of Eden*, or *Paradise*, a name originally Persian, by which the word answering to *garden*, especially when applied to Eden, had commonly been rendered, by the Seventy. To denote the same state, they sometimes used the phrase *Abraham's bosom*, a metaphor borrowed from the manner in which they reclined at meals. But, on the other hand, to express the unhappy situation of the wicked, in that intermediate state, they do not seem to have declined the use of the word *tartarus*. The Apostle Peter, says<sup>87</sup> of evil angels, that *God cast them down to hell, and*

<sup>87</sup> 2 Peter, ii. 4.

*delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment.* So it stands in the common version, though neither *γεεννα* nor *ἀδης* are in the original, where the expression is, *σειραῖς ζοφου ταρταρώσας παρεδωκεν εἰς κρίσιν τετηρημένους.* The word is not *γεεννα*; for that comes after judgment; but *ταρταρος*, which is, as it were, the prison of *hades*, wherein criminals are kept till the general judgment. And as, in the ordinary use of the Greek word, it was comprehended under *hades*, as a part; it ought, unless we had some positive reason to the contrary, by the ordinary rules of interpretation, to be understood so here. There is, then, no inconsistency in maintaining, that the rich man, though in torments, was not in *gehenna*, but in that part of *hades* called *tartarus*, where we have seen already, that spirits reserved for judgment are detained in darkness.

That there is, in a lower degree, a reward of the righteous, and a punishment of the wicked, in the state intervening between death and the resurrection, is no more repugnant to the divine perfections, than that there should be (as, in the course of providence, there often are) manifest recompenses of eminent virtues, and of enormous crimes, in the present world. Add to this, that Josephus, in the account he gives of the opinions of the Pharisees, or those Jews who believed a future state, mentions expressly the rewards of the virtuous, and the punishments of the vicious, in *hades*, or under the earth, which is, as was observed before, another expression for the same

thing<sup>88</sup>. From his representation we should conclude, that, in his time, a resurrection and future judgment, as understood by the Christians, were not universally the doctrine, even of the Pharisees; but, that the prevalent and distinguishing opinion was, that the soul survived the body, that vicious souls would suffer an everlasting imprisonment in *hades*, and that the souls of the virtuous would both be happy there, and, in process of time, obtain the privilege of transmigrating into other bodies. The immortality of human souls, and the transmigration of the good, seem to have been all that they comprehended in the phrase

<sup>88</sup> *Αθανατον τε ισχυνταις ψυχαις πιστις αυτοις ειναι, και υπο χθονος δικαιοδεις τε και τιμας δις αρετης η κακίας επιτηδευσις εν τω βιω γερονε, και ταις μεν ειργμον αιδιον προστιθεσθαι, ταις δε ραστωνην του αναβιονν. Antiq. lib. xviii. c. 2. Ψυχην δε πασαν μεν αφθαρτον μεταβαινειν δε εις ετερον σωμα, την των αγαθων μονην την δε των φαυλων, αδιω τιμαρια κολαζεσθαι. Bell. Lib. ii. c. 12. 'Ετερον σωμα is an expression by no means parallel, as Dr. Jennings seems to have thought [Jewish Antiquities, B. i. c. 10.] to that used of our Lord's transfiguration [Luke, ix. 29.] το ειδος του προσωπου αυτου ετερον. Ειδος is no more than the appearance. Now, to say that the body into which the soul passes is another body: and to say that it has another appearance, are two expressions which no person who reflects, will confound as equivalent. That there are some things, however, which would lead one to infer that the opinions of the Pharisees, on this article, were more conformable to the Christian doctrine, than is implied in the words of Josephus, is not to be dissembled. But the difficulty resulting hence, is more easily removed by admitting, what is nowise improbable, that there was not then, among them, an exact uniformity of opinion, than by recurring, on either side, to a mode of criticism which the language will not bear.*

ἀναστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. Indeed, the words strictly denote no more than the renewal of life.

Their sentiments on this topic naturally recal to our remembrance some of those exhibited by Virgil, in the sixth book of the *Æneid*. That this Pythagorean dogma was become pretty general, among the Jews, appears even from some passages in the Gospels. The question put by the disciples<sup>89</sup>, *Who sinned ; this man, or his parents, that he was born blind ?* and some popular opinions concerning Jesus, whom they knew to have been born, and brought up, among themselves, that he was Elijah, or Jeremiah, or one of the ancient Prophets<sup>90</sup>, manifestly presuppose the doctrine of the transmigration. It is also, in allusion to this, that the Jewish author of the book of Wisdom, has, as it is rendered in the common translation, thus expressed himself: *I was a witty child, and had a good spirit ; yea, rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled : ἀγαβος ὢν, ἤλθον εἰς σῶμα αμικαντόν*<sup>91</sup>. Yet we have reason, from the New Testament, to think that these tenets were not, at that time, universal among the Pharisees, but that some entertained juster notions of a resurrection, and that afterwards, the opinions of the Talmudists, on this article, had a much greater conformity to the doctrine of the Gospel, than the opinions of some of their predecessors in, and before, our Saviour's time.

<sup>89</sup> John, ix. 2.

<sup>90</sup> Matth. xvi. 14.

<sup>91</sup> Wisd. viii. 19, 20.

§ 20. ACCORDING to this explication, the rich man and Lazarus were both in *hades*, though in very different situations, the latter in the mansions of the happy, and the former in those of the wretched. Both are comprehended under the same general name. In the conversation lately quoted between Saul and the ghost of Samuel, the prophet, amongst other things, said to the king, *Tomorrow shalt thou and thy sons be with me*<sup>92</sup>, which does not imply that their condition would be the same, though each would have his place in the receptacle of departed spirits. Let us see how the circumstances mentioned, and the expressions used, in the parable, will suit this hypothesis. First, though they are said to be at a great distance from each other, they are still within sight and hearing, so as to be able to converse together. This would have been too gross a violation of probability, if the one were considered as inhabiting the highest heavens, and the other as placed in the infernal regions. Again, the expressions used are such as entirely suit this explanation, and no other; for first, the distance from each other is mentioned, but no hint that the one was higher in situation than the other; secondly, the terms whereby motion from the one to the other is expressed, are such as are never employed in expressing motion to, or from heaven, but always when the places are on a level, or nearly so. Thus, Lazarus, when dead, is said<sup>93</sup>

<sup>92</sup> 1 Sam. xxviii. 19.

<sup>93</sup> Luke, xvi. 22.

*απενεχθηναι*, *to be carried away*, not *ανενεχθηναι*, *to be carried up*, by angels, into Abraham's bosom; whereas, it is the latter of these, or one similarly compounded, that is always used, where an assumption into heaven is spoken of. Thus, the same writer, in speaking of our Lord's ascension, says<sup>94</sup> *ανεφερετο εις τον ουρανον*, and Mark<sup>95</sup>, in relation to the same event, says, *ανεληφθη εις τον ουρανον*, *he was taken up into heaven*. These words are also used, wherever one is said to be conveyed from a lower to a higher situation. But, what is still more decisive in this way, where mention is made of passing from Abraham to the rich man, and inversely, the verbs employed are, *διαβαινω* and *διαπεραω*, words which always denote motion on the same ground or level; as, passing a river or lake, passing through the Red Sea, or passing from Asia into Macedonia. But, when heaven is spoken of as the termination to which, or from which, the passage is made, the word is, invariably, either in the first case, *αναβαινω*, and in the second, *καταβαινω*, or some word similarly formed, and of the same import. Thus, both the circumstances of the story, and the expressions employed in it, confirm the explanation I have given. For, if the sacred penmen wrote to be understood, they must have employed their words and phrases, in conformity to the current usage of those for whom they wrote.

<sup>94</sup> xxiv. 51.<sup>95</sup> Mark, xvi. 19.

§ 21. WHEN our Saviour, therefore, said to the penitent thief upon the cross <sup>96</sup>, *To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise*; he said nothing that contradicts what is affirmed of his descent into *hades*, in the Psalms, in the Acts, or in the Apostles' creed. *Paradise* is another name for what is, in the parable, called Abraham's bosom. But it may be urged on the other side, that Paul has given some reason to conclude that paradise and heaven, or the seat of the glorious hierarchy, are the same. *It is not*, says he <sup>97</sup>, *expedient for me doubtless to glory: I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago (whether in the body I cannot tell, or whether out of the body I cannot tell, God knoweth,) such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth,) how that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.* The Jews make mention of three heavens. The first is properly the atmosphere where the birds fly, and the clouds are suspended. The second is above the first, and is what we call the visible firmament, wherein the sun, moon, and stars appear. The third, to us invisible, is conceived to be above the second, and therefore sometimes styled the heaven of heavens. This they considered as the place of the throne of God, and the habitation of the holy angels. Now it is evident that, if, in the second

<sup>96</sup> Luke, xxiii. 43.

<sup>97</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 1, 2, 3, 4.

and fourth verses, he speak of one vision or revelation only, paradise and heaven are the same; not so, if, in these, he speak of two different revelations. My opinion is, that there are two, and I shall assign my reasons. First, he speaks of them as more than one, and that not only in introducing them, *I will come to visions and revelations*; for sometimes it must be owned, that the plural is used in expressing a subject indefinitely; but afterwards, in referring to what he had related, he says<sup>98</sup> *lest I should be exalted above measure, through the abundance of the revelations, των αποκαλυψεων*. Secondly, they are related precisely as two distinct events, and coupled together by the connexive particle. Thirdly, there is a repetition of his doubts<sup>99</sup>, in regard to the reality of his translation, which, if the whole relate to a single event, was not only superfluous, but improper. This repetition, however, was necessary, if what is related in the third and fourth verses, be a different fact from what is told in the second, and if he was equally uncertain, whether it passed in vision or in reality. Fourthly, if all the three verses regard only one revelation, there is, in the manner of relating it, a tautology unexampled in the Apostle's writings. I might urge, as a fifth reason, the opinion of all Christian antiquity, Origen alone excepted. And this, in a question of philology, is not without its weight.

I shall only add, that, though, in both verses, the words in the English Bible are *caught up*,

<sup>98</sup> Verse, 7.<sup>99</sup> Verse, 2, 3.

there is nothing in the original answering to the particle *up*. The Apostle has very properly employed here the word ἀρπαζω, expressive more of the suddenness of the event, and of his own passiveness, than of the direction of the motion<sup>100</sup>. The only other place in which παραδεισος occurs is in the Apocalypse<sup>101</sup>. *To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst του παραδεισου of the paradise of God.* Here our Lord, no doubt, speaks of heaven, but, as he plainly alludes to the state of matters in the garden of Eden, where our first parents were placed, and where the tree of life grew, it can only be understood as a figurative expression of the promise of eternal life, forfeited by Adam, but recovered by our Lord Jesus Christ.

§ 22. To conclude this long discussion, I shall observe that, though we may discover hence,

<sup>100</sup> The learned reader may peruse the following passage from Epiphanius on this subject, in opposition to Origen. Ουδε ο αποστολος υποτιθεται τον παραδεισον ειναι εν τριτω ουρανω, τοις λεπτων ακροαθαι λογων επισταμενοις· οida γαρ αρπαγεντα εως τριτου λεγων ουρανου. και οida τον τοιουτον ανθρωπον, ειτε εν σωματι, ειτε χωρις σωματος, ο θεος οιδεν, οτι ηρπαγη εις τον παραδεισον. δυο αποκαλυψεις μεγαλας εωρακεναι μηνυει, δις αναληφθεις εαναργως, απαξ μεν εως τριτου ουρανου, απαξ δε εις τον παραδεισον. το γαρ οida αρπαγεντα τον τοιουτον εως τριτου ουρανου, ιδιως αποκαλυπιν αυτω κατα τον τριτον αναληφθεντι πεφηνηναι συνιστησι. το δε, και οida παλιν επιφερομενον τον τοιουτον ανθρωπον, ειτε εν σωματι, ειτε εκτος του σωματος, εις τον παραδεισον, ετεραν αυθις αυτω πεφανερωσθαι κατα τον παραδεισον αποκαλυπιν δεικνυσι. Epiph. Lib. ii. Hær. 44.

<sup>101</sup> Rev. ii. 7.

pretty exactly, the general sentiments entertained on these subjects, at the time, and the style used concerning them; we are not to imagine that the expressions are to be rigorously interpreted, in order to come at the true doctrine, upon these articles, but solely, in order to discover the popular opinions of the age. In regard to these, the opinions of the age, there ought to be a close attention to the letter of what is spoken; but, in regard to the other, the doctrine of holy writ, our attention ought to be mostly to the spirit. Thus it appears to me the plain doctrine of Scripture, that there are such states as I have mentioned, and that the use and nature of them is such as has been said. That it was, for ages, the doctrine of all the ancient ecclesiastical writers, is not less evident. But in respect of situation, expressions implying that *hades* is under the earth, and that the seat of the blessed is above the stars, ought to be regarded merely, as attempts to accommodate what is spoken to vulgar apprehension and language. Of the like kind is the practice, so frequent in holy writ, of ascribing human passions, nay, and human organs and members, to the Deity. The same may be said of what we hear of plants and trees, in paradise, of eating and drinking in heaven, or of fire and brimstone, in either *hades* or *gehenna*. We have no more reason to understand these literally, than we have to believe that the soul, when separated from the body, can feel torment in its tongue, or that a little cold water can relieve it.

§ 23. I AM not ignorant that the doctrine of an intermediate state between death and the resurrection, has been of late strenuously combatted, by some learned and ingenious men; amongst whom we must reckon that excellent divine and firm friend to freedom of inquiry, Dr. Law, the present bishop of Carlisle<sup>102</sup>. I honour his disposition, and have the greatest respect for his talents; but at the same time that I acknowledge he has, with much ability, supported the side he has espoused, I have never felt myself, on this head, convinced, though sometimes perplexed, by his reasoning. It is foreign to my purpose to enter into a minute discussion of controverted points in theology; and therefore I shall only, in passing, make a few remarks on this controversy, as it is closely connected with my subject.

First, I remark that the arguments on which the deniers of that state chiefly build, arise, in my opinion, from a misapprehension of the import of some scriptural expressions. *Καθευδειν, κοιμᾶν*, *to sleep*, are words often applied to the *dead*; but this application is no more than a metaphorical euphemism derived from the resemblance which a dead body bears to the body of a person asleep. Traces of this idiom may be found in all languages, whatever be the popular belief about the state of the dead. They often occur in the Old Testament; yet it has been shown that the common doctrine of the Orientals

<sup>102</sup> Dr. Law was living when the first edition of these Dissertations was in the hands of the printer.

favoured the separate existence of the souls of the deceased. But, if it did not, and if, as some suppose, the ancient Jews were, on all articles relating to another life, no better than Sadducees; this shows the more strongly, that such metaphors, so frequent in their writings, could be derived solely from bodily likeness, and having no reference to a resurrection, could be employed solely for the sake of avoiding a disagreeable or ominous word. I own, at the same time, that Christians have been the more ready to adopt such expressions, as their doctrine of the resurrection of the body, presented to their minds an additional analogy between the bodies of the deceased, and the bodies of those asleep, that of being one day awaked. But I see no reason to imagine that, in this use, they carried their thoughts further than to the corporeal and visible resemblance now mentioned. Another mistake about the import of scriptural terms, is in the sense which has been given to the word *αναστασις*. They confine it by a use derived merely from modern European tongues, to that renovation which we call the reunion of the soul and the body, and which is to take place at the last day. I have shown, in another place<sup>103</sup>, that this is not always the sense of the term in the New Testament.

I remark, secondly, that many expressions of scripture, in the natural and obvious sense, imply that an intermediate and separate state of the soul

<sup>103</sup> Notes on Matth. xxii. 23. and 32.

is actually to succeed death. Such are the words of our Lord to the penitent thief upon the cross<sup>104</sup>, Stephen's dying petition<sup>105</sup>, the comparisons which the Apostle Paul makes in different places<sup>106</sup>, between the enjoyment which true Christians can attain by their continuance in this world, and that which they enter on at their departure out of it, and several other passages. Let the words referred to be read by any judicious person, either in the original, or in the common translation, which is sufficiently exact for this purpose ; and let him, setting aside all theory or system, say candidly, whether they would not be understood, by the gross of mankind, as presupposing that the soul may, and will, exist separately from the body, and be susceptible of happiness or misery in that state. If any thing could add to the native evidence of the expressions, it would be the unnatural meanings that are put upon them, in order to disguise that evidence. What shall we say of the metaphysical distinction introduced, for this purpose, between absolute, and relative, time ? The Apostle Paul, they are sensible, speaks of the saints as admitted to enjoyment, in the presence of God, immediately after death. Now, to palliate the direct contradiction there is in this to their doctrine, that the vital principle, which is all they mean by the soul, remains extinguished between death and the resurrection, they remind us of the

<sup>104</sup> Luke, xxiii. 43.

<sup>105</sup> Acts, vii. 59.

<sup>106</sup> 2 Cor. v. 6, &c. Philip. i. 21, &c.

difference there is between absolute or real, and relative or apparent, time. They admit that, if the Apostle be understood as speaking of real time, what is said flatly contradicts their system ; but, say they, his words must be interpreted as spoken, only of apparent time. He talks indeed of entering on a state of enjoyment, immediately after death, though there may be many thousands of years between the one and the other ; for, he means only, that when that state shall commence, however distant in reality the time may be, the person entering on it will not be sensible of that distance, and consequently there will be to him an apparent coincidence with the moment of his death. But, does the Apostle any where hint that this is his meaning ? or, is it what any man would naturally discover from his words ? That it is exceedingly remote from the common use of language, I believe hardly any of those who favour this scheme, will be partial enough to deny. Did the sacred penmen then mean to put a cheat upon the world, and, by the help of an equivocal expression, to flatter men with the hope of entering, the instant they expire, on a state of felicity ; when, in fact, they knew that it would be many ages before it would take place ? But, were the hypothesis about the extinction of the mind between death and the resurrection well founded, the apparent coincidence they speak of, is not so clear as they seem to think it. For my part, I cannot regard it as an axiom, and I never heard of any who attempted to demonstrate it. To me it appears merely a corollary

from Mr. Locke's doctrine, which derives our conceptions of time from the succession of our ideas, which, whether true or false, is a doctrine to be found only among certain philosophers, and which, we may reasonably believe, never came into the heads of those to whom the gospel, in the apostolic age, was announced.

I remark, thirdly, that even the curious equivocation, (or, perhaps more properly, mental reservation,) that has been devised for them, will not, in every case, save the credit of apostolical veracity. The words of Paul to the Corinthians are, *Knowing, that whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord* ; again, *We are willing rather to be absent from the body, and present with the Lord*. Could such expressions have been used by him, if he had held it impossible to be with the Lord, or indeed any where, without the body ; and that, whatever the change was which was made by death, he could not be in the presence of the Lord, till he returned to the body ? Absence from the body, and presence with the Lord, were never, therefore, more unfortunately combined, than in this illustration. Things are combined here as coincident, which, on the hypothesis of those gentlemen, are incompatible. If recourse be had to the original, the expressions in Greek are, if possible, still stronger. They are, *οἱ ἐνδημουντες ἐν τῷ σώματι*, *those who dwell in the body*, who are *ἐκδημουντες ἀπο τοῦ Κυρίου*, *at a distance from the Lord* ; as, on the contrary, they are, *οἱ ἐκδημουντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος*, *those who have travelled out of the body*, who

are *οι ενδημιουντες προς τον Κυριον*, *those who reside, or are present with the Lord*. In the passage to the Philippians also, the commencement of his presence with the Lord is represented as coincident, not with his return to the body, but with his leaving it, with the dissolution, not with the restoration, of the union.

The fourth, and only other remark I shall make, on this subject, is, that from the tenor of the New Testament, the sacred writers appear to proceed on the supposition, that the soul and the body are naturally distinct and separable, and that the soul is susceptible of pain or pleasure in a state of separation. It were endless to enumerate all the places which evince this. The story of the rich man and Lazarus<sup>107</sup>; the last words of our Lord upon the cross<sup>108</sup>, and of Stephen when dying; Paul's doubts whether he was in the body or out of the body, when he was translated to the third heaven, and paradise<sup>109</sup>; our Lord's words to Thomas, to satisfy him that he was not a spirit<sup>110</sup>; and to conclude, the express mention of the denial of spirits, as one of the errors of the Sadducees<sup>111</sup>; *For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit; μηδε αγγελον, μηδε πνευμα*. All these are irrefragable evidences of the general opinion, on this subject, of both Jews and Christians. By *spirit*, as distinguished from *angel*, is evidently meant the de-

<sup>107</sup> Luke, xvi. 22, 23.<sup>108</sup> Luke, xxiii. 46.<sup>109</sup> 2 Cor.

xii. 2, 3, 4.

<sup>110</sup> Luke, xxiv. 39.<sup>111</sup> Acts, xxi. 8.

parted spirit of a human being; for, that man is here, before his natural death, possessed of a vital and intelligent principle, which is commonly called his soul or spirit, it was never pretended that the Sadducees denied. It has been said, that this manner of expressing themselves has been adopted by the Apostles and Evangelists, merely in conformity to vulgar notions. To me it appears a conformity, which (if the sacred writers entertained the sentiments of our antagonists, on this article) is hardly reconcilable to the known simplicity and integrity of their character. It savours much more of the pious frauds, which became common afterwards, to which I own myself unwilling to ascribe so ancient and so respectable an origin. See Part I. of this Dissertation, § 10.

§ 24. I SHALL subjoin a few words on the manner wherein the distinction has been preserved between *hades* and *gehenna* by the translators of the New Testament; for, as I observed before, *gehenna*, as a name for the place of future punishment, does not occur in the Old. All the Latin translations I have seen, observe the distinction. All without exception adopt the word *gehenna*, though they do not all uniformly translate *hades*. Both the Geneva French, and Diodati, have followed the same method. Luther, on the contrary, in his German version, has uniformly confounded them, rendered both by the word *holle*. The English translators have taken the same method, and rendering both the Greek names by the

word *hell*, except in one single place<sup>112</sup> where *ᾠδης* is translated *grave*. Most foreign versions observe the difference. So do some of the late English translators, but not all. The common method of distinguishing, hitherto observed, has been to retain the word *gehenna*, and translate *hades* either *hell* or *grave*, as appeared most to suit the context. I have chosen, in this version, to reverse that method, to render *γεεννα* always *hell*, and to retain the word *hades*. My reasons are, first, though English ears are not entirely familiarized to either term, they are much more so to the latter than to the former, in consequence of the greater use made of the latter in theological writings. Secondly, the import of the English word *hell*, when we speak as Christians, answers exactly to *γεεννα*, not to *ᾠδης*; whereas, to this last word we have no term in the language corresponding. Accordingly, though, in my judgment, it is not one of those terms which admit different meanings, there has been very little uniformity preserved by translators in rendering it.

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### PART III.

*Μετανοεω* and *Μεταμελομαι*.

I SHALL now offer a few remarks on two words that are uniformly rendered, by the same English word, in the common version, between which

<sup>112</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 55.

there appears, notwithstanding, to be a real difference in signification. The words are μετανοεω and μεταμελομαι, *I repent*. It has been observed by some, and, I think, with reason, that the former denotes, properly, a change to the better; the latter, barely a change, whether it be to the better or to the worse; that the former marks a change of mind that is durable and productive of consequences; the latter expresses only a present uneasy feeling of regret or sorrow for what is done, without regard either to duration or to effects; in fine, that the first may properly be translated into English, *I reform*; the second, *I repent*, in the familiar acceptation of the word.

§ 2. THE learned Grotius (whose judgment, in critical questions, is highly respectable) is not convinced that this distinction is well founded. And I acknowledge that he advances some plausible things in support of his opinion. But as I have not found them satisfactory, I shall assign my reasons for thinking differently. Let it, in the first place, be observed, that the import of μεταμελομαι, in the explanation given, being more extensive or generical than that of μετανοεω, it may, in many cases, be used, without impropriety, for μετανοεω; though the latter, being more limited and special in its acceptation, cannot so properly be employed for the former. The genus includes the species, not the species the genus.

§ 3. ADMITTING, therefore, that, in the expression in the parable quoted by Grotius in support of his opinion, ὕστερον δε μεταμεληθεὶς ἀπηλθε, *afterwards he repented and went*<sup>113</sup>, the word μετανοήσας would have been apposite, because the change spoken of is to the better, and had an effect on his conduct; still the word μεταμελομαι is not improper, no more than the English word *repented*, though the change, as far as it went, was a real reformation. Every one who reforms, repents; but every one who repents, does not reform. I use the words entirely according to the popular idiom, and not according to the definitions of theologians: nay, I say further that, in this instance, the Greek word μεταμελομαι is more proper than μετανοεω, and the English *repent* than *reform*. The reason is, because the latter expression in each language is not so well adapted to a single action, as to a habit of acting, whereas the former may be equally applied to either. Now it is only one action that is mentioned in the parable.

§ 4. IN regard to the other passage quoted by Grotius, to show that μετανοια also is used where, according to the doctrine above explained, it ought to be μεταμελεια, I think he has not been more fortunate than in the former. The passage is, where it is said of Esau<sup>114</sup>, *Ye know that afterward, when he would have inherited the blessing, he was rejected. For he found no place of repen-*

<sup>113</sup> Matth. xxi. 29.<sup>114</sup> Heb. xii. 17.

*tance, μετανοιας τοπον ουχ εβρε, though he sought it carefully with tears.* Grotius, in his comment on the place, acknowledges that the word *μετανοια* is not used here literally, but by a metonymy of the effect for the cause. ‘He found no scope for effecting a change in what had been done, a revocation of the blessing given to Jacob, with a new grant of it to himself, or at least of such a blessing as might, in a great measure, supersede or cancel the former.’ This change was what he found no possibility of effecting, however earnestly and movingly he sought it. It is plain, that neither *μετανοια*, nor *μεταμελεια*, in their ordinary acceptation, expresses this change. For that it was not any repentance or reformation on himself, which he found no place for, is manifest both from the passage itself, and from the story to which it refers. From the construction of the words we learn, that what Esau did not find, was what he sought carefully with tears. Now, what he sought carefully with tears, was, as is evident from the history <sup>115</sup>, such a change in his father as I have mentioned. This was what he urged so affectingly, and this was what he, notwithstanding, found it impossible to obtain. Now I acknowledge that it is only by a trope that this can be called either *μετανοια* or *μεταμελεια*. That it was not literally the regret or grief implied in *μεταμελεια* that he sought, is as clear as day, since the manner in which he applied to his father, showed him to be already possessed of the most pungent

<sup>115</sup> Gen. xxvii. 30, &c.

grief for what had happened. Nay, it appears from the history, that the good old Patriarch, when he discovered the deceit that had been practised on him, was very strongly affected also : for it is said <sup>116</sup>, that Isaac *trembled very exceedingly*. Now, as *μετανοια* implies a change of conduct, as well as sorrow for what is past, it comes nearer the scope of the sacred writer than *μεταμελεια*. If, therefore, there is some deviation from strict propriety, in the word *μετανοια* here used, it is unquestionable that, to substitute in its place *μεταμελεια*, and represent Esau as seeking, in the bitterness of grief, that he, or even his father, might be grieved, would include, not barely an impropriety, or deviation from the literal import, but an evident absurdity.

§ 5. PASSING these examples, which are all that have been produced on that side, are the words in general so promiscuously used by sacred writers, (for it is only about words which seldom occur in Scripture, that we need recur to the usage of profane authors,) as that we cannot, with certainty, or at least with probability, mark the difference? Though I do not believe this to be the case; yet, as I do not think the matter so clear as in the supposed synonymas already discussed, I shall impartially and briefly state what appears to me of weight on both sides.

<sup>116</sup> Gen. xxvii. 33.

§ 6. FIRST, in regard to the usage of the Seventy, it cannot be denied that they employ the two words indiscriminately ; and, if the present inquiry were about the use observed in their version, we could not, with justice, say, that they intended to mark any distinction between them. They are, besides, used indifferently in translating the same Hebrew words, so that there is every appearance that, with them, they were synonymous. But, though the use of the Seventy adds considerable strength to any argument drawn from the use of the New Testament writers, when the usages of both are the same, or even doubtful ; yet, when they differ, the former, however clear, cannot, in a question which solely concerns the use that prevails in the New Testament, invalidate the evidence of the latter. We know that, in a much shorter period than that which intervened between the translation of the Old Testament, and the composition of the New, some words may become obsolete, and others may considerably alter in signification. It is, comparatively, but a short time (being less than two centuries) that has intervened between the making of our own version and the present hour ; and yet, in regard to the language of that version, both have already happened, as shall be shown afterwards<sup>117</sup>. Several of its words are antiquated, and others bear a different meaning now from what they did then.

<sup>117</sup> Diss. XI. Part II. § 5, &c.

§ 7. LET us therefore recur to the use of the New Testament. And here I observe, first, that where this change of mind is inculcated as a duty, or the necessity of it mentioned as a doctrine of Christianity, the terms are invariably *μετανοεω* and *μετανοια*. Thus John the Baptist and our Lord, both began their preaching with this injunction, *μετανοειτε* <sup>118</sup>. The disciples that were sent out to warn and prepare men for the manifestation of the Messiah, are said to have gone and preached *ἵνα μετανοήσωσι* <sup>119</sup>. The call which the Apostles gave to all hearers was, *μετανοήσατε, και επιστρεψατε, και βαπτισθητω ἕκαστος ὑμῶν* <sup>120</sup>, *reform your lives, return to God, and be baptized*. Peter's command to Simon Magus, on discovering the corruption of his heart, is, *μετανοήσον ἀπο τῆς κακίας ταύτης* <sup>121</sup>. When it is mentioned as an order from God, *παραγγέλλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι πανταχού μετανοεῖν* <sup>122</sup>. The duty to which Paul every where exhorted was, *μετανοεῖν και επιστρεφειν ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν* <sup>123</sup>. The charge to reformation given to the Asiatic churches in the Apocalypse, is always expressed by the word *μετανοήσον*, and their failure in this particular by *οὐ μετενόησε* <sup>124</sup>. The necessity of this change for preventing final ruin, is thus repeatedly expressed by our Lord, *Εὰν μὴ μετανοήτε, πάντες ἀπολεισθήε* <sup>125</sup>. And,

<sup>118</sup> Matth. iii. 2. iv. 17.<sup>119</sup> Mark, vi. 2.<sup>120</sup> Acts, ii. 38. iii. 19.<sup>121</sup> viii. 22.<sup>122</sup> xvii. 30.<sup>123</sup> xxvi. 20.<sup>124</sup> Rev. ii. and iii. passim.<sup>125</sup> Luke, xiii. 3. 5.

in regard to the noun, wherever mention is made of this change as a duty, it is *μετανοια*, not *μεταμελεια*. It was *εις μετανοιαν* that our Lord came to call sinners <sup>126</sup>; the baptism which John preached was *βαπτισμα μετανοιας* <sup>127</sup>. The fruits of a good life, which he enjoined them to produce, were *αξιους μετανοιας* <sup>128</sup>. What the Apostles preached to all nations, in their Master's name, as inseparably connected, were *μετανοιαν, και αφεσιν ἁμαρτιων* <sup>129</sup>. Again it is given as the sum of their teaching, *την εις τον Θεον μετανοιαν, και πιστιν εις τον Κυριον ἡμων Ιησουν Χριστον* <sup>130</sup>. The same word is employed when the offer of such terms is exhibited as the result of divine grace <sup>131</sup>. Now, in a question of criticism, it is hardly possible to find stronger evidence of the distinction than that which has now been produced.

§ 8. THERE is a great difference between the mention of any thing as a duty, especially of that consequence, that the promises or threats of religion depend on the performance or neglect of it; and the bare recording of an event as fact. In the former, the words ought to be as special as possible, that there may be no mistake in the application of the promise, no pretence for saying that more is exacted than was expressed in the condition. But, in relating facts, it is often a matter of indifference, whether the terms be

<sup>126</sup> Matth. ix. 13.

<sup>127</sup> Mark, i. 4.

<sup>128</sup> Matth. iii. 8.

<sup>129</sup> Luke, xxiv. 47.

<sup>130</sup> Acts, xx. 21.

<sup>131</sup> Acts, xi. 18.

general or special. Provided nothing false be added, it is not expected that every thing true should be included. This is the less necessary when, in the sequel of a story, circumstances are mentioned, which supply any defect arising from the generality of the terms. Under this description may be included both the passage formerly considered, *ὕστερον μεταμεληθεὶς ἀπηλθε*; and that other connected with it, in the reproach pronounced against the Pharisees, for their impenitence and incredulity under the Baptist's ministry, *οὐ μετεμεληθητε ὕστερον του πιστευσαι αὐτω* <sup>132</sup>. The last clause in each perfectly ascertains the import of the sentence, and supplies every defect.

§ 9. LET it further be observed, that when such a sorrow is alluded to, as either was not productive of reformation, or, in the nature of the thing, does not imply it, the words *μετανοια* and *μετανοεω* are never used. Thus the repentance of Judas, which drove him to despair, is expressed by *μεταμεληθεὶς* <sup>133</sup>. When Paul, writing to the Corinthians, mentions the sorrow his former letter had given them, he says, that, considering the good effects of that sorrow, he does not repent that he had written it, though he had formerly repented. Here no more can be understood by his own repentance spoken of, but that uneasiness which a good man feels, not from the consciousness of having done wrong, but from a tenderness

<sup>132</sup> Matth. xxi. 32.

<sup>133</sup> Matth. xxvii. 3.

for others, and a fear, lest that which, prompted by duty, he had said, should have too strong an effect upon them. This might have been the case, without any fault in him, as the consequence of a reproof depends much on the temper with which it is received. His words are *Εἰ ἐλυπησα ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ οὐ μεταμελομαι εἰ καὶ μετεμελομην* <sup>134</sup>. As it would have made nonsense of the passage to have rendered the verb in English, *reformed* instead of *repented*, the verb *μετανοεω* instead of *μεταμελομαι*, would have been improper in Greek.

There is one passage in which this Apostle has, in effect, employed both words, and in such a manner, as clearly shows the difference. *Ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν λύπη μετανοίαν εἰς σωτηρίαν ἀμεταμελήτον κατεργάζεται* <sup>135</sup>: in the common version, *Godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of*. There is a paronomasia here, or play upon the word *repent*, which is not in the original. As both words *μετανοεω* and *μεταμελομαι* are uniformly translated by the same English word, this figure of speech could hardly have been avoided in the common version. Now, had the two words been also synonymous in Greek (as that trope, when it comes in the way, is often adopted by the sacred writers,) it had been more natural to say *μετανοίαν ἀμετανοήτον*. Whereas the change of the word plainly shows that, in the Apostle's judgment, there would have been something incongruous in that expression. In the first word

<sup>134</sup> 2 Cor. vii. 8.

<sup>135</sup> Verse 10.

μετανοιαν, is expressed the effect of godly sorrow, which is reformation, a duty required by our religion as necessary to salvation. In the other αμεταμελητον, there is no allusion to a further reformation, but to a further change, it being only meant to say, that the reformation effected is such as shall never be regretted, never repented of. As into the import of this word there enters no consideration of goodness or badness, but barely of change, from whatever motive or cause; the word αμεταμελητος comes to signify *steady, immutable, irrevocable*. This is evidently the meaning of it in that expression, *Αμεταμελητα τα χαρισματα και η κλησις του Θεου*<sup>136</sup>, which our translators render, *the gifts and calling of God are without repentance*; more appositely and perspicuously, are *irrevocable*. For this reason the word μεταμελομαι is used when the sentence relates to the constancy or immutability of God. Thus *Ωμοσε Κυριος και ου μεταμεληθησεται*<sup>137</sup>: *The Lord hath sworn and will not repent*, that is, *alter his purpose*.

The word αμετανοητον, on the contrary, including somewhat of the sense of its primitive, expresses not, as the other, *unchanged* or *unchangeable*, but *unreformed, unreformable, impenitent*. The Apostle says, addressing himself to the obstinate infidel, *κατα την σκληροτητα σου και αμετανοητον καρδιαν*<sup>138</sup>. *After thy hardness and impenitent, or irreclaimable heart*. The word αμετανοητος, in the New Testament style, ought

<sup>136</sup> Rom. xi. 29.<sup>137</sup> Heb. vii. 21.<sup>138</sup> Rom. ii. 5.

analogically to express a wretched state, as it signifies the want of that *μετανοια*, which the Gospel every where represents as the indispensable duty of the lapsed, and therefore as essential to their becoming Christians : but the term *αμεταμελητον* is no-way fitted to this end, as it expresses only the absence of that *μεταμελεια*, which is no-where represented as a virtue, or required as a duty, and which may be good, bad, or indifferent, according to its object. Thus I have shown, that on every pertinent occasion, the distinction is sacredly observed by the penmen of the New Testament, and that the very few instances in which it may appear otherwise at first glance, are found to be no exceptions when attentively examined.

§ 10. HAVING now ascertained the distinction, it may be asked, How the words ought to be discriminated in a translation ? In my opinion, *μετανοεω*, in most cases, particularly where it is expressed as a command, or mentioned as a duty, should be rendered by the English verb *reform*, *μετανοια*, by *reformation* ; and that *μεταμελομαι* ought to be translated *repent*. *Μεταμελεια* is defined by Phavorinus *δυσαρεστησις επι πεπραγμενοις*, *dissatisfaction with one's self, for what one has done*, which exactly hits the meaning of the word *repentance* ; whereas *μετανοια* is defined *γνησια απο πταισματος επι το εναντιον αγαθον επιστροφη*, and *ἡ προς το κρειττον επιστροφη*, *a genuine correction of faults, and a change from worse to better*. We cannot more exactly

define the word *reformation*. It may be said that, in using the terms *repent* and *repentance*, as our translators have done, for both the original terms, there is no risk of any dangerous error; because, in the theological definitions of repentance, given by almost all parties, such a reformation of the disposition is included, as will infallibly produce a reformation of conduct. This, however, does not satisfy. Our Lord and his Apostles accommodated themselves in their style to the people whom they addressed, by employing words according to the received and vulgar idiom, and not according to the technical use of any learned doctors. It was not to such that this doctrine was revealed, but to those who, in respect of acquired knowledge, were babes<sup>139</sup>. The learned use is known, comparatively, but to a few: and it is certain that with us, according to the common acceptance of the words, a man may be said just as properly to repent of a good, as of a bad, action. A covetous man will repent of the alms which a sudden fit of pity may have induced him to bestow. Besides, it is but too evident, that a man may often justly be said to repent, who never reforms. In neither of these ways do I find the word *μετανοεω* ever used.

I have another objection to the word *repent*. It unavoidably appears to lay the principal stress on the sorrow or remorse which it implies for former misconduct. Now this appears a secondary

<sup>139</sup> Matth. xi. 25.

matter, at the most, and not to be the idea suggested by the Greek verb. The primary object is a real change of conduct. The Apostle expressly distinguishes it from sorrow, in a passage lately quoted, representing it as what the sorrow, if of a godly sort, terminates in, or produces. *Ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν λυπὴ μετάνοιαν κατεργάζεται*, rendered in the common version, *Godly sorrow worketh repentance*. Now, if he did not mean to say that the thing was caused by itself, or that repentance worketh repentance (and who will charge him with this absurdity?) *ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν λυπὴ* is one thing, and *μετάνοια* is another. But it is certain that our word repentance implies no more in common use, even in its best sense, than *ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν λυπὴ*, and often not so much. It is consequently not a just interpretation of the Greek word *μετάνοια*, which is not *ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν λυπὴ*, but its certain consequence. Grief or remorse, compared with this, is but an accidental circumstance. Who had more grief than Judas, whom it drove to despondency and self-destruction? To him the Evangelist applies very properly the term *μεταμεληθεὶς*, which we as properly translate *repented*. He was in the highest degree dissatisfied with himself. But, to show that a great deal more is necessary in the Christian, neither our Lord himself, as we have seen, nor his forerunner John, nor his Apostles and ministers who followed, ever expressed themselves in this manner, when recommending to their hearers the great duties of Christianity. They never called out to the people, *μεταμελεσθε*, but always *μετανοεῖτε*. If they

were so attentive to this distinction, in order to prevent men, in so important an article, from placing their duty in a barren remorse, however violent; we ought not surely to express this capital precept of our religion, by a term that is just as well adapted to the case of Judas, as to that of Peter. For the Greek word *μεταμελομαι*, though carefully avoided by the inspired writers, in expressing our duty, is fully equivalent to the English word *repent*.

§ 11. I SHALL now, ere I conclude this subject, consider briefly in what manner some of the principal translators have rendered the words in question into other languages. I shall begin with the Syriac, being the most respectable, on the score of antiquity, of all we are acquainted with. In this venerable version, which has served as a model to interpreters in the East, in like manner as the Vulgate has served to those in the West, the distinction is uniformly preserved. *Μετανοειν* is rendered תוב *thub*, to reform, to return to God, to amend one's life; *μετανοια* תבוּתָא *thebutha*, reformation; *μεταμελεσθαι* is rendered תוא *thua*, to repent, to be sorry for what one has done. Nor are these Syriac words ever confounded as synonymous, except in the Apocalypse, which, though now added in the printed editions, is no part of that ancient translation, but was made many centuries after.

The second place in point of antiquity is, no doubt, due to the Vulgate, where, I acknowledge, there is no distinction made. The usual term

for μετανοια is *pœnitentia*, for μετανοεω and μεταμελομαι, indiscriminately, *pœnitentiam ago*, *pœnitentiam habeo*, *pœniteo*, or *me pœnitet*. These can hardly be said to express more than the English words *repentance* and *repent*. Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον is not improperly rendered *pœnitentiam stabilem*, agreeably to an acceptation of the term above taken notice of.

Beza, one of the most noted, and by Protestants most imitated, of all the Latin translators since the reformation, has carefully observed the distinction, wherever it was of consequence ; for, as I remarked, there are a few cases in which either term might have been used in the original, and concerning which, a translator must be directed by the idiom of the tongue in which he writes. The same distinction had been made before, though not with perfect uniformity, by the translators of Zurich. Beza's word for μετανοεω is *resipisco*, and for μετανοια, *resipiscentia*. To this last term he was led both by analogy, and (if not by classical authority) by the authority of early ecclesiastical writers, which, in the translation of holy writ, is authority sufficient. These words have this advantage of *pœnitere* and *pœnitentia*, that they always denote a change of some continuance, and a change to the better. For μεταμελομαι his word is *pœnitere*. Thus μεταμεληθεις, spoken of Judas, is *pœnitens* : Μετανοιαν αμεταμελητον, *resipiscentiam cujus nunquam pœniteat*, in which the force of both words is very well expressed. So is also αμετανοητον καρδιαν, *cor quod resipiscere nescit*. Erasmus, one of the

earliest translators on the Romish side, uses both *resipisco* and *pœnitentiam ago*, but with no discrimination. They are not only both employed in rendering the same word *μετανοεω*, but even when the scope is the same. Thus *μετανοείτε*, in the imperative, is at one time *resipiscite*, at another *pœnitentiam agite*: so that his only view seems to have been to diversify his style.

Castalio, one of the most eminent Latin Protestant translators, has been sensible of the distinction, and careful to preserve it in his version. But, as his great aim was to give a classical air to the books of Scripture, in order to engage readers of taste who affected an elegant and copious diction; he has disfigured, with his adventitious ornaments, the native simplicity which so remarkably distinguishes the sacred penmen, and is, in fact, one of their greatest ornaments. We can more easily bear rusticity than affectation, especially on the most serious and important subjects. Among other arts, by which Castalio has endeavoured to recommend his work, one is a studied variety in the phrases, that the ear may not be tired by too frequent recurrence to the same sounds. The words under consideration afford a strong example. The verb *μετανοεω* is translated by him, I know not how many different ways. It is *se corrigere*, *vitam corrigere*, *redire ad frugem*, *redire ad sanitatem*, *reverti ad sanitatem*; when the vices which we are required to amend are mentioned, the phrase is, *desciscere a sua pravitate*, *desistere a turpitudine*, *desistere a suis operibus*, *impudicitia sua recedere*, *sua homicidia*. &c. omit-

*tere.* *Μετανοια* partakes of the like variety. It is *emendata vita, vitæ emendatio, correctæ vita, vitæ correctio, morum correctio, correcti mores, corrigenda vita, sanitas, pœnitentia*; and in the oblique cases, *frugem* and *bonam frugem*. For *μεταμελομαι* I only find the two words *pœnitere* and *mutare sententiam*. *Μετανοϊαν αμεταμελητον* is not badly rendered *vitæ correctionem nunquam pœnitendam, αμεταμελητα χαριδματα munera irrevocabilia*, and *αμετανοητος καρδια, deploratus animus*.

Diodati, the Italian translator, in every case of moment, renders the verb *μετανοειν* *ravedersi*, which in the Vocabolario della Crusca is explained *resipiscere, ad mentis sanitatem redire*; but for the noun *μετανοια* he always uses *penitenza*, and for *μεταμελομαι*, very properly *pentirsi*. The Geneva French translates *μετανοεω*, *s'amender*, *μεταμελομαι*, *se repentir*, and *μετανοια* *repentance*. In both these versions they use, in rendering *μετανοϊαν αμεταμελητον*, the same paronomasia which is in the common English version. Diodati has *penitenza della quale huom non si pente*. The Geneva French has *repentance dont on ne se repent*. The other passages, also above quoted from the original, they translate in nearly the same manner. Luther, in his German translation, has generally distinguished the two verbs, rendering *μετανοειν* *busse thun*, and *μεταμελεσθαι*, *reuen* or *ge-reuen*.

## PART IV.

*ἅγιος* AND *όσιος*.

I SHALL give, as another example of words, supposed to be synonymous, the terms *ἅγιος* and *όσιος*. The former is, if I mistake not, uniformly rendered in the New Testament, *holy*, or, when used substantively in the plural, *saints*. The latter, except in one instance, is always rendered by the same term, not only in the English Bible, but in most modern translations. Yet that these two Greek words are altogether equivalent, there is, in my opinion, good reason to doubt. Both belong to the second class of words which I explained in a former Dissertation<sup>140</sup>. They relate to manners, and are therefore not so easily defined. Nor are such words in one language ever found exactly to tally with those of another. There are, however, certain means, by which the true signification may, in most cases, be, very nearly, if not entirely, reached. I shall, therefore, first mention my reasons for thinking that the two words *ἅγιος* and *όσιος*, in the New Testament, are not synonymous, and then endeavour to ascertain the precise meaning of each.

<sup>140</sup> Diss. II. § 4.

§ 2. THAT there is a real difference in signification between the two Greek words, notwithstanding their affinity, my first reason for thinking is, because in the Septuagint, which is the foundation of the Hellenistic idiom, one of them is that by which one Hebrew word, and the other that by which another, not at all synonymous, is commonly translated. *Áγιος* is the word used for קדוש *ka-dosh*, *sanctus*, *holy*, ὁσιος for חסיד *chasid*, *benignus*, *gracious*.

§ 3. MY second reason is, because these words have been understood by the ancient Greek translators to be so distinct in signification, that not, in one single instance, is the Hebrew word *kadosh* rendered by the Greek ὁσιος or *chasid* by *áyios*. What gives additional weight to this reason, is the consideration, that both words frequently occur; and that the Greek translators, though they have not been uniform in rendering either, but have adopted different words, on different occasions, for translating each; have, nevertheless, not in a single instance, adopted any of those terms for rendering one of these Hebrew words, which they had adopted for rendering the other. Few words occur oftener than *kadosh*. But, though it is, beyond comparison, oftenest translated *áyios*, it is not so always. In one place it is rendered καθάρος, *mundus*, *clean*; the verb *kadash*, the etymon, is rendered δοξάζειν, *glorificare*, *to glorify*, ἀναβιβάζειν *ascendere facere*, *to cause to ascend*, καθαρίζειν *purgare*, *to cleanse*, ἀγνίζειν *purificare*, *to purify*, as well as ἁγιάζειν and

καθαγιαζειν *sanctificare, to hallow, to sanctify*; but not once by ὁσιος, or any of its conjugates. On the other hand, *chasid* is rendered ελεημων and πολυελεος *misericors, merciful*, ευλαβης *pious, devout*, and by some other words, but not once by ἅγιος, or by any of its conjugates, or by any of the terms employed in rendering *kadosh*; a certain sign that, to the old Greek translators, several other words appeared to have more coincidence with either than these had with each other.

§ 4. THE third reason, which inclines me to think that the two words are not synonymous, is, because I find, on examining and comparing, that there is a considerable difference in the application of them, not only in the Old Testament, but in the New. In regard to the word ἅγιος, it is applied not only to persons, but to things inanimate, as the sacred utensils and vestments; to times, as their jubilees and sabbaths, their solemn festivals and fasts; and to places, as the land of Judea, the city of Jerusalem, the mountain whereon stood the temple with its courts; but more especially the house which the courts inclosed, the outer part whereof was called, by way of eminence, ἡ ἁγία scilicet σκηνη, *the holy place*, and the inner ἡ ἁγία ἁγιων, *the holy of holies, or the most holy place*. Now I find nothing like this in the use made of the word ὁσιος, which as far as I can discover, is applied only to persons, or beings susceptible of character. The τα ὁσια Λαβιδ<sup>141</sup>,

<sup>141</sup> Isaiah. lv. 3. Acts, xiii. 34.

cannot be accounted an exception. The word used by the Prophet is חסד *chesed*, *benignitas*, not חסיד *chasid*, *benignus*, and is not improperly rendered in our version *mercies*. Nor is the ὁσίου *χειράς* of the Apostle <sup>142</sup>, an exception, this being manifestly not a literal, but a tropical use of the epithet, wherein that is applied to the instrument, which, in strictness, is applicable only to the agent; as when we say a *slandering tongue* and *guilty hands*, we are always understood as applying the qualities of *slander* and *guilt*, to the person of whose tongue and hands we are speaking.

§ 5. I OBSERVE, further, that even when ἅγιος is applied to persons, it has not always a relation to the moral character, but often to something which, in regard to the person, is merely circumstantial and external. It is, in this respect, that the children of Israel are called a *holy* nation, being consecrated by their circumcision, notwithstanding they were a rebellious and stiff-necked people, and rather worse, instead of better, than other nations; as their great legislator Moses often declares to them. In this sense the tribe of Levi was *holier* than any other tribe, purely because selected for the sacred service; the priesthood had more *holiness* than the other Levites, and the high-priest was the *holiest* of all. There was the same gradation in these, as in the courts and house of the temple. It is in this sense I understand the word ἅγιος, as applied to Aaron;

<sup>142</sup> 1 Tim. ii. 8.

*They envied Moses, also, in the camp, and Aaron the saint of the Lord*<sup>143</sup>; *τον ἅγιον Κυρίου*. Aaron's personal character does not seem to have entitled him to this distinction above Moses, and the whole nation. Nor does the title seem to have been peculiarly applicable to him, in any other sense than that now mentioned, namely, that he was the only one of the people who carried on his forehead the signature of his consecration, *holiness to the Lord*, *ἁγιασμα Κυρίου*.

§ 6. ON the other hand, it does not appear, from any clear passage, either in the Old Testament or in the New, that the Hebrew word *chasid*, or the Greek *hosios*, are susceptible of this interpretation. I say, any clear passage; for I acknowledge there is one, the only one I can find in either, wherein the application of this term, as commonly understood, is similar to that of the other lately quoted from the Psalms. It is in Moses' benediction of the tribes, immediately before his death: *Of Levi he said, Let thy Thummim and thy Urim be with thy holy one, whom thou didst prove at Massah, and with whom thou didst strive at the waters of Meribah*<sup>144</sup>. Not to mention, that in the Samaritan copy of the Pentateuch (which in some things is more correct than the Hebrew,) there is a different reading of the word here rendered *ὅσιος*; the whole passage is exceedingly obscure; insomuch that it is impossible to say, with certainty, who is

<sup>143</sup> Psal. cvi. 16.<sup>144</sup> Deut. xxxiii. 8.

here called *chasidecha*, which our translators have rendered *thy holy one*. The words which follow serve rather to increase the darkness, than to remove it.

Houbigant, in his valuable edition of the Old Testament, with a new Latin translation, and notes, will not admit that it can refer to Aaron, or his successors in the pontificate; and, in my judgment, supports his opinion with unanswerable reasons. One is that, the term *chasid*, *hosios*, is never applied to Aaron, nor to the priesthood in general, nor to any priest as such. Another is that, though we often hear of the people's proving God at Massah, and contending with him at the waters of Meribah, we nowhere hear that they proved or tempted Aaron, and strove with him, there. Indeed, if they had been said to have tempted Moses, the expression, though unusual, had been less improper, because the immediate recourse of the people, in their strait, was to Moses. They chid with him, we are told, and were almost ready to stone him<sup>145</sup>. Houbigant's opinion is, that by *thy holy one*, is here meant Jesus Christ, who is distinguished by this appellation in the Book of Psalms. *Thou wilt not suffer thy holy one*, *הַכַּסִּיד הַקָּדוֹשׁ* *chasidecha*, *τον ὁσιον σου*, *to see corruption*<sup>146</sup>. And to say that they strove with, tempted or proved Christ in the wilderness, is conformable to the language of Scripture. *Neither let us tempt Christ*, says Paul<sup>147</sup>, *as some*

<sup>145</sup> Exod. xvii. 1, &c. Numb. xx. 3, &c.

<sup>146</sup> Psal. xvi. 10.

<sup>147</sup> 1 Cor. x. 9.

*of them also tempted*, referring to what happened in the desert, *and were destroyed of serpents*. Houbigant's version (the words being understood as addressed to Levi, according to the original,) is *Levi autem dixit, Thummim tuum, tuumque Urim viri sancti tui est, quem tu tentationis in loco tentasti, cui convitium fecisti, apud aquas contradictionis*. It must be owned, that he has added some plausibility to his gloss upon the passage, by the turn he has given to the following verses. But it is sufficient for my purpose to say, in regard to the negative part of his remark, that he is certainly right in maintaining that the expression does not refer to Aaron and his successors. But as to the positive part, that it refers to our Lord Jesus Christ, will perhaps be thought more questionable. His being styled *thy holy one*, τὸν ὅσιον σου, in words addressed to God, is not authority enough for understanding him to be meant by τῷ ὁσίῳ σου, *to thy holy one*, in words addressed to Levi.

§ 7. BUT to return : another difference in the application of the words ἅγιος and ὅσιος, is that the latter is sometimes found coupled with other epithets expressive of different good qualities, and applied to character or moral conduct, each exhibiting, as it were, a feature distinct from those exhibited by the rest. The word ἅγιος is not commonly accompanied with other epithets : when it is, they are of such a general nature, as rather to affect the whole character than separate parts

of it. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says of our Lord<sup>148</sup>, that he was ὁσῖος, ἀκακος, ἀμιαντος, in the common translation, *holy, harmless, undefiled*. But the English word *holy*, being general in its signification, adds nothing to the import of the other epithets, especially of ἀμιαντος, and consequently does not hit the exact meaning of the word ὁσῖος, which here probably denotes *pious*; the two other epithets, being employed to express compendiously the regards due to others, and to himself. Paul has given us another example in his character of a bishop, who, he says<sup>149</sup>, ought to be φιλοξενον, φιλαγαθον, σωφρονα, δικαιον, ὁσιον, εγκρατη. To render the word ὁσιος, in this verse *holy*, is chargeable with the same fault as in the former instance. The same thing holds also of the adverb ὁσιως. Now the word ἅγιος is not included in this manner, in an enumeration of good qualities. It is commonly found single, or joined with other epithets equally general. The expression used by the Apostle<sup>150</sup>, ὁ μὲν νομος ἅγιος, καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ ἁγία, καὶ δικαία, καὶ ἀγαθή: *The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good*—is no exception; for we have no enumeration here of the virtues of an individual, but of the general good qualities that may be ascribed to God's law. And though the terms are equally general, they are not synonymous; they present us with the different aspects of the same object. To say that the law of God is *holy*, is to represent it as awful

<sup>148</sup> Heb. vii. 26.<sup>149</sup> Tit. i. 8.<sup>150</sup> Rom. vii. 12.

to creatures such as we ; to say it is *just*, is to remind us that it is obligatory ; and to say it is *good*, is to tell us, in other words, that it is adapted to promote universal happiness, and therefore *lovely*.

§ 8. HAVING assigned my reasons for thinking that the two words *όσιος* and *άγιος* in the New Testament are not synonymous, I shall now, as I proposed, endeavour to ascertain the precise meaning of each. I believe it will appear, on examination, that the affinity between the two Greek words, in their ordinary and classical acceptation, is greater than between the Hebrew words, in lieu of which they have been so generally substituted by the Seventy. This, which may have originated from some peculiarity in the idiom of Alexandria, has, I suppose, led the translators of both Testaments to regard them often as equivalent, and to translate them by the same word. The authors of the Vulgate in particular, have almost always employed *sanctus* in expounding both. This has misled most modern interpreters in the West. As to our own translators, the example has, doubtless, had some influence. Nevertheless they have, in this, not so implicitly followed the Vulgate, in their version of the Old Testament, as in that of the New. Let it be premised, that the significations of words, in any nation, do not remain invariably the same. In a course of years much fewer than two thousand, which are reckoned to have elapsed from the commencement to the finishing of the sacred canon, very

considerable changes happen in the meanings of words in the same language, and among the same people. Now, to trace the gradations and nicer shades of meaning, which distinguish different periods, is one of the most difficult, but most important, tasks of criticism.

§ 9. IN regard to the word *kadosh*, *hagios*, I acknowledge that it does not seem to me to have had originally any relation to character or morals. Its primitive signification appears to have been *clean*; first, in the literal sense, as denoting free from all filth, dirt, or nastiness; secondly, as expressing what, according to the religious ritual, was accounted *clean*. The first is natural, the second ceremonial, cleanness. Some traces of the first of these meanings we have in the Old Testament, but nothing is more common there than the second, particularly in the Pentateuch. Again, as things are made clean to prepare them for being used (and the more important the use, the more carefully they are cleaned,) the term has been adopted to denote, thirdly, *prepared*, *fitted*, *destined for* a particular purpose, of what kind soever the purpose be; fourthly, and more especially, *consecrated*, or devoted to a religious use; fifthly, as things, so prepared and devoted, are treated with peculiar care and attention, *to hallow* or *sanctify*, comes to signify to honour, to reverence, to stand in awe of, and *holy*, to imply worthy of this treatment, that is, honourable, *venerable*, awful: sixthly, and lastly, as outward and

corporeal cleanness has, in all ages and languages been considered as an apt metaphor for moral purity, it denotes guiltless, *irreproachable*, which is at present, among Christians, the most common acceptance of the word.

§ 10. I SHALL give an example or two of each of the six uses aforesaid, not confining myself to the adjective *kadosh*, but including its conjugates of the same root. First, that it denotes *clean* in the vulgar acceptance, is manifest from the precept given to Israel in the desert, to be careful to keep the camp free from all odour<sup>151</sup>. The reason assigned is in these words: *For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, therefore shall thy camp be holy*, והיה קרושׁ *και εσται ἁγια*, *that he see no unclean thing in thee, and turn away from thee*.

Another remarkable example of this meaning we have in the history of king Hezekiah, who is said to have given orders to the Levites<sup>152</sup>, to sanctify the house of the Lord; the import of which order is explained by the words immediately following, and *carry forth the filthiness out of the holy place*. The sacred service had, in the reign of the impious Ahaz, been for a long time totally neglected; the lamps were gone out, and the fire extinguished on the altars, both of burnt-offerings and of incense; nay, and the temple itself had at length been absolutely deserted and

<sup>151</sup> See the whole passage, Deut. xxiii. 12, 13, 14.

<sup>152</sup> 2 Chron. xxix. 5, &c.

shut up. The king, intending to restore the religious worship of Jehovah to its former splendour, saw that the first thing necessary was to make clean the house, with all its furniture, that they might be fit for the service. Frequent mention is made of this cleansing in the chapter above referred to, where it is sometimes called *cleansing* <sup>153</sup>, sometimes *sanctifying* <sup>154</sup>; the Hebrew verbs טָהַר *tahar*, and קָדַשׁ *kadash*, being manifestly, through the whole chapter, used indiscriminately. Both words are, accordingly, in this passage, rendered by the Seventy indifferently ἀγνίζειν and καθαρίζειν, not ἀγιάζειν; in the Vulgate *mundare*, *expiare*, and once *sanctificare*. In both the above examples the word *holy* is evidently the opposite of *dirty*, *nasty*, *filthy*, in the current acceptance of the terms. This, as being the simplest and most obvious, is probably the primitive sense. Things sensible first had names in every language. The names were afterwards extended to things conceivable and intellectual. This is according to the natural progress of knowledge.

§ 11. FROM this first signification, the transition is easy to that which, in the eye of the ceremonial law, is clean. One great purpose of that law, though neither the only, nor the chief, purpose, is to draw respect to the religious service, by guarding against every thing that might savour of

<sup>153</sup> Verse 15, 16, 18.

<sup>154</sup> Verse 5, 17, 19.

indecenty or uncleanness. The climate, as well as the nature of their service, rendered this more necessary than we are apt to imagine. Any thing which could serve as a security against infectious disorders in their public assemblies, whereof, as they lived in a hot climate, they were in much greater danger than we are, was a matter of the highest importance. Now, when once a fence is established by statute, it is necessary, in order to support its authority, that the letter of the statute should be the rule in all cases. Hence it will happen, that there may be a defilement in the eye of the law, where there is no natural foulness at all. This I call *ceremonial uncleanness*, to express the reverse of which, the term *holy* is frequently employed. Thus, by avoiding to eat what was accounted unclean food, they sanctified themselves<sup>155</sup>; they were likewise kept holy by avoiding the touch of dead bodies, to avoid which, was particularly required of the priests, except in certain cases, they being obliged, by their ministry, to be holier than others<sup>156</sup>. Moses is said<sup>157</sup> to sanctify the people by making them wash their clothes, and go through the legal ceremonies of purification. Nor is it possible to doubt that, when men were ordered to sanctify themselves directly, for a particular occasion, they were enjoined the immediate performance of something which could be visibly and quickly executed, and not the acquisition of a character, which is

<sup>155</sup> Lev. xi. 42, &c. xx. 25, 26.

<sup>156</sup> Lev. xxi. 1—6.

<sup>157</sup> Exod. xix. 10. 14. 22.

certainly not the work of an hour or of a day. Thus the priests were to sanctify themselves, before they approached the Lord on Sinai; and thus the people were commanded by Joshua to sanctify themselves, in the evening, that they might be prepared for seeing the wonders which God was to perform among them, next day <sup>158</sup>. In the same sense, Joshua also is said to sanctify the people <sup>159</sup>. In this sense, we are also to understand what we are told of those who sanctified themselves, for the observance of that great pass-over which Hezekiah caused to be celebrated. What is termed *sanctifying* in one verse, is *cleansing* in another <sup>160</sup>. To prevent being tedious, I do not repeat the whole passages, but refer to them in the margin; the reader may consult them at his leisure.

Even in the New Testament, where the word is not so frequently used in the ceremonial sense, *holy* and *unclean*, *ἅγιος* and *ακαθάρτος*, are contrasted as natural opposites <sup>161</sup>. In one place in the Old Testament <sup>162</sup>, the Seventy have rendered the word *kadosh* *καθάρτος*, as entirely equivalent, calling that pure or *clean* water, which, in Hebrew, is *holy water*; and oftener than once in the Targums or Chaldee paraphrases, the Hebrew *kadosh* is rendered, by their common term, for *clean*. Thus, in that passage of the Prophet <sup>163</sup>, “Stand by thyself; come not near me, for I am

<sup>158</sup> Josh. iii. 5.    <sup>159</sup> Josh. vii. 13.    <sup>160</sup> 2 Chron. xxx. 17, 18.

<sup>161</sup> 1 Cor. vii. 14.    <sup>162</sup> Numb. v. 17.    <sup>163</sup> Isaiah, lxxv. 5

“*holier* than thou,” the last clause is in Chaldee,  
 “I am *cleaner* than thou.”

§ 12. IN regard to the third sense, separated or *prepared* for a special purpose, there are several examples. The appointing of places for cities of refuge is, both in the original, and in the Septuagint <sup>164</sup>, called sanctifying them. To make ready for war is, in several places, to *sanctify* war <sup>165</sup>. In such places, however, the Seventy have not imitated the Hebrew penmen, probably thinking it too great a stretch for the Greek language to employ *ἁγιαζω* in this manner. In one place, men are said to be *sanctified* for destruction <sup>166</sup>, that is, devoted or prepared for it. To devote to a bad, even to an idolatrous use, is called *to sanctify*. Thus, both in Hebrew, and in Greek, Micah's mother is said <sup>167</sup>, to *sanctify* the silver which she had devoted for making an idol, for her and her family to worship. From this application, probably, has sprung such anomalous productions as קדשה *kedeshah*, a prostitute, and קדשים *kedeshim*, Sodomites. Nor is this so strange as it may at first appear. Similar examples may be found in most tongues. The Latin *sacer*, which commonly signifies *sacred*, *holy*, *venerable*, sometimes denotes the contrary, and is equivalent to *scelestus*. *Auri sacra fames*, the execrable thirst of gold.

<sup>164</sup> Josh. xx. 7.      <sup>165</sup> Jer. vi. 4.    Mic. iii. 5.

<sup>166</sup> Jer. xii. 3.

<sup>167</sup> Judg. xvii. 3.

§ 13. THE fourth meaning mentioned, was devoted to religious or pious use. Thus Jeremiah was *sanctified*<sup>168</sup>, from the womb, in being ordained a Prophet unto the nations; the priests and the Levites were sanctified or consecrated for their respective sacred offices. It were losing time to produce examples of an use so frequently to be met with in Scripture, and almost in every page of the Books of Moses. In this sense, (for it admits degrees) the Jewish nation was called *holy*, they being consecrated to God by circumcision, the seal of his covenant; in this sense also, all who profess Christianity are denominated *saints*, having been dedicated to God in their baptism.

§ 14. OF the fifth meaning, according to which, to *hallow* or *sanctify* denotes to respect, to honour, to venerate; and *holy* denotes respectable, honourable, venerable; we have many examples. Thus to *hallow* God is opposed to profaning his name<sup>169</sup>, that is, to treating him with irreverence and disrespect. It is opposed also to the display of a want of confidence in his power, and in his promise<sup>170</sup>. It is in this meaning the word is used, when we are required to sanctify the Sabbath, that is, to treat it with respect; and are commanded to pray that God's name may be hallowed, that is, honoured, revered. It is in this meaning chiefly that the word seems, in a lower degree,

<sup>168</sup> Jer. i. 5.<sup>169</sup> Lev. xxii. 32.<sup>170</sup> Numb. xx. 12.

applied to angels, and, in the highest, to the Lord of heaven and earth.

There are some things which incline me to conclude, that this is more properly the import of the word, at least in the application to God, than, as is commonly supposed, moral excellence in general. Doubtless, both the moral, and what are called the natural, attributes of God, may be considered as, in some respect, included, being the foundations of that profound reverence with which he ought ever to be mentioned, and more especially addressed by mortals. But it is worthy of our notice, that when the term *holy* is applied to God, and accompanied with other attributives, they are such as infuse fear rather than love, and suggest ideas of vengeance rather than of grace. When Joshua found it necessary to alarm the fears of an inconsiderate nation, he told them, *Ye cannot serve the Lord, for he is a holy God, he is a jealous God ; he will not forgive your transgressions and sins*<sup>171</sup>. Again, this epithet *holy* is more frequently than any other applied to God's name. Now, if we consider what other epithets are thus applied in Scripture, we shall find that they are not those which express any natural or moral qualities abstractedly considered ; they are not the names of essential attributes, but such only as suggest the sentiments of awe and reverence with which he ought to be regarded by every reasonable creature. No mention is made of

<sup>171</sup> Joshua, xxiv. 19.

God's wise name, powerful name, or true name, good name, or merciful name, faithful name, or righteous name; yet all these qualities, wisdom, power, truth, goodness, mercy, faithfulness, and righteousness, are, in numberless instances, ascribed to God, as the eternal and immutable perfections of his nature: but there is mention of his fearful name, his glorious name, his great name, his reverend name, and his excellent name, sometimes even of his dreadful name, but oftenest of his holy name; for all these terms are comparative, and bear an immediate reference to the sentiments of the humble worshipper. Nay, as the epithet *holy* is often found in conjunction with some of the others above mentioned, which admit this application, they serve to explain it. Thus the Psalmist<sup>172</sup>, *Let them praise thy great and terrible name, for it is holy*. Again<sup>173</sup>, *Holy and reverend is his name*.

What was the display which Jehovah made to the Philistines, when his ark was in their possession, a display which extorted from them the acknowledgment that the God of Israel is a holy God, before whom they could not stand? It was solely of sovereignty and uncontrollable power in the destruction of their idol god Dagon, and great numbers of the people. This filled them with such terror at the bare sight of the ark, the symbol of God's presence, as was too much for them to bear. And indeed both the Greek

<sup>172</sup> Psal. xcix. 3.

<sup>173</sup> Psal. cxi. 9.

ἅγιος, and the Latin *sanctus*, admit the same meaning, and are often equivalent to *augustus*, *venerandus*. The former term *augustus*, Castalio has frequently, and not improperly, adopted in his version; when the Hebrew word *kadosh* is applied to God. The change of the epithet *sanctus* is not necessary; but if perspicuity be thought in a particular case to require it, I should prefer the latter term *venerandus*, as more expressive of religious awe. Further, when the term *holy* is ascribed by angels to God, we find it accompanied with such words or gestures as are expressive of the profoundest awe and veneration.

The description, action, and exclamation of the seraphim in Isaiah <sup>174</sup>, lead our thoughts more to the ideas of majesty and transcendent glory than to those of a moral nature. *I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lofty, and his train filled the temple : above it stood the seraphim : each one had six wings : with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried to another and said, Holy, holy, holy is Jehovah the God of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory. And the pillars of the porch were shaken by the voice of him that cried ; and the house was filled with smoke.* Every thing in this description is awful and majestic. That he is the Lord of hosts who dwelleth on high, in whose august presence even the seraphim must veil their faces, and that the whole earth is

<sup>174</sup> Isaiah, vi. 1, &c.

full of his glory, are introduced as the ground of ascribing to him thrice, in the most solemn manner, the epithet *holy*.

There is a passage pretty similar to this in the Apocalypse<sup>175</sup>. *The four beasts* (or, as the word ought to be rendered, *living creatures*,) *had each of them six wings about him, and they were full of eyes within ; and they rest not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God almighty, who was, and is, and is to come. And when those creatures give glory, and honour, and thanks, to him that sitteth on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever ; the four and twenty elders fall down before him that sitteth on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power ; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are, and they were created.* Here every circumstance points to the majesty, power, and dominion, not to the moral perfections of God ; the action and doxology of the elders make the best comment on the exclamation of the four living creatures, *Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, &c.*

It is universally admitted, that to hallow or sanctify the name of God, is to venerate, to *honour* it. According to analogy, therefore, to affirm that the name of God is holy, is to affirm that it is *honourable*, that it is *venerable*. Nay, in the same sense, we are said to sanctify

<sup>175</sup> Rev. iv. 8, &c.

God himself; that is, to make him the object of our veneration and awe. In this way, to sanctify God, is nearly the same as to fear him, differing chiefly in degree, and may be opposed to an undue fear of man. Thus it is employed by the Prophet<sup>176</sup>, *Say not, A confederacy to all them to whom this people shall say, a confederacy, neither fear ye their fear, nor be afraid. Sanctify the Lord of hosts himself, and let him be your fear, and let him be your dread.* But nothing can give a more apposite example of this use than the words of Moses to Aaron<sup>177</sup>, on occasion of the terrible fate of Aaron's two sons, Nadab and Abihu. *This is that the Lord spake, I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me; and before all the people I will be glorified.* Their transgression was, that *they offered before the Lord strange fire*, or what was, not the peculiar fire of the altar, lighted originally from heaven, but ordinary fire kindled from their own hearth, an action which, in the eye of that dispensation, must be deemed the grossest indignity. Spencer<sup>178</sup> has well expressed the sense of the passage in these words: "Deum sanctum esse, id est, a quavis persona vel eminentia, incomparabili naturæ suæ excellentia, separatum, ideoque postulare, ut sanctificetur, id est, auguste, decore, et ritu naturæ suæ separatæ, imaginem quandam ferente, colatur."

<sup>176</sup> Isaiah, viii. 12, 13.      <sup>177</sup> Lev. x. 1, &c.

<sup>178</sup> Lib. I. cap. vii.

§ 15. THE sixth and last sense mentioned, was *moral purity* and innocence, a sense which, by a very natural turn of thinking, arises out of the two first meanings assigned, namely, clean in the common import of the word, and clean in the eye of the ceremonial law. This meaning might, in respect of its connection with these, have been ranked in the third place. But, because I consider this as originally a metaphorical use of the word, and requiring a greater degree of refinement than the other meanings, I have reserved it for the last. This acceptation is accordingly much more frequent in the New Testament than in the Old. In the latter, it oftener occurs in the prophetical and devotional writings, than in the Pentateuch, and the other historical books, where we never find *holy* mentioned in the description of a good character. This, in my judgment, merits a more particular attention than seems to have been given it. In what is affirmed expressly in commendation of Noah, Abraham, or any of the Patriarchs, of Moses, Joshua, Job, David, Hezekiah, or any of the good kings of Israel or Judah, or any of the Prophets or ancient worthies, except where there is an allusion to a sacred office, the term *kadosh*, holy, is not once employed. Now there is hardly another general term, as *just*, *good*, *perfect*, *upright*, whereof, in such cases, we do not find examples. Yet there is no epithet which occurs oftener, on other occasions, than that whereof I am speaking. But, in the time of the Evangelists, this moral application of the

corresponding word *hagios* was become more familiar; though the other meanings were not obsolete, as they are almost all at present. Herod is said to have known that John the Baptist *was a just man and a holy*<sup>179</sup>. There is nothing like this in all the Old Testament. When David pleads that he is *holy*<sup>180</sup>, it is not the word *kadosh* that he uses. The many injunctions to holiness given in the law, as has been already hinted, have at least a much greater reference to ceremonial purity, than to moral. The only immorality, against which they sometimes seem immediately pointed, is *idolatry*, it being always considered, in the law, as the greatest degree of defilement in both senses, ceremonial and moral.

But, as every vicious action is a transgression of the law, holiness came gradually to be opposed to vice of every kind. The consideration of this, as a stain on the character, as what sullies the mind, and renders it similarly disagreeable to a virtuous man, as dirt renders the body to a cleanly man, has been common in most nations. Metaphors, drawn hence, are to be found, perhaps, in every language. As the ideas of a people become more spiritual and refined, and, which is a natural consequence, as ceremonies sink in their estimation, and virtue rises, the secondary and metaphorical use of such terms grows more habitual, and often, in the end, supplants the primitive and proper. This has happened to the term *holiness*, as now commonly understood by Chris-

<sup>179</sup> Mark, vi. 20.

<sup>180</sup> Psal. lxxxvi. 2.

tians, or rather to the original terms so rendered. It had, in a good measure, happened, but not entirely, in the language of the Jews, in the days of our Lord and his Apostles. The exhortations to holiness, in the New Testament, are evidently to be understood of moral purity, and of that only. On other occasions, the words *holy*, and *saints*, *ἅγιοι*, even in the New Testament, ought to be explained in conformity to the fourth meaning above assigned, devoted or consecrated to the service of God.

§ 16. HAVING illustrated these different senses, I shall consider an objection that may be offered against the interpretation here given of the word *holy*, when applied to God, as denoting *awful*, *venerable*. Is not, it may be said, the imitation of God, in holiness, enjoined as a duty? And does not this imply, that the thing itself must be the same in nature, how different soever in degree, when ascribed to God, and when enjoined on us? As I did not entirely exclude this sense, to wit, *moral purity*, from the term, when applied to the Deity, I readily admit that, in this injunction in the New Testament, there may be a particular reference to it. But it is not necessary, that, in such sentences, there be so perfect a coincidence of signification, as seems, in the objection, to be contended for. The words are, *Be ye holy, for (not as) I am holy*. In the passage where this precept first occurs, it is manifest, from the context, that the scope of the

charge given to the people, is to avoid ceremonial impurities; those particularly that may be contracted by eating unclean meats, and above all, by eating insects and reptiles, which are called an abomination. Now, certainly, in this inferior acceptation, the term is utterly inapplicable to God. But what entirely removes the difficulty, is, that the people are said, by a participation in such unclean food, to make themselves abominable. To this the precept, *Sanctify yourselves, and be ye holy*, stands in direct opposition. There is here, therefore, a coincidence of the second and fifth meanings of the word *holy*, which are connected, in their application to men, as the means and the end, and therefore ought both to be understood as comprehended; though the latter alone is applicable to God. Now, as the opposite of abominable is *estimable, venerable*, the import of the precept, *Sanctify yourselves*, manifestly is, ‘Be careful, by a strict attention to the statutes ye have received concerning purity, especially in what regards your food, to avoid the pollution of your body; maintain thus a proper respect for your persons, that your religious services may be esteemed by men, and accepted of God; for remember that the God whom ye serve, as being pure and perfect, is entitled to the highest esteem and veneration. Whatever, therefore, may be called *slovenly*, or what his law has pronounced impure in his servants, is an indignity offered by them to their master, which he will certainly resent.’

But as an artful gloss or paraphrase will sometimes mislead, I shall subjoin the plain words of Scripture <sup>181</sup>, which come in the conclusion of a long chapter, wherein the laws relating to cleanliness in animal food, in beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles, are laid down. *Whatsoever goeth upon the belly, and whatsoever goeth upon all four, or whatsoever hath more feet among all creeping things, that creep upon the earth; them ye shall not eat, for they are an abomination. Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth, neither shall ye make yourselves unclean with them, that ye should be defiled thereby. For I am the Lord your God; ye shall therefore sanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy; for I am holy: neither shall ye defile yourselves with any manner of creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. For I am the Lord that bringeth you up out of the land of Egypt, to be your God; ye shall therefore be holy, for I am holy.* It is plain that any other interpretation of the word *holy* than that now given, would render the whole passage incoherent.

§ 17. Now, to come to the word חַסִּיד *chasid*, ὁσῖος, this is a term which properly and originally expresses a mental quality, and that only, in the same manner as צַדִּיק *tsaddik*, δίκαιος *just*, אֲמוֹן *amon*, πιστός *faithful*, and several others. Nor is there any material variation of meaning that the word seems to have undergone at different pe-

<sup>181</sup> Lev. xi. 42, &c.

riods. The most common acceptation is, *humane, merciful, beneficent, benign*. When there appears to be a particular reference to the way wherein the person stands affected to God and religion, it means *pious, devout*. In conformity to this sense, our translators have, in several places in the Old Testament, rendered it *godly*. The phrase *οἱ ὅσιοι τοῦ Θεοῦ* is, therefore, not improperly rendered *the saints of God*, that is, his pious servants. It most probably, as was hinted before, means *pious* in what is said of our Lord, that he was *ὁσίος, ἀκακος, ἀμικτός*, as it seems to have been the intention of the sacred writer to comprehend, in few words, his whole moral character respecting God, the rest of mankind, and himself. In the enumeration which Paul gives to Titus <sup>182</sup>, of the virtues whereof a bishop ought to be possessed, it is surely improper to explain any of them by a general term equally adapted to them all; since nothing can be plainer than that his intention is to denote, by every epithet, some quality not expressed before. His words are *φιλοξενον, φιλαγαθον, σωφρονα, δικαιον, ὅσιον, εγκρατη*. To render *ὅσιον* *holy* (though that were in other places a proper version) would be here in effect the same as to omit it altogether. If the sense had been *pious*, it had probably been either the first or the last in the catalogue. As it stands, I think it ought to be rendered *humane*.

There are certain words which on some occasions, are used with greater, and on others, with

<sup>182</sup> Titus, i. 8.

less, latitude. Thus the word *δικαιος* sometimes comprehends the whole of our duty to God, our neighbour, and ourselves; sometimes it includes only the virtue of justice. When *οι δίκαιοι* is opposed to *οι πονηροί*, the former is the case, and it is better to render it *the righteous*, and *δικαιοσύνη* *righteousness*; but when *δικαιος* or *δικαιοσύνη* occur in a list with other virtues, it is better to render them *just* or *justice*. Sometimes the word is employed in a sense which has been called forensic, as being derived from judicial proceedings. *He that justifieth the wicked*, says Solomon<sup>183</sup>, *and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord*. The word *wicked*, means no more here than *guilty*, and the word *just*, *guiltless* of the crime charged. In like manner *οσιότης*, in one or two instances, may be found in the New Testament, in an extent of signification greater than usual. In such cases it may be rendered *sanctity*, a word rather more expressive of what concerns manners than *holiness* is.

§ 18. BUT, as a further evidence that the Hebrew word *חסיד* *chasid*, is not synonymous with *קדוש* *kadosh*, and consequently neither *οσιος* with *ἅγιος*, it must be observed, that the abstract *חסד* *chesed*, is not once rendered by the Seventy *οσιότης*, or, by our interpreters, *holiness*, though the concrete is almost always rendered *οσιος* in Greek, and often *holy* in English. This substantive, on the

<sup>183</sup> Prov. xvii. 15.

contrary, is translated in the Septuagint, *ελεος, ελεημοσυνη, οικτειρημα, ελπις, χαρις*, or some such term; once, indeed, and but once, *οσια*. In English it is translated *kindness, favour, grace, mercy, loving-kindness, pity*, but never *holiness*. The analogy of language, (unless use were clear against it, which is not the case here) would lead us to think, that there must be a nearer relation in meaning than this, between the substantive and the adjective formed from it. Yet *worthy* does not more evidently spring from *worth*, than *חסיד chasid*, springs from *חסד chesed*. Of the term last mentioned it may be proper just to observe, that there is also an anomalous use (like that remarked in *kadosh*,) which assigns it a meaning, the reverse of its usual signification, answering to *ανομια, ονειδος, flagitium, probrum*. But it is only in two or three places that the word occurs in this acceptation.

§ 19. I SHALL conclude with observing, that *chasid* or *hosios* is sometimes applied to God; in which case, there can be little doubt of its implying *merciful, bountiful, gracious, liberal, or benign*. The only case, wherein it has an affinity in meaning to the English words *saint* or *holy*, is when it expresses pious affections towards God. As these cannot be attributed to God himself, the term, when used of him, ought to be understood, according to its most frequent acceptation. The Psalmist's words, which, in the common version, are<sup>184</sup>, *The Lord is righteous in all*

<sup>184</sup> Psal. cxlv. 17.

*his ways, and holy, chasid, in all his works,* would have been more truly, as well as intelligibly and emphatically rendered, *The Lord is just in all his ways, and bountiful in all his works.* There is not equal reason for translating in the same manner the Greek *hosios*, when applied to God in the New Testament. Though *hosios*, in the Septuagint, commonly occupies the place of *chasid*, it does not always. It is sometimes employed in translating the Hebrew words תָּם *tham*, *perfect*, and יָשָׁר *jasher*, *upright*. Once it is used for this last term when applied to God<sup>185</sup>. Those words, therefore, ὅτι μόνος ὁσῖος<sup>186</sup>, in an address to God, ought to be translated, *for thou alone art perfect*, rather than *bountiful* or *gracious*. The addition of *μόνος* to the other epithet, is a sufficient ground for this preference. The context also favours it. But, in the more common acceptance of the term ὁσῖος *hosios*, there is this difference between it and ἅγιος *hagios*, as applied to God, that the latter appellation represents the Deity as awful, or rather terrible; the former as amiable. The latter checks all advances on our part. We are ready to cry with the men of Bethshemesh<sup>187</sup>, *Who is able to stand before this holy God?* The former emboldens us to approach. Thus they are so far from being synonymous in this application, that they may rather be contrasted with each other. As to their import, when applied to men, the word ἅγιος, in

<sup>185</sup> Deut. xxxii. 4.<sup>186</sup> Rev. xv. 4.<sup>187</sup> 1 Sam. vi. 20.

the best sense, still retains so much of its origin, as to appear rather a negative character, denoting a mind without stain ; whereas the term *ᾀσιος* is properly positive, and implies, in its utmost extent, both piety and benevolence.

§ 20. IN regard to the manner of translating *kadosh* in the Old Testament, and *hagios* in the New ; when all circumstances are considered, I think it safest to retain very generally the common version *holy*. The same remark holds nearly also of the conjugates. It is very true that the sense of the original, in many places, does not entirely suit the meaning which we affix to that word. But it is certain, on the other hand, that we have no one word that answers so well in all cases. To change the term with each variation in meaning, would be attended with great inconveniency, and, in many cases, oblige the translator to express himself either unintelligibly, and, to appearance, inconsequentially, or too much in the manner of the paraphrast. On the other hand, as the English term *holy* is somewhat indefinite in respect of meaning, and in a manner appropriated to religious subjects, nothing can serve better to ascertain and illustrate the scriptural use than such uniformity ; and the scriptural use of a word hardly current in common discourse, cannot fail to fix the general acceptance. But this would not hold of any words, in familiar use, on ordinary subjects. With regard to such, any deviation from the received meaning would, to common readers, prove the occasion of perplexity at least, if not

of error. But *chasid* in the Old Testament, and *hosios* in the New (except when used substantively, where it may be rendered *saint*,) ought, when it respects the disposition towards God, to be translated *pious* ; when it respects the disposition towards men, *gracious, kind, humane*.

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## PART V.

*Κηρυσσειν, ευαγγελιζειν, καταγγελλειν, AND διδασκειν.*

THE only other specimen I shall here give of words supposed to be synonymous, or nearly so, shall be *κηρυσσειν, ευαγγελιζειν, καταγγελλειν, and διδασκειν* all nearly related, the former three being almost always rendered in English *to preach*, and the last *to teach*. My intention is, not only to point out exactly the differences of meaning in these words, but to evince that the words whereby the two former are rendered in some, perhaps most, modern languages, do not entirely reach the meaning of the original terms ; and, in some measure, by consequence, mislead most readers. It happens, in a tract of ages, through the gradual alterations which take place in laws, manners,

rites, and customs, that words come, as it were, along with these, by imperceptible degrees, to vary considerably from their primitive signification. Perhaps it is oftener than we are aware, to be ascribed to this cause, that the terms employed by translators, are found so feebly to express the meaning of the original.

§ 2. THE first of the words above mentioned, *κηρυσσειν*, rendered *to preach*, is derived from *κηρυξ*, rendered *preacher*, whence also *κηρυγμα*, rendered *a preaching*. The primitive *κηρυξ* signifies properly both *herald* and *common crier*, and answers exactly to the Latin word *caduceator* in the first of these senses, and to *præco* in the second. The verb *κηρυσσειν* is accordingly *to cry, publish, or proclaim* authoritatively, or by commission from another, and the noun *κηρυγμα* is *the thing published or proclaimed*. The word *κηρυξ* occurs only twice in the Septuagint, and once in the apocryphal book Ecclesiasticus, and evidently means in them all *crier*. The other sense of the word, namely, *herald*, or messenger of important intelligence between princes and states, is nearly related, as the same persons had often the charge of carrying such embassies, and of proclaiming war or peace : but it is not quite the same. In the New Testament the word seems to partake of both senses, but more evidently of that of *crier*. And to this sense the derivatives *κηρυσσω* and *κηρυγμα*, more properly accord than to the other : for, to discharge the

office of herald is, in Greek, *κηρυκευειν*, and the office itself *κηρυκευσις*. But these words, though frequent in classical writers, are not found in Scripture. The word *κηρυξ* occurs but thrice in the New Testament, once in each of the Epistles to Timothy<sup>188</sup>, wherein Paul calls himself *κηρυξ και αποστολος*; and once it is used by the Apostle Peter, who, speaking of Noah, calls him<sup>189</sup> *κηρυξ δικαιοσυνης*. The word *κηρυγμα* occurs but in three places in the Septuagint, and imports in them all *proclamation* or *thing proclaimed*. In one of those places it relates to that made by the Prophet Jonah, through the streets of Nineveh, called, as in the Gospel, *preaching*<sup>190</sup>, and in another<sup>191</sup>, is, in the common version, rendered *proclamation*. In the New Testament it occurs eight times, and is always rendered *preaching*. In two of those places it relates to Jonah's proclamation in Nineveh. The verb *κηρυσσω* occurs in the New Testament about five and twenty times, always in nearly the same sense: *I proclaim, prædico, palam annuncio*. In at least twelve of these cases it relates solely to proclamations made by human authority, and denotes in them all *to warn*, or, by crying out, to advertise people openly of any thing done or to be done, or danger to be avoided. This may be called the primitive sense of the word, and in this sense it will be found to be oftenest employed in the New Testament.

<sup>188</sup> 1 Tim. ii. 7. 2 Tim. i. 11. <sup>189</sup> 2 Pet. ii. 5.

<sup>190</sup> Jonah, iii. 2.

<sup>191</sup> 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22.

§ 3. Now if it be asked, whether this suits the import of the English word, *to preach*, by which it is almost always rendered in the common version of this part of the canon, I answer that, in my judgment, it does not entirely suit it. *To preach*, is defined, by Johnson, in his Dictionary, “to pronounce a public discourse upon sacred subjects.” This expresses, with sufficient exactness, the idea we commonly affix to the term. For, we may admit, that the attendant circumstances of church, pulpit, text, worship, are but appendages. But the definition, given by the English lexicographer, cannot be called an interpretation of the term *κηρυσσω*, as used in Scripture. For, so far is it from being necessary that the *κηρυγμα* should be a discourse, that it may be only a single sentence, and a very short sentence too. Nay, to such brief notifications we shall find the term most frequently applied. Besides the word *κηρυσσω*, and *κηρυγμα*, were adopted, with equal propriety, whether the subject were sacred or civil. Again, though the verb *κηρυσσω* always implied public notice of some event, either accomplished, or about to be accomplished, often accompanied with a warning, to do or forbear something; it never denoted either a comment on, or explanation of, any doctrine, critical observations on, or illustrations of, any subject, or a chain of reasoning, in proof of a particular sentiment. And, if so, to pronounce publicly such a discourse as, with us, is denominated sermon, homily, lecture, or preaching, would,

by no means, come within the meaning of the word *κηρυσσω*, in its first and common acceptation. It is, therefore, not so nearly synonymous with *διδασκω*, *I teach*, as is now commonly imagined.

§ 4. BUT, that we may be more fully satisfied of this, it will be necessary to examine more closely the application of the word in the Gospels, and in the Acts. The first time it occurs, is in the account that is given of our Lord's harbinger<sup>192</sup>. *In those days came John the Baptist, κηρυσσων εν τη ερημω της Ιουδαιας, και λεγων, making proclamation in the wilderness of Judea, and saying.* Now, what was it that he cried, or proclaimed in the wilderness? It immediately follows, *Μετανοειτε ηγγικε γαρ η βασιλεια των ουρανων. Reform ; for the reign of heaven approacheth.* This is, literally, his *κηρυγμα*, proclamation, or preaching, stript of the allegorical language in which it is clothed by the Prophet<sup>193</sup>, as quoted in the next verse, to this effect : *For this is he to whom Isaiah alludeth in these words, The cry of a crier in the desert, " Prepare a way for the Lord, make his road " straight."* Hence we may learn, what the Evangelists call *βαπτισμα μετανοιας*, which John preached for the remission of sins. He proclaimed to all within hearing, that if they would obtain the pardon of former offences, they must now enter on a new life ; for that the reign of the Messiah was just about to commence ; and, as a pledge of their

<sup>192</sup> Matth. iii. 1, 2.

<sup>193</sup> Isa. xl. 3.

intended reformation, and an engagement to it, he called on all to come and be baptized by him, confessing their sins.

Another public intimation, which John made to the people, and to which the word *κηρυσσω* is also applied, we have in Mark <sup>194</sup>: *He proclaimed, saying, "After me cometh one mightier than I, whose shoe latchet I am not worthy to stoop down and untie. I indeed baptize you in water, but he will baptize you in the holy Spirit."* Such short calls, warnings, notices, or advertisements, given with a loud voice to the multitude, from whomsoever, and on what subject soever, come under the notion of *κηρυγματα*, as used in Scripture. To the particular moral instructions which John gave the people severally, according to their different professions, the word *κηρυσσειν* is not applied, but *παρακαλειν*, to admonish, to exhort <sup>195</sup>. *Πολλα μιν ουν και ετερα παρακαλων ευηγγελιζετο τον λαον*. Which is very improperly translated, *And many other things in his exhortation preached he unto the people*. *Πολλα* is manifestly construed with *παρακαλων*, not with *ευηγγελιζετο*, whose only regimen is *τον λαον*. The meaning is therefore: *Accompanied with many other exhortations, he published the good news to the people*.

§ 5. LET us next consider in what manner the term *κηρυσσω* is applied to our Saviour. The first time we find it used of him <sup>196</sup>, the very same

<sup>194</sup> 1. 7, 8.

<sup>195</sup> Luke, iii. 18.

<sup>196</sup> Matth. iv. 17.

*proclamation* or preaching is ascribed to him, which had been ascribed to John the Baptist. *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth.* With giving this public notice he also began his ministry. Again, we are told<sup>197</sup>, that *he went over all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and κηρυσσων το εναγγελιον της βασιλειας, proclaiming the good news of the reign.* There can be no doubt that the same proclamation is here meant, which is quoted above from the same chapter. Nor is this the only place wherein this expression is used of our Lord<sup>198</sup>. Again, it is applied to Jesus Christ by the Prophet Isaiah<sup>199</sup>, as quoted in the Gospel<sup>200</sup>, as to which I shall only observe at present (having made some remarks on the passage in the preceding Dissertation<sup>201</sup>,) that the word κηρυσσω, which twice occurs in it, is used solely in relation to those things which were wont to be notified by proclamation. In the last clause, *to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord*, there is a manifest allusion to the jubilee, which was always proclaimed by sound of trumpet, and accompanied with a proclamation of liberty to all the bondmen and bondwomen among them. It was by proclamation, also, that Cyrus gave freedom to the captives of Judah, to return to their native land. I need only add, that the word κηρυσσω is sometimes applied to our Lord indefinitely, where we are not told what he *proclaimed* or *preached*. In such cases, the rules of inter-

<sup>197</sup> Matth. iv. 23.<sup>198</sup> Matth. ix. 35. Mark, i. 14.<sup>199</sup> lxi. 1, &c.<sup>200</sup> Luke, iv. 18, 19.<sup>201</sup> P. II. § 2.

pretation invariably require, that the expressions which are indefinite and defective, be explained by those which are definite and full; and that, by consequence, they be understood to signify, that he gave public warning of the Messiah's approaching reign.

§ 6. LASTLY, as to the application of the term to the Apostles: its first appearance is in the instructions which their Lord gave them, along with their first mission to the cities and villages of Israel. *As ye go*, says he<sup>202</sup>, *κηρυσσετε λεγοντες, proclaim, saying, ηγγικε η βασιλεια των ουρανων, the reign of heaven approacheth.* Here we have the very words of their preaching, or proclamation, expressly given them. To the same purpose, another Evangelist tells us<sup>203</sup>, *Απεστειλεν αυτους κηρυσσειν την βασιλειαν του Θεου*, which is literally, *He commissioned them to proclaim the reign of God.* The same is doubtless to be understood by Mark, who acquaints us<sup>204</sup>, *Εξελθοντες εκηρυσσον ινα μετανοησωσι*; which is saying, in effect, that wherever they went they made the same proclamation, which had been made by their Master, and his precursor, before them. *Reform, for the reign of heaven approacheth.* Now, it deserves our notice, that we nowhere find such an order as *διδασκετε λεγοντες, teach saying*, where the express words of their teaching are prescribed. It was necessary that this should differ in

<sup>202</sup> Matth. x. 7.<sup>203</sup> Luke, ix. 2.<sup>204</sup> vi. 12.

manner, according to the occasion, and be suited to the capacities and circumstances of the persons to be taught, and therefore, that it should be left to the discretion of the teacher. No variation was necessary, or even proper, in the other, which was no more than the public notification of a fact, with a warning to prepare themselves.

In the charge which our Lord gave to his Apostles, after his resurrection, he says <sup>205</sup>, *Go throughout all the world, κηρυξανε το ευαγγελιον, proclaim the good news to the whole creation.* And as the call to reformation was enforced by the promise of remission in the name of Christ, these are also said <sup>206</sup> *κηρυχθηναι εις παντα τα εθνη, to have been proclaimed to all nations.* Indemnity for past sins is the foundation of the call to reform, with which the proclamation of the reign of God was always accompanied. It is proper to remark, that the form, *ηγγικε γαρ*, used first by the Baptist, then by our Lord himself, and lastly, by his disciples in his lifetime, is never repeated after his resurrection. And we have reason to believe, from the material alteration in circumstances which then took place, that they have then said, not as formerly, *ηγγικε* but *ηλθε γαρ η βασιλεια των ουρανων.* *The reign of heaven, that is, of the Messiah, is come.*

§ 7. FURTHER, I must take notice, that though announcing publicly the reign of the Messiah,

<sup>205</sup> Mark, xvi. 15.

<sup>206</sup> Luke, xxiv. 47.

comes always under the denomination, *κηρύσσειν*, no moral instructions, or doctrinal explanations, given either by our Lord, or by his Apostles, are ever, either in the Gospels, or in the Acts, so denominated. Thus, that most instructive discourse of our Lord, the longest that is recorded in the Gospel, commonly named his sermon on the mount, is called teaching by the Evangelists, both in introducing it, and after the conclusion<sup>207</sup>.

*Opening his mouth, ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς, he taught them, saying :* and, *when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished, ἐπὶ τῇ διδασκῇ αὐτοῦ, at his doctrine, his manner of teaching.* It is added, *ὅτι γὰρ διδάσκει αὐτοὺς ; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes.* He is said to have been employed in teaching<sup>208</sup>, when the wisdom, which shone forth in his discourses, excited the astonishment of all who heard him. In like manner, the instructions he gave by parables, are called teaching the people, not preaching to them<sup>209</sup> ; and those given in private to his Apostles, are in the same way styled<sup>210</sup> teaching, never preaching. And if teaching and preaching be found sometimes coupled together, the reason appears to be, because their teaching, in the beginning of this new dispensation, must have been frequently introduced by announcing the Messiah, which alone was preaching. The explanations, admonitions, arguments, and motives, that followed, came under the

<sup>207</sup> Matth. v. 2. vii. 28, 29.

<sup>208</sup> Matth. xiii. 54. Mark, vi. 2. Luke, iv. 15. 22.

<sup>209</sup> Mark, iv. 1, 2.

<sup>210</sup> Mark, viii. 31.

denomination of teaching. Nor does any thing else, spoken by our Lord and his disciples, in his lifetime, appear to have been called preaching, but this single sentence, *Μετανοειτε· ηγγικε γαρ ἡ βασιλεια των ουρανων*. In the Acts of the Apostles, the difference of meaning in the two words is carefully observed. The former is always a general and open declaration of the Messiah's reign, called emphatically, the good news, or gospel; or, which amounts to the same, the announcing of the great foundation of our hope, the Messiah's resurrection: the latter comprehends every kind of instruction, public or private, that is necessary for illustrating the nature and laws of this kingdom, for confuting gainsayers, persuading the hearers, for confirming and comforting believers. The proper subject of each is fitly expressed in the conclusion of this book<sup>211</sup>; where, speaking of Paul, then confined at Rome, in a hired house, the author tells us, that he received all who came to him, *κηρυσσων την βασιλειαν του Θεου, και διδασκων τα περι του Κυριου Ιησου Χριστου*. Announcing to them the reign of God, and instructing them in every thing that related to the Lord Jesus Christ.

§ 8. LET it also be observed that, in all the quotations in the Gospels, from the ancient Prophets, neither the word *κηρυσσω*, nor any of its conjugates, is applied to any of them beside Jonah. What is quoted from the rest, is said to

<sup>211</sup> Acts, xxviii. 31.

have been spoken, or foretold, or prophesied, but never *preached*. Jonah's prophecy to the Ninivites, on the contrary, is but twice quoted; and it is in both places called *κηρυγμα*, rendered *preaching*, properly *cry*, or *proclamation*. The same name it has, in the book itself, in the Septuagint, and with great propriety, according to the explanation above given of the word, for it was a real proclamation which God required him to make through the streets of Niniveh. Thus he is charged<sup>212</sup>, *Go to Niniveh, that great city, and preach to it the preaching that I bid thee*. The very words are prescribed. It may be observed here, by the way, that both in the Hebrew, and in the Greek, it is the same word which is here rendered *preach*, and in verse fifth, *proclaim*, when used in reference to a fast appointed by the king of Niniveh, for averting the divine anger, and notified to the people by *proclamation*. In obedience to the command of God, Jonah began to enter into the city, a day's journey, and to cry, as he had been bidden. Now, what was the *preaching* which God put into his mouth? It was neither more nor less than this, *Yet forty days, and Niniveh shall be overthrown*. This warning the Prophet, at proper distances, repeated as he advanced.

In one passage of the Apocalypse<sup>213</sup>, the word occurs so manifestly in the same sense, that it is one of the two places (for there are no more) in the New Testament, wherein our translators have

<sup>212</sup> Jonah, iii. 2.<sup>213</sup> Rev. v. 2.

rendered it *proclaim* : *I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice, Who is worthy to open the book, and to loose the seals thereof?* That is, whosoever is worthy to open the book and to loose its seals, may come and do it. This is the whole of the angel's *κηρυγμα*, preaching or proclamation. In the Acts and Epistles, we find the verb *κηρυσσω* followed by *τον Χριστον, τον Ιησουν*, or something equivalent. This is entirely proper. To proclaim the advent of the Messiah, and that Jesus is the person, was the first step of their important charge, and necessarily preceded their teaching and explaining his doctrine, or inculcating his precepts.

§ 9. So much for the primitive and most common meaning of the word *κηρυσσω* in the New Testament. But, as few words in any language remain perfectly univocal, I own there are some instances in which the term is employed in this part of Scripture with greater latitude. The first and most natural extension of the word is when it is used by hyperbole for publishing any how, divulging, making a thing to be universally talked of. The first instance of this is where we are told of the leper that was cleansed by our Lord, and charged not to divulge the manner of his cure. *But he went out*, says the historian<sup>214</sup>, *and began to publish it much*, *κηρυσσειν πολλα*. So our translators, very properly, render the word. In some other places we find it in the same sense,

<sup>214</sup> Mark, i. 45.

and in the same way rendered<sup>215</sup>. All the instances are similar, in that they relate to miraculous cures performed by our Lord, which some of those who received, notwithstanding the prohibition given them, were every where assiduous to divulge. Not that they did literally proclaim them, by crying aloud in the public places, but that they made the matter as well known, as though this method had been taken. Such hyperbolical idioms are to be found in all languages. How common is it to say of profligates, that they proclaim their infamy to all the world? because their lives make it as notorious, as it could be made by proclamation. It is in the same sense of publishing, and by the same figure, that proclaiming from the house-tops<sup>216</sup> is opposed to whispering in the ear. Nor is it certain, that the words *κηρυσσω* and *κηρυγμα* have any other meaning than those above specified in the Gospels and Acts.

§ 10. THE only remaining sense of the words which I find in the New Testament, and which answers to the import of the English words, *preach* and *preaching*, seems to be peculiar to the writings of Paul. *Thou*, says he<sup>217</sup>, *who teachest another, teachest thou not thyself?* *Thou that preachest, 'ο κηρυσσων, a man should not steal, dost thou steal?* The two clauses illustrate each other, and show that *κηρυσσω* in the latter has nearly the

<sup>215</sup> Matth. x. 27. Luke, xii. 3.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Rom. ii. 21.

same import with *διδασκω* in the former. For, though we may speak properly of proclaiming laws, and *thou shalt not steal*, is doubtless of the number ; it is only of laws newly enacted, or at least not before promulgated, that we use that expression. The law here spoken of was sufficiently known and acknowledged every where ; but, though there was no occasion for proclaiming it, it might be very necessary to inculcate and explain it. Now this is properly expressed by the word *preach*. There are some other places in his epistles, wherein it cannot be doubted, that the word is used in this large acceptation for teaching publicly. Thus we ought to understand his admonition to Timothy<sup>218</sup>, *κηρυξον τον λογον, preach the word*. *Κηρυγμα* is also used by him, with the same latitude, for all public teaching, as when he says<sup>219</sup>, *It pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, δια της μωριας του κηρυγματος, to save them that believe*. Again<sup>220</sup>, *My speech and my preaching, το κηρυγμα μου, was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in the demonstration of the spirit and of power ;* there can be no question but the term is used for teaching in general, since *κηρυγμα*, in the confined sense it bears in the Gospels, could hardly admit variety or choice in the expression, nor consequently ought of the enticing words of man's wisdom. There is, besides, one place, where the Apostle Peter uses the word *κηρυσσειν*<sup>221</sup>, in speaking of

<sup>218</sup> 2 Tim. iv. 2.<sup>219</sup> 1 Cor. i. 21.<sup>220</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 4.<sup>221</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 19.

our Lord's preaching to the spirits in prison: but the passage is so obscure, that no argument can safely be founded on it.

§ 11. NOTHING, however, can be clearer to the attentive and critical reader of the original, than that the aforesaid words are not used with the same latitude in the historical books. In the Acts, in particular, several discourses are recorded, those especially of Peter and Paul, but to none of them are the terms *κηρυσσω* and *κηρυγμα* ever applied. I think it the more necessary to make this remark, because the English word *preach* is in the common version frequently applied to them. Now this tends to confound the distinction so well preserved in the history, and to render all our ideas on this head extremely indeterminate. Some will, perhaps, be surprised to be informed that there are, in the Acts alone, no fewer than six Greek words (not synonymous neither) which are (some of them oftener, some of them seldomer) translated by the verb *preach*. The words are *κηρυσσω*, *ευαγγελιζομαι*, *καταγγελλω*, *λαλεω*, *διαλεγομαι*, and *παρησιαζομαι*, which last is rendered *I preach boldly*. I admit that it is impossible, in translating out of one language into another, to find a distinction of words in one exactly correspondent to what obtains in the other, and so to preserve uniformity, in rendering every different word by a different word, and the same word by the same word. This is what neither propriety nor perspicuity will admit. The rule, however, to translate uniformly, when it

can be done, in a consistency both with propriety and perspicuity, is a good rule, and one of the simplest and surest methods I know, of making us enter into the conceptions of the sacred writers, and adopt their very turn of thinking.

§ 12. I SHALL here take notice only of two passages in the common translation, which, to a reader unacquainted with the original, may appear to contradict my remark in regard to the distinction so carefully observed by the historian. *When the Jews*, says he<sup>222</sup>, *were gone out of the synagogue, the Gentiles besought, that these words might be preached to them*, λαληθηναι αυτοις τα ρηματα ταυτα, *the next Sabbath*; literally and simply, *that these words might be spoken to them*. The words here meant, are those contained in the twenty-six preceding verses. Our translators, I suppose, have been the more inclinable to call it preaching, because spoken in a synagogue by permission of the rulers. In another place<sup>223</sup>, *when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them*, διελεγετο αυτοις. Soon after<sup>224</sup>, *as Paul was long preaching*, διαλεγομενου επι πλειον. Διαλεγομαι is properly *dissero*, *disputo*. It occurs frequently in the Acts, but, except in this passage, is always rendered *to reason*, or *to dispute*. I own that neither of these words suits the context here, as it appears that all present were disciples. The word, however, implies not only *to dispute*, but *to discourse* on any

<sup>222</sup> Acts, xiii. 42.<sup>223</sup> Acts, xx. 7.<sup>224</sup> 9.

subject. But what I take the freedom to censure in our translators, is not their rendering *διαλεγομαι* in this place *preach*, which, considered by itself, might be justified; but it is their confounding it with so many words not synonymous, particularly with *κηρυσσω*, whose meaning, in this book, as well as in the Gospels, is totally different.

§ 13. Now, in regard to the manner wherein this word has been translated, with which I shall finish what relates peculiarly to it, we may observe, that *prædicare*, used in the Vulgate, and in all the Latin versions, corresponds entirely to the Greek word in its primitive meaning, and signifies to give public notice by proclamation. In this sense it had been used by the Latin classics, long before the translation of the Bible into their tongue. But *prædicare*, having been employed uniformly in rendering *κηρυσσειν*, not only in the history, but in the Epistles, has derived, from the latter use, a signification different, and much more limited than it has in profane authors. Now this additional, or acquired signification, is that which has principally obtained amongst ecclesiastics; and hence has arisen the sole meaning in modern languages ascribed to the word, whereby they commonly render the Greek *κηρυσσω*. The Latin word is manifestly that from which the Italian *predicare*, the French *precher*, and the English *to preach*, are derived. Yet these three words correspond to the Latin, only in the last mentioned

and ecclesiastical sense, not in the primitive and classical, which is also the scriptural sense in the Gospels and Acts. Thus the learned Academicians della Crusca, in their Vocabulary, interpret the Italian *predicare*, not by the Latin *prædicare*, its etymon, but by *concionari*, *concionem habere*; terms certainly much nearer than the other to the import of the word used in the other two languages mentioned, though by no means adapted to express the sense of *κηρυσσειν* in the historical books. \* This is another evidence of what was observed in a former Dissertation<sup>225</sup>, that a mistake, occasioned by supposing the word in the original, exactly correspondent to the term in the common version, by which it is usually rendered, is often confirmed, instead of being corrected by recurring to translations into other modern tongues, inasmuch as from the same, or similar causes, the like deviation from the original import, has been produced in these languages, as in our own.

§ 14. I SHOULD now examine critically the import of the word *εὐαγγελιζω*, often rendered in the same way with *κηρυσσω*. But what might have been offered on this subject, I have in a great measure anticipated, in the explanation I gave of the name *εὐαγγελιον*. It would have been impossible to consider the noun and the verb separately, without either repeating the same observations

<sup>225</sup> Diss. II. P. III. § 6.

and criticisms on each, or, by dividing things so closely connected, injuring the illustration of both. I shall therefore here, after referring the reader to that Dissertation <sup>226</sup>, which is pretty full, point out, in the briefest manner, the chief distinctions in meaning, that may be remarked between this word, and *κηρυσσω*, already explained.

The former always refers to a message or news in itself good and agreeable, the latter does not require this quality in the subject. What would come under the denomination of *κακαγγελια* *bad news*, may be the subject of *κηρυγμα*, *proclamation*, as well as good news. We say, with equal propriety, *κηρυσσειν πολεμον* as *κηρυσσειν ειρηνην*, to proclaim war, as to proclaim peace. Nay, Jonah's cry through the streets of Niniveh, *Yet forty days and Niniveh shall be overthrown*, is denominated *κηρυγμα* both in the Old Testament and in the New. But this is no where, nor indeed could be, styled *ευαγγελιον* *glad tidings*.

A second difference is, the word *κηρυσσω* implies that the notification is made openly to many, whereas the word *ευαγγελιζομαι* may not improperly be used, in whatever way the thing be notified, publicly or privately, aloud or in a whisper, to one or to many. Thus, in regard to the important and agreeable message delivered by Gabriel to Zacharias the father of John the Baptist, when the latter was alone in the sanctuary offering

<sup>226</sup> Diss. V. Part II.

incense; the archangel says <sup>227</sup>, *I am sent, ευαγγελισασθαι σοι ταυτα, to show thee these glad tidings.* And it is said of Philip, when in the chariot with only the Ethiopian eunuch <sup>228</sup>, *ευηγγελισατο αυτω τον Ιησουν. He preached to him Jesus.* The term *preached*, by which our translators have rendered the word, does not in this place reach the meaning of the Greek word, nor does it answer to the ordinary acceptation of the English. It does not reach the meaning of the Greek, as the quality of the subject, its being good news, is not suggested. Nor is the English word proper here; for this teaching was neither public, nor have we reason to believe it was a continued discourse. It is much more probable, that it was in the familiar way of dialogue, in which he had begun, that Philip continued to instruct this stranger in the doctrine of Christ.

Another distinction seems to arise from the original import of the words, though I will not say that it is uniformly observed. It is, that the word *ευαγγελιζη* relates to the first information that is given to a person or people, that is, when the subject may be properly called *news*. Thus, in the Acts, it is frequently used for expressing the first publication of the Gospel in a city or village, or amongst a particular people. In regard to the word *κηρυσσω*, there is no impropriety in speaking of the same thing as repeatedly proclaimed among the same people. Thus the approach of the reign of God

<sup>227</sup> Luke, i. 19.

<sup>228</sup> Acts, viii. 35.

was, in fact, proclaimed to the Jews in our Saviour's lifetime, first by the Baptist, then by our Lord himself, afterwards by the Apostles, and lastly by the seventy disciples. I shall only add, that the word *εὐαγγελίζομαι* is sometimes, though not often, used more indefinitely for teaching and preaching in general<sup>229</sup>. In one place<sup>230</sup>, it is rendered by our translators *declared*. But in the Gospels, it always preserves the primitive signification. When, therefore, we find it there coupled with the verb *διδασκω*, we are not to understand the terms as synonymous, but as intended to acquaint us that the teaching mentioned was accompanied, or perhaps introduced, with an intimation of the approaching reign of the Messiah.

The most obvious things are sometimes the most apt to be overlooked by ingenious men. We should otherwise think it unaccountable that men, eminent for their attainments in sacred literature, should be so far misled by the ordinary meaning of a phrase in the translation, as entirely to forget the proper import of the original expression. I am led to this reflection by observing, in a late publication<sup>231</sup>, the following remark on Luke xx. 1. “*Διδασκοντος αυτου—και ευαγγελιζομενον*. Why this specification of *preaching the gospel*? Did he not always *preach the gospel* when *he taught the people*? Hence I conclude, that *και ευαγγελιζομενον* should be thrown out as a marginal reading, founded perhaps on

<sup>229</sup> Acts, xiv. 15. Gal. i. 23.

<sup>230</sup> Rev. x. 7.

<sup>231</sup> Bowyer's Conjectures.

“Matth. iv. 23. or ix. 35.” Doubtless, according to the import of the English phrase, he always preached the Gospel when he taught, inasmuch as his teaching consisted either in explaining the doctrine, or enforcing the precepts of the Christian religion, which is all that we mean by *preaching the gospel*. But his teaching, though it was sometimes, was not always, (as is manifest from his whole history,) attended with the intimation above mentioned, which, in that history, is the only thing implied in *ευαγγελιζομενου*. A close version of the words removes every difficulty. *One day, as he was teaching the people in the temple, and publishing the good tidings.* In my judgment, this last circumstance was the more worthy of being specified here by the Evangelist, as it has probably been that which then incensed the chief priests, and prompted them to demand of him in so peremptory a manner to show his warrant for what he did. To say that the reign of the Messiah was about to commence, would be accounted by them very presumptuous, and might be construed into an insinuation, that he himself was the Messiah, a position which we find them soon after pronouncing blasphemy: and in any case they would consider the declaration (which was well known not to originate from them) as an attempt to undermine their authority with the people.

Hence I also will take the liberty to conclude, that the common way of rendering the Greek verb, by the aid of consecrated words, not only into English, but into Latin, and most modern

languages, has produced an association in the minds of men strong enough to mislead critical, as well as ordinary readers ; else men of letters, like Dr. Owen and Mr. Bowyer, had never fancied that there is here either a tautology, or so much as a redundancy of words. I further conclude, that if we were to proceed in the way proposed by the former of these critics, and to expunge whatever in Scripture we dislike, or imagine might be spared, it is impossible to say what would be left at last of the divine oracles. The remarker, if he would act consistently, ought also to throw out as a marginal reading *κηρυσσων το ευαγγελιον*, which is coupled with *διδασκων* in the two places of Matthew referred to. We may not be able to discover the meaning or the use of a particular expression ; for who can discover every thing ? but let us not be vain enough to think, that what we do not discover, no other person ever will <sup>232</sup>.

§ 15. THE only other word in the New Testament that can be said to be nearly synonymous with either of the preceding, is *καταγγελλω αν-  
nuncio*, I announce, publish, or promulgate. It is an intermediate term between *κηρυσσω* and *ευαγγελιζομαι*. In regard to the manner, it implies more of public notice than is necessarily implied in *ευαγγελιζομαι*, but less than is denoted by *κηρυσσω*. In regard to the subject, though commonly used in a good sense, it does not express

quite so much as *εὐαγγελίζομαι*, but it expresses more than *κηρύσσω*, which generally refers to some one remarkable fact or event, that may be told in a sentence or two. Accordingly both these words, *καταγγέλλω* and *εὐαγγελίζομαι* come nearer to a coincidence in signification with *διδάσκω* than *κηρύσσω* does.

§ 16. THE word *εὐαγγελιστής*, rendered *evangelist*, occurs only thrice in the New Testament. First in the Acts<sup>233</sup>, where Philip, one of the seven deacons is called an evangelist; secondly, in the Epistle to the Ephesians<sup>234</sup>, where *evangelists* are mentioned after apostles and prophets, as one of the offices which our Lord, after his ascension, had appointed for the conversion of infidels, and the establishment of order in his church; and, lastly, in the injunction which Paul gives Timothy to do the work of an evangelist<sup>235</sup>. This word has also obtained another signification which, though not scriptural, is very ancient. As *εὐαγγέλιον* sometimes denotes any of the four narratives of our Lord's life and suffering, which make a part of the canon, so *evangelist* means the composer. Hence Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, are called evangelists.

§ 17. As to the word *διδάσκειν*, it may suffice to observe, that it can hardly ever be wrong translated into Latin by the verb *docere*, or into English by the verb *to teach*; and that it was

<sup>233</sup> Acts, xxi. 8.<sup>234</sup> Eph. iv. 11.<sup>235</sup> 2 Tim. iv. 5.

mentioned in the title, not on account of any difficulty occasioned by it, but solely for the sake of suggesting my purpose to show that, far from being coincident, it has not even so great an affinity in signification to the other words there mentioned, as is commonly supposed. But, as the supposed coincidence or affinity always arises from mistaking the exact import of the other words, and not from any error in regard to this, a particular explanation of this term is not necessary.

## Dissertation the Seventh.

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INQUIRY INTO THE IMPORT OF CERTAIN TITLES OF HONOUR  
OCCURRING IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I INTEND, in this Dissertation, to offer a few remarks on those titles of honour which most frequently occur in the New Testament, that we may judge more accurately of their import, by attending, not only to their peculiarities in signification, but also to the difference in the ancient Jewish manner of applying them, from that which obtains among the modern Europeans, in the use of words thought to be equivalent.

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### PART I.

*Kyrios.*

Nothing can be more evident, than that, originally, titles were every where the names, either of offices, or of relations, natural or conventional, in-somuch that it could not be said of any of them,

as may be said, with justice, of several of our titles at present, those especially called titles of quality, that they mark neither office nor relation, property nor jurisdiction, but merely certain degrees of hereditary honour, and rights of precedence. Relation implies opposite relation in the object. Now, when those persons, for whose behoof a particular office was exercised, and who were consequently in the opposite relation, were very numerous, as a whole nation, province, or kingdom, the language commonly had no correlate to the title expressing the office; that is, it had not a term appropriated to denote the people who stood in the opposite relation. But when there was only a small number, there was a special term for denoting the relative connection in which these also stood. Thus the terms, *king*, *judge*, *prophet*, *pontiff*, hardly admitted any correlative term, but the general one of *people*. But this does not hold invariably. With us the correlate to *king* is *subject*. In like manner, offices which are exercised, not statedly, in behalf of certain individuals, but variously and occasionally, in behalf sometimes of one, sometimes of another, do not often require titles correlative. Of this kind are the names of most handicrafts, and several other professions. Yet, with us the *physician* has his *patients*, the *lawyer* his *clients*, and the *tradesman* his *customers*. In most other cases of relation, whether arising from nature, or from convention, we find title tallying with title exactly. Thus, *father* has *son*, *husband* has *wife*, *uncle* has

*nephew, teacher has disciple or scholar, master has servant.*

§ 2. I ADMIT, however, that in the most simple times, and the most ancient usages with which we are acquainted, things did not remain so entirely on the original footing, as that none should be called *father*, but by his *son* or his *daughter*; none should be saluted *master*, but by his *servant*; or styled *teacher*, but by his *scholar*. There is a progression in every thing relating to language, as, indeed, in all human sciences and arts. Necessity, first, and ornament, afterwards, lead to the extension of words beyond their primitive signification. All languages are scanty in the beginning, not having been fabricated beforehand, to suit the occasions which might arise. Now, when a person, in speaking, is sensible of the want of a proper sign for expressing his thought, he, much more naturally, recurs to a word which is the known name of something that has an affinity to what he means, than to a sound which, being entirely new to the hearers, cannot, by any law of association in our ideas, suggest his meaning to them. Whereas, by availing himself of the name of something related, by resemblance, or otherwise, to the sentiment he wants to convey, he touches some principle, in the minds of those whom he addresses, which (if they be persons of any sagacity) will quickly lead them to the discovery of his meaning. Thus, for expressing the reverence which I feel for a respectable character,

in one who is also my senior, I shall naturally be led to style him *father*, though I be not literally his *son* ; to express my submission to a man of greater merit and dignity, I shall call him *master*, though I be not his *servant* ; and to express my respect for one of more extensive knowledge and erudition, I shall denominate him *teacher*, though I be not his *disciple*. Indeed, these consequences arise so directly from those essential principles of the imagination, uniformly to be found in human nature, that deviations, in some degree similar, from the earliest meanings of words, are to be found in all tongues, ancient and modern. This is the first step from pure simplicity.

§ 3. YET, that the differences in laws, sentiments, and manners, which obtain in different nations, will occasion in this, as well as in other things, considerable variety, is not to be denied. In Asia, a common sign of respect to superiors was prostration. In Europe, that ceremony was held in abhorrence. What I have remarked above, suits entirely the progress of civilization in the Asiatic regions. The high-spirited republicans of Greece and Rome, appear, on the contrary, long to have considered the title *kyrios*, or *dominus*, given to a man, as proper only in the mouth of a slave. Octavius, the emperor, when master of the world, and absolute in Rome, seems not to have thought it prudent to accept it. He very justly marked the precise import of the term, according to the usage which then obtained, in that noted saying ascribed to him. *Imperator*

*militum, Princeps reipublicæ, Dominus servorum.* To assume this title, therefore, he considered as what could not fail to be interpreted by his people, as an indirect, yet sufficiently evident, manner of calling them his *slaves* ; for such was then the common import of the word *servus*. But, in despotic countries, and countries long accustomed to kingly government, it did not hurt the delicacy of the greatest subject to give the title *Dominus* to the prince.

§ 4. THAT such honorary applications of words were quite common among the Jews, was evident to every body, who has read the Bible with attention. In such applications, however, it must be noted, that the titles are not considered as strictly due from those who give them. They are considered rather as voluntary expressions of respect, in him who gives the title, being a sort of tribute, either to civility, or to the personal merit of him on whom it is bestowed. But, to affix titles to places and offices, to be given by all who shall address those possessed of such places and offices, whether they that give them stand in the relation correspondent to the title or not, or whether they possess the respect or esteem implied or not, is comparatively a modern refinement in the civil intercourse of mankind, at least in the degree to which it is carried in Europe. This is the second remove from the earliest and simplest state of society.

§ 5. THERE remains a third, still more remarkable, to which I find nothing similar in ancient

times. We have gotten a number of honorary titles, such as *duke*, *marquis*, *earl*, *viscount*, *baron*, *baronet*, &c. which it would be very difficult, or rather impossible to define; as they express, at present, neither office, nor relation, but which, nevertheless, descend from father to son, are regarded as part of a man's inheritance, and, without any consideration of merit, or station, or wealth, secure to him certain titular honours and ceremonial respect, and which are of a more unalienable nature than any other property (if they may be called property,) real or personal, that he possesses. I am sensible, that those modern titles were all originally names of offices, as well as the ancient. Thus, *duke* was equivalent to commander; *marquis*, or margrave (for they differed in different countries,) to guardian of the marches; *count*, landgrave, alderman, or *earl*, to sheriff; whence the shire is still denominated county; *viscount*, to deputy-sheriff. *Vicecomes*, accordingly, is the Latin word in law-writs for the officiating sheriff<sup>1</sup>. When the principal, in any kind of office, becomes too rich, and too lazy, for the service, the burden naturally devolves upon the substitute; and the power of the constituent, through disuse, comes at last to be antiquated. But, so much was the title once connected with the office, that when the king intended to create a new *earl*, he had no other expedient, than to erect a certain territory into

<sup>1</sup> Blackstone's Commentary, Introduc. Sect. 4. and B. I. ch. xii. § 3, 4.

a *county*, *earldom*, or *sheriffdom*, (for these words were then synonymous,) and to bestow the jurisdiction of it on the person honoured with the title. The *baron*, though his name was anciently common to all the nobility, was judge or lord of a smaller and subordinate jurisdiction, called a barony<sup>2</sup>. In process of time, through the vicissitudes that necessarily happen in the manners of the people, and in their methods of government, the offices came gradually to be superseded, or at least to subsist no longer, on the same footing of hereditary possession. But, when these had given place to other political arrangements, the titles, as a badge of ancestry, and of the right to certain privileges which accompanied the name, were, as we may naturally suppose, still suffered to remain. It hardly now answers the first end, as a badge of ancestry, in those countries where there are often new creations: but it answers the second, and besides, ennobles their posterity. In consequence of these differences, the titles are regarded as due to him who succeeds to them, alike from all men, and that without any consideration of either personal or official dignity, or even of territorial possessions. Thus, one who is entitled to be called *my lord* is, in this manner, addressed not only by his inferiors, but by his equals, nay, even superiors. The king himself, in addressing his nobles, says *My Lords*.

<sup>2</sup> See Spelman's Glossary on the different names.

§ 6. It was totally different among the Hebrews, I might have said, among the ancients in general. The Greek word *κύριος* *kyrios*, answering to the Hebrew אָדוֹן *adon*, to the Latin *dominus*, and to the words *lord* or *master* in English, was not originally given, unless by a servant to his master, by a subject to his sovereign, or in brief, by one bound to obey, to the person entitled to command. Soon, however, it became common to give it to a superior, though the person who gave it, had no dependence upon him; and if sometimes it was, through complaisance, bestowed on an equal; still the man who gave the title, was considered as modestly putting himself on the footing of an inferior and servant, inasmuch as the title was invariably understood to express, not only superior rank, but even authority, in the person on whom it was conferred, over him who gave it. We have examples in Scripture which put it beyond a doubt, that for any man to address another by the title *my lord*, and to acknowledge himself that person's servant, were but different ways of expressing the same thing, *κύριος* and *δουλος* being correlative terms. The courteous form of addressing with them, when they meant to be respectful (for it was not used on all occasions,) was not that of most modern Europeans, who, in using the second personal pronoun, employ the plural for the singular; nor that of the Germans, who change both person and number, making the third plural serve for the second singular, but it was what more rarely could occasion

ambiguity than either of these ; the substitution of the third person for the first, the number being retained, whether singular or plural. This mode, as occurring in Scripture, gives an additional illustration of the import of the term *κύριος* with them. "Let *thy servant*, I pray thee," said Judah<sup>3</sup> to his brother Joseph, when governor of Egypt, "speak a word in *my lord's* ears." "Nay, *my lord*," said the Shunamite to the Prophet Elisha, "do not deceive *thine handmaid*<sup>4</sup>." Some other instances are marked in the margin<sup>5</sup>.

Assisted by these remarks, we may perceive the force of that observation of the Apostle Peter<sup>6</sup>, in regard to the conjugal respect and obedience yielded by Sarah to her husband Abraham. *Being in subjection*, says he, speaking of the wives, *to their own husbands, even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord* ; that is, acknowledging, by this her usual compellation, her inferiority, and obligation to obedience ; for the intimacy of their relation hinders us from ascribing it to a ceremonious civility. Some have cavilled at this argument brought by the Apostle. The rank and quality of Abraham, say they, who, by the accounts we have of him, was a powerful prince, entitled him to be addressed in this manner by every body. Others, in the opposite extreme, have inferred that every dutiful wife ought to give the same testimony of respect and submission to her husband, which this pious matron did to the

<sup>3</sup> Gen. xliv. 18.      <sup>4</sup> 2 Kings, iv. 16.      <sup>5</sup> Gen. xxxii. 4, 5.  
xxxiii. 5. 8.    xlii. 10.    1 Kings, xviii. 7. 9.    <sup>6</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 5, 6.

Patriarch. Both ways of reasoning are weak, and proceed from the same ignorance of the different import of words, resulting from the difference of manners and customs. The title *lord* with us, as applied to men, is either hereditary in certain families, or annexed by royal authority, or immemorial usage, to certain offices and stations. Wherever it is considered as due, nobody, of what rank soever, withholds it. And wherever it is not due, one would not only expose one's self to ridicule by giving it, but, instead of paying a compliment to the person addressed, would put him out of countenance. It cannot, therefore, with us, serve as a token of subjection in the person who gives it. Such is the consequence of the different footing whereon things now stand, that the titles which, in those times of simplicity, were merely relative and ambulatory, are now absolute and stationary. Whereas the man who, in those ages, was well entitled to the compellation of *lord* in one company, had no title to it at all in another. It happens with us frequently (to wit, as often as two or more who, by law or custom, have a right to that mark of respect, converse together,) that the title of *lord* is reciprocally given and taken by the same persons. But of this I do not recollect a single instance in Scripture. Such a thing to the ancients must, doubtless, have appeared ridiculous, as an acknowledgment of superiority in the person on whom it was conferred, was always understood to be conveyed by it. For, though it was sometimes, as I

observed, politely given to an equal, he was thereby treated as superior : and, as each could not be superior, to retort the title on him who gave it, must have been considered by them, as an indelicate rejection of the civility offered. To their sentiments it seems to have been more conformable, that the honour should be repaid with some other marks of respect or affection, by the person who received it. The fact, if I remember right, is certain : this manner of accounting for it, I acknowledge to be no more than conjecture ; but it is a conjecture which some passages in ancient history, particularly the conversation of Abraham with Ephron and the sons of Heth<sup>7</sup>, and Jacob's interview with his elder brother Esau<sup>8</sup>, after an absence of more than fourteen years, render not improbable.

§ 7. THE title of *master* (for the Hebrew *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, signify no more) was perhaps universally the first which, by a kind of catachresis, was bestowed on a superior, or a person considered as such, by one who was not his servant or dependent. But still, as it implied the acknowledgment of superiority, it varied with the company. There were few so low who were not entitled to this honourable compellation from some persons ; there were none (the king alone excepted) so high as to be entitled to it from every person. Joab, who was captain-general of the army, is properly styled by Uriah<sup>9</sup>, who was only

<sup>7</sup> Gen. xxiii. 3, &c. <sup>8</sup> xxxiii. 1,—15. <sup>9</sup> 2 Sam. xi. 11.

an inferior officer, *my lord* Joab ; but had the king himself, or any of the princes, given him that title, it could have been understood no otherwise than in derision. It would have been, as if the sovereign should call any of his ministers his master. The title *father*, though held in general superior to *lord*, yet, as the respect expressed by it, implied superiority, not in station, but in years, experience, and knowledge, was sometimes given to the Prophets of the true God, even by kings. Thus, the Prophet Elisha is in this manner addressed by the king of Israel<sup>10</sup> ; but no prophet is ever denominated lord or master by one vested with the supreme authority. By others the prophets were often so denominated. Thus Obadiah, who was steward of the king's household, calls the Prophet Elijah, *my lord* Elijah<sup>11</sup>. The same title we find also given to Elisha<sup>12</sup>. Whereas to the king himself, the common address, from men of all ranks, was, *my lord*, *O king*, or, as the expression strictly implied, *O king, my master* ; but by the king, the title *my lord*, or *my master*, was given to none but God. The reason is obvious. A monarch, who was not tributary, acknowledged, in point of station, no earthly superior. And though, in any rank inferior to the highest, good breeding might require it to be conferred on an equal, the royal dignity appears generally to have been considered as of too delicate a nature to admit the use of such compliments without derogation. Cræsus king of

<sup>10</sup> 2 Kings, vi. 21.<sup>11</sup> 1 Kings, xviii. 7. 13.<sup>12</sup> 2 Kings, ii. 19. iv. 16. 28.

Lydia, is represented by Herodotus<sup>13</sup>, as giving the title *δεσποτης*, which is of the same import, to Cyrus king of Persia; but it was after his kingdom was conquered by Cyrus, and when he himself was his captive, and consequently, according to the usages of those times, his slave. Before that event he would have disdained to salute any man with this compellation. Ahab king of Israel, styled Benhadad king of Syria, *my lord*; but it was when, through fear, he consented to surrender himself and all that he had, into his hands<sup>14</sup>.

I am not, however, certain that the politeness of the Orientals, which, in the judgment of the Greeks, savoured of servility, did not sometimes carry them thus far: for, though no such title is found in the conversation between Solomon and the queen of Sheba<sup>15</sup>, or between Jehoshaphat king of Judah, and Ahab king of Israel<sup>16</sup>, as related either in the First Book of Kings, or in the Second Book of Chronicles; or in the correspondence between Hiram king of Tyre and Solomon, as related in the First Book of Kings<sup>17</sup>; yet, in the account we have of this correspondence in the Second Book of Chronicles<sup>18</sup>, which is of much later date, Hiram is represented as giving this title to both David and Solomon. Whether this ought to be considered, as merely a strain of eastern complaisance, or as an acknow-

<sup>13</sup> Lib. I.<sup>14</sup> 1 Kings, xx. 4.<sup>15</sup> 1 Kings, x.<sup>16</sup> 1 Kings, xxii. 2 Chron. xviii.<sup>17</sup> 1 Kings, ix. 10, &c.<sup>18</sup> 2 Chron. ii. 14, 15.

ledgment of subordination, a state to which many of the neighbouring princes had been reduced by those monarchs, I will not take upon me to say. But it may hold as a general truth, that when this title is found given to a man in any ancient author, particularly in Scripture, before we can judge from it of the quality of the person accosted, we must know something of the quality of the person that accosts. It is not so with us, or in any Christian European country at present. When we find one addressed with the title of *highness*, or *grace*, or *lordship*, we discover his rank, without needing to know any thing of the addresser, save only, that he is not ignorant of the current forms of civility.

When we find that Mary Magdalene addresses, with the title of lord (*κύριε* is her word<sup>19</sup>), one whom she took to be no higher than a gardener, we are apt to accuse her, in our hearts, either of flattery or of gross ignorance, to accost a man in so low a station with so high a title. But the ignorance is entirely our own, when we would vainly make our ideas, modes, and usages, a standard for other ages and nations. Mary and a gardener might, in the world's account, have been on a level in point of rank. If so, as he was a stranger to her, modesty and the laws of courtesy led her to yield to him the superiority, by giving him this respectful title. Abraham's servant was addressed in the same way by Rebekah,

<sup>19</sup> John, xx. 15.

before she knew him <sup>20</sup>. Paul and Silas, who cannot be supposed superior in figure and appearance to ordinary mechanics, were, after having been publicly stripped, beaten, imprisoned, and put in the stocks, accosted with the title *κυριοι lords* <sup>21</sup>, though the common translation has it *sirs*. But it was given by a jailor, and, it may be added, after a miraculous interposition of heaven in their favour. To satisfy us, however, that this last circumstance was not necessary to entitle mean people to be addressed in this manner by those, whose condition was equally mean or meaner; we may observe that the same title *κυριε* is given to Philip <sup>22</sup>, one of the Apostles from Bethsaida of Galilee, who was probably not above the rank of a fisherman. The persons who gave it were Greeks, doubtless of the lowest sort, who had come to Jerusalem to worship. With us the title *lord*, given to one who by law or custom has no right to it, is a sort of injury to the whole order to whom the constitution of their country has given an exclusive privilege to be so denominated. With them it could affect no third person whatever, as it implied merely that the person spoken to was, by the speaker, acknowledged his superior.

It may appear to some an objection against this account of the relative import of the words *adon* and *kyrios*, that in the English Bible, we find the title *lord*, in one place of the sacred history, used

<sup>20</sup> Gen. xxiv. 18.

<sup>21</sup> Acts, xvi. 30.

<sup>22</sup> John, xii. 21.

as we should use the word *nobleman* or *grandee*, for denoting a person of a certain determinate rank. Thus we are informed of a *lord*, on whose hand king Jehoram leaned, who is mentioned thrice under this description in the same chapter<sup>23</sup>. I acknowledge that, if the Hebrew word there were *adon*, and the Greek *kyrios*, it would suffice to overturn what has been here advanced in regard to the difference between the ancient use of such titles and the modern. But it is not *adon* and *kyrios*. In neither language is it a title of honour, but a mere name of office. In Hebrew it is שָׁלִישׁ *shalish*, in Greek τριστατης *tristatees*, a word which occurs often in other places, and is never translated *lord*, but always *captain*, as it ought to have been rendered here. The Vulgate interprets it, not *dominus quidam*, but very properly *unus de ducibus*. Again, in the common version, we find mention of the *king and his lords*<sup>24</sup>, precisely in the manner wherein an English historian would speak of his sovereign and the peers of the realm. But neither here is the Hebrew word *adon*, nor the Greek *kyrios*. It is שָׂרָיו *sharaio*, in the former, and οἱ ἀρχοντες αὐτοῦ in the latter. In the Vulgate it is rendered *principes ejus*, and ought to have been in English *his chief men*, or *his principal officers*. Whereas אֲדֹנָיו *adonaio* in Hebrew, οἱ κυριοι αὐτοῦ in Greek, and *domini ejus* in Latin, would have meant *his masters*, or those whom he served, a sense quite foreign from the purpose. But though our word

<sup>23</sup> 2 Kings, vii. 2. 17. 19.<sup>24</sup> Ezra, viii. 25.

*lords*, used as in the above quotations, is not unsuitable to the English style; it would have been better, in such instances, to conform to the Hebrew idiom, for a reason which will appear from the next paragraph. Herod is said, by our translators, to have made a supper to his *lords*<sup>25</sup>. The word is *μεγιστασιν* *grandeess*. I shall only add, that the term *lords* is also used in the English translation, where the corresponding words, both in Hebrew and in Greek, are names of offices equivalent to rulers, magistrates, governors of provinces. And therefore nothing can be concluded from the application of this title in the version.

§ 8. Now, with the aid of the above observations on the relative value of honorary titles among the ancients, we may discover the full force of our Saviour's argument, in regard to the dignity of the Messiah. The modern use in this particular, is so different from the ancient, that, without knowing this circumstance, and reflecting upon it, a proper apprehension of the reasoning is unattainable. I shall give the whole passage as rendered in this version<sup>26</sup>. *While so many Pharisees were present, Jesus asked them, saying, What think ye of the Messiah? Whose son should he be? They answered, David's. He replied, How then doth David, speaking by inspiration, call him his Lord? The Lord, saith he, said to my Lord, sit at my right hand, until I make thy foes*

<sup>25</sup> Mark, vi. 21.

<sup>26</sup> Matth. xxii. 41, &c.

*thy footstool. If the Messiah were David's Son, would David call him his Lord? To this none of them could answer.* They were confounded; yet from our very different usages, whereby such titles, if due at all, are due alike from superiors as from inferiors and equals; we cannot easily, at first, feel the strength of this argument. I have observed already, that an independent monarch, such as David, acknowledged no lord or master but God. Far less would he bestow this title on a son or descendant. It was customary, because respectful, and in the natural order of subordination, for a son so to address his father. Accordingly, in the parable of the man who had two sons, the elder son is thus represented as answering his father, *Εγώ κυριε*<sup>27</sup>. It is the same word which is commonly rendered *lord*, but in this place *sir*. The same title was also given by Rachel to her father Laban, when he came into her tent, in quest of his images<sup>28</sup>, and even by Jacob, after his return from Padan Aram, to his elder brother Esau<sup>29</sup>. In no instance, however, will it be found given by a father to his son. This, according to their notions of paternal dignity and authority, which were incomparably higher than ours, would have been preposterous. The Pharisees, and other hearers, were so sensible of this that, however much they showed themselves, on most occasions, disposed to cavil, our Saviour's observation struck them dumb. *None of them could answer.*

<sup>27</sup> Matth. xxi. 30.<sup>28</sup> Gen. xxxi. 35.<sup>29</sup> Gen. xxxii. 4, 5.

§ 9. THOUGH the general belief of the Jews at that time was, that the Messiah would be a much greater man than David, a mighty conqueror, and even a universal monarch, the sovereign of the kings of the earth, who was to subdue all nations, and render them tributary to the chosen people; yet they still supposed him to be a mere man, possessed of no higher nature than that which he derived from his earthly progenitors. Though their Rabbies at that time agreed that the words quoted were spoken of the Messiah, and spoken by David, the difficulty suggested by our Lord seems never to have occurred to them; and now that it was pointed out, they appeared, by their silence, to admit that, on the received hypothesis, it was incapable of a solution. It was plainly our Saviour's intention to insinuate, that there was, in this character, as delineated by the Prophets, and suggested by the Royal Psalmist, something superior to human, which they were not aware of. And, though he does not, in express words, give the solution, he leaves no person who reflects, at a loss to infer it. I have been the more particular in this illustration, in order to shew of how much importance it is, for attaining a critical acquaintance with the import of words in the sacred languages, to become acquainted with the customs, sentiments, and manners of the people.

§ 10. THE name *κύριος*, in the New Testament, is most frequently translated, in the common version, *lord*, sometimes *sir*, sometimes *master*, and

once *owner*. It corresponds pretty nearly, except when it is employed in translating the name *Jehovah*, to the Latin *dominus*, and to the Italian *signore*. But there is not any one word, either in French or in English, that will so generally answer. It may occasionally be applied to a man in any station, except the very lowest, because, to men of every other station there are inferiors. It is always proper, as applied to God, to whom every creature is inferior. In the former of these applications, namely to man, it frequently corresponds, but not invariably, to the French *monsieur*, and to the English *sir*, or *master*. In the application to God, it answers always to the French *seigneur*, and to the English *lord*. There is a necessity, in these two languages, of changing the term, in compliance with the idiom of the tongue. *Domine* in Latin, and *signor* in Italian, in like manner as *kyrie* in Greek, and *adoni* in Hebrew, are equally suitable, in addressing God or man. But every body must be sensible, that this cannot be affirmed of the compellation of *monsieur* in French, or *sir* in English.

§ 11. THERE is something so peculiar in the English use of these familiar titles that it may be proper to take particular notice of it, before I proceed to the application of them in translating. In regard to the term *sir*, the most common of all, let it be observed, first, that, in its ordinary acceptance, it is never used, except in the vocative answering to *kyrie* and *domine*; secondly, that it

is never joined to the name of a person, neither to the Christian name, nor to the surname. When the proper name is used, *master*, not *sir*, must be prefixed. I say this of the word *sir*, in its ordinary acceptation; for when it serves as the distinguishing title of knighthood, it is used in all the cases, and is always prefixed to the Christian name. But for this application there is no occasion in translating. The third thing I shall observe, on the ordinary acceptation of the word, is, that it never admits the article, either definite or indefinite. This, indeed, is a consequence of its use being confined to the vocative. Lastly, it has not a proper plural. The word *sirs*, originally the plural, and equally respectful with the singular, is now rarely used. When it is used, it is with some difference in meaning. The compellation *sir*, almost always shows respect; but *sirs* shows a degree of familiarity hardly consistent with respect. It is most commonly employed in speaking to a crowd, or to inferiors. We usually supply the plural of *sir*, in our addresses to others, by the word *gentlemen*. But this bears so strong a signature of the distinctions which obtain in modern Europe, that it could not be used with propriety in the translation of an ancient author.

Now, as to the title of *lord*, I have several peculiarities to observe. In the first place, when in the vocative, without either the possessive pronoun *my* prefixed, or any name or title annexed, the application is invariably, according to the best use at present, to God or Christ. When it is ad-

dressed to men (now it is only to noblemen, and to persons in certain eminent stations that use permits us to give it,) it is always either preceded by the pronoun *my*, or followed by the title, or both. Thus, to say, *Lord*, or, *O Lord*, *help me* ! is nowhere proper but in an address to God : whereas, *Help me, my lord*, is proper only when spoken to a man. The distinction now taken notice of, is, if I mistake not, sacredly observed in the common version of the Old Testament. There are two cases, indeed, in which *my Lord*, in the vocative, is applied to God ; but the intention, in both, is sufficiently marked. In one case, whereof there occur a few examples, it is preceded by the interjection *O* ! which adds solemnity to the invocation : *O ! my Lord*<sup>30</sup>. The other is, when it is coupled with *my God*, as in this<sup>31</sup>, *Awake to my judgment, my God, and my Lord*. Another thing to be remarked is, that when the term *lord* has the definite article prefixed, with no name, title, or description subjoined, it is to be understood as spoken of God, or of Christ. When the word is applied to men, whether the article be, or be not, used, the name or title should be annexed. If the frequent recurrence of the title render it proper to omit it, we must say, *my lord*, not *the lord*, acted thus ; or we may say, *his lordship*, this last form being never used of a celestial superior.

§ 12. So much for the words *sir* and *lord*, as used by us at present. In regard to the term

<sup>30</sup> Exod. iv. 10. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Psalm. xxxv. 23.

*master*, there can be no question that it comes nearer the primitive signification of *κυριος*, than either of the former. *Κυριος* and *δουλος* are correlates in Greek, just as *master* and *servant* are in English. Indeed, *lord* and *servant* are thus used in the common version of the Gospels, but not so properly. *Vassal*, not *servant*, is, in English, correlative to *lord*<sup>32</sup>. At least, it was so anciently; for both were feudal terms, the latter denoting the proprietor of the land, the former the tenant, or him who held it under the proprietor. But, with the gradual abolition of feudal customs, the name *vassal* has gone almost into disuse; whereas the import of the term *lord* has been greatly altered, in some respects extended, and in some respects limited. But such variations are incident to every language. A remain of this usage, however, we have still in Scotland, in the meaning assigned to the word *laird*, which is no other than the old Scotch pronunciation of *lord*. In that dialect, it invariably denotes *landlord*, or, as Dr. Johnson well explains it, *lord of the manor*. But to return: the reason why our translators have chosen sometimes to contrast *servant* and *lord*, rather than *servant* and *master*, is because they had preoccupied the word *master*, employing it to answer to *διδασκαλος*. This made it necessary to recur to some other term, to answer to *κυριος*, for which none fitter could be found than *lord*. I have thought it preferable to render

<sup>32</sup> Blackstone's Com. B. II. ch. 4.

διδασκαλος, more literally, *teacher*, and say <sup>33</sup>, *The disciple is not above his teacher, nor the servant above his master*. That the motive of our translators was precisely what I have mentioned, is evident from this, that in the numerous passages in the Epistles, where the observance of the relative duties of masters and servants is inculcated, the word κυριος, as well as δεσποτης, is always rendered *master*, and not *lord*. But there is an ambiguity, which arises from rendering διδασκαλος *master*, when the context does not point out what kind of master is meant. In the words of James <sup>34</sup>, Μη πολλοι διδασκαλοι γινεσθε, as expressed in the common translation, *Be not many masters*, hardly any of the unlearned suppose him to be speaking of *teachers*.

§ 13. Now, let us consider the ordinary method which our translators have followed, in the history of Jesus Christ. One who reads the Bible with reflection, (which not one of a thousand does,) is astonished to find, that on the very first appearance of Jesus Christ, as a teacher, though attended with no exterior marks of splendor and majesty; though not acknowledged by the great and learned of the age; though meanly habited, in a garb not superior to that of an ordinary artificer, in which capacity we have ground to believe he assisted <sup>35</sup> his supposed father, in his earlier days; he is addressed by almost every body

<sup>33</sup> Matth. x. 24.<sup>34</sup> James, iii. 1.<sup>35</sup> Mark, vi. 3

in the peculiar manner in which the Almighty is addressed in prayer. Thus the leper<sup>36</sup>, *Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean*. Thus the centurion<sup>37</sup>, *Lord my servant lieth at home*. The Canaanitish woman crieth after him<sup>38</sup>, *Have mercy on me, O Lord*. He is likewise mentioned sometimes under the single appellation of *The Lord*<sup>39</sup>, without any addition, a form of expression which, in the Old Testament, our translators, as above observed, had invariably appropriated to God. What is the meaning of this? Is it that, from his first showing himself in public, all men believed him to be the Messiah, and not only so, but to be possessed of a divine nature, and entitled to be accosted as God? Far from it. The utmost that can with truth be affirmed of the multitude, is that they believed him to be a prophet. And even those who, in process of time, came to think him the Messiah, never formed a conception of any character, as belonging to that title, superior to that of an earthly sovereign, or of any nature superior to the human. Nay, that the Apostles themselves, before his resurrection, had no higher notion, it were easy to prove. What then is the reason of this strange peculiarity? Does the original give any handle for it? None in the least. For, though the title that is given to him, is the same that is given to God, it is so far from being peculiarly so, as is the case with the Eng-

<sup>36</sup> Matth. viii. 2.<sup>37</sup> 6.<sup>38</sup> Matth. xv. 22.<sup>39</sup> John, xx. 2.

lish term so circumstanced, that it is the common compellation of civility given not only to every stranger, but to almost every man of a decent appearance, by those whose station does not place them in an evident superiority.

It is the title with which Mary Magdalene accosted one whom she supposed to be a gardener<sup>40</sup>. It is the title given by some Greek proselytes to the Apostle Philip<sup>41</sup>, probably a fisherman of Galilee. It is the title with which Paul the tent-maker, and Silas his companion, were saluted by the jailor at Philippi<sup>42</sup>. Lastly, it is the title with which Pontius Pilate, the Roman procurator, a pagan and idolater, is addressed by the chief priests and Pharisees<sup>43</sup>. And though the Jewish rulers would not refuse what was merely respectful to the Roman procurator, who as such was their superior, we may be sure they would not have given him a title that could be understood to imply any thing sacred or divine. Our translators have been so sensible of this, that even in the application to the chief magistrate within the country, they have thought fit to render it only *sir*. Further, it is the title which those gave to Jesus, who, at the time they gave it, knew nothing about him. In this manner, the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well addressed him<sup>44</sup>, when she knew no more of him than that he was a Jew, which

<sup>40</sup> John, xx. 15.

<sup>41</sup> John, xii. 21.

<sup>42</sup> Acts, xvi. 30. See § 7.

<sup>43</sup> Matth. xxvii. 63

<sup>44</sup> John, iv. 11.

would not recommend him to her regard. Thus also he was addressed by the impotent man who lay near the pool of Bethesda<sup>45</sup>, who, as we learn from the sequel of the story, did not then know the person who conversed with him, and who soon proved his benefactor. In these places indeed, and some others which might be mentioned, our translators have rendered the word *κύριε*, not *lord*, but *sir*. Why they have not uniformly done so, when the term is given by contemporaries to Jesus residing on the earth, it would be impossible to assign a good reason. The only reason I can imagine, is the uniform practice that obtains very properly amongst his followers since his ascension, now when all power in heaven and on earth is committed to him<sup>46</sup>, now when he is made head over all things unto his church<sup>47</sup>, and hath received a name that is above every name<sup>48</sup>, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on the earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is LORD, to the glory of God the Father: in one word, now when men are more especially obliged to honour the Son even as they honour the Father<sup>49</sup>.

Is there any fitness in thus exhibiting the honours of deity, as appropriated to him in the very time of his humiliation, when, for our sakes, he was pleased to veil his glory<sup>50</sup>, when he made

<sup>45</sup> John, v. 7.<sup>46</sup> Matth. xxviii. 18.<sup>47</sup> Eph. i. 22.<sup>48</sup> Phil. ii. 9, &c<sup>49</sup> John, v. 23.<sup>50</sup> Phil. ii. 6.

himself of no reputation, divested himself, as the expression strictly implies, and took upon him the form of a servant? Or is there any consistency in representing men as using this style, whose sentiments, on examination, will not support it? The highest to which the faith of any of the people, not his disciples, at that time rose, was to think that he was<sup>51</sup> John the Baptist risen from the dead, Jeremiah, or one of the Prophets. But where do we find any of the Prophets addressed with that peculiarity of idiom, which commonly distinguishes the Deity? There is, therefore, in this manner of translating, a very great impropriety, first, as it produces an inconsistency between the style of the persons introduced, and what from the history itself we discover of their sentiments; secondly, as it thereby, to a mere English reader, throws a degree of incredibility on the whole narrative.

§ 14. If they had uniformly translated the word *κύριε* *lord*, to whomsoever applied, they would have done better; because every reader of common sense must have perceived that the word was employed, not according to the English idiom, but according to the usage of a tongue very different. Still, however, by comparing the various places where it occurs, it would have been practicable to reduce the term to its proper value. Not that I approve this servile manner of translating, any more than that in the opposite extreme called liberal. To translate the words, but not

<sup>51</sup> Matth. xvi. 13, &c.

the idiom, is doing but half, and much the easier half, of the work of a translator, and never fails to render obscure and enigmatical in the translation, what is perspicuous and simple in the original. But our interpreters have, in this particular, followed neither the Hebrew idiom nor the English, but adopted a peculiarity in regard to Jesus Christ, which represents most of his contemporaries, as entertaining the same opinions concerning him, which are now entertained among Christians. Now, nothing can be more manifest than that, in those days, the ideas of his Apostles themselves were far inferior to what we entertain.

To do justice, therefore, to our idiom, to preserve at once consistency, perspicuity, and propriety, it is necessary that the word *κύριος*, in an address to heaven, be rendered *Lord*, or *O Lord* ; when the Supreme Being is not addressed, but spoken of, *the Lord* ; in addressing a king, or eminent magistrate, *my lord* ; and in other ordinary cases, *sir*. Sometimes from a servant to his master, or from one in immediate subordination, to a person on whom he depends, it may be more emphatical to say *master*. Let it, however, be observed, that in translating the Scripture, *κύριος* prefixed to a proper name, cannot be rendered either *sir* or *master*, immediately followed by the name, on account of the particular idea which that mode of expression conveys to us. Let it be also observed, that what I have said of *kyrios*, as applied to Jesus Christ, regards purely its application in the Gospels. It is plain, that after

Christ's ascension into heaven, and exaltation to the right hand of the Father, he is viewed in a very different light. Addresses to him are conveyed only by prayer, and ought to be clothed in its language. When we speak of him, it ought to be, not as of *a lord*, one possessed of great power and eminence, but as of *The Lord* of the creation, the heir of all things, to whom all authority in heaven and upon the earth, and all judgment are committed by the Father. That expression of Thomas, therefore, *ὁ Κυριος μου και ὁ Θεος μου*<sup>52</sup>, cannot be otherwise rendered than it has been rendered by our translators, *My Lord and my God*. It is manifest, from the exclamation, that Thomas viewed his Master now since his resurrection, though not yet ascended, in a light in which he had never viewed him before. For these reasons, I think that in general no alteration would be proper in the way of rendering the word *κυριος* as applied to Jesus, either in the Acts or in the Epistles. The case is different in the Gospels.

§ 15. It is proper to take notice, before I conclude this article, that the word *κυριος* is in the Septuagint also employed in translating the Hebrew word יְהוָה *Jehovah*, the incommunicable name of God. Though this is a proper name, and not an appellative, the Seventy, probably from the superstitious opinion which had arisen among the Jews (for it was evidently not from the begin-

<sup>52</sup> John, xx. 28.

ning,) that it was dangerous to pronounce that word, and consequently to adopt it into another language, have thought fit to render it always *κύριος*, an appellative which, as we have seen, is of very extensive application. Nay, in reading the Hebrew Scriptures in the synagogue service, their doctors to this day always read *adon*, or *adoni*, *Lord* or *my Lord*, where they find *Jehovah*. The writers of the New Testament, who wrote in Greek, have so far conformed to the usage of their countrymen, that they have never introduced this name in their writings. In quoting from the Old Testament, they have adopted the method of the Seventy, whose words they frequently use. The generality of Christian translators have in this imitated their practice. Our own, in particular, have only in four places of the Old Testament, used the name *Jehovah*. In all other places, which are almost innumerable, they render it *the Lord*. But, for distinction's sake, when this word corresponds to *Jehovah*, it is printed in capitals.

I once thought, that in translating the New Testament, the word *Jehovah* might properly be replaced, wherever, in a quotation from the Old, that name was used in the Hebrew. On more mature reflection I now think differently. It seemed good to infinite wisdom, in the old dispensation, when a peculiar nation was chosen, and contradistinguished to all others, so far to condescend to the weakness of his creatures, as to distinguish himself as their God, by an appropriated name, which might discriminate him, with them, from the gods of the nations; the general names

*God* and *Lord* being applied to them all. But, in the Gospel dispensation, wherein all such distinctions were to be abolished, it was proper that there should remain nothing which might appear to represent God as a national or local deity. A proper name is not necessary where there are no more than one of a kind. We are not sensible of the want of a proper name for the sun, the moon, or the earth. It is not suitable in the interpreter of the New Testament, to show a greater nicety of distinction than the sacred penmen have warranted. It belongs rather to the annotator, than to the translator, to mark such differences. In translating the Old Testament, the distinction, in my judgment, ought to be sacredly preserved, for the very same reason that no distinction ought to be made, in the New. The translator ought faithfully to represent his original, as far as the language which he writes is capable of doing it. So much for the import of the word *κύριος*, and the different senses that it bears according to the application.

## PART II.

*Διδασκαλος, RABBI.*

I PURPOSE now to make a few observations on the word *διδασκαλος*, and some other titles of respect current in Judea in the days of our Saviour. After the Babylonish captivity, when Jerusalem and the temple were rebuilt, and the people restored to their ancient possessions, care was taken, under the conduct of Ezra, and of those who succeeded him in the administration of affairs, to prevent their relapsing into idolatry, which had brought such accumulated calamities on their country. It was justly considered as one of the best expedients for answering this end, as we learn partly from Scripture, and partly from Jewish writers, to promote, amongst all ranks, the knowledge of God and of his law, and to excite the whole people, throughout the land, to join regularly in the public worship of the only true God. For their accommodation, synagogues came, in process of time, to be erected in every city and village where a sufficient number of people could be found to make a congregation. Every synagogue had its stated governors and president, that the public service might be decently con-

ducted, and that the people might be instructed in the sacred writings, both the law and the prophets. The synagogues were fitted for answering, among them, the like purposes with parish-churches, amongst us Christians. But this was not all. That the synagogues might be provided with knowing pastors and wise rulers, it was necessary that there should also be public seminaries or schools, wherein those who were destined to teach others, were to be taught themselves. And so great was their veneration for these schools or colleges, that they accounted them, says Buxtorf<sup>53</sup>, more sacred than even synagogues, and next, in this respect, to the temple. They maintained that a synagogue might lawfully be converted into a school, but not a school into a synagogue. The former was ascending, the latter descending. Both were devoted to the service of God; but the synagogue, say they, is for the spiritual nourishment of the sheep, the school for that of the shepherds.

§ 2. Now their schools were properly what we should call divinity colleges; for in them they were instructed in the sacred language, the ancient Hebrew, not then the language of the country, in the law and the traditions, the writings of the Prophets, the holy ceremonies, the statutes, customs, and procedure of their judicatories; in a word, in whatever concerned the civil constitution

<sup>53</sup> Synag. Jud. cap. x.

and religion of their country. I make this distinction, of civil and religious, more in conformity to modern and Christian notions, than in reference to ancient and Jewish. In that polity, these were so interwoven, or rather blended, as to be inseparable. Their law was their religion, and their religion was their law; insomuch that with them there was a perfect coincidence in the professions of lawyer and divine. But as to their mode of education, that they had some kind of schools long before the time above mentioned, even from the beginning of their establishment, in the land of Canaan, under Joshua, or, at least, from the time of Samuel, can hardly be made a question. A certain progress in letters had been made, very early, by this people, and regularly transmitted from one generation to another. But this seems evidently to have been without such fixed seminaries as were erected and endowed afterwards; else it is impossible there should be so little notice of them in so long a tract of time, of which, as far as religion is concerned, we have a history pretty particular. All that appears before the captivity, on this subject, is, that numbers of young men were wont, for the sake of instruction, to attend the most eminent Prophets, and were therefore called the sons, that is, the disciples, of the Prophets; and that, in this manner, were constituted a sort of ambulatory schools, for communicating the knowledge of letters, and of the law. In these were probably taught the elements of the Hebrew music and versification. We are inform-

ed, also<sup>54</sup>, that Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, sent Priests, Levites, and others, to teach in all the cities of Judah. But this appears to have been merely a temporary measure, adopted by that pious monarch for the instruction of the people in his own time, and not an establishment, which secured a succession and continuance. Now, this is quite different from the erection that obtained afterwards in their cities, of a sort of permanent academies, for the education of the youth destined for the upper stations in society.

§ 3. FURTHER, to give the greater lustre to those seminaries, they were commonly men of note, in respect of their station and quality, as well as distinguished for their learning, who were appointed to preside and teach in them. These were mostly Priests and Levites ; but not entirely ; for eminent persons, from other tribes, were also admitted to share in this honour. No sooner did erudition become an object of national attention in Judea ; no sooner were endowments made for advancing and promoting it, than the emulation of literary men was excited to attain the honours peculiar to the profession, by having the direction, or a principal part in the teaching, in some noted school. Even a certificate, from the persons qualified, of being equal to the charge, was not a little prized. Though, at first sight, it may appear but a small

<sup>54</sup> 2 Chron. xvii. 7, 8, 9.

circumstance, it will be admitted, by the judicious, to be a considerable evidence that, in our Saviour's time, learning was in general and high esteem among the Jews; to find that those titles which related to the business of teaching, were, with so much solicitude, courted, and, with so much ostentation, displayed by persons of distinction. Of this kind, the honorary titles, *father*, *rabbi*, *doctor*, or *teacher*, *guide*, or *conductor*, the name *scribe*, often indeed a name of office, *lawyer*, *doctor of law*, may justly be accounted. I do not, however, mean to affirm, that all these titles are of different import. Some of them, as will soon appear, are justly held synonymous.

§ 4. SOME of these had come into use but a little before our Saviour's time. This was the case, in particular, of that most celebrated title *rabbi*, or *rab*, and *rabbān*, as, for some time, these seem to have been distinguished, by some difference of signification. In the Old Testament, we find the term רַב *rab*, in composition with some other word, employed as a name of office and dignity, but not till the people became acquainted with the Chaldeans, concerning whom only it is used. The word, both in Hebrew and in Chaldee, signifies sometimes *great*, sometimes *many*, and when used substantively, denotes one who is at the head of any business, of whatever kind it be. Thus, רַב הַחֵבֶל *rab hachebel*<sup>55</sup>, is, in the Septuagint

<sup>55</sup> Jonah, i. 6.

πρωτος, רב טבחים *rab tebachim*<sup>56</sup>, αρχιμαγειρος, *chief cook*. The word will bear this version, but it does not suit the context in the passage where it is found, and רב סריסים *rab serisim*<sup>57</sup>, αρχιευνουχος, the first rendered, in the English version, *shipmaster*, the second, *captain of the guard*, and the third, *master of the eunuchs*. It is used in the plural also for *chief men* in general, superintendents, or those at the head of affairs. Thus, רבי חמלך *rabbe hammelech*<sup>58</sup>, are the chief men employed by the king over the different departments of the state. It is rendered *the princes of the king* in the common translation. The original term suits entirely the import of the Latin word *princeps*, but not of the English word *prince*, at least in its most common acceptation: for it is not the king's sons, or any order of nobles, who are so denominated. The word, among the Chaldeans, appears evidently to have been equivalent to the term שר *shar* among the Hebrews. Accordingly, he who is styled by Daniel, in the passage above quoted, רב סריסים, is four times, in the same chapter, called שר הסריסים *shar hase-risim*<sup>59</sup>. And this use of the name *rab* seems to have continued long in Syria, as well as in Chaldaea. Thus, in the Syriac New Testament, it is found, in the same manner, united with the common appellation of any sort of officer, in order to denote the principal person in that office. Thus, *rab-cohana*<sup>60</sup> is the high-priest, *rab-machsa* is chief

<sup>56</sup> Jer. xxxix. 11.<sup>57</sup> Dan. i. 3.<sup>58</sup> Jer. xxxix. 13.<sup>59</sup> Dan. i. 7, 8, 9. 18.<sup>60</sup> Matth. xxvi. 51.

of the publicans <sup>61</sup>, and *rabraghatha* <sup>62</sup> is chief shepherd. *Rab*, construed in this manner, is equivalent to the Greek *αρχι*, as used in composition. The preceding titles are accordingly thus expressed in the Greek, *αρχιερεως*, *αρχιτελωνης*, and *αρχιποιμην*.

Again, the word *rab* is sometimes found in that version, combined, not with the title of any sort of officer, but with a term denoting the office or charge itself; in which case it always means the person who is principally intrusted with the business. Thus, *rab-beth* <sup>63</sup> is the steward, *επιτροπος*, he who is over the household; and *rab cano-she-tha* <sup>64</sup> is the ruler of the synagogue, *αρχισυναγωγος*. It is not unlikely, though I do not find any example of it in Scripture, that the term has at first been similarly compounded with some word signifying a school, or, perhaps, with the name of the art or science taught, in order to denote the overseer of such a seminary, or the teacher of such an art. This hypothesis is at least favoured by analogy. As use, however, is variable, it appears, from what has actually happened, extremely probable, that, when all other applications of the term have been dropped, it has still remained as an honourable compellation of the learned. And when the term *rab* came to be peculiarly applied to such, the word wherewith it was, at first, for distinction's sake, compounded, would be superseded as unnecessary.

<sup>61</sup> Luke, xix. 2.

<sup>63</sup> Matth. xx. 8.

<sup>62</sup> 1 Pet. v. 4.

<sup>64</sup> Mark, v. 35.

It is, at least, certain, that the Jewish doctors, who resided at Babylon, about the time of our Saviour, were called simply *rab*. But, in the Old Testament, there is no trace of such a title as *rab*, *rabbi*, or *rabban*, given to a man of letters; nor is any of the old Prophets, or Scribes, or indeed, any other person, distinguished by this mark of respect prefixed to his name. Though the introduction of titles is always occasioned by the erection of useful and important offices, it is commonly in the decline of merit that pompous titles are most affected. At first, no doubt, vain-glory has led many to assume them, to whom they did not belong, in right of office, and an interested adulation has induced others to give them. Some of them, however, came soon, among the Jews, to be converted into a kind of academical distinctions, which, to give them more weight, are said to have been conferred solemnly in their schools or colleges, accompanied with certain religious ceremonies. From this practice, I may observe, by the way, sprang literary degrees in Christian universities, to which there is nothing similar, in all Pagan antiquity, either Greek or Roman, but to which the Jewish custom above mentioned bears an evident and close analogy.

§ 5. THOSE who belonged to the school were divided into three classes or orders. The lowest was that of the disciples, or learners; the second, that of the fellows, or companions, those who, having made considerable progress in learning,

were occasionally employed by the masters, in teaching the younger students. The highest was that of the preceptors, or teachers, to whom they appropriated the respectful title of *doctor*, or *rabbi*, which differs from *rab* only by the addition of the affix pronoun of the first person. All belonging to the school were accounted honourable, in a certain degree. Even the lowest, the name *disciple*, was considered as redounding to the honour of those youths, who were selected from the multitude, had the advantage of a learned education, and by their diligence and progress, gave hopes that they would, one day, fill with credit the most important stations. The title, *companion*, *fellow*, or *associate*, was considered as very honorable to the young graduate who obtained it, being a public testimony of the proficiency he had made in his studies. And the title *rabbi* was their highest academical honour. That it was only the youth, in what are called the genteeler stations, who had the advantage of a learned education, is manifest from the contempt which our Lord's parentage drew on him, as a teacher, from his fellow-citizens. *Whence, say they*<sup>65</sup>, *hath this man this wisdom? Is not this the carpenter's son?* They conclude that he must be illiterate, from the mean condition of his parents. It was not the children of such, then, we may reasonably infer, who were trained in those seminaries.

In the Gospels, *διδασκαλος* is given as the Greek translation of the Syriac *rabbi*<sup>66</sup>. Yet this word

<sup>65</sup> Matth. xiii. 54, 55.

<sup>66</sup> John, i. 38.

does not, as the Greek, literally signify *teacher*; but, having been conferred, at first, as a mark of respect on actual teachers, and afterwards on other learned men, διδασκαλος was justly accounted as apposite a version as the Greek language afforded. It is certain, the term *rabbi* began soon to be used with great latitude. But though it came gradually to be bestowed on those who were not actual teachers, it always retained, ever since it had been appropriated to the learned, a relation to learning; and, being understood as an addition due only to literary merit, it still denoted, that though the person who enjoyed it, might not be actually employed in teaching, he was well qualified for the office. *Rabban* is not the name of a degree superior to *rabbi*, though it seems intended for heightening the signification. It may be understood to denote eminent or learned *rabbi*, and appears to have been but very seldom used. The title *rabboni*, which we find twice given to our Lord, is *rabban*, with the addition of the affix of the first person, and accommodated to the pronunciation of Judea. One of those who addressed him with this compellation, was blind Bartimeus, when he applied for the recovery of his sight<sup>67</sup>. The other was Mary Magdalene, when she first saw Jesus after his resurrection<sup>68</sup>.

That the use of the term *rabban* has not extended far beyond Palestine, may be presumed

<sup>67</sup> Mark, x. 51.

<sup>68</sup> John, xx. 16.

from the following circumstance. Though the word *rabbi* is very common in the Syriac translation, the Greek *διδασκαλε* being generally so rendered; yet in the only place where that translator introduces the word *rabboni*, which is that quoted from John, he prefixes *in Hebrew*, that is, in the dialect of Palestine, which was then so called, adding the explanation given by the Evangelist, *that is, teacher*; which plainly shows that the word *rabboni* was not Syriac. This is the more remarkable, as in the other passage, where the historian interprets the word *rabbi*, in the same manner, adding <sup>69</sup> *ὁ λεγεται ἐρμηνευομενον διδασκαλε*, that interpreter omits this explanatory clause as intended only for the Grecian reader, and of no use to those who understood Syriac. In the passage in Mark, where *rabboni* occurs, as the Evangelist had added no explanation, his interpreter has not thought it necessary to change their own word *rabbi*. This is an evidence that he also considered the difference in signification between the two words as inconsiderable. Another strong presumption of the same point is, that the Apostle John explains both by the same Greek word <sup>70</sup>.

It may be observed here by the way, that they likewise used to raise the import of a title by doubling it. Thus our Lord, speaking of the Pharisees, says, They love to be called of men *rabbi, rabbi* <sup>71</sup>. In this manner he was himself

<sup>69</sup> John, i. 38.

<sup>70</sup> i. 39. xx. 16.

<sup>71</sup> Matth. xxiii. 7.

addressed by Judas, at the time when that disciple chose to assume the appearance of more than ordinary regard <sup>72</sup>. The title *κυριε* seems to have been used in the same manner. Not every one who saith unto me *Lord, Lord, κυριε, κυριε*, <sup>73</sup>. This is very agreeable to the genius of the Oriental tongues, which often, by the repetition of an adjective, express the superlative degree.

§ 6. I took notice once before that, in the common version of the Gospels, *διδασκαλος* is generally rendered *master*. I cannot say that the word is mistranslated when so rendered, since it is the most common title with us, wherewith scholars address their teacher. But is rather too indefinite, as this term does not distinguish the relation meant from almost any other relation, wherein superior and inferior are brought together. The word *master* serves equally for rendering *κυριος*, *δεσποτης*, *επιστατης*, *καθηγητης*, as for *διδασκαλος*. And, therefore, in many cases, especially where the context requires a contradistinction to any of those terms, the word *master* is not proper. It is indeed evident to me, that in the ordinary Hellenistic use, it corresponds nearly to the English word *doctor*. Both are honorary titles, expressive of the qualifications of the persons to whom they are given. Both are literary titles that relate to no other sort of merit but learning; and both are solemnly conferred with certain ceremonies which

<sup>72</sup> Mark, xiv. 45.

<sup>73</sup> Matth. vii. 21.

we call *graduation*, by those who are accounted the proper judges. Our translators have, in one place, very properly rendered it *doctor*. Joseph and Mary, we are told<sup>74</sup>, found Jesus in the temple sitting *in the midst of the doctors*, εν μεσω των διδασκαλων. To have said, in the midst of the masters, would have been a very vague expression of the sense. Nor have we reason to believe that it would have been proper here to translate the word *teachers*, as it did not imply that they were such by profession. In composition, our interpreters have commonly rendered it *doctors*<sup>75</sup>. *There were Pharisees and νομοδιδασκαλοι, doctors of the law sitting by*. Again<sup>76</sup>, *There stood up one of the council, a Pharisee named Gamaliel, νομοδιδασκαλος, a doctor of law*. Besides, we are accustomed to hear the words *Jewish rabbies*, and *Jewish doctors* used synonymously. In Justin Martyr's dialogue with Trypho the Jew, the rabbies are always called διδασκαλοι.

§ 7. BUT it may be objected that this does not account for the application of the title to our Lord. As he did not derive his doctrine from any of those learned seminaries, frequented by such of the youth as were reckoned the flower of the nation, the name *doctor* could not, with propriety, be applied to him. In answer to this, let it be observed, first, that as in Judea at that time they spoke not Greek, but a dialect of Chaldee, not differing considerably from what is called Syriac,

<sup>74</sup> Luke, ii. 46.<sup>75</sup> Luke, v. 17.<sup>76</sup> Acts, v. 34.

it is evident that the actual compellation, whereby our Saviour was addressed, was *rabbi*. For this we have the express testimony of the Apostle John, in a passage lately quoted, who, though writing in a different tongue, thought proper to mention the title usually given him in the language of the country, adding, merely for the sake of those readers who knew nothing of the Oriental languages, that it is equivalent to the Greek *διδασκαλος*. Now, as the Chaldaic word does not literally signify *teacher*, which the Greek word does, their equivalence must arise solely from the ordinary application of them as titles of respect to men of learning; and in this view the English word *doctor* is adapted equally to the translation of both.

Secondly, though the title *rabbi* could regularly be conferred only by those who had the superintendency of their schools, we have ground to believe that with them, as with us, the people would be ready to give the compellation through courtesy, and on the presumption that it had been conferred, wherever they saw or supposed distinguished abilities in learning: and this is most probably the reason why we find it given also to John the Baptist<sup>77</sup>.

Thirdly, in the Jewish state, a divine commission was conceived to confer all sorts of dignities and honours, in an eminent manner, and so superseded ordinary rules, and human destinations. On this account they considered a prophet, though

<sup>77</sup> John, iii. 26.

not of the sacerdotal family, as an extraordinary priest, and entitled to offer sacrifice, in consideration of the evidences he gave of his mission. Thus the Prophets Samuel <sup>78</sup> and Elijah <sup>79</sup> (neither of whom was a priest) offered sacrifice with acceptance, and upon altars too not warranted by the law. It is evident that some of those who gave the title of *rabbi* to our Saviour, were willing, either sincerely or pretendedly, thus to account for their doing so. *Rabbi*, said Nicodemus, a Pharisee, and a member of the Sanhedrim <sup>80</sup>, *we know that thou art a teacher come from God ; for no man can do these miracles that thou dost, except God be with him.* Here he, as it were, assigns the reason why he saluted him *rabbi*, although he knew that he had not been educated in human literature, and had not received from men any literary honours. The same title was given him also by others of that sect insidiously, when, though they pretended friendship, their aim was to entangle him in his talk, that they might have a pretext for delivering him up to the Roman governor. In other cases they show sufficiently how little they were disposed to admit his right to any degree of respect arising from knowledge. They said <sup>81</sup>, *How knoweth this man letters, having never learned ?* A charge, the truth of which our Lord very readily admitted by replying, *My doctrine is not mine, but his who sent me.*

<sup>78</sup> 1 Sam. vii. 9.

<sup>79</sup> 1 Kings, xviii. 31, &c.

<sup>80</sup> John, iii. 1, &c.

<sup>81</sup> John, vii. 15.

§ 8. Now, from the foregoing observations, it appears that the name *διδασκαλος*, as being nearly equivalent in import to the appellation *rabbi*, for which it has been substituted by the Evangelist, may be fitly expressed, either by the English term *doctor*, or by the Syriac *rabbi*, which is now so much naturalized amongst us, that its meaning, as a Jewish title of literary honour, can hardly be mistaken. In the addresses made to our Lord in his lifetime, the Syriac term is surely preferable; the English word, though very apposite in respect of its origin, and ordinary acceptance, has considerably sunk in its value, in consequence of the slight manner wherein we are accustomed to hear it applied. But we all know that *rabbi* among the Jews of that age was a title in the highest degree respectful, and on that account interdicted by their Master, even to the Apostles themselves. It is also the word by which *διδασκαλος* is commonly rendered in the Syriac version of the New Testament, justly held the most respectable of all the translations extant, as being both the oldest, and written in a language not materially different from that spoken by our Lord and his Apostles. The difference appears not to be greater (if so great) than that which we observe between the Attic and the Ionic dialects in Greek. But when *διδασκαλος* is construed with other words, which either limit or appropriate it, we commonly judge it better to render it *teacher*, according to the simple and primitive signification of the word. In such cases it is probable,

that the writer alludes merely to what is usually implied in the Greek term. So much for the import of *rabbi* or *διδασκαλος* in the New Testament.

§ 9. Now, when we compare the titles *kyrios* and *didascalos* together, in respect of the Jewish use and application of them, we find several remarkable differences between them. From our modes of thinking, we should be apt to conclude, that the former of these appellations would be much the more honourable of the two. Yet this is far from holding generally, though, in particular cases, it no doubt does. In regard to the term *kyrios*, I observed formerly, that as it originally signified *master*, as opposed to *servant*, it retained in that nation, in our Saviour's time, so much of its primitive meaning, as to be always understood to imply, in the person who gave the title, an acknowledged inferiority to him to whom it was given. Civility might lead a man to give it to his equal. But to give it to one who, either in the order of nature, or by human conventions, was considered as inferior and subordinate, would have looked more like an insult, than like a compliment. Hence it must be regarded as a term purely relative, which derived its value solely from the dignity of the person who seriously bestowed it. To be entitled to this compellation from a monarch neither tributary nor dependent, denoted him who received it to be superior to human. But no useful citizen was so low as

not to be entitled to this mark of respect from a common beggar. And, as its value in every instance depended solely on the dignity of the giver, it might be either the most honourable title that could be conferred, or the most insignificant. The use of the title *rabbi didascalos*, or doctor, was, in this respect, totally different. As it was understood to express not relation, but certain permanent qualifications in the person who received it, they did not consider it as a matter of courtesy, but as a matter of right. It was not relative but absolute. The same person did not (as was the case of *kyrios*) consider himself as obliged to give it to one, and entitled to receive it from another. Whoever had this literary degree conferred on him, was entitled to receive the honourable compellation equally from all persons, superiors, inferiors, and equals. And we need not doubt that this vain-glorious race would brand with the ignominious character of rusticity all who withheld it.

§ 10. HENCE we may discover the reason why our Lord, when warning his disciples<sup>82</sup> against imitating the ostentation and presumption of the Scribes and Pharisees, in affecting to be denominated *rabbi*, father, guide, or conductor, does not once mention *kyrios*, though, of all titles of respect, the most common. It is manifest that his view was not to prohibit them from giving or

<sup>82</sup> Matth. xxiii. 7, &c.

receiving the common marks of civility, but to check them from arrogating what might seem to imply a superiority in wisdom and understanding over others, and a title to dictate to their fellows—a species of arrogance which appeared but too plainly in the Scribes and learned men of those days. As to the title *kyrios*, he knew well that from their worldly situation and circumstances (which in this matter were the only rule,) they could expect it from none but those in the lowest ranks, who would as readily give it to an artisan or a peasant, and that therefore there could be no danger of vanity from this quarter. But the case was different with titles expressive not of fleeting relations, but of those important qualifications which denote a fitness for being the lights and conductors of the human race. The title *father*, in the spiritual or metaphoric sense, the most respectful of all, he prohibits his disciples from either assuming or giving, chusing that it should be appropriated to God; and at the same time claims the title of guide and spiritual instructor to himself.

§ 11. Nor let it be imagined that the title *διδασκαλοι*, bestowed on the first ministers of the religion of Christ, stands in opposition to the admonitions here given. The word, it must be owned, is equivocal, but is every where easily distinguished by the connection; for when it is applied to such as are literally employed in teaching, it must not be understood as a complimentary title answering to the Chaldaic word *rabbi*, but as a name of

office corresponding to the Hebrew word מלמד *melammed, teacher, preceptor*. Besides, when applied even to the Apostles, it is to be understood in a subordinate sense. They are in like manner called *shepherds*, but still in subordination to him who is the *chief Shepherd*, as well as the *chief Teacher* in his church. Christ is called the only foundation ; *for other foundation*, says Paul<sup>83</sup>, *can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ*. Yet the same Apostle does not hesitate to represent the church<sup>84</sup> as *built on the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets*. Nor does he consider his styling himself the father of those in whose conversion he had been instrumental, as either incompatible with, or derogatory from, the honour of him who alone is our Father, and who is in heaven. When his meaning is so evident, no mistake can arise from the word. *It is the spirit that quickeneth*, said our Lord<sup>85</sup>, *the flesh profiteth nothing ; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life*. Now the spirit of the precept is transgressed, when his ministers claim an undue superiority over their Lord's heritage, arrogating to themselves a dominion over the faith of his disciples ; and when, in consequence of an undue attachment to worldly honours, or to the power that is understood to accompany these, men become solicitous of being distinguished from their equals, either by external marks of homage, or by an implicit deference and submission in point of judgment. With this character Diotre-

<sup>83</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 11.<sup>84</sup> Eph. ii. 20.<sup>85</sup> John, vi. 63.

phes<sup>86</sup> seems to have been charged, whom the Apostle John denominates *φιλοπρωτειων*, one who loves pre-eminence, a character which, not many ages after, became too general in the church.

§ 12. It was not, therefore, so much the titles, as that sort of authority which was understood, among the Jews, to be conveyed under them, that was our Saviour's object in those admonitions. Indeed a fondness for title, a solicitude about precedence, or an affectation of being distinguished by such outward marks of reverence, are evidently condemned by him, as a kind of earthly ambition unbecoming the meekness and humility of his disciples, and that unremitted deference to the divine authority, which they ought ever to maintain. The practice of the Apostles, and indeed the whole tenour of the New Testament, supply us with this commentary on the words. Whereas the customary marks of mere civil respect, so far from being condemned in Scripture, are always used by the inspired penmen themselves, when there is a proper occasion of giving them.

§ 13. So much for the import of the principal titles of honour which occur in the New Testament, and the difference, in respect of application, between them and those commonly supposed to correspond to them, amongst us.

<sup>86</sup> 3 John, 9.







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